05000277/FIN-2013005-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | TS 3.4.3 Limiting Condition for Operation requires that 11 of 13 SRVs\SVs shall be operable in reactor operating modes 1, 2, and 3. TS 3.4.3.1 surveillance requirement states that the SRVs\SVs opening lift setpoints are maintained within 1% tolerance of the design opening pressure. Contrary to the above, information received by site engineering from a laboratory performing SRV\SV as-found testing, determined that on October 1, 2013, the valve setpoint deficiencies existed with four SRVs and one SV that were in place during the Unit 3 19th operating cycle. The SRVs/SV were determined to have their as-found setpoints outside of the TS allowable 1% tolerance. The four SRVs and one SV outside of their TS allowable setpoint range were within the ASME Code allowable 3% tolerance. The cause of the SRVs/SV being outside of their allowable as-found setpoints was due to setpoint drift. The SRVs/SV were replaced with refurbished SRVs/SV for the 20th Unit 3 operating cycle. The amount of setpoint drift was within the as found Target Rock SRV values when compared to industry data. The SRVs/SV were replaced with refurbished valves that were tested and opened within the allowable 1% tolerance. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Section A of Exhibit 2 in Appendix A of IMC 0609, The SDP for Findings at Power, because the SRVs safety function was not affected. Although outside the lift setpoint tolerance, the as-found SRV/SV lift pressure values would not have challenged the reactor vessel design maximum pressure rating during the most limiting postulated accident event. The inspectors reviewed PBAPSs planned corrective actions to address the SRV setpoint drift issue and a planned industry standard TS setpoint change submittal to a 3% tolerance appropriate. Because this finding is of very low safety significance, the as-found out of tolerance SRVs were replaced with SRVs that had the proper lift setpoint prior to the Unit 3 reactor plant startup, and the issue was entered into Exelon's CAP under Issue Report 1567200, this violation is being treated as a Green NCV consistent with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. |
Site: | Peach Bottom |
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Report | IR 05000277/2013005 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Smith F Laughlin J D'Antonio J Furia J Grieves J Laughlin S Hansell |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Peach Bottom - IR 05000277/2013005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Peach Bottom) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Peach Bottom)
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