ML17264A847

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Application for Amend to License DPR-18,revising Spent Fuel Pool Storage Requirements
ML17264A847
Person / Time
Site: Ginna 
Issue date: 03/31/1997
From: MECREDY R C
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17264A848 List:
References
NUDOCS 9704070038
Download: ML17264A847 (19)
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UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION IntheMatterof))Rochester GasandElectricCorporation

)DocketNo.50-244(R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantAPPLICATION FORAMENDMENT TPERATINLIENSEPursuanttoSection50.90oftheregulations oftheU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC),Rochester GasandElectricCorporation (RG&E),holderofFacilityOperating LicenseNo.DPR-18,herebyrequeststhattheTechnical Specifications setforthinAppendixAtothatlicense,beamended.Thisrequestforchangeistoreviserequirements associated withthespentfuelpooltoreflectaplannedmodification tothestorageracks.Adescription oftheamendment request,necessary background information, justification oftherequested changes,andnosignificant hazardsandenvironmental considerations areprovidedinAttachment I.Thisevaluation demonstrates thattheproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificant changeinthetypesorasignificant increaseintheamountsofeffluents oranychangeintheauthorized powerlevelofthefacility.

Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration.

9704070038 9'7033kPDRADQCK05000244PPDR AmarkedupcopyoftheGinnaStationTechnical Specifications whichshowtherequested changesissetforthinAttachment II.Theproposedrevisedtechnical specifications areprovidedinAttachment III.TheLicensing Reportsupporting theproposedchangestothespentfuelpoolstorageracksisprovidedinAttachment IV.WHEREFORE, Applicant respectfully requeststhatFacilityOperating LicenseNo.DPR-18,andAttachment Atothatlicense,beamendedintheformattachedheretoasAttachment Rochester GasandElectricCorporation ByRobertC.MecryVicePresident NuclearOperations Subscribed andsworntobeforemeonthis3t'Jay of~1997.NotaryPublicDEBORAHA.PIPERN[

NotaryPublicrntheStateofNewYork~ONTARIOCOUNTYCommisrroo ExpireeNov.23,I9...2' Attachment 1R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantLicenseAmendment RequestRevisedSpentFuelStorageRequirements Thisamendment providesthedescription ofthelicenseamendment request(LAR)andthenecessary justifications tosupportanincreaseintheallowedspentfuelpoolstoragecapacity.

Thisattachment isdividedintosixsectionsasfollows.SectionAsummarizes allchangestotheGinnaStationTechnical Specifications.

SectionBprovidesbackground andhistoryassociated withthechangesbeingrequested.

SectionCprovidesthejustifications associated withtheproposedchanges.Anosignificant hazardsconsideration evaluation andenvironmental consideration oftherequested changestoGinnaStationTechnical Specifications areprovidedinSectionsDandE,respectively.

SectionFlistsallreferences usedinthisattachment.

A.DESCRIPTION OFPROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESThisLARproposestorevisetheGinnaStationTechnical Specifications toreflectnewspentfuelpoolstoragerequirements.

Thischangeissummarized belowandshowninAttachment II.L7.121.The'requirement fortheminimumboronconcentration inthespentfuelpoolisincreased from300to450ppm.~L~~711.Therequirements forstorageofspentfuelinRegion1ofthestorageracksisrevisedtoincluderestrictions oninitialenrichment andaccumulated burnupasidentified innewFigure3.7.13-1.

2.TheREQUIREDACTIONfornotsatisfying thestoragerequirements isrevisedtoallowmovementofthenoncomplying fuelassemblytoanyacceptable storagelocationregardless ofstorageregion.3.Figure3.7.13-1isaddedtoprovidetheinitialenrichment andburnuprestrictions forstorageinspecified locations inRegion1.4.PreviousFigure3.7.13-1isrenumbered to3.7.13-2andrevisedtoprovideadditional restrictions onacceptable storagelocations forRegion2. 5.SR3.7.13.1isrevisedtoremovetheNOTEproviding anexemption totheSRwhenmovingafuelassemblyfromRegion2toRegion1.6.SR3.7.13.1isrevisedtoverifytheadditional restriction onburnupandaccumulated burnupissatisfied priortostoringafuelassemblyinRegion1.7.Figure3.7.13-1isrenumbered to3.7.13-2inSR3.7.13.2reflecting theadditionofthefigureforRegion1.DINFEAR41.Specification 4.3.1.1(c)ischangedtoremovethestatement concerning RGAF2fuelstoragecanisternotsatisfying therequirements forinitialenrichment andburnupofLCO3.7.13.2.Thespecification ofthespentfuelpoolstoragecapacityischangedtoreflectthemaximumnumberoffuelassemblies andstoragelocations.

B.BACKGROUND TheoriginalspentfuelstorageracksforGinnaStationhadastoragecapacityof210fuelassemblies.

In1977theserackswereremovedandreplacedwithracksmanufactured byUSToolandDieconsisting ofninerackmodulesutilizing acheckerboard patternalternating storagelocations withwatercells.Thisincreased storagecapacityto595storagelocations.

In1985sixoftheninerackswereremovedfromthestoragepoolandmodified.

Thismodification removedthelead-infunnelsoverthewaterboxlocations andaddedboraflexinsertstoalllocations toeffectively doublethestoragecapacityforthemodifiedmodules,Thisincreased overallpoolstoragecapacityto1016fuelassemblies anddividedthestorageracksintotworegions.Region1consisted ofthreecheckerboard patternrackmodulescapableofstoringall(freshorrecentlydischarged) fuelassemblies.

Region2consisted ofthesixmodifiedrackmoduleswithhigherdensityfuelstorageandrestrictions basedoninitialenrichment, minimumaccumulated burnup,andminimumdecaytimeaftershutdown.

Theproposedmodification willreplacethethreeRegion1rackmoduleswithsevennewrackmodulesscheduled forimplementation in1998.Sixnewperipheral modulescanbeaddedatsometimeinthefuture.Twoofthesevennewmodulesplannedtobeinstalled in1998willbedesignated aspartofRegion2withsimilarrestrictions onburnupversusinitialenrichment (i.e.,theRegion2areawillbeeffectively increased).

TheotherfivenewmoduleswillcomposeRegion1.Higherdensityfuelstorageinthenewrackswillbepossiblewiththeuseofboratedstainless steeland,forRegion1,theuseofacheckerboard patternalternating freshfuelwithburnedfuelsatisfying minimumburnuplevelsbasedoninitialenrichment.

Table1summarizes theproposedSFP changes.C.JUSTIFICATION OFCHANGESThissectionprovidesthejustification forallchangesdescribed inSectionAaboveandshowninAttachment II.Thejustifications areorganized basedonwhetherthechangeis:morerestrictive (M),lessrestrictive (L),administrative (A),ortherequirement isrelocated (R).Thejustifications listedbelowarealsoreferenced inthetechnical specifications whichareaffected(seeAttachment II).Reference 1(enclosed asAttachment IV)providesadetailedanalysisofthedesignandlicensing basisoftheproposedmodification.

Thisanalysisisbasedupontheguidanceestablished inReference 2andaddresses themajorareasofstructural, criticality, thermalhydraulic, andradiological.

Thisanalysisissummarized belowtotheextentnecessary toprovidejustification forthespecificproposedchangestotheTechnical Specifications.

C.1MoreRestrictive 1.LCO3.7.12specifies theminimumboronconcentration requiredforthespentfuelpool.Theproposedrevisionincreases thisminimumconcentration to450ppmfrom300ppm.Thecriteriaforthecriticality designofbothRegion1and2ofthespentfuelpoolisbaseduponmaintaining theK,6.95.NRCguidelines specifythatduetothepostulated accidentcondition whereallsolubleboronislost,nocreditforboroncanbetakenundernormalconditions.

Howeverthedoublecontingency principle discussed inANSIN16.1-1975 (Reference 3)andReference 2allowscreditforboronunderaccidentorabnormalconditions sinceonlyasingleaccidentneedbeconsidered atonetime.Thelimitingaccidentcondition, asdiscussed inSection4ofReference 1,isanincorrectly placedassemblyinRegion2.Theanalysisshowsthatthecriticality criterion forthis,andanyotherabnormalevent,issatisfied byaminimumboronconcentration of450ppmduringfuelmovement.

T2.LCO3.7.13specifies therequirements forstorageoffuelassemblies inRegions1and2ofthespentfuelpooltomaintainK,~~.95.Withtheproposedmodification thestorageconfiguration forfuelinRegion1changestoacheckerboard patternalternating betweenstoragelocations forfreshorlowburnupfuel,andlocations forhigherburnupfuel.Thefresh/low burnupfuellocations areidentified ontheracksbyusinglead-infunnelsforthoselocations only.TheproposedchangetotheTechnical Specification addsthereference tothenewFigure3.7.13-1whichprovidesthecriteriafordetermining the

't)Al acceptability offuelassemblystorageineitheroftwolocations basedupontheinitialenrichment andaccumulated burnup.Theanalysisproviding thebasisforthisconfiguration isinSection4ofReference 1.WiththeadditionofnewFigure3.7.13-1forRegion1,thefigureforRegion2isrenumbered to3.7.13-2.

Thisnewfigurecontainsfourpossiblelocations forfuelstoragewithinRegion2(versustheprevioustwo).Withtheproposedmodification Region2isexpandedfromtheoriginalsixBoraflexlinedrackmodulestoincludetwonewboratedstainless steelrackmodules.Theacceptability forstorageoffuelassemblies inRegion2isexpandedtoincludeanyfuelassemblyprovidedspecified initialenrichment, burnup,andstorageconfiguration requirements aresatisfied.

Theserequirements arebaseduponmaintaining thecriticality criteriaofK,S.95,andincludeanassumedamountofBoraflexdegradation/shrinkage.

Based'ntheinitialenrichment andaccumulated burnupthefuelassemblyisdetermined tofallwithinoneoffourburnupdomains.Eachdomainhasspecificrestrictions forthestorageoffuelassemblies inadjacentstoragelocations tosatisfythebasisforthecriticality analysis.

Theanalysisthatdemonstrates thatfuelassemblies storedinconformance withthisfiguresatisfythecriteriaofK,s.95isinSection4ofReference 1.3.SR3.7.13.1specifies thesurveillance requiredpriortoplacingafuelassemblyintoastoragelocationinRegion1.Consistent withtheproposedchangetoLCO3,7.13,theproposedchangetothisSRaddsthereference totheinitialenrichment andaccumulated burnupcriteriaidentified onFigure3.7.13-1.

Priortotheproposedmodification, anyfuelassemblyacceptable forstorageinRegion2couldbestoredinanylocationofRegion1.Aftertheproposedmodification andrevisions tonewFigure3.7.13-2, thecriteriashouldbeverifiedpriortomovementofanyassemblyregardless ofitsinitialstoragelocation.

Withtheproposedchange,thenoteexempting thissurveillance whenmovingafuelassemblyfromRegion2isnolongerappropriate.

C.2sRestrictive 1.REQUIREDACTIONA.1forLCO3.7.13specifies theactiontobetakengivenafuelassemblyisidentified inalocationthatisnotincompliance withtherequirements oftheLCO.Withtheadditionofrequirements forstorageoffuelassemblies withineachregionasidentified onFigures3.7.13-1and3.7.13-2, theactionfornon-compliance mustallowmovementoffuelwithinaregiontoanacceptable location.

Thatis,itisnowacceptable toallowmovementofthenoncomplying fuelassemblytoadifferent locationwithinthesamespentfuelpoolregionandstillmeettheLCOrequirements.

,r~~ 2.DesignFeature4.3.1.1(c)containsastatement notingthatafuelcanistercontaining rodsfromaregionRGAF2fuelassemblythatwouldnotsatisfytheinitialenrichment andburnupspecifications forthestorageregion.Withthecriticality'analysis documented inSection4ofReference 1,thesubjectfuelcanisterwillsatisfythemodifiedrequirements ofLCO3.7.13andthestatement isnolongerrequired.

3.DesignFeature4.3.3currently specifies thespentfuelpoolstoragecapacityintermsofthenumberoffuelassemblies.

Withtheuseofconsolidated fuelcanisters, fuelrodsfrommultiplefuelassemblies (typically 2assemblies orless)canbestoredinonecanisterwhichoccupiesonestoragelocation.

Withtheproposedmodification, thedesignandlicensing basiswillsupportthestorageofupto1879fuelassemblies in1369storagelocations.

Therefore, thisspecification wasrevisedtospecifythatnomorethan1879fuelassemblies bestoredinnomorethan.1369 storagelocations consistent withtheanalysisinReference 1.D.SIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATIONS EVALUATION TheproposedchangestoGinnaStationTechnical Specifications asidentified inSectionAandjustified inSectionChavebeenevaluated withrespectto10CFR50.92(c)andshowntonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration asdescribed below.Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Thedesignbasiseventsconsidered forthespentfuelpoolincludebothexternaleventsandpostulated accidents inthepool.Theexternaleventsconsidered aretornadomissilesandseismicevents,Theevaluation ofthepostulated impactofatornadomissileisdetailedinSections3,4,and6ofReference 1.Thestructural evaluation indicates thattherearenogrossdistortions oftheracksoranyadverseeffectsuponplantstructures orequipment.

Theradiological consequences ofthiseventindicatethatoffsitedosesare"wellwithin"the10CFR100limits.Thestructural evaluation isdetailedinSection3ofReference 1.Currentstateoftheartmethodsareusedinthestructural analysis.

Theevaluation ofthestorageracksisbasedonaconservative interpretation oftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode.Theevaluation ofthespentfuelpoolisbasedonaconservative interpretation ofrequirements setforthintheAmericanConcreteInstitute, CodeRequirements forNuclearSafetyRelatedConcreteStructures, andAmericanInstitute ofSteelContruction, Specification forStructural SteelBuildings.

The spentfuelstoragesystemwasdesignedtomeetallapplicable structural criteriafornormal(LevelA),upset(LevelB),andfaulted(LevelD)conditions asdefinedinNUREG-0900, SRP3.8.4,AppendixD.Thefollowing loadingswereconsidered:

deadweight,seismic,thermal,stuckfuelassembly, dropafuelassembly, andtornadomissileimpact.Loadcombinations wereperformed inaccordance withSRP3.8.4,AppendixD.Giventheevaluated seismicevents,thechangesinthefinalpositionoftheracksaresmallascomparedtotheinitialpositionpriortotheseismicevent.Themaximumclosureofgapsissuchthatnosignificant changesingapsresultduringanysingleseismicevent.Furthermore, thecombinedgapclosuresresulting fromacombination of5OBEsand1SSEshowthattherearenorack-to-rack or,.rack-to-wall impacts.Theseevaluations concludethatunderthesepostulated eventsthestoredfuelassemblies aremaintained inastable,eoolablegeometry, andasubcritical configuration.

Asdescribed inthebasesforLCO3.7.12and3.7.13,thepostulated accidents inthespentfuelpoolaredividedintotwocategories.

Thefirstarethoseinvolving alossofcoolinginthespentfuelpool.Thethermal-hydraulic analysisforthemaximumexpecteddecayheatloadsisdescribed inSection5ofReference 1.Theproposedmodification doesnotchangetheconfiguration oftheavailable spentfuelcoolingsystems,thelimitingdesignconditions formaximumdecayheatloadwhichoccursduringafullcoreoffload,ortheexistingrequirement tomaintainpooltemperature below150'F.Utilizing thethreeavailable spentfuelcoolingsystems,GinnaStationmaintains fullredundancy duringhighheatloadconditions.

Thedecayheatloadtothespentfuelpoolismaintained withinthecapacityoftheoperating coolingsystembyappropriately delayingfueloffloadfromthereactor.Shouldafailureoccurontheoperating coolingsystem,theresulting heatratesallowsufficient timetoplaceastandbycoolingsysteminservicebeforethepooldesignlimittemperature isexceeded.

Increases inspentfuelpooltemperature, withthecorresponding decreaseinwaterdensityandvoidformation fromboiling,willresultinadecreaseinreactivity duetothedecreaseinmoderation effects.Inaddition, theanalysisdemonstrates thatthestoragerackgeometryandrequiredfuelstorageconfigurations resultinaK,~S.95assumingnosolubleboronallowingforthepotential ofmakeuptothepoolwithunborated water.Thesecondcategoryisrelatedtothemovementoffuelassemblies andotherloadsabovethespentfuelpool.Thelimitingaccidentwithrespecttoreactivity isthefuelhandlingaccidentwhichisanalyzedinSection4ofReference 1.Forboththeincorrectly transferred fuelassembly(placedinanunauthorized location) oradroppedfuelassembly, thepositivereactivity effectsresulting areoffsetbythenegativereactivity fromtherequiredminimumsolubleboronconcentration.

Theresulting K,isshowntobelessthan0.95.Theradiological consequences ofafuelassemblydropremainasdescribed inSection15.7.3oftheUFSARandasdiscussed inSection6ofReference 1.Loadsinexcessofafuelassemblyandits r.4~* handlingtoolareadministratively prohibited frombeingcarriedoverspentfuel.Therearenochangesanticipated foreitherthefuelhandlingequipment ortheauxiliary buildingoverheadcraneduetotheproposedmodification tothefuelstorageracks.Themodification isscheduled fortheYear1998tobeperformed whileGinnaStationisoperating.

Movementofheavyloadsaroundthespentfuelpoolarecontrolled bytherequirements ofNUREG-0612 andtheregulatory guidelines setforthinNRCBulletin96-02(seeSection3ofReference 1).Spentfuelcasksandstorageracks(duringremovalandinstallation) willbemovedusingtheauxiliary buildingcraneandliftingattachments satisfying thesinglefailureproofcriteriaofNUREG-0554, obviating theneedtodetermine theconsequences forthisaccident.

Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesdonotsignificantly increasetheprobability orconsequences ofanyaccidentpreviously analyzed.

2.Operation inaccordance withtheproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Theproposedmodification doesnotalterthefunctionofanysystemassociated withspentfuel'handling, cooling,orstorage.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveadifferent typeofequipment-or changesinmethodsgoverning normalplantoperation.

Theadditional restrictions placedontheacceptable storagelocations forspentfuelareconsistent withthetypeofrestriction thatpreviously existed.Thepotential violation oftheserestrictions (incorrectly transferred fuelassembly) areanalyzedasdiscussed above.Thedesign,analysis, fabrication, andinstallation meetalltheappropriate NRCregulatory requirements, andappropriate industrycodesandstandards.

Basedontheabove,thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzed.

3.Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafety.TheLicensing ReportenclosedasReference 1addresses thefollowing considerations:

nuclearcriticality, thermal-hydraulic, andmechanical,

material, andstructural.

Resultsoftheseevaluations demonstrate thatthechangesassociated withthespentfuelreracking'do notinvolveasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafetyassummarized below:NclrriicalitTheestablished regulatory acceptance criterion isthatK,~belessthanorequalto I.~t1l'~l'j 0.95,including alluncertainties atthe95/95probability/confidence level,undernormalandabnormalconditions.

Themethodology usedintheevaluation meetsNRCrequirements, andapplicable industrycodes,standards, andspecifications.

Inaddition, themethodology hasbeenreviewedandapprovedbytheNRCinrecentnuclearcriticality evaluations.

Specificconditions whichwereevaluated includemisloading ofafuelassembly, dropofafuelassembly(shallow, deepdrops,andsidedrops),poolwatertemperature effects,andmovementofracksduetoseismicevents.Resultsdescribed inSection4ofReference 1documentthatthecriticality acceptance criterion ismetforallnormalandabnormalconditions.

Thermal-H dulicConservative methodsandassumptions havebeenusedtocalculate themaximumtemperature ofthefuelandtheincreaseofthebulkpoolwatertemperature inthespentfuelpoolundernormalandabnormalconditions.

Themethodology forperforming thethermal-hydraulic evaluation meetsNRCregulatory requirements.

Resultsfromthethermal-hydraulic evaluation showthatthemaximumtemperature ofthehottestfuelassembly, intactorconsolidated

canister, islessthanthetemperature fornucleateboilingcondition.

Theeffectsofcellblockageonthemaximumtemperature ofintactfuelandconsolidated canisters wereevaluated.

Resultsdescribed inSection5ofReference 1showthatadequatecoolingoftheintactorconsolidated fuelisassured.Inallcasestheexistingspentfuelpoolcoolingsystemwillmaintainthebulkpooltemperature atorbelow150'Fbydelayingcoreoffloadfromthereactor.Mechanical Materialndru1Theprimarysafetyfunctionofthespentfuelpoolandtheracksistomaintainthespentfuelassemblies inasafeconfiguration throughallnormalandabnormalloads.,Abnormalloadingswhichhavebeenconsidered intheevaluation are:seismicevents,thedropofafuelassembly, theimpactofatornadomissile,astuckassembly, andthedropofaheavyload.Themechanical,

material, andstructural designofthenewspentfuelracksisinaccordance withNRCregulatory requirements (including theNRCOTPositiondatedApril14,1978,andaddendumdatedJanuary18,1979),andapplicable industrystandards.

Therackmaterials arecompatible withthespentfuelpoolenvironment andfuelassemblies.

Thematerialusedasaneutronabsorber(boratedstainless steel)hasbeenapprovedbytheAmericanSocietyforTestingandMaterials (ASTM),andlicensedpreviously bytheNRCforuseasaneutronabsorberatIndianPoint3,IndianPoint2,andMillstone 2.Thestructural evaluation presented inSection3ofReference 1documents thatthetippingorslidingofthefree-standing rackswillnotresultinrack-to-rack orrack-to-wall impactsduringseismicevents.Thespentfuelassemblies willremainintactandthecriticality criterion ofk,zlessthanorequalto V5g~~g~,' 0.95ismet,Basedupontheaboveinformation, ithasbeendetermined thattheproposedchangestotheGinnaTechnical Specifications donotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentpreviously evaluated, anddoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafety.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesmeettherequirements of10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration.

E.ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION RG&Ehasevaluated theproposedchangesanddetermined that:1.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificant safetyhazardsconsideration asdocumented inSectionDabove;2.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents thatmaybereleasedoffsite,since:a.theconsequences following afuelhandlingaccidentortornadomissileeventremainwithinacceptedlimits(Section6ofReference 1),b.itisnotexpectedthatthewastegenerated fromdemineralizer resinreplacement willsignificantly increase(Section6ofReference 1),c.anticipated wastegenerated fromtherackreplacement willbesubstantially decreased throughdecontamination priortodisposal(Section6ofReference 1),andd.itisnotexpectedthatasignificant activitywillbereleasedtoreceiving waters-ortotheatmosphere asaresultofthereracking (Section6ofReference 1).3,Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Theoccupational exposurelimits'are limitedby10CFR20andcontrolled toaslowasreasonably achievable byplantprocedures andpractices.

Expecteddoseratesinaccessible spacesadjacenttothespentfuelpoolarecalculated anddocumented inSection6ofReference 1.Increased storagecapacityofthespentfuelpoolisnotexpectedtoresultinanysignificant increaseintheradiation doselevelsatthepoolsurfaceorotherlocations ofaccessibility.

Dosestotheworkerswillbeconstantly monitored duringthereracking.

Theuse ofelectronic dosimetry, in-poolradiation areamonitors, aswellasthepresenceofradiation protection staffwillprovideahighdegreeofassurance thatdosestoworkerswillbeminimized inaccordance withALARAprinciples.

TheRadiation Protection Staffwillbeanintegralpartofthisoperation, andtherefore willbeavailable tosupportemergingrequirements.

Theestimated totalexposureforthisoperation willbebetween8and12Person-Rem.

Reviewsofthererackwillbeconducted formallyaspartoftheALARAprocess,anddocumented aspartoftheprojectworkscope.Additional radiological considerations aredetailedinSection6ofReference 1.Accordingly, theproposedchangesmeettheeligibility criteriaof.categorical exclusion setforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9).

Therefore, pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),

anenvironmental impactstatement oftheproposedchangesisnotrequired.

F..REFERENCES 1.Framatome Technologies, Inc.,"R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,SpentFuelPoolRe-reracking Licensing Report",February1997.2.LetterfromB.K.Grimes,NRCtoAllReactorLicensees,

Subject:

"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptance ofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"

datedApril14,1978,andmodifiedJanuary18,1979.3.ANSIN16.1-1975, "American NationalStandardforNuclearCriticality SafetyinOperations withFissionable Materials OutsideReactors."

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j...Sections433andB3.7.13FigureB3.7.13-1Notdescribed Sections3.7.13andB3.7.13Figure3.7.13-1Sections43andB3.7.13Sections1,2,3,4,5,6,and8Section1Section4Section40CAPACITY0NUMBEROFRACKSANDTYPEOFPOISOi(MATERIAL0LOADINGREQUIREI,KNTS 0CONSOLIDATED RODSTORAGECANISTERS 1016FUELASSEhIBLIES REGIOiN1(176LOCATIONS) 3S.S.IVITHNOPOISONSREGION2(840LOCATIONS) 6S.S.IVITHBORAFLEXREGION1NOENRICILmm/BURNUP REQUIRIMFKI'S REGIOiN2EiNRICI&KÃf/BURhVP REQUIREMENTS (TiVODOMAINS)TRANSFEROFNOiN-COMPLYIiNG ASSEMBLIES FROMREGIOiN2TOREGIOiN1iN&iIBEROFRODSINCOiNSOLIDATED STORAGECANISTERSHALLBE(144RODSOR)256RODS1879FUELASSEi~LIES IN1369STORAGELOCATIOiNS (ASSUMESCONSOLIDATION)

REGIOiN1(294LOCATIONS) 5S.S.iVITHBORATEDSTAINLESS STEELREGIOiN2(1075LOCATIONS) 2S.S.iVITHBORATEDSTAINLESS STEEL6S.SiVITHBORAFLEX6S.S.IVITHBORATEDSTAINLESS STEELREGIOiN1EiiiRICHMENT/BURNUP (TiVODOMAINS)ANDSTORAGECONFIGURATIONS REGION2ENRICIBKNT/BURi&JP (FOURDOMAINS)AM)STORAGECOiIFIGURATIONS TRANSFEROFNON-COMPLYING FUELASSEMBLIES IVITHINAREGIOiNNORESTRICTIONS ONTHENUMBEROFRODSINCOiNSOLIDATED RODSTORAGECANISTERSection3.7.12andB3.7.12Section40BORONCOiNCENTRATIOiN 300PPM450PPiVI Attachment IIMarkedupcopyofR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnical Specifications Includedpages:3.7273.7-293.7-303.7-314.0-24.0-3B3.7-87*B3.7-89*B3.7-90~B3.7-91*B3.7-92+B3.7-93*B3.7-94*B3.7-96*"'hesebasespagesareunderthecontrolofRG&Eandarebeingprovidedforinformation only.

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