ML20211B639
| ML20211B639 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1987 |
| From: | Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Campbell G ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8702190473 | |
| Download: ML20211B639 (1) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1986026
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FEB 121987
In Reply Refer To:
Dockets: 50-313/86-26
50-368/86-27
Arkansas Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. Gene Campbell
Vice President, Nuclear
Operations
P. O. Box 551
Little Rock, Arkansas
72203
Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letter of December 19, 1986, in response to our letter
and Notice of Violation dated October 6, 1986. We have reviewed your reply and
find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We will
,
review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection
to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintained.
Sincerely,
Drfginal Signed Dy
J. E. Gag!!ardo
J. E. Gagliardo, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch
cc:
J. M. Levine, Director
Site Nuclear Operations
Arkansas Nuclear One
P. O. Box 608
Russellville, Arkansas
72801
Arkansas Radiation Control Program Director
bec to DMB (IE01)
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R. D. Martin, RA
R&SPB
SectionChief(RPB/B)
D. Weiss, RM/ALF
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DRSP
RSB
MIS System
RSTS Operator
Project Inspector
R. Hall
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ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
POST OFFICE BOX 551 UTTLE ROCK. ARKANSAS 72203 (501) 371-4000
December 19, 1986
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Mr. J. E. Gagliardo, Chief
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Reactor Projects Branch
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011
SUBJECT: Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 & 2
Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368
Response to Inspection Report
50-313/86-26 and 50-368/86-27
Dear Mr. Gagliardo:
The subject inspection report has been reviewed.
A response to the Notice
of Violation is attached.
Very truly yours.
. Ted Enos, Manager
Nuclear Engineering and Licensing
JTE/RJS/sg
Attachment
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MEMBEA MOOLE SOUTH UTIUTIES SYSTEM
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A.
Unit 2 Technical Specifi' cation (TS) 6.8.1 requires, in part, that
written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained
covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of
Section 1.6 of Appendix A to RG 1.33, Revision '2, February 1978, states
that safety-related activities such as, " Authorities and
Responsibilities for Safe Operation and Shutdown," should be covered by
written procedures.
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Section 8.7.1 of Operations Administrative Procedure 1015.01, " Conduct
of Operation," requires that conditions which re,sult in actuation of
the annunciator system should be promptly investigated and corrective
action taken to clear the alarm.
Contrary to the above, on August 13, 1986, the licensee failed to
properly respond to an annunciator alarm indicating low level in the
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cooling water expansion tank for one of the emergency diesel
generators.
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This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I.0) (368/8627-01).
Response to Violation 368/8627-01
An operator initially responded to the alarm and acknowledged it as
appropriate.
The violation occurred when the responding operator was
distracted while in the process-of taking corrective actions.
The
operator completed proper corrective actions when the NRC Inspector
brought it to his attention.
The actions were to close the tank drain
valves which had been inadvertently partially opened and to open the
fill valve to reestablish level.
The operator'was counselled by his
supervisors.
The incident wad discussed by the Operations
Superintendent in the operator requalification training cycle that
followed the incident.
Full compliance was achieved when corrective
actions were completed on August 13, 1986.
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B.
Criterion II of Appendix B to 10CFR Part 50 and Section 2.4 of the
approved Arkansas Power and Light Quality Assurance Manual - Operations
(AP&L QAM), requires that activities affecting quality shall be
accomplished under suitably controlled conditions.
Criterion V of
Appendix B to 10CFR Part 50 and Section 5 of the AP&L QAM requires that
activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented
instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Contrary to the above, the controls for erection of scaffolding were
less than adequate in that, on August 21, 1986, the NRC Inspector found
that a temporary scaffold had been installed in the Unit 2 auxiliary
building in the vicinity of the "A" emergency diesel generator with one
side of the scaffold wired to the diesel fuel oil supply line.
This
line, 2HBD-103-3, is seismic Category I piping.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I.D) (368/8626-02).
Response to Violation 368/8627-02
AP&L was unable to ascertain how and when the wire was placed on the
scaffold.
The scaffolding controls recently implemented (reference
response to violation 368/8615-08, OCAN088613) require an engineering
review for attaching scaffolds to seismic piping.
The installation
control form indicated no engineering review was required.
This
indicates that the scaffolding would not be secured to piping, pipe
hangers, etc., associated with safety-related systems.
Immediate
actions were to remove the wire.
As a result of this violation, the
use of " tie wire" to stabilize scaffolding has been prohibited without
approval by supervision.
Additionally, crafts involved in scaffolding
installation were re-instructed that engineering approval is required
before scaffolding can be tied or braced to any safety-related
component.
AP&L maintenance personnel were cautioned not to modify
scaffolding installations without supervisor approval and re-instructed
on the scaffolding controls.
Full compliance was achieved at the time
the wire was removed from the scaffold and piping.
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C.
Criterion V of Appendix B to 10CFR Part 50 and Sectior 5 of the
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Arkansas Power & Light Quality Assurance Manual - Operations require,
in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by
documented drawings and shall be accomplished in accordance with these
drawings.
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Design Drawings 2C'CB-70-H19, Revision 4, dated December 17, 1982, and
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2CCB-13-H8, Revision 3, dated March 26, 1982, show the design
configuration of' seismic supports 2CCB-70-H19 and 2CCB-13-H8 including
the specifications for the baseplate concrete expansion anchor bolts.
Contrary to the above, on August 8, 1986, and August 25, 1986, seismic
supports 2CCB.70-H19 and 2CCB-13-H8, respectively, were found not to
match the de. sign drawings in that the first support had one anchor bolt
with no nut and the second support had one anchor bolt in which the nut
made no contact with the washer.
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This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I.E) (368/8627-03).
Response to Violation 368/8627-03
We believe the discrepancies to have resulted due to original
construction as there have been no design changes performed on these
seismic supports.
The supports are dssociated with piping less than
four inches in diameter and are, therefore, exempt and not inspected
under the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI inservice
inspection (ISI) requirements.
This Code provision is based on the
significant conservatism of the design requirements for such piping.
The supports identified in this violation and the support discussed in
NRC Inspection Report 50-313/86-29 and 50-368/86-29 are for the
following piping:
1
3" piping
3" piping
2" piping
Our seismic support inspections for ISI (4" or greater piping) are not
presently augmented for piping exempt from Code requirements.
However,
AP&L plans to initiate inspections of supports for exempt piping and is
presently investigating the appropriate scope and methods. We expect
to finalize the scope and schedule of such inspections by March 31,
1987.
Repairs have been completed and we are in full compliance for the
supports cited. We are also evaluating the as-found condition of these
suppot ts to verify there was no impact on the operability of the
piping.
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