ML17329A717
| ML17329A717 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1992 |
| From: | AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17329A705 | List: |
| References | |
| 2985-SKF-01, 2985-SKF-01-R00, 2985-SKF-1, 2985-SKF-1-R, NUDOCS 9212180082 | |
| Download: ML17329A717 (6) | |
Text
REACTORPROTECTIONANDCONTROLPROCESSINSTRUMENTATIONREPLACEMENTPROJECTATDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITS1AND2TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCOMPLIANCEASSESSMENTREPORTNO.2985-SKF-01,REV0Preparedby:Concurredby:Date~/<<8IHX/DateL/Approvedby:Date2<i<a.9212i80082921216pppAOOCK050003isiilpPDR
~Sub'ect:ThisReportistosummarizetheimpactoftheCookNuclearPlantReactorProtectionSystemUpgradeontheexistingTechnicalSpecifications.
References:
CookNuclearPlantTechnicalSpecifications(bothUnit152).Calculation12-RPC-01LoopUncertainty/SetpointCalculationForTheReactorCoolantFlow.Calculation12-RPC-04LoopUncertainty/SetpointCalculationForPressurizerPressure.HurstEngineeringReport2985-HEI-01;ResponseTimeEvaluation.InstrumentSocietyofAmerica(ISA)draftrecommendedpracticeISA-DRP67.04,PartII,MethodologiesfortheDeterminationofSetpointsforNuclearSafety-RelatedInstrumentation(Draft10).WestinghouseMenuDrivenSetpointCalculationProgram(WCAP-12741).Issue:TheCookNuclearPlant,ReactorProtectionSystemisbeingupgradedtoFoxboroSPEC200/SPEC200MICROequipment.SeveraloftheexistingTechnicalSpecificationscontaindefinitions,testing,configuration,surveillance,andoperabilityrequirementswhicharepotentiallyeffectedbytheupgradeofthisinstrumentation.ThisevaluationwasperformedtodocumenttheimpactoftheReactorProtectionUpgradeontheseTechnicalSpecifications.~Scce:TheTechnicalSpecificationswerereviewedindetailtoidentifyallareasofpotentialimpact.Thefollowingareaswereidentifiedbythisreview:1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.ChannelFunctionalTestDefinitionIndicatedDNBandTAVGoperatingparametersTimeResponseTestingSurveillanceIntervalsChannelOperabilityRequirementsPermissivesandInterlocksRemoteShutdownInstrumentationAppendixRRequirementsPostAccidentMonitoringReactorTripandEngineeredSafetyFeatureTripSetpointsReactorTripandEngineeredSafetyFeatureAllowableValuesThisreportprovidesasummaryoftheimpactoftheReactorProtectionandReportg2985-SKF-01,Rev.0Page1of4 ControlSystemupgradeoneachoftheseTechnicalSpecificationtopics.~~Discussion:ChannelFunctionalTestDefinitionBasedoninformationfromotherPlantsperformingsimilarprojects,thedefinitionssectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswasreviewed.Inparticularthedefinition,ofChannelFunctionalTestwasscrutinized.Thecurrentdefinitionrecognizesanalogandbistablechannels.Additionofadigitalchannelfunctionaltestdefinition,asdoneinsomeofthesimilarupgrades,wouldimplythatthereissomeacceptanceofequipmentperformancebasedontheinputormonitoringofdigitalsignals.Thisimplicationwouldnotbecorrect.Eventhoughthenewinstrumentationusescardleveldigitalprocessorsforsignalprocessing,allcommunicationbetweenmodulesisbyanalogsignal.Alltestpointsusedforevaluatingperformancearelocatedintheanalogportionsoftheinstrumentloops.Allinputsandoutputsusedasacceptancecriteriaforchannelcalibration,channelcheck,andchannelfunctionaltestsareanalog.TheexistingdefinitionforChannelFunctionalTest,aswellastheotherdefinitions,arebothappropriateandcorrect.2.IndicatedDNBandTAVGoperatingparameters(T.S3.2.5)TechnicalSpecification3.2.5providesvaluesforReactorCoolantSystemAverageTemperature,PressurizerPressureandReactorCoolantSystemTotalFlowRate,Thevaluesprovidedincludeaninstrumenterrorallowancefortheindicationportionoftheseinstrumentloops.BasedonreviewoftheUnit2Cycle9TechnicalSpecificationsubmittal(AEP:NRC:1071E)theseallowancesare2.7degreesforAverageTemperature,63psiforPressurizerPressure,and3.5%ReactorCoolantFlow.Calculation12-RPC-01rev0showsthenewReactorCoolantflowindicationuncertaintytobe3.1%.Calculation2-RPC-04rev0showsthePressurizerPressureindicationuncertaintytobe49psi.Bothofthesevaluesaremoderatelyconservativeandacceptable.UncertaintiesassociatedwithTavgIndicationwillberevisedasaUnit2Cycle10specificparametertoreflectcurrentassumptionsrelativetotemperaturestreamingandcalculationmethods.3.TimeResponseTestingTimeResponseTestingisdiscussedinReportNumber2985-HEI-01.ManufacturersSpecificationsindicatethatthenewequipmentwillmeetthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationresponsetimerequirements.Instrumentperformancewillbeverifiedbothduringacceptancetestingandduringpostinstallationtests.Report82985-SKF-01,Rev.0Page2of4 4,SurveillanceIntervalsThedriftspecificationsofthenewequipmentarebetterthantheinstalledequipment.ThisimprovementmaybesufficienttoallowextensionofsomeoftheSurveillanceintervalsusingthepreviouslyapprovedWestinghouseOwnersGroupMethodology;however,applicationforextendedsurveillanceintervalswillbedeferreduntilanextensiveamountofplantspecificdatahasbeencollectedandanalyzed.5.6.ChannelOperabilityRequirementsPermissivesandInterlocksDesignofthenewequipmentmaintainsthesamefunctionsandlogicasthebasedesign.TherearenochangesineitherthenumberofchannelsorthechannelpowersupplyorientationoftheFunctionalUnitslistedinthecurrentTechnicalSpecifications.Thenewequipmentdoesnotincorporateanychannelbypassfeatures.ExistingTechnicalSpecificationTables3.3-1and3.3-3accuratelyreflecttheconfigurationofthenewequipment.SimilarlythevariouspermissivesandinterlocksnotedinthenotesthroughoutTechnicalSpecificationSection3.4.3arenoteffected.7.8.9.RemoteShutdownInstrumentationAppendixRRequirementsPostAccidentMonitoringCurrentTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsforRemoteShutdownInstrumentation,AppendixRRemoteShutdownInstrumentation,andPost-AccidentInstrumentationwerereviewed.Thenewinstrumentationdoesnotaddordeleteanyplantparameters.Noindicatorsareadded,deleted,ormoved.NoSurveillanceIntervalchangesarerequired.TheReactorProtectionandControlSystemUpgradewillhavenoimpactoncompliancewiththeseTechnicalSpecificationrequirements.10.ReactorTripandEngineeredSafetyFeatureTripSetpointsAllTripSetpointsnotedintables2.2-1,ReactorTripSystemInstrumentationTripSetpointsandtable3,3-4,EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrumentationTripSetpointswereevaluated.FunctionalUnitsassociatedwithNeutronFluxwerenotrecalculatedbecausetheNuclearInstrumentationisnoteffectedbythisproject.TheremainingFunctionalUnitsforUnit2havebeenrecalculated.TripsetpointcalculationswerebasedbothonInstrumentSocietyofAmerica(ISA)draftrecommendedpracticeISA-dRP67.04,PartII,MethodologiesfortheDeterminationofSetpointsforNuclearSafety-RelatedInstrumentation(Draft10)andtheWestinghouseMenuDrivenSetpointCalculationProgram,WCAP-12741(STEPIT).TheISAmethodologywasusedtoprovideacompletelynewsetofcalculationsReport¹2985-SICF-01,Rev.0Page3of4 basedonmanufacturerspublisheddata,qualificationtestreports,PlantspecificproceduresandPlantspecificpractices.Thesecalculationsaddresstheentireinstrumentloop(processconnectionthroughbistableoutput)andincludeinaccuraciesassociatedwithcableinsulationlosses.TheWestinghousemethodologywasusedasadirectcomparisonbetweenthecurrentH-LineequipmentandtheSPEC200/SPEC200MICROequipment.TheSTEPITdatabaseswerefirstbenchmarkedagainsttheexistingsetpointstudiesperformedbyWestinghouse.Therackportionsofthedatabaseswerethenmodifiedtoreflectthenewequipment.AccuraciesusedintheSTEPITdatabasesreflectanalogsignalaccuracies,thisassuredboththeapplicabilityandfidelityoftheWestinghousemethodology.ThenewvaluesfrombothcalculationswerethencomparedwiththeexistingvaluescontainedintheTechnicalSpecifications.InallcasesthecalculatedTripSetpointswereconservativetotheexistingTechnicalSpecificationvalues.ReactorTripandEngineeredSafetyFeatureAllowableValuesAllAllowableValuesnotedintables2.2-1,ReactorTripSystemInstrumentationTripSetpointsandtable3.3-4,EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrumentationTripSetpointswereevaluated.FunctionalUnitsassociatedwithNeutronFluxwerenotrecalculatedbecausetheNuclearInstrumentationSystemisnoteffectedbythisproject.AllowableValuesassociatedwiththeremainingFunctionalUnitsusingthesamemethodologydescribedaboveforTripSetpoints.TheexistingTechnicalSpecificationAllowableValuesareconservativeapproximationsofcurrentcalculatedallowances.Ofthe16Allowablevaluesexamined,6arebasedontheoriginallicensepracticeofa1%or10psidifferencebetweenthetripandallowablevalues.TheremainingvaluesareconservativeapproximationsofthevaluescalculatedbySTEPIT.TheconservatismbuiltintotheexistingvaluesissufficienttoboundthecalculationvariancecausedbytheimproveddriftcharacteristicsoftheSPEC200/SPEC200MICROequipment.Conclusion:ThereplacementoftheexistingFoxboroH-lineReactorProtectionSystemInstrumentationwithFoxboroSPEC200/SPEC200MICROInstrumentationdoesnotgeneratetheneedforaTechnicalSpecificationAmendment.held(SKF$1590.WPReportg2985-SKF-Ol,Rev.0Page4of4 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