Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | TS 3.6.3 required that each containment isolation valve be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. TS 3.6.3, Condition A, specified if one containment isolation valve is inoperable, the flow path must be isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and verified isolated once per 31 days. Contrary to the above, from November 2, 2012, to November 4, 2012, with Unit 2 in Mode 4, manual containment isolation valve 2NV-1053 was inoperable and the licensee failed to isolate the flow path within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) due to the small size of the piping and that a control room air-operated valve (i.e., 2NV-840) located downstream of 2NV-1053 could have been used to isolate the penetration. This violation was documented in the licensees CAP as PIP M-12-09347. |
| Site: | McGuire  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000369/2013002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Zeiler J Montgomery R Kellner J Bartley W Loo |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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