05000277/FIN-2013002-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Operability Determination in Response to Power Load Unbalance Device Failure |
Description | The inspectors identified a Green finding for PBAPS\\\'s failure to follow the operability determination (OD) process described in Procedure OP-AA-108-115, Operability Determinations. Specifically, on February 24, 2013, between 6:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., an immediate determination of operability was not made in a timely manner, and was not initially documented in accordance with the corrective action process (CAP), following discovery that Unit 2 was operating outside of the analyzed limits specified in the core operating limits report (COLR) with the power load unbalance (PLU) circuit out of service (OOS). Consequently, operators entered the Unit 2 minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) technical specification limiting condition for operation (TS LCO) 3.2.2, Condition A, after exceeding the two-hour required action completion time. The inspectors determined that the immediate determination of operability was not performed in a matter commensurate with the safety significance of the two-hour LCO required action completion time. The inspectors determined that this was not a violation of TSs because subsequent analysis by a third party vendor determined that MCPR thermal limits were satisfied between 85 percent and 100 percent reactor power with the PLU circuit OOS on Unit 2. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that the physical design barriers (fuel cladding) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by events. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The SDP for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that this issue screened to Green, because it was associated only with the fuel cladding barrier. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, decisionmaking, because PBAPS did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and did not adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disprove the action. |
Site: | Peach Bottom |
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Report | IR 05000277/2013002 Section 1R13 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
Inspectors (proximate) | S Barr S Hansell J Laughlin A Ziedonis J Tomlinson E Burket G Meyer J Furia M Gray T Fish |
CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Peach Bottom - IR 05000277/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Peach Bottom) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Peach Bottom)
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