Regulatory Guide 5.7
| ML13350A204 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/30/1973 |
| From: | US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| RG-5.007 | |
| Download: ML13350A204 (10) | |
iU.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY
DIRECTORATE
OF REGULATORY
STANDARDS
Juno 1973GuIDEREGULATORY
GUIDE 5.7CONTROL OF PERSONNEL
ACCESS TO PROTECTED
AREAS,VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL
ACCESS AREAS
A. INTRODUCTION
Proposed amendments to the Commission regulations of 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities."
10 CFR Part 70. "SpecialNuclear Material,"
and 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material,"
would, ifadopted.
require nuc..ures (I) for the protection againstindustrial sabotage of fuel reprocessing plants andcertain facilities subject to tic provisions of 10 CFR Part70 and (2) for tile protection of special nuclear mtaterial (SNM) against theft or diversion from certain licensedlacilities.
One element of this protection is proper control ofaccess of personnel to and from protected areas, vitalareas, and material access areas. Searching persons andpackages for tirearms.
explosives, and other deviceswhich could aid in sabotage or theft of SNM is anotherelement of physical protection.
This guide describes acceptable methods ofsearching personnel prior to entry into a protected areaand upon exit from a material access area, and ofcontrolling access to protected areas, vital areas, andmaterial access areas.
B. DISCUSSION
The objective of controlling access to protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas is to ensurethat (I) only persons authorized access to a protected area are permilled within that area and (2) that onlyindividuals authorized access to vital equipment orspecial nuclear material will be allowed within vital areasor material access areas.The objective of searching individuals prior tcpermitting entry into a protected area is to prevent illicitpassage into tile protected area of objects such asfirearms, explosives, and incendiary devices which couldaid in industrial sabotage to the facility or in tile theft ofspecial nuclear material.
Searching individuals andpackages for conce:;Ied special nuclear material at exitpoints from material access areas provides a means ofdetecting attempted theft or diversion of special nuclearmaterial.
Some meanis by which control of access can beaccomplished include a key and lock system. a magneticor electronic key-card system. an attendant guard orwatchman, or a closed-circuit TV (CCTV) in conjunction with keys or key-cards.
Of these means. the magnetic orelectronic key-card system in conjunction with closed.circuit TV offers the greatest security with a ininimurn of personnel.
The key-cards are mutch more difficult toduplicate tian keys and the locks cannot be "picked."
Further, the control system can "read" the key-card andrecord the identity of the card (to whom it was issued)and the time of entry. A closed-cilcuit
1V system wouldallow visual observation of the access point withoutrequiring an attendant guard or watchman.
In fact, byuse of closed-circuit TV several such access points can bemaintained under observation by a single guard orwatchman.
Such a system would be especially useful ataccess points to remote or normally unoccupied vitalareas or material access areas. In any case, visualobservation, either directly or via CCTV, provides apositive neans of assuring that only individuals authorized access to an area pass through the accesspoint into the area.Searching of individuals can be carried out by meansof a hands-on search ("frisking").
or by means of deviceswhich will detect the presence of weapons andexplosives or SNM concealed on the individual, or by acombination of both. The search should be conducted ina manner which (I) provides as.surance that firearms, explosives, and other such contraband are not beingcarried into the protected area and that SNM is notUSAEC REGULATORY
GUIDES Copies ol published guides may be obtained by request Indicating the divisions desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commisston.
Wathinglon, D.C 240645,Regulatory Guides are issued to denoribe and rrake available to the public Attention:
Director of Regulatory Standerds.
Comments and suggestions formethods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of Implementing specific parts of Improvements In theta guides are encouraged end should be sent to the Secretary the Commisson';
regulations, to delineate techniques used by the stafl In of the Commission.
US. Atomic Energy CommIsslon, Washington.
DC. 20545,evaluating probtems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to Attention:
Chief. Public Proceedinmt Staff.applicants.
Regulatory Guidet are not substitutla for regulations and complIance with thenm is not reouired.
Methods and solutions different from those set out In The guides are Issued In the following lan broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the findings requisite tothe issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
2. Poewerds and Teas Reactors
7. Traneportotlon I. Fuels and Matatials Facilities
8. Occupt.lional HealthPublished guides will he revised periodically, at appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitruitt Reviewcomments and to reflect new information or experience.
5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. Geonwal I.Ibeing transportcd out of a material access area and (2)nminimizcs inconvenience to the individuals beingsearched.
The use of equipment capable of detecting weapons, explosives, or SNM is usually the preferable form of searching, since the use of detection devicesavoids the personal imposition of a hands-on search.An "airport type" weapon (me tal) detector locatedin a passageway arranged so that all individuals enteringthe protected area pass through the detector provides aconvenient and effective means ofsearching for firearms.
Devices capable of detecting dynanmite.
TNT, andother explosives can be used to search individuals forconcealed explosives.
Most explosive detectors commercialiy available at present are of the hand-held
"sniffer"
variety- hence an attendant guard or watchmanmust pass the detector over the individual beingsearched.
However, it is possible to locate an explosive detector in a passageway and to use the detector in thesanre manner that a fixed weapon detector is used.If a hand-held explosive detector is used, tIleexplosive check is best made after the weapon detectorhas indicated that no weapon is concealed upon theindividual.
This procedure affords greater protection tothe attendant guard or watchman on the presumption that concealed explosives offer less of an immediate danger to the guard or watchman than a concealed firearm.One alternative approach to the hand-held explosive detector would be tile location of an explosive detectorwithin a revolving-door frame. The rather small volumeof air trapped in a section of the revolving door wouldbe sampled by tile explosive detector and, as theisý)lation of the air volume by a revolving door sectionprovides some concentration of vapors emitted by anyexplosives within that section, the 41fectiveness of thedetector would be increased.
To further increaseefficiency of thie explosive detector, the air in the doorsection might be flushed through the detector.
Searching individuals for concealed SNM upon exitfrom material access areas can be accomplished in avariety of ways. For example, at facilities processing plutonium or uranium-233 the search for concealed SNM can be made in an attended air lock betweenchange rooms. At areas where only highly enricheduranium is processed.
the search can be carried nut byuse of a doorway SNM monitor and a metal detector inconjunction with a clused-circiit TV (C"CTV) system.hence a guard om watchman need notl be alleirdattl, However, whether or not the access voint is Attended.
the use of both an SNM .-ot;iitor ain ,I itetal de tIotlwould seemn iiecessary to asstirr that eni iched rIrailrl.
shielded or Li1lshieldcd, is niot tnecorlcealcd.
Itaddition, exit from any imaterial access area sNhould bucontrolled to assure that all individuals and packagesexiting from a material access area pass through the SNMcheck system.It is the facility guards and watchmen who arecharged with the responsibility of assuring that firearms, explosives, and other similar items or devices are nottransported into the protected area and that SNM is notremoved from a material access area withoutauthorization.
Hence, they should search any packagesbeing carried into thc protected area or out of a materialaccess area. No individual should be allowed to directlyhand carry any package, valise, tool box, or similarhand-carriable item into the protected area or out ot" amaterial access area. Such objects should be handed toan attendant guard or watchman who will check themand pass them into the protectcd area or out of thematerial access area. To further reduce the possibility ofconcealment, where feasible, bulky outer clothing suchas overcoats, raincoats, greatcodits, and ski jackets shouldbe left in a cloak room provided outside the protected area and in any case should never be taken into amaterial access area. The licensee may wish to use severalmembers of the security force to check packages, coats,etc.. during shift change to minimize tile delayencountered in gaining access. Unattended access pointsinto the protected area can be used. providedobservation of such points is maintained by CCTV toassure that packages are not being hand carried into theprotected area at that point.Posting of a sign in a conspicuous location willinform individuals requesting access into the protected area that they will be searched, and that any packages, etc., they wish to take into the protected area will alsobe searched.
Although the Commission regulations do notrequire searching of individuals entering a material accessarea, observation of access points provides a convenient method of ensuring that personnel do not carryweapons, explosives, and other similar items or devicesinto the material access area.In emergency situations, such as those which mayrequire the evacuation of a material access area, theobjectives of access control and search should not beallowed to compromise health and safety. Hence, thelicensee should develop plans of action and provide areasand equipment for searching and controlling accessunder emergency conditions compatible with theobjectives of both safety and security.
Such emergency procedures will minimize the effectiveness of anemergency situation deliberately perpetrated to concealtheft of SNMNAdmiinisirtaive controls, as well as physical barrierswhere applicable.
may be employed to gather evacuating individuals within a holding area. Such controls wouldserve both ro vetif' that to one has remained in 1heevacuated area and to ensure that an emergency
57.2
(0situation will not successfully conceal an attempted theft of SNM.C. DEFINITIONS
For the purpose uf this guide (he following dve illilions
- lLe provided
I ."Guard'"
incan.i in armed arid uniforiied individual whose primary ditty is thie protection of materials andproperty to the ,txlcnit that theft of SNM or sabotage ofthie facility curl Id pose a threat to tile common defensearid security or result in a r:adiological hazard to publichealth and sal'ct y.2. "Walchilnlul"
Illealls all tin arnd individual.
ntonieces.iarily uinifornied, who provides protection fornialerials and property in tile course of performing oilierduties.3. -Patrol watrman'"
means an ainis-qualified individual whose primary duty, at lcast during threat orenmergency situations, is the protection
.,f material andproperty, arid hvlio is normally unarmed but who may bearmed during emergency or threat situations.
A patrolwatchman may or may not be uniformed.
D. REGULATORY
POSITIONI. Protected AreasI. Identity and Authorization At each access point into a protected area, anidentlity and access authorization check should be madeini conjunction willi a search for firearms and explosives'
Si.!,:],
idenlitv and access authorization checks should beperformied by an attendant guard or watchman or bynmeans of an electronic or magnetic key-card system anda closed-circuit TV systenm.
Packages should be takeninto the protected area only at access points attended bya guard or watchman.
If the access point is unattended, the individual monitoring.
the access point viaclosed-circuit TV should carefully observe any individual requesting access at that point to ensure that nopackages arc being carried into the protected area.b. Personnel SearchIf tile search of individuals is to be carried outby mezuis of detection equipment, a weapon (metal)detector anl(] an explosive detector should be used. Anacceptable arrangement for the use of detection equipnmenI
in a secure access passageway is illustrated inFigure 1. The doors oil the secure access passageway should be interlocked so that both cannot besinniltaneously open, thus providing positive accesscontrol.
An explicit enabling act should be required of asecurity individual, either attending the secure accesspassageway or in the central alarm station, to open theinner door.c. Metal DetectorThe metal detector located within (tie secureaccess passageway should be capable of detecting aminimum of 200 grams of non-forrous metal placedanywhere on the body at a )0% conifidence limit. Thefalse alarm rate should be a niaxi mnum of' Id. Explosive DetectorThe explosive detector, as a miliniumn.
hould becapable of' detecting dynaimite.
TNT. and similarnitrogen compounds in nminiimim amountsl of 200 gramisat a 90%-. confidence hinil, The false alarii rate should bea miaxinium of 1V,.. If deteclor is hand held rather thanpermanently fixed to a passageway or revolving doorframle, lieice requiriing an attendanlt guard or watchlmaui, the search for explosives should be IerTornied after thesearch for firearms.
An acceptable arrangi.ent isillustrated in Figure 2.e. Alarm Ani. niciation The alarins of tile weapon detector arid tileexplosive detector should annunciate at the location oftile detectors, if attended, as well as in a centrad alarmstation.
The alarm annunciation at the location of tiledetectors need not be aural.f. Alarm SystemThe alarms of the weaponi (metal) detector andtihe explosive detector should be interfaced with (lieinner door lock so ihal. with aln alarm triggered.
Ihe innerdoor cannot be opened from either side without aspecific action by the individual manning the centralalarm station acknowledging the alarm and enabling theinner door to be opened.2. Material Access Areas Containing Pu or U-233a. Change Room ExitChecking for c on cealed plutoniumn oruranirim-233 at all exit point from a material access areainto a protected area should be performed in anattended secure access passageway located betweenchange rooms. An acceptable arrangement is shown inFigure 3. Unless exit is into a contiguous material accessarea, all individuals should exit from a nmatcrial accessarea, other than a vault, only via tie change rooms aridshould be required to deposit all work clothing in tileinner change room. walk through tihe passageway, anddress in street clothing in (lie outer change room. Thelicensee should generally not allow packages to betransported out of the miaterial access area via tirechange rooms. Showers, except those used exclusively for health plhysic.s, should be located in thie outer changeroom. A guard or watchman need not be altendant except when personnel are exiting from the materialaccess area.b. SNM DetectorAn SNM detector should be located within thepassageway.
T1he detector should be capable of detecting
0.5 gram of plutonium or I gram of uraniun-233 shielded by 3 min of brass concealed anywhere on anindividual at a 9Oi confidence limit. The false alarm rateon the detector should be less than 0.1%.5.7-3
0c. Door Interlock The doors of tile attended secure accesspassageway should be interlocked so that both cannot besimultaneously open. The doors should also be alarmed.so that an explicit action must be taken by either theattendant security individual or the individual manningthe central alarm station to enable either door to openwithout triggering the alarm.d. PackagesAll packages.
including waste barrels and workclothes hampers, being transported out of a materialaccess area should be checked by an attendani guard orwatchman for concealed SNM, preferably at an exitpoint expressly provided for packages.
SNM packagesshould be checked for proper seals, identification, andtransfer documentation.
e. Change Room AccessAccess by personnel into a material access areashould he permitted only through the change rooms.Control of access should be accomplished either by aguard or watchman attending the secure accesspassageway between the change rooms, or by acombination of key-card and CCTV when thepassageway is unattended.
f. Observation of Individuals Procedures should be employed in the controlof access to material access areas to ensure that no loneindihidual is allowed within a material access areawithout some means to observe that individual's activities.
3. Material Access Areas Containing Highly EnrichedUranium, and Vaults Containing SNMa. ExitAt material access area exit points, the checkfor concealed SNM should be carried out by means of anSNM doorway monitor and a metal detector.
A secureaccess passageway located at the exit point from thematerial access area should house the detection equipment.
An attendant guard or watchman or aclosed-circuit TV connected to the central alarm stationshould also be provided.
Administrative procedures should require the passage of packages only throughattended exit points. The doors of the secure accesspassageway should be interlocked so that both cannot besimultaneously open. A suggested layout is illustrated inFigure 4.b. SNM DetectorThe SNM doorway monitor in the secure accesspassageway should be capable of detecting a minimumof 3 grams uranium enriched to 90t10 in the uranium-235 isotope in 3 mm of brass concealed anywhere on anindividual at a 50,7 confidence limit. The false alarm rateshould not exceed 0. 1%,c. Metal DetectorThe metal detector in the secure accesspassageway should be capable of detecting a minimumof 100 grams of non-ferrous metal (shielding)
at a 90%confidence limit concealed anywhere on an individual.
The false alarm rate should not exceed 0.1%.d. AlarmsThe doors of the se. :tre access passageway should be alarmed and interfaced with the doorwaymonitor such that an individual can be detained for asufficient time for the doorway monitor to operate.
Ifan individual passes through without waiting for theproper period of time (perhaps indicated by a light) thealarm should sound. The doorway monitor and metaldetector alarms and the door alarms should annunciate in the central alarm station and may also annunciate atthe passageway.
e. AccessThe exit points from the material access areashould be used for access points as well. Control ofaccess should be by either the attendant securityindividual or by a key-card CCTV system.f. Closed-Circuit TV Observation If observation of the passageway isaccomplished by CCTV, the guard or watchmanmonitoring the passageway should carefully observe anyindividual widtin to ensure that no packages are beingcarried into or out of the access area.g. Observation of Individuals Procedures should be employed in the controlof access to material access areas to ensure that no loneindividual is allowed within a material access areawithout sonic means to observe that individual's activities.
h. VaultsA key-card CCTV system should be employedto control access to and from a vault if such access andexit points do not open to or from material access areascontiguous to the vault. In addition, all individuals whotransport SNM between material access areas or to orfrom a vault, should be escorted by a member of thefacility's security force during any period of thetransport that the SNM is not within a material accessarea.4. Vital AreasControl of access into vital areas should beaccompli fl ither by an attendant guard or watchman, or by meiýn , i nagnetic or electronic key-card access inconjunctint:
with closed-circuit TV. The identification checi: .,tid include either direct observation by an.attendant guard or watchman or observation by CCTVof each individual passing into the vital area, or somealternate means (e.g.. an escort) which will provide5.7-4 pisitive asstrance that only individuals authorized accessto the vital area are permitted to pass into that area.5. Security Force Response to an AlarmThe guard:; and patrol watchmen should be trainedand prepared to protect the facility from sabot::ge andtihe SNM within from theft.a. Protected Area Access PointSIlion anlnunciatiot, ot all alarni from explosive Or Lea rt detectir tl eqtuirnment loc:ated at a protected area access point attended by a lone guard or watchman.
a gtr:-rd 'hould lc dispatched iCnIlediatelV
to the accesspoint oripinating the "d:rni. If the ac,:ess point isunaltellded.
two .,r: should h%, sent to thie accesspointi. At the a,ces, poittil th,: 0ti'rd or watchmlan should!eLicsi t tha 11,Cividluafl'.
pockets be emptied and thatthe ilndividUal la.s arilin 1hioudi the detection cquiipmen'n.
I1 the i: dividu.al complies and if the alarmsdo inot register.
tie individual may be allowed to passinto the protected area after the contents of theindividual's pocketis have beet examnined verifying thatnto atleruipt has been made to pass explosives or firearmsinto the proleeted area. If. however, all alarmi continues t) register.
tie individual should be physically searched1w a%,n tiarned security individual, while at least onegCaif or armcd pitrol watchnian observes.
to verify thatno firearms or explosives are yet concealed by thehndividtral.
I!* tile individual relfuses to comply with theren.ýuesl tI r furthher searching, or if a weapon orcexpiosives
- tic ftound. tlie individual should be deniedh. -Materil Access Area Exit PointIf an SNM or metal delector alarii or a door.'ir~i is triggered at a miatcrial access area exit pointated bd hv a guard or watchman or at all unattended A.,lt point, security personnel, at least one of whom isarmled (a guard or arnied patrol watchman).
should bedispatched to that exit point. The individual should bescatrhed bw emptying pockets and passing again through!O detection equipment or by a hands-on search1.xrfortned by an unarmed security individual while atleast ote guard or arnied patrol watchman observes.
Th,ca~(, of the alarm should be determined before theindividual is ieleased.
If the cause of the alarti was anuhiect. metal or SNM, not concealed by the individual.
thl. individual should be searched without the object toensure that the object is not a decoy and that SNM isolt still tk:ing concealed by the individual.
If the::cur 1ity personnel determine that attempted unauthtorized removal of SNM has been made with tileintent to .;teal SN.M, local police and the Federal BureauWf Investigation should be contacted.
and tile individual should be field by the security personnel until the localpolio: arrive and arrest the individual.
c. Unoccupied Vital Areas and Material AccessAreasIt1 unautllioried ent ry is made or atlempted into a vital area or material access arca. or if atn intrusiorn alarm protecting all unoccupied vital or material accessarea is triggered, two drnied xecuirity personnel should hedispatched immediately to the area of al:irn. If.however.
the area of the alarm can be obsev.:ed byCCTV. tile guard or valchniman in the alrm :.iationwhiere the TV mronitor is located should first verily tileexistence of intrusiOn and assess tile extent of a tharc:. ifany. before dispatching flie security persottnef.
If ilie,,i,.cti ce of all intrusion is verified, cither by CCTV or:;CCLMiy personnel in tile area, a law en 'oreerenjuimi'ty should be nolified imnmediately.
It" pos,;ible.
tli ifiatruder(s)
found by tile security persotnel shothdsearched and detadned until arrest by local police.6. Emergency Procedures The licensee should provide proteduhres anrdequipmen t to maintain the level of access control andSNM and facility protection during condilions ofemergency or equipment failure.
E-mergency procedures should be developed and executed in a rimtinerconsistent with safety.a. Evacuation Procedures During emergency conditions which requireevacuation of part or all of the facility.
lemporafry SNMchecking stations should be established at the perinucler of tile protected area or at a personnel collection areaoutside the protected area. All individuals should hesearched for concealed SNM before being released fromthe protected area or collection area. In addition, a rollof all individuals
%,,ho had entered tile evacutated areashould be taken to ensure that all have evacuated
.alfely.If an evacuation or other emergency alarm souttids.
guards and watchmen should take atprearranged surveillance points to ensure that:(I) Proper evacuation routes :ire beingobserved,
(2) SNM is not being tossed over tile protected area perimeter harrier, and(3) No one atteinpts to gain trnatlhorized access to the protected area during tile emergency.
b. Failed Detection Equipment Failed detection equipment should be repairedas quickly as possible.
Ill the interim, alternate access orexit points or hand-held detection devices or hands-onsearch procedures should be employed, Ili no caseshould the failure of equipment be allowed tocompromise tihe protection of the facility or the SNMwithin the facility.
Sip4sitive assurance that only individuals authorized accessto the vital area are permit ted to pass into that area.5. Security Force Response to an AlarmThe guard:, and patrol watchnmen should be trainedand prepared to protect tlie l'acility firom sahotage andthe SNNI within fromi thelt.a. Protected Area Access PointI Ilion1 annunciation of an alarin from explosive or weapon detctiiOn equipment located at a protected area access point attended by a lone guard or watchman, a guard should be dispatched inmediately to the accesspoii't originating tile alarm. If the aczess point ist1tlat tenrdell.
two .should be sent to the accesspoint. At the ajces; point the guard or watchman should thar dhc itlividual's pockets be emptied and thatthe individual pas again tlhr'ough Ltie detection equipment.
If the individual complies and if tile alarmsdo not register.
tile individual may be allowed to passinto the protected area after the contents of theindividual's pockets have been examined verifying thatno at lempt has been made to pass explosives or firearmsinit, the protected area. It1. however.
an alarm continues fit register.
thle individual should be physically searched1wv all unarmed security individual.
while at least one.Ciad or armed patrol watchman observes.
to verify thatnio firearms or explosives are yet concealed by tieindividual.
If the individual rfiuses to comply with therequest for further searching, or if a weapon orexpiosives are found, the individual should be denied*kcces:ý.
1). Material Access Area Exit PointIf an SNM or nietal detector alarm or a door,arran, is triggered at a material access area exit point t by a guard or watchman or at an unattended exit point. security personnel, at least one of whom isarmied (a guard or armed patrol watchman).
should bedispatched to that exit point. Tile individual should besearched by emptying pockets and passing again throughthi' detection equipment or by a hands-on searchperformed by an unarmed security individual while atleast one guard or armed patrol watchman observes.
Thecaosc of the alarm should be determined before theindividual is feleased.
If the cause of the alarm was anobject, metal or SNM, riot concealed by the individual, tile individual should be searched without the object toensure that tile object is not a decoy and that SNM isnrot still b-ing concealed by the individual.
If thesecurity personnel determine that attempted unauthorized removal of SNM has been made with theintent to .4tcal SNM, local police and the Federal Bureauof Invesligation should he contacted.
and the individual should be held by the security personnel until the localpolice arrive and arrest the individual.
c. Unoccupied Vital Areas and Material AccessAreasIt' unauthoried en ry is made or atternited into a vital area or material access area. or if an intrusion alarm protecting an unoccupied vilal or material accessarea is triggered.
two arrmed security personnel should hedispatched imnediately to tihe area of alarm. It.however.
tile area of' the alarmn can be obsc.'ed byCCTV, the guard or vatlchman in the alarm ,,atlihri where the TV monitor is located should first verify theexistence of intrusion and assess the extent of 'tihrkal.
it lany. before dispatching thie security personnel.
i1 theexiStence of anl intrusion is verified, either by CCTV orsccuniny personnel in tlie area, a law enforcement aJltno ily should be nolified immediately.
If' pts,.ihle.
th,' nitnider(s)
found by the security personnel sh,0tm1dsearched and detained until arrest by local police.6. Emergency Procedures The licensee should provide procedures
- ndequipment to maintain the level of access conitrol
- anldSNM and facility protection during conditions ot'emergency or equipment failure.
Etmergency procedures should be developed and executtcd in a mn:arneconsistent with safety.a. Evacuation Procedures During emergency conditions whicil reqinteevacuation of part or all of live facility.
lemporary SNMchecking stations should be established at the peri nelerof thie protected area or at a personnel collection areaoutside the protected area. All individuals should Lesearched for concealed SNM before being released nronotile protected area or collection area. In addition, a rollof' all individuals who had entered the evacu:ated areashould be taken to ensure that all have evacuated
.allly.if an evacuation or other emergency alarm souinds.guards and watchmen should take positio- atprearranged surveillance peints to ensure that:(i) Proper evacuation rouics are beingobserved,
(2) SNM is not being tossed over tire protected area perimeter barrier, and(3) No one attempts to gain unarlhtorized access to the protected area during tIre emergency.
b. Failed Detection Equipment Failed detection equipment should be repairedas quickly as possible.
In the interim, allernlale access orexit points or hand-held detection devices or hands-onsearch procedures should be employed.
In no caseshould the failure of equipment be allowed tocompromise the protection of tlie facility or tire SNMwithin the facility.
05.7-5 PROTECTED
AREA-J'CCTV CAMERA-NPERIMETER
FENCE-x_ X-xx-X-x--
EXPLOSIVES
DETECTOR-/
READER---'
INNER DOOR-WEAPON (METAL) DETECTORKEY-CARD
READER (FOR EXIT),-PERIMETER
FENCEa ----ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
OUTER DOORFigure 1SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
INTO PROTECTED
AREA (UNATTENDED)
0.
t"PROTECTED
AREAINNER DOORWEAPONDETECTORPERIMETER
FENCEcocn>00 mmCAI/GUARDSTATIONIPERIMETER
f FENCE_kz __ lz %y _%Z-JOFFICES--- ~ IOUTEFDOORRECEPTION
AREA-I.Figure 2SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
AT ENTRANCE
TO PROTECTED
AREA (ATTENDED)
PROTECTED
AREAENTRANCEFigure 3SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
BETWEEN CHANGE ROOMS
IPROTECTED
AREA--MATERIAL
ACCESS AREAKEY-CARDFigure 4READER~SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
AT EXIT FROM MATERIAL
ACCESS AREA