ML23191A868
| ML23191A868 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/2023 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| 50-250/23-301, 50-251/23-301 50-250/OL-23, 50-251/OL-23 | |
| Download: ML23191A868 (1) | |
Text
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Administrative Topics Outline Form 3.2-1 3.2-1 RO pg 1 of 2 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 3/20/2023 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:
2023-301 Administrative Topic (see Note)
Type Code*
Activity and Associated K/A Conduct of Operations M, R Calculate Emergency Boration for Stuck Rods 2.1.20: Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (RO 4.6)
Conduct of Operations D, R Calculate Primary Water Required to Raise Power from 80% to 100%
2.1.25: Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (RO 3.9)
Equipment Control D, R Check HHSI Alignment for 380°F 2.2.44: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (RO 4.2)
Radiation Control D, R Respond to Failed ARMS Channel 2.3.13: Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (RO 3.4)
Emergency Plan NOT SELECTED FOR RO EXAM NOTE:
All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Administrative Topics Outline Form 3.2-1 3.2-1 RO pg 2 of 2 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS A.1.a Calculate Emergency Boration for Stuck Rods: The examinee is given a blank copy of 3-ONOP-046.1, Emergency Boration, and PTN Technical Specifications as a reference. The examinee is also given the status of Unit 3 and Unit 4 as well as an initial average boric acid storage tank level, and concentration, and RWST level. The examinee is given the conditions of a reactor trip with three control rods failing to insert and is told that an emergency boration is in progress due to the stuck control rods. The examinee must interpret the information related to the boration flow path to information to determine the procedurally required amount of boration time required for each stuck control rod. The examinee must then use this information to determine if the BASTs or the RWST will lower during the boration and calculate the final values for these tanks at the completion of the boration. The examinee must also determine that the RWST level will remain unchanged based on the determined boration source. The examinee must then review and interpret the Tech Spec requirements for borated water sources to determine that the minimum amount of boric acid required for two operating units is not met. The examinee must also determine that the remaining level in the RWST is enough to satisfy the minimum Tech Spec requirements.
A.1.b Calculate Primary Water Required to Raise Power from 80% to 100%: The examinee is given a blank copy of 0-OP-046, Attachment 5, Reactivity Worksheet, and all of the Plant Curve Book, Section 2, Estimated Critical Conditions. The examinee is given the initial conditions of reactor power, boron concentration, rod height and core burnup and the final desired configuration for reactor power and rod height. The examinee must choose and interpret the applicable Plant Curve Book curves related to Integral Rod Worth, Power Defect and Integral Boron Worth accounting for core burnup. The examinee must then perform the required calculations using the reactivity worksheet to determine a final desired boron concentration. The examinee must then interpret whether a boration or dilution is required and then calculate the required amount of dilution.
A.2 Check HHSI Alignment for 380°F: The examinee is informed of RCS temperature, pressure and heat-up rate and given pictures of the SI Valve Status Panel and control room switches related to the HHSI system. The examinee is also given a blank copy of 3-GOP-503, Attachment 4, Control Room Switch Alignment Prior to Exceeding 380°F. The examinee must identify that the correct alignment is required before reaching 380°F and calculate the amount of time, based on the heatup rate, before the alignment must be verified. The examinee must also review the given pictures, interpret the valve position indications, and compare them to the requirements of 3-GOP-503 and identify a valve that is out of position.
A.3 Respond to Failed ARMS Channel: The examinee is given blank copies of the Annunciator Response Procedure for ANN X 4/1, ARMS HI RADIATION, and 0-ONOP-066, High Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarm. The examinee is also informed that the unit is in Mode 5, ANN 4/1 is in alarm and ARMS Channel RI-3-1401B is alarming at a specific value. The examinee is directed to determine the expected reading on RI-3-1401B when the high alarm pushbutton is depressed and list the required actions in response to the alarming ARMS channel. The examinee must use an attachment of 0-ONOP-066, consider current plant conditions to determine the expected alarm setpoint and then determine that the alarm setpoint is set too high.
Since the ARMS channel alarmed at a value other than the alarm setpoint, the examinee must determine that the channel is failed and the correct action is to acknowledge the alarm and direct RP to install a portable area radiation monitor with alarm.
A.4 NOT SELECTED FOR RO EXAM
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Administrative Topics Outline Form 3.2-1 3.2-1 SRO pg 1 of 2 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 3/20/2023 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:
2023-301 Administrative Topic (see Note)
Type Code*
Activity and Associated K/A Conduct of Operations M, R Calculate Emergency Boration for Stuck Rods 2.1.20: Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (SRO 4.6)
Conduct of Operations D, R Determine Shift Manning Technical Specification Requirements 2.1.5: Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. (SRO 3.9)
Equipment Control D, R Check ECCS Alignment During Heatup 2.2.44: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (SRO 4.4)
Radiation Control D, R Approve a Gas Decay Tank Release 2.3.6: Ability to approve release permits. (SRO 3.8)
Emergency Plan M, R Fill Out SNF with PARs 2.4.44: Knowledge of the emergency plan implementing procedures protective action recommendations. (SRO 4.4)
NOTE:
All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Administrative Topics Outline Form 3.2-1 3.2-1 SRO pg 2 of 2 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS A.1.a Calculate Emergency Boration for Stuck Rods: The examinee is given a blank copy of 3-ONOP-046.1, Emergency Boration, and PTN Technical Specifications as a reference, and the status of Unit 3 and Unit 4 as well as an initial average boric acid storage tank level and concentration. The examinee is given the conditions of a reactor trip with three control rods failing to insert and is told that an emergency boration is in progress due to the stuck control rods. The examinee is also given the information regarding the boration flow path used. conditions that the emergency boration valve failed and the manual emergency boration valve is in use. The examinee must interpret the information related to the source and flow path of boration flow and use that information to determine the procedurally required amount of boration time required for each stuck control rod. The examinee must then calculate the total boration duration based on the number of stuck control rods.
The examinee must then calculate, from the number of minutes and boration flowrate, the total amount of boric acid used. The examinee must then determine from the average boric acid storage tank level, the total amount of boric acid available at the start of the event and subtract the amount of boric acid used to determine the amount of boric acid remaining when the procedural boration requirements are met. The examinee must then review and interpret the Tech Spec requirements for boric acid to determine that the minimum amount of boric acid required for two operating units is not met and determine the required action to restore boric acid storage tank level within 70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br />.
A.1.b Determine Shift Manning Technical Specification Requirements: The examinee is given a list of operators and their qualifications. The examinee is also given three work schedules. For the first two work schedules, the examinee must determine if the minimum shift crew composition required by Technical Specifications is met.
The second schedule shows one of the RCOs had to leave early due to sickness and their position was vacant for a period of time. Finally, the examinee must review the third work schedule, which includes a sick call for the STA, and determine how to change the schedule to meet the minimum Technical Specification requirements for staffing using only the operators listed.
A.2 Check ECCS Alignment During Heatup: The examinee is given unit temperature and pressure as well as PTN Technical Specifications and blank copies of 3-GOP-503, Attachment 3, Control Room Switch Alignment Check Prior to Exceeding 350°F, and Attachment 4, Control Room Switch Alignment Check Prior to Exceeding 380°F. The examinee is also given pictures of the HHSI Valve Status Panel and control switches and a DCS screen applicable to the HHSI system. The examinee must interpret the pictures to determine valve positions and determine that two valves are out of position based on the requirement to go above 350°F. The examinee must also interpret the Tech Spec surveillance requirement related to valve positions with power removed and determine the suction flowpath from the RWST is inoperable. The examinee must determine that the inoperable flowpath is required at the existing RCS temperature and list the required Tech Spec actions and time requirements.
A.3 Approve a Gas Decay Tank Release: The examinee is given background information describing the need to release a particular Gas Decay Tank. The examinee is also given a Gas Decay Tank Release Permit that has been prepared and approved by the Chemistry Department. The examinee must determine that the Permit cannot be approved due to errors. The examinee must identify errors related to which tank was sampled, an expected PRMS value that is above an administrative allowed value, incorrect sample and count duration and a PRMS alarm setpoint that is below the expected channel response value.
A.4 Fill Out SNF with PARs: The examinee is given 0-EPIP-20101, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator, 0-EPIP-20134, Offsite Notifications and Protective Action Recommendations, the EAL Classification Tables, and a set of various emergency plant parameters. The examinee is informed of an emergency classification, but not given the specific basis of the classification. The examinee is directed to determine the appropriate Protective Action Recommendations and complete the notification form, which is time critical. The examinee must interpret the flowchart for determining Protective Action Recommendations and also interpret the given plant conditions to determine that containment integrity is not bypassed and no release is in progress and therefore a Rapidly Progressing Severe accident does not exist and there are no impediments to evacuation.
The examinee will determine that Papa 1 PARs applies. The examinee must then properly fill in the remaining sections of the notification form including the correct wording for PARs.
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form 3.2-2 3.2-2 RO pg 1 of 3 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 3/20/2023 Examination Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: 2023-301 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function
- a. APE 003 Dropped Control Rod (AK3.11, 4.1)
Respond to Multiple Dropped Rods A, N, S 1
- b. 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) (A2.02, 3.9)
Respond to Loss of Cold Leg HHSI Injection Path A, EN, D, S 2
- c. APE 027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction (AA1.01, 3.8)
Respond to Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction A, D, S 3
- d. 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) (A4.01, 4.0)
Respond to Loss of RHR A, D, L, S 4P
Test Auxiliary Feedwater System EN, D, S 4S
- f. APE 056 Loss of Offsite Power (AA2.44, 4.3)
Align 3A Bus to the Unit 4 Startup Transformer A, D, S 6
- g. 012 Reactor Protection System (RPS) (A4.04, 3.9)
Trip Bistables for PT-447 Failure D, S 7
- h. 008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) (A2.02, 3.8)
Investigate and Respond to a Ruptured CCW Header D, S 8
In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U
- i. 004 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) (K6.17, 4.2)
Lineup Unit 4 Boric Acid Transfer Pump to Unit 3 D, R 1
- j. 064 Emergency Diesel Generators (A2.27, 3.8)
Recover from Unit 4 EDG Control Power Failure A, N, E 6
- k. APE 065 Loss of Instrument Air (AA1.04, 3.4)
Manually Start 3(4)CD Instrument Air Compressor M, E 8
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6/4-6 /2-3 9/ 8/ 4 1/ 1/ 1 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system) 1/ 1/ 1 2/ 2/ 1 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected) 1/ 1/ 1 JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form 3.2-2 3.2-2 RO pg 2 of 3 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION a.
Respond to Multiple Dropped Rods: The examinee is informed that TM-408, Median Selector Signal, has failed and the immediate operator actions for 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction, are completed. The examinee is directed to continue 3-ONOP-028. The examinee will verify the Immediate Operator Actions were performed correctly, determine that expected Tref for the current power level is above the current Tavg, and determine the need to withdrawal control rods. The examinee will withdraw control rods in increments not to exceed four steps per withdrawal. After some incremental rod withdrawals, multiple rods will drop into the core.
The examinee must then perform the actions from ARP B7/1 or 3-ONOP-028.3 and trip the reactor.
b.
Respond to Loss of Cold Leg HHSI Injection Path: The examinee enters the scenario after an automatic reactor trip and automatic safety injection. The cause of the accident is not given. The examinee is informed that the immediate operator actions and the foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, are complete. The examinee is directed to perform Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verification, of 3-EOP-E-0. After working through the attachment, the examinee will discover that the HHSI Cold Leg Injection valves, MOV-3-843A/B are both open, and all HHSI pumps are running, but there is no cold leg injection flow. If investigated, the examinee will be informed that 3-867, Cold Leg SI Boundary Isolation, was found closed and the valve is stuck. Per procedural guidance, the examinee will direct breaker closure for the Hot Leg Injection valves. When the examinee attempts to open SI to Hot Leg Isolation valve MOV-3-869, the valve will not open from the control room or locally. The operator will direct local operation of the MOV-3-869 bypass valve and then open additional Hot Leg Injection valves to establish a flowpath. Note: The misposition of 3-867 is based on previously identified actual events in the plant history.
c.
Respond to Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. The examinee enters the scenario in Mode 1, 100% power, and is directed to respond to plant conditions. After assuming the watch, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, PT-3-444 fails high. This causes the Pressurizer Pressure Controller, PC-3-444J, to raise demand which causes the spray valves to fully open and PORV PCV-3-455C to open. The examinee will attempt to close PORV PCV-3-455C but will find the PORV is failed open. The examinee will close its associated block valve and then manually close the Pressurizer Spray valves. The examinee will identify that pressurizer pressure continues to lower with the spray valves closed and the PORV block valve closed because the block valve has a small amount of leak-by. The examinee will enter 3-ONOP-041.5, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction, identify that pressure cannot be maintained greater than 2000 psig, and will trip the reactor prior to reaching the low pressure safety injection setpoint.
d.
Respond to Loss of RHR: The JPM starts with the unit in Mode 4 with RHR cooling in service. The examinee is directed to swap RHR pumps per 3-OP-050. After the RHR pumps are swapped, RHR suction valve MOV-3-750 fails closed. The examinee will enter 3-ONOP-050, Loss of RHR, stop the running RHR pump and attempt to re-open the RHR suction valve, which will remain failed closed. The examinee will direct the isolation of any containment openings. After determining that RCS temperature is rising, the examinee will initiate containment evacuation.
e.
Test Auxiliary Feedwater System: The examinee is directed to perform 3-OSP-075.1, Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Operability Verification, for the A AFW Pump. The examinee will verify the Train 1 AFW flow controllers are set properly and configure the Calorimetric Program to account for the increased AFW flow using DCS. The examinee will start the A AFW pump, interpret indications to determine Train 1 AFW flowrates, and determine that the surveillance acceptance criteria is met.
f.
Align 3A Bus to the Unit 4 Startup Transformer: From the initial conditions, the examinee is informed that a loss of offsite power has occurred and both units have tripped. All EDGs initially performed properly and are
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form 3.2-2 3.2-2 RO pg 3 of 3 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION energizing their respective 4KV busses. Due to a problem with the fuel system for the 3A EDG, the crew has commenced the realignment of the busses to offsite power, which has been restored. However, the 3A EDG runs out of fuel before this can be completed. The examinee is directed to restore offsite power to the 3A 4KV bus per 3-ONOP-004.1, System Restoration Following Loss of Offsite Power. When the examinee attempts to close 3AA05, Startup Transformer 3A 4KV Bus Supply, the breaker will fail to close and the examinee must interpret the procedure and transition to 3-ONOP-004.2, Loss of 3A 4KV Bus. The examinee will determine the 3A EDG is not available for bus restoration, direct operators to locally rack in breaker 3AA22, 3A 4KV Bus Emergency Tie to Unit 4 Startup Transformer, and energize the 3A 4KV bus from the Unit 4 Startup Transformer.
g.
Trip Bistable for PT-447 Failure: The examinee is informed that PT-3-447, Turbine Inlet Pressure, has failed low and the crew is responding with 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The examinee is directed to continue with 3-ONOP-049.1. The examinee will determine that all bistables associated with PT-3-447 can be placed in the tripped condition without an undesired RPS or ESF actuation. The examinee will obtain the required key and located the applicable protection racks (multiple),
locate the applicable bistables and place them in the test position. The examinee will then verify proper system response by checking bistable indications and annunciators. The examinee will continue to interpret 3-ONOP-049.1, reset the steam dumps to condenser and direct local AMSAC actions.
h.
Investigate and Respond to a Ruptured CCW Header: The examinee is informed that the unit is at 100% power with no equipment out of service and directed to respond to plant conditions. After the examinee takes the watch, a CCW rupture will initiate and CCW head tank will lower. The examinee will enter 3-ONOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfunction, and commence makeup to the CCW system which will slow, but not stop, the reduction in CCW system inventory. The examinee will trip the reactor, stop all RCPs, isolate letdown and direct personnel to establish emergency cooling water to a charging pump and search for a CCW system leak.
i.
Lineup Unit 4 Boric Acid Transfer Pump to Unit 3: The examinee is given initial conditions describing a situation where the control room has the need to borate but neither of the Unit 3 boric acid pumps is available. The examinee is directed to realign the 4A Boric Acid Pump to supply Unit 3 per a specific step in 3-ONOP-046.4, Malfunction of the Boron Concentration Control System. The examinee is required to locate and manipulate specific valves which are located in close proximity to Unit 3, Unit 4 and Common valves and components.
Operation of these valves allows the 4A boric acid pump to deliver flow to the Unit 3 CVCS system while still maintaining unit separation of the boric acid system as required by Tech Specs.
j.
Recover from a Unit 4 EDG Control Power Failure: The examinee is given an initial condition describing a Loss of Offsite Power where 4A(4B) EDG failed to start. The examinee is directed to respond to the EDG start failure per 4-ONOP-023.2, Emergency Diesel Generator Failure. First, the examinee has to locate the procedure, which is stored on the wall of the EDG room for this type of event. Then the examinee will assess the EDG status by observing various status lights, alarms and relays and identify that a start failure exists due to no control power. The examinee will verify position of local DC breakers to restore control power.
k.
Manually Start 3(4)CD Instrument Air Compressor: Based on the initial conditions, the examinee is informed of a loss of instrument air impacting both units where none of the instrument air compressors are available. The examinee is directed to investigate and attempt to restore Instrument Air. The examinee will obtain the procedure and verify that a reactor trip is not required. Then the examinee will identify that CV-3(4)-1605 did not close when expected, and proceed to manually isolate one or the other. The 3(4)CD will then be locally started and loaded to restore instrument air.
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form 3.2-2 3.2-2 SRO-I pg 1 of 3 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 3/20/2023 Examination Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: 2023-301 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function
- a. APE 003 Dropped Control Rod (AK3.11, 4.1)
Respond to Multiple Dropped Rods A, N, S 1
- b. 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) (A2.02, 3.8)
Respond to Loss of Cold Leg HHSI Injection Path A, EN, D, S 2
- c. APE 027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction (AA1.01, 3.8)
Respond to Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction A, D, S 3
- d. 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) (A4.01, 4.0)
Respond to Loss of RHR A, D, L, S 4P
Test Auxiliary Feedwater System EN, D, S 4S
- f. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-I EXAM N/A N/A
- g. 012 Reactor Protection System (RPS) (A4.04, 3.9)
Trip Bistables for PT-447 Failure D, S 7
- h. 008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) (A2.02, 3.7)
Investigate and Respond to a Ruptured CCW Header D, S 8
In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U
- i. 004 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) (K6.17, 4.2)
Lineup Unit 4 Boric Acid Transfer Pump to Unit 3 D, R 1
- j. 064 Emergency Diesel Generators (A2.27, 3.9)
Recover from Unit 4 EDG Control Power Failure A, N, E 6
- k. APE 065 Loss of Instrument Air (AA1.04, 3.4)
Manually Start 3(4)CD Instrument Air Compressor M, E 8
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6/4-6 /2-3 9/ 8/ 4 1/ 1/ 1 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system) 1/ 1/ 1 2/ 2/ 1 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected) 1/ 1/ 1 JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form 3.2-2 3.2-2 SRO-I pg 2 of 3 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION a.
Respond to Multiple Dropped Rods: The examinee is informed that TM-408, Median Selector Signal, has failed and the immediate operator actions for 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction, are completed. The examinee is directed to continue 3-ONOP-028. The examinee will verify the Immediate Operator Actions were performed correctly, determine that expected Tref for the current power level is above the current Tavg, and determine the need to withdrawal control rods. The examinee will withdraw control rods in increments not to exceed four steps per withdrawal. After some incremental rod withdrawals, multiple rods will drop into the core.
The examinee must then perform the actions from ARP B7/1 or 3-ONOP-028.3 and trip the reactor.
b.
Respond to Loss of Cold Leg HHSI Injection Path: The examinee enters the scenario after an automatic reactor trip and automatic safety injection. The cause of the accident is not given. The examinee is informed that the immediate operator actions and the foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, are complete. The examinee is directed to perform Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verification, of 3-EOP-E-0. After working through the attachment, the examinee will discover that the HHSI Cold Leg Injection valves, MOV-3-843A/B are both open, and all HHSI pumps are running, but there is no cold leg injection flow. If investigated, the examinee will be informed that 3-867, Cold Leg SI Boundary Isolation, was found closed and the valve is stuck. Per procedural guidance, the examinee will direct breaker closure for the Hot Leg Injection valves. When the examinee attempts to open SI to Hot Leg Isolation valve MOV-3-869, the valve will not open from the control room or locally. The operator will direct local operation of the MOV-3-869 bypass valve and then open additional Hot Leg Injection valves to establish a flowpath. Note: The misposition of 3-867 is based on previously identified actual events in the plant history.
c.
Respond to Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. The examinee enters the scenario in Mode 1, 100% power, and is directed to respond to plant conditions. After assuming the watch, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, PT-3-444 fails high. This causes the Pressurizer Pressure Controller, PC-3-444J, to raise demand which causes the spray valves to fully open and PORV PCV-3-455C to open. The examinee will attempt to close PORV PCV-3-455C but will find the PORV is failed open. The examinee will close its associated block valve and then manually close the Pressurizer Spray valves. The examinee will identify that pressurizer pressure continues to lower with the spray valves closed and the PORV block valve closed because the block valve has a small amount of leak-by. The examinee will enter 3-ONOP-041.5, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction, identify that pressure cannot be maintained greater than 2000 psig, and will trip the reactor prior to reaching the low pressure safety injection setpoint.
d.
Respond to Loss of RHR: The JPM starts with the unit in Mode 4 with RHR cooling in service. The examinee is directed to swap RHR pumps per 3-OP-050. After the RHR pumps are swapped, RHR suction valve MOV-3-750 fails closed. The examinee will enter 3-ONOP-050, Loss of RHR, stop the running RHR pump and attempt to re-open the RHR suction valve, which will remain failed closed. The examinee will direct the isolation of any containment openings. After determining that RCS temperature is rising, the examinee will initiate containment evacuation.
e.
Test Auxiliary Feedwater System: The examinee is directed to perform 3-OSP-075.1, Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Operability Verification, for the A AFW Pump. The examinee will verify the Train 1 AFW flow controllers are set properly and configure the Calorimetric Program to account for the increased AFW flow using DCS. The examinee will start the A AFW pump, interpret indications to determine Train 1 AFW flowrates, and determine that the surveillance acceptance criteria is met.
f.
NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-I EXAM g.
Trip Bistable for PT-447 Failure: The examinee is informed that PT-3-447, Turbine Inlet Pressure, has failed low and the crew is responding with 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The examinee is directed to continue with 3-ONOP-049.1. The examinee will determine that all
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form 3.2-2 3.2-2 SRO-I pg 3 of 3 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION bistables associated with PT-3-447 can be placed in the tripped condition without an undesired RPS or ESF actuation. The examinee will obtain the required key and located the applicable protection racks (multiple),
locate the applicable bistables and place them in the test position. The examinee will then verify proper system response by checking bistable indications and annunciators. The examinee will continue to interpret 3-ONOP-049.1, reset the steam dumps to condenser and direct local AMSAC actions.
h.
Investigate and Respond to a Ruptured CCW Header: The examinee is informed that the unit is at 100% power with no equipment out of service and directed to respond to plant conditions. After the examinee takes the watch, a CCW rupture will initiate and CCW head tank will lower. The examinee will enter 3-ONOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfunction, and commence makeup to the CCW system which will slow, but not stop, the reduction in CCW system inventory. The examinee will trip the reactor, stop all RCPs, isolate letdown and direct personnel to establish emergency cooling water to a charging pump and search for a CCW system leak.
i.
Lineup Unit 4 Boric Acid Transfer Pump to Unit 3: The examinee is given initial conditions describing a situation where the control room has the need to borate but neither of the Unit 3 boric acid pumps is available. The examinee is directed to realign the 4A Boric Acid Pump to supply Unit 3 per a specific step in 3-ONOP-046.4, Malfunction of the Boron Concentration Control System. The examinee is required to locate and manipulate specific valves which are located in close proximity to Unit 3, Unit 4 and Common valves and components.
Operation of these valves allows the 4A boric acid pump to deliver flow to the Unit 3 CVCS system while still maintaining unit separation of the boric acid system as required by Tech Specs.
j.
Recover from a Unit 4 EDG Control Power Failure: The examinee is given an initial condition describing a Loss of Offsite Power where 4A(4B) EDG failed to start. The examinee is directed to respond to the EDG start failure per 4-ONOP-023.2, Emergency Diesel Generator Failure. First, the examinee has to locate the procedure, which is stored on the wall of the EDG room for this type of event. Then the examinee will assess the EDG status by observing various status lights, alarms and relays and identify that a start failure exists due to no control power. The examinee will verify position of local DC breakers to restore control power.
k.
Manually Start 3(4)CD Instrument Air Compressor: Based on the initial conditions, the examinee is informed of a loss of instrument air impacting both units where none of the instrument air compressors are available. The examinee is directed to investigate and attempt to restore Instrument Air. The examinee will obtain the procedure and verify that a reactor trip is not required. Then the examinee will identify that CV-3(4)-1605 did not close when expected, and proceed to manually isolate one or the other. The 3(4)CD will then be locally started and loaded to restore instrument air.
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form 3.2-2 3.2-2 SRO-U pg 1 of 2 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 3/20/2023 Examination Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: 2023-301 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function
- a. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM N/A N/A
- b. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM N/A N/A
- c. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM N/A N/A
- d. 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) (A4.01, 4.0)
Respond to Loss of RHR A, D, L, S 4P
Test Auxiliary Feedwater System EN, D, S 4S
- f. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM N/A N/A
- g. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM N/A N/A
- h. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM N/A N/A In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U
- i. 004 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) (K6.17, 4.2)
Lineup Unit 4 Boric Acid Transfer Pump to Unit 3 D, R 1
- j. 064 Emergency Diesel Generators (A2.27, 3.9)
Recover from Unit 4 EDG Control Power Failure A, N, E 6
- k. APE 065 Loss of Instrument Air (AA1.04, 3.4)
Manually Start 3(4)CD Instrument Air Compressor M, E 8
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6/4-6 /2-3 9/ 8/ 4 1/ 1/ 1 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system) 1/ 1/ 1 2/ 2/ 1 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected) 1/ 1/ 1
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-3.2 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form 3.2-2 3.2-2 SRO-U pg 2 of 2 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS a.
NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM b.
NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM c.
NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM d.
Respond to Loss of RHR: The JPM starts with the unit in Mode 4 with RHR cooling in service. The examinee is directed to swap RHR pumps per 3-OP-050. After the RHR pumps are swapped, RHR suction valve MOV-3-750 fails closed. The examinee will enter 3-ONOP-050, Loss of RHR, stop the running RHR pump and attempt to re-open the RHR suction valve, which will remain failed closed. The examinee will direct the isolation of any containment openings. After determining that RCS temperature is rising, the examinee will initiate containment evacuation.
e.
Test Auxiliary Feedwater System: The examinee is directed to perform 3-OSP-075.1, Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Operability Verification, for the A AFW Pump. The examinee will verify the Train 1 AFW flow controllers are set properly and configure the Calorimetric Program to account for the increased AFW flow using DCS. The examinee will start the A AFW pump, interpret indications to determine Train 1 AFW flowrates, and determine that the surveillance acceptance criteria is met.
f.
NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM g.
NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM h.
NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM i.
Lineup Unit 4 Boric Acid Transfer Pump to Unit 3: The examinee is given initial conditions describing a situation where the control room has the need to borate but neither of the Unit 3 boric acid pumps is available. The examinee is directed to realign the 4A Boric Acid Pump to supply Unit 3 per a specific step in 3-ONOP-046.4, Malfunction of the Boron Concentration Control System. The examinee is required to locate and manipulate specific valves which are located in close proximity to Unit 3, Unit 4 and Common valves and components.
Operation of these valves allows the 4A boric acid pump to deliver flow to the Unit 3 CVCS system while still maintaining unit separation of the boric acid system as required by Tech Specs.
j.
Recover from a Unit 4 EDG Control Power Failure: The examinee is given an initial condition describing a Loss of Offsite Power where 4A(4B) EDG failed to start. The examinee is directed to respond to the EDG start failure per 4-ONOP-023.2, Emergency Diesel Generator Failure. First, the examinee has to locate the procedure, which is stored on the wall of the EDG room for this type of event. Then the examinee will assess the EDG status by observing various status lights, alarms and relays and identify that a start failure exists due to no control power. The examinee will verify position of local DC breakers to restore control power.
k.
Manually Start 3(4)CD Instrument Air Compressor: Based on the initial conditions, the examinee is informed of a loss of instrument air impacting both units where none of the instrument air compressors are available. The examinee is directed to investigate and attempt to restore Instrument Air. The examinee will obtain the procedure and verify that a reactor trip is not required. Then the examinee will identify that CV-3(4)-1605 did not close when expected, and proceed to manually isolate one or the other. The 3(4)CD will then be locally started and loaded to restore instrument air.
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Events and Evolutions Checklist Form 3.4-1 3.4-1 pg 1 of 4 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Facility: Turkey Point (PTN)
Date of Exam: 3/20/23 Operating Test No.:
2023-301 Scenarios N5 N1 N4 N2 N3 (spare)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION M
I N
I M
U M(*)
A P
P L
I C
A N
T E
V E
N T
T Y
P E
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P T
O T
A L
R I
U RX 3
1 1
NOR 4
1 1
I/C 1,3 2,3 4
4 MAJ 5
5 2
2 Man 4
2 2
1 RO-1 TS 0
0 RX 4
1 1
NOR 3
1 1
I/C 1,2 1,3 4
4 MAJ 5
5 2
2 Man 2
1 2
1 RO-2 TS 0
0 RX 3
1 1
NOR 4
1 1
I/C 1,3 2,3 4
4 MAJ 5
5 2
2 Man 4
2 2
1 RO-3 TS 0
0 RX 4
1 1
NOR 3
1 1
I/C 1,2 1,3 4
4 MAJ 5
5 2
2 Man 2
1 2
1 RO-4 TS 0
0 RX 4
1 1
NOR 3
1 1
I/C 1,2 1,3 4
4 MAJ 5
5 2
2 Man 2
1 2
1 RO-5 TS 0
0
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Events and Evolutions Checklist Form 3.4-1 3.4-1 pg 2 of 4 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Facility: Turkey Point (PTN)
Date of Exam: 3/20/23 Operating Test No.:
2023-301 Scenarios N5 N1 N4 N2 N3 (spare)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION M
I N
I M
U M(*)
A P
P L
I C
A N
T E
V E
N T
T Y
P E
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P T
O T
A L
R I
U RX 3
1 1
NOR 4
1 1
I/C 1,2,4 2,3 5
4 MAJ 5
5 2
2 Man 2
1 1
SROI-1 TS 2,3 2
2 RX 3
4 2
1 NOR 1*
1 1
I/C 1,3 2,3 4
4 MAJ 5
5 2
2 Man 4
1 1
SROI-2 TS 2,4 2
2 RX 4
1 2
1 NOR 2*
1 1
I/C 1,2,3 2,4 4, 5 7
4 MAJ 5
6 6
3 2
Man 2
2,5 3
1 SROI-3 TS 2,4 2
2 RX 4
1 2
1 NOR 2*
1 1
I/C 1,2,3 2,4 4, 5 7
4 MAJ 5
6 6
3 2
Man 2
2,5 3
1 SROI-4 TS 2,4 2
2 RX 1
1 1
NOR 1*
1 1
I/C 2,3 4,5 3,5 6
4 MAJ 6
6 2
2 Man 5
1 1
SROI-5 TS 4,5 2
2
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Events and Evolutions Checklist Form 3.4-1 3.4-1 pg 3 of 4 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Facility: Turkey Point (PTN)
Date of Exam: 3/20/23 Operating Test No.:
2023-301 Scenarios N5 N1 N4 N2 N3 (spare)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION M
I N
I M
U M(*)
A P
P L
I C
A N
T E
V E
N T
T Y
P E
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P T
O T
A L
R I
U RX 1*
1 1
NOR 1
1 1
I/C 3,5 2,3 4,5 6
4 MAJ 6
6 2
2 Man 3
1 1
SROI-6 TS 1,2,3 3
2 RX 1
1 1
NOR 1*
1 1
I/C 2,3 4,5 3,5 6
4 MAJ 6
6 2
2 Man 5
1 1
SROI-7 TS 4,5 2
2 RX 1*
1 1
NOR 1
1 1
I/C 3,5 2,3 4,5 6
4 MAJ 6
6 2
2 Man 3
1 1
SROI-8 TS 1,2,3 3
2 RX 1
1 1
NOR 4
1 1
I/C 2,3 2,3 4,5 1,3,5 9
4 MAJ 5
6 6
3 2
Man 2
5 2
1 SROI-9 TS 4,5 2
2 RX 4
1 2
1 NOR 2*
1 1
I/C 1,2,3 2,4 4,5 7
4 MAJ 5
6 6
3 2
Man 2
2,5 3
1 SROI-10 TS 2,4 2
2
L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Events and Evolutions Checklist Form 3.4-1 3.4-1 pg 4 of 4 L-23-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Facility: Turkey Point (PTN)
Date of Exam: 3/20/23 Operating Test No.:
2023-301 Scenarios N5 N1 N4 N2 N1 (spare)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION M
I N
I M
U M(*)
A P
P L
I C
A N
T E
V E
N T
T Y
P E
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P T
O T
A L
R I
U RX 4
1 1
NOR 1
1 1
I/C 1,3 3,5 1,2,3 4,5 9
4 MAJ 5
6 6
3 2
Man 1
3 2
1 SROI-11 TS 1,2,3 3
2 RX 3
1 0
NOR 1*
1 1
I/C 2,4 2
2 MAJ 5
1 1
Man 0
0 SROU-1 TS 2,3 2
2 RX 3
1 0
NOR 1*
1 1
I/C 2,4 2
2 MAJ 5
1 1
Man 0
0 SROU-2 TS 2,3 2
2 RX NOR I/C MAJ Man TS RX NOR I/C MAJ Man TS
Facility:
Turkey Point Exam Date: 2023 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL General comments:
A S
Y 2-4 S
B S
Y 2-4 E
Some steps (I.E. SEQ-4) have highlighted step standards but they are not critical steps.
Do these highlighted steps indicate that the student is expected to perform an action, but that action has no bearing on completing the task? This is just being mentioned as a reminder for the exam team to evaluate these during validation week. This comment may apply to other steps for this JPM as well as others.
Licensee replied yes to the above question.
SEQ13-the substeps to complete the original task are also critical steps. This also needs to be reflected in the overall Task Std at the beginning of the JPM. Attempting to establish flow via the planned path is critical, then completion of the Alt Path is also critical.
Comment noted - verify during validation week and on final submittal to ensure correctness. - Incorporated.. MAB C
S Y
2-4 S
D S
Y 2-4 S
We will likely have the student use the simulator copy of the ONOP so as not to cue
Facility:
Turkey Point Exam Date: 2023 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL anything inadvertently by handing them the procedure section - assuming the simulator copy can be easily swapped between JPMs -
if not we can discuss during validation week.
Address comment during review of the JPM during validation week. Yes - simulator copy may be used. MAB E
S N
2-4 S
SEQ6: What if the applicant misfires when starting the stop watch? Is it permissible for the applicant to make a second attempt, or is that pre-conditioning the valve which may impact the reliability of the test results?
Yes - student can make a second attempt.
F S
Y 2-4 S
Likely will have students use sim copy of ONOP rather than inadvertently cue them.
Evaluate during validation week. Yes -
simulator copy may be used. MAB G
S N
2-4 S
H S
N 2-4 S
I P
N 2-4 S
J P
Y 2-4 S
K P
N 2-4 S
Double checking to ensure that CV-3/4-1605 responded as expected given the initial conditions and the assigned task. If they responded as expected, then the JPM is not Alternate Path - therefore no changes needed. Not Alt Path.
Facility:
Turkey Point Exam Date: 2023 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL JPM may place them at the failure step.
Evaluate during validation week. JPM categorized correctly. MAB General If changes are made to a JPM, revisit the Task Standard to ensure it captures everything that is being evaluated. Note: We will review each Task Standard with the entire exam team during validation week as a final check.
Task Std will be reviewed for each JPM on validation week.
RO A1a A
2-4 E
BAST and RWST Levels are provided in the IC with units of gallons. At your facility do you use units of gallons when describing level?
Should level be provided in percent or inches? Perhaps a picture of the level gauge would be more appropriate? Discuss.
Discuss during validation week. I believe they stated that the level is provided in gallons.
Correct - MAB SEQ-6, Step 4, is a critical step.
Evaluate during validation week.
Not incorporated, but partially covered in the determination of Step 6.
SEQ-7, Step 3, is a critical step.
Step 3 may have been intended to be Step 2.
Evaluate during validation week.
Facility:
Turkey Point Exam Date: 2023 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL Not incorporated, but partially covered in the determination of Step 4.
RO A1b A
2-4 x
E/U For determining rod worth - please check the values from the graph and compare to the values from the table. At 4000 MWd/MTU the values for CB-D from the graph do not appear to match the values in the table. Discuss with me as it may be possible that I am incorrect in my initial assessment; but if I am correct, it brings into question the accuracy of the curve book.
Licensee stated that the rod worth curves were incorrect, but the tables were correct.
The procedure requires operators to use the tables. Verify during validation week. - CR to be written after exam. Curve Book will still work with the JPM. MAB Is it acceptable for students to pull values from the graphs? If so, acceptance bands would be needed for students that pull values from the graphs. These bands would then apply for calculating downstream acceptance bands. These bands should only apply when students do not use the values in the tables.
Licensee stated that operators are not allowed to use the curves.
What is the basis for the upper end of the band on final boron concentration - none of the upstream calculations have acceptance
Facility:
Turkey Point Exam Date: 2023 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL bands. Rounding up 9 ppm does not appear to be reasonable and yields a significant difference in the final answer. Perhaps allow for truncating to the nearest whole number as well as rounding up to the nearest whole number.
Discussed the band. Will ensure an acceptable band is used when on validation week. Band modified. MAB RO A2 A
1 x
U LOD=1: Does not discriminate at an appropriate level. Replace JPM.
JPM was enhanced. Modified version appears to be more discriminating and is more appropriate than original submittal.
Entire team of examiners will evaluate acceptability during validation week.
An applicant who can read and write and do simple math can obtain the correct answer with no nuclear power plant training.
Recall my comment from the Outline Submittal: The ideas described in the outlines and supporting paragraphs indicate that the tasks may be appropriate for an NRC exam. As long as nuclear power plant knowledge is needed for successful performance, then there is a high likelihood that the submitted JPM topics will work. Recall my earlier reminder to help guide JPM development:
Facility:
Turkey Point Exam Date: 2023 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL If someone who can read and do math will get the correct answer when given the JPM, then it may not be appropriate to be used for a licensing decision. I often use my wife as the example - she has never set foot on a nuclear site, but she can read and do math - if she will get the right answer with the materials provided, then the task likely does not test nuclear power plant knowledge and is likely not acceptable.
RO A3 1
x U
LOD=1: Does not discriminate at an appropriate level. Replace JPM.
JPM was enhanced and appears to be more appropriate for use on an exam. Entire team of examiners will review for acceptability during validation week.
SRO A1a E
See comments from the RO A1a.
Same items will be reviewed on validation week.
JPM ready for administration. MAB SRO A1b A
2-4 E
The JPM targets Tech Spec requirements. Is there a procedure where shift staffing requirements reside - such that if the procedure is followed, then the Tech Specs requirements would be met? I checked the Conduct of Operations Procedure, but did not see any staffing requirements. Most sites
Facility:
Turkey Point Exam Date: 2023 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL would have a procedure that would provide requirements for shift staffing.
No such procedure exists at the site.
For AOs, the Tech Specs state that AOs must be assigned to the designated position for each unit. None of the AO positions have a unit designation like the ROs do. Discuss the plant-specific terminology and explain how the Tech Specs are met without having the AO positions designated to specific units.
Unit designations will be added.
SRO A2 A
2-4 x
x U
JPM does not evaluate SRO-only knowledge.
ROs are required to understand when the conditions of a Tech Spec LCO is not met.
ROs are also required to know and apply one hour or less Tech Spec Required Actions.
JPM needs to be enhanced to elevate the task to the SRO level.
Above issue corrected by incorporating suggestion below.
Consider adding requirement to apply Tech Specs beyond one hour - such as asking for the actual time when they are required to be in HOT STANDBY and HOT SHUTDOWN (I.E. the time on the clock: ##:## AM or PM -
not simply stating 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />), etc.
Incorporated.
SRO A3 A
2-4 E
Evaluator Note at the beginning of the JPM states that identification of additional reasons are not grounds for receiving an
Facility:
Turkey Point Exam Date: 2023 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL unsatisfactory grade on the JPM. This needs to state the opposite. Otherwise, a student can state that every item on the release form is unsatisfactory and meet the task standard.
The Task Standard also needs to be revised to state that invalid reasons are grounds for an unsatisfactory performance. If additional reasons are discovered and the applicant is actually correct, then the JPM criteria can be revised after the fact to ensure accurate grading occurs for all applicants.
Address during validation week. Additional reasons comments deleted.
SEQ-4: The Step Standard and the construct of the alarm setpoint simply provides the student multiple ways to get this step correct.
Either make one method for getting the step correct, or make identification of both reasons critical.
Review during validation week. Modified to limit to one way.
SRO A4 A
2-4 x
x U
The sheet containing the initiating cue appears to cue the applicant to provide Fission Product Barrier Degradation and Hazardous Events. The time critical JPM should be scripted to use only tools/procedures available during an actual event. The typical method for this is to have them complete the Emergency Notification Form thereby creating a 2-part time critical JPM with 15 minute to classify and 15
Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (JPMs)
Facility:
Turkey Point Exam Date: 2023 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL minutes to complete the Emergency Notification Form. Providing cues for what to look at is not appropriate.
The timeline of events is a bit unusual for a classification unless a previous classification was made and they are evaluating upgrade criteria. Where in this timeline is the applicant making the declaration? If a seismic event at 01:10:00 causes a classification criteria to be met and no classification has yet been made, then the applicants would only have 5 minutes left to complete the first declaration.
Ensure that JPM instructs student not to use EC judgment when making their declaration.
JPM was replaced. The replacement appears to be close enough to warrant review during validation week.
JPM modified to only complete notification form.
Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the JPM Table
- 1. Enter the JPM number and/or title.
- 2. Enter the type of JPM(S)imulator, (P)lant, or (A)dministrative.
- 3. Enter (Y)es or (N)o for an Alternate Path JPM.
- 4. Rate the level of difficulty (LOD) of each JPM using a scale of 1-5 (easy-difficult). A JPM containing less than two critical steps, a JPM that tests solely for recall or memorization, or a JPM that involves directly looking up a single correct answer is likely LOD = 1 (too easy). Conversely, a JPM with over 30 steps or a JPM that takes more than 45 minutes to complete is likely LOD = 5 (too difficult).
- 5. Check the appropriate block for each JPM error type, using the following criteria:
LOD = 1 or 5 is unsatisfactory (U).
REF: The JPM lacks required references, tools, or procedures (U).
IC: The JPM initial conditions are missing or the JPM lacks an adequate initial cue (U).
CUE: The JPM lacks adequate evaluator cues to allow the applicant to complete the task, or the evaluator cues are subjective or leading (U).
TSK: The JPM lacks a task standard or lacks completion criteria for a task standard (U).
CS: The JPM contains errors in designating critical steps, or the JPM lacks an adequate performance standard for a critical step (U).
TL: The JPM validation times are unreasonable, or a time-critical JPM lacks a completion time (U).
- 6. Mark the JPM as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). A JPM is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 5. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.
- 7. Briefly describe any JPM determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.
Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (Scenarios)
Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: 1 Exam Date: 2023 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors 3
U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
S 2
S 3
S 4
S 5
S 6
S CT1: Comment from outline review was not incorporated. Wording needs to state that the actions are completed to prevent meeting the criteria to cool to less than 280F, vs. prior to 280F.
Incorporated
Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the Scenario Table
- 1. For each scenario, enter the scenario event names and descriptions.
- 2. Review the individual events contained in each scenario, and identify and mark event errors:
The scenario guide event description is not realistic/credibleunsatisfactory (U).
The scenario guide event description lacks adequate crew/operator performance standardsneeds enhancement (E).
The scenario guide event description lacks verifiable actions for a credited normal event, reactivity event instrument/component malfunction, or technical specification (TS) event (or a combination of these) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates an event as a critical task (i.e., a noncritical task labeled as critical or a critical task labeled as noncritical). This includes critical tasks that do not meet the critical task criteria (i.e., the critical task does not have a measurable performance standard) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates entry into TS actions when not required or does not designate entry into TS actions when required (U).
- 3. Based on the outcome in step 2, mark the scenario event as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). An event is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 2. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.
- 4. Briefly describe any scenario event determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario event is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.
Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: 2 Exam Date: 2023 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors 3
U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
S 2
S 3
S 4
S 5
S 6
S 7
S 8
S
Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: 3 Exam Date: 2023 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors 3
U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
S 2
S 3
S 4
S 5
S 6
S 7
S 8
S
Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: 4 Exam Date: 2023 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors 3
U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
S 2
S 3
S 4
S 5
S 6
S 7
S CT1: Does EOP-E-1 require SI equipment to be operating (I.E. Pumps running & valves correctly positioned) to avoid entry to ECA-1.1? Or does the equipment just need to be available?
Does the plant reach any FRP criteria if SI is not initiated?
CT wording determined to be acceptable.
8 S
Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: 5 Exam Date: 2023 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors 3
U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
S 2
S 3
S 4
S 5
S 6
S
Final Written Exam Sample Plan is the combination of the Draft Sample Plan and Form 4.1-1, Final Record of Rejected K/As.
Form 4.1-1 Record of Rejected Knowledge and Abilities Refer to Examination Standard (ES)-4.2, Developing Written Examinations, Section B.3, for deviations from the approved written examination outline.
Tier/Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection T1 / G1 RO 065G2.4.44 Replaced with 065G2.4.50 because original KA was SRO Only.
T2 /G1 RO 005A3.01 Replaced with 005A3.02. Original KA was not compatible with PTN.
T2 / G1 RO 076K2.08 Replaced with 076K2.01. Original KA was not compatible with PTN.
T2 / G1 RO 103A2.09 Replaced with 103A2.06. Original KA was not compatible with PTN.
T2 / G2 RO 191002K1.05 Replaced with 191002K1.09. Original KA was not compatible with PTN.
T3 RO G2.1.28 Replaced with G2.1.2. Could not write a discriminating question testing a generic concept for originally selected KA.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level In the first column I have placed a P when the question requires emergency or abnormal procedure knowledge. This is to check for balance of coverage to ensure that adequate procedure knowledge is tested on the exam as a whole.
(+)/(-) are also used in the first column to ensure when binary question cjoices are provided (I.E. will / will NOT) that an acceptable balance exists between the positives and negatives.
Questions relying on a provided reference to students (REF): 6 Preliminary Statistics for Form 2.3-4:
Bank RO: 27 20 SRO: 10 9 Mod RO: 19 25 SRO: 6 9 New RO: 29 30 SRO: 9 7 High LOK RO: 38 40 SRO: 19 18 Fundamental LOK RO: 37 35 SRO: 6 7 Reminders for Chief Examiner:
Check balance of coverage for procedures - tier 1. (There were 27 Qs on the RO exam that required emergency/abnormal procedure knowledge to arrive at the correct answer - abnormal procedures included Tech Specs, ARPs, etc., that address abnormal conditions.) Final submittal contains 29 Qs.
Check for (+)/(-) balance. (Close to an even split for the binary choice formats - I.E. on the (is) / (is not) format of questions. Final submittal has 31 RO (+), 26 RO (-), 7 SRO (+), 5 SRO (-)
Check for acceptable use of the word ONLY. Corrected on an as-needed basis.
Check for questions that ask for what an operator will do - if it is IAW a procedure it may be okay - otherwise, they should test what is required. Corrected on an as-needed basis.
Provided References still need to be reviewed to ensure they do not contain cues for unrelated questions. Mostly the EAL Tables need to be reviewed. Reviewed sat.
NUREG-1021, Rev 12, ES-4.2, Page 4 of 29 If the bank contains more than one question that fits a specific K/A statement, randomly select from among the available questions unless there is an appropriate basis for selecting a specific question (e.g., a particular question has a higher cognitive level, has better discrimination validity, is more operationally oriented, or addresses site-specific priorities.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 7 bank questions were used from the 2016 exam, 9 from the 2017 exam, and 7 from the 2019 exam. There is a hard limit on the number of questions that can be used from the previous two exams; however, the NUREG does not prescribe hard limits on the exams beyond the last two. The above ES-4.2 requirement strives to ensure that when bank questions are selected outside of the most recent two exams, that a generally random process is used so as not to allow the students to focus on an insufficiently small exam bank. Statistically, based on the bank questions selected from previous NRC exams since 2009, it would seem unlikely that 23 questions would get randomly selected from the three most recent NRC exams outside of the previous two exams that were administered in 2019-302 and 2021.
Rather than go through an exercise of understanding how PTN linked questions to K/As and randomly select from among them, it may be more productive to modify some of the questions from 2016, 2017, and 2019-301 to reduce the impact of bank questions being over sampled. We could try to modify those that are most easily transitioned to a modified question. That may be enough to alleviate any concern of the applicants being able to target a small exam bank and get a large percentage of the exam correct.
Statistically, if the above NUREG requirement was followed, it would be unlikely that so many questions would be taken from those three exams if they were randomly selected from the bank.
Status as of 2/23/2023:
3 Bank questions from the 2016 exam are still on exam. (OK) 4 Bank questions from the 2017 exam are still on exam. (perhaps OK0 7 Bank questions from the 2019-301 exam are still on exam, however Q6 and Q68 contain minor cosmetic changes.
(To be in better keeping with the spirit and intent of the requirements to not draw too many bank questions from a small exam bank, at least two of the following need to be modified: Q17, Q41, Q57, Q79, Q87 - My suggestion to minimize rework and maintain in good keeping with what already has been written is to modify the following:
Q41: Perhaps change which SG depressurizes - thereby changing the correct answer. (incorporated)
Q86: In the first part, change the component from MOV-3716B to something else that would provide a correct answer and credible distractors. (incorporated)
Please provide a copy of your written audit exam when it is available - either place it in the box or email in a password protected file.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 1
P F
2-4 x
B M
2017 NRC Joe E
Q now S 007G2.1.37 (T1/G1)
Cred Dist.: 547F is not sufficiently low. Use 541F, which corresponds to the minimum temperature for criticality iaw Tech Spec 3.1.1.4. 541F also used to appear in ES-0.1 in previous revisions.
Above comment was incorporated.
Note: Question rated as E due to previous use on an NRC exam.
Question is now sat. MAB 2
P REF H
2-4 B
S 008AK3.03 (T1/G1)
No comments.
3 H
2-4 x
N U
Q now S 009EA2.29 (T1/G1)
The wrong KA is referenced in the Topic and KA # designation at the top of the first page of the question. The stated KA is 009AK3.03, but the correct KA is 009EA2.29, which is then correctly stated in the KA statement on that same page.
Stem Focus: Do the conditions in the stem ensure that the SI has occurred when E-0 is entered? If a small SBLOCA occurs and the reactor trips but pressure is above the SI setpoint, would the intended answer be the correct answer? The lack of detail in the stem of the question forces the applicant to make an assumption as to whether SI has occurred; therefore, there is not one and only one correct answer. The stem requires enough detail to ensure SI has occurred to support the correct answer.
RCS pressure of 1690 psig was added. Q is now sat. MAB 4
(+)
H 2
1 2-4 x
M 2016 NRC Exam Phil N
E U
Q now S 015AA1.15 (T1/G1) - PREREVIEW QUESTION Cred. Dist.: A power level of 14% is well below the setpoint of 45%,
which enables the trip on a single RCP. The distractors would be more credible if a power level of 40% was used. I am not sure if the reactor would trip on any other trip functions, but that could easily be resolved by restricting the applicant to only analyzing the trips of low flow or RCP breaker position.
I.E. (nomenclature abbreviated - your presentation is fine)
- Unit 3 at 40% power GOP-301 shutdown in progress
- 3A 4KV bus de-energizes
____ RCPs will trip and as a result the reactor ____ automatically trip on low RCS flow or RCP breaker position.
If the reactor is not at risk of tripping on a different trip function, then there is no need to specifically ask about the low RCS flow/RCP breaker trips. The way you initially presented the question statement would be fine if that is the case.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level DRAFT EXAM SUBMITTAL Cred. Dist.: B does not make any sense. Why would the trip of one RCP cause the reactor to trip, but if two RCPs trip the reactor will not trip? By default one RCP is in a tripped condition if two pumps trip.
The above suggestion from the pre-review is now being used; therefore, the above concern has been addressed.
Cred. Dist.: D is also not plausible. It is not credible to lose two pumps while at 40% with no reactor trip.
The above suggestion from the pre-review is now being used; therefore, the above concern has been addressed.
Was there an issue with the suggestion that was provided during the pre-review? Power level was changed, but the question was changed in other ways that impacted the credibility of distractors.
Question is now sat. MAB 5
P
(-)
F 2-4 x
M 2016 NRC Phil E
Q now S 022AK2.12 (T1/G1)
Stem Focus: The question statement states, If a charging pump is subsequently restored.. - Does having a charging pump restored mean that it is running? Step 1 of ONOP-47.1 asks if a charging pump is running. If a restored charging pump is a running charging pump, then the RNO of that step is not performed Suggest rewording the question statement to something like, If a charging pump is subsequently available to be placed in service, the Unit Supervisor will direct the crew to ___(2)__ IAW 3-ONOP-47.1.
The above suggestion was; therefore, the above concern has been addressed.
The question states that LCV-3-115B will not open. That is stated as a fact, so nothing an operator does, even isolating air and venting, will open the valve. Consider stating that it will not open from the control room in the fifth bullet.
The above suggestion was; therefore, the above concern has been addressed.
The question analysis states that C(1) is incorrect - this may be a typo.
This was just a typo.
Q is now sat. MAB
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 6
P
(+)
H 2-4 x
x x
B 2019 NRC Lanyi E
Q now S.
025AK1.07 (T1/G1)
Stem Focus: Would the RHR pump experience fluctuating amps with a break in the designated location? I would expect amps to fluctuate when a pump loses suction, but with the location of this break, has the pumps suction been impacted?
Above comment addressed by incorporating the suggestion stated below.
Cred. Dist.: 3-ONOP-050, Step 1, requires the RHR pump to be stopped due to RCS level alone. Proving fluctuating amps damages the plausibility of A(2) and C(2) for not being required to secure the RHR pump. Because there is no need to provide the fluctuating amps and deleting this also addresses the first comment stated above, this minor change may be all that is needed to fix the question. If needed a draindown level of 20% could be added.
Above comments incorporated.
Question documentation states that this was on a 2018 NRC exam, however, our records indicate that it was on a 2019 NRC exam, which may have been developed in 2018 - this comment applies to all bank and modified questions designated as 2018.
The 2018 designations are 2019-301.
K/A: The K/A requires testing pump flow vs level. Implementing the above suggestion also allows for a better K/A match because the oump would be required to be stopped based on the level indication.
Incorporated The first question statement should more directly ask which alarm will annunciate given the above conditions. Who knows what an operator will do?
Above comment incorporated.
Q is now sat. MAB 7
P
(-)
H 2-4 x
N E
Q now S 027AK2.07 (T1/G1)
Stem Focus: When the PORV fails open, pressurizer level should go up, not down. Suggest simply deleting the third bullet. With a failed open PORV applicants should know that the level will rise.
This condition could be corrected and the question likely would be satisfactory. The question statement may need a minor modification such as, Due to the above conditions, CVCS normal letdown (did) / (did NOT) automatically isolate.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level If possible I would like to see this on the simulator during validation week. Assuming it checks out on the simulator, then the question may be sat. I will leave this question as an E until verification has been completed.
Observed on simulator. Q is now sat. MAB 8
P
(+)
H 2-4 N
E Q now S 038EA1.19 (T1/G1)
The title of Attachment 3 is not provided in the stem. Are applicants required to know the title of Attachment 3 or would it be more appropriate to provide the title in the question?
They stated they would add the title. Ill leave as an E until final verification.
Title added. Q now sat. MAB 9
P F
2-4 N
S WE12EK3.14 (T1/G1)
Question is satisfactory.
10 P
(+)
(+)
H 1
2-4 x
N U
Q now S E
Q now S 054AK1.05 (T1/G1)
Cred. Dist.: B(2) and D(2) are not plausible. There are no conditions in the stem that would lead an applicant to believe that one of the SG pressures are below the shutoff head of the condensate pumps.
Comment addressed by modifying the Q.
Suggest revising the second part of the question to test one of the consequences that are encountered due to the process of depressurizing a SG - such as the need to lower RCS pressure in order to block SI.
I.E.: IAW 3-EOP-FR-H.1, operators (are) / (are NOT) required to lower RCS pressure using auxiliary spray prior to establishing condensate feed to a SG.
A version of the above comment was incorporated.
Q is now sat. MAB Q status now E to track whether there are more potential changes.
The proposed change to toggle between 575 psig and 360 psig on the second part will not work in its current form, but the sentiment may be incorporated with the suggestion stated below. The 575 psig is not associated with SG pressure; rather it is associated with RCS pressure to secure RHR pumps and in Q42 we test FW Pump start permissives with
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level condensate pressure which provides some potential to cue the answer when toggling between 360 psig ad 575 psig.
Consider the following suggestion:
If required to depressurize a SG to feed with condensate IAW 3-EOP-FR-H.1, lowering the SG pressure to 400 psig (will) /
(will NOT) comply with the procedure guidance to feed with a condensate pump.
Licensee ncorporated the above comment with 350 psig instead of 400 psig, but it still address the concerns. Q is now sat. MAB 11 P
F 2-4 x
x M
2016 NRC Phil U
Q now S 055EK3.1 (T1/G1)
Cred. Dist.: Change the 30 minutes in the answer choices to 60 minutes to enhance the credibility. 30 minutes has no basis. At least 60 minutes has some meaning within ECA-0.0 (restoring computer room chiller within 60 minutes).
Above comment was incorporated.
Stem Focus: The first question statement needs to be tied to the procedure. I.E. IAW ECA-0.0 Basis Document.
The first question statement still needs to be tied to the Basis Document. I will leave this question as a U just as a place holder until this comment has been verified.
First question statement is now tied to the Basis Doc. Q is now sat.
MAB 12 P
(+)
H 2-4 B
2016 NRC Phil S
056AA2.18 (T1/G1)
No comments.
13 P
F 2-4 B
2017 NRC Joe S
058AA2.01 (T1/G1)
No comments.
14 P
(+)
F 2-4 N
S 062AK2.02 (T1/G1)
No comments.
15 P
(+)
H 2-4 x
M E/U Q now S 065G2.4.50 (T1/G1)
Stem Focus: The question timing is confusing when considering the answer choices. The present tense is used. It leads to trying to figure out if the reactor should be tripped when instrument air pressure is now 90 psig. Operator errors may result in not tripping the reactor when it should have been tripped - but if instrument air pressure has recovered, would it make sense to place an unnecessary transient on the plant once instrument air pressure
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level has recovered? If applying the question statement in the present tense - Instrument Air Pressure is above 65 psig - so no trip is required.
Above concern addressed by rewording the question statement.
No supporting information was provided to know how the cross-tie valves respond when instrument air pressure is re-gained.
Because the question is asked in the present tense - please provide supporting documentation to show that these valves remain closed when instrument air pressure recovers to 90 psig.
Above comment resolved with supporting documentation.
Q is now sat.
16 H
2-4 x
M 2017 NRC Joe S
077AA1.07 (T1/G1)
No comments.
17 P
H 2-4 B
2019 NRC Lanyi S
WE11G2.2.44 (T1/G1)
No comments.
18 P
H 2-4 B
2010 NRC Bruno S
WE05EK1.11 (T1/G1)
No comments.
19 P
(+)
H 1
2-4 x
N U
Q now S E
Q now S 003G2.4.45 (T1/G2)
Cred. Dist.: A rod dropping to the bottom, just from a common sense perspective, is equally present in both the bottom and top of the core; therefore, the axial effects would be minimal. The lack of credibility lowers the LOD to an unacceptable level.
Resolved by incorporation of the suggestion below.
One idea to consider would be to fully drop E-11 and then partially drop a second rod about 20 steps into the core and then test whether ONOP-28.3 requires a reactor trip. The ONOP does not require a trip, but it would be plausible because a second rod would be out by more than 12 steps allowed by TS 3.1.3.1. (ONOP-28.1 also does not appear to require a reactor trip).
Comment incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB Q status now E to track whether there are more potential changes.
Your suggestion of testing the Urgent Failure Alarm is accepted. Q is now sat. MAB
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 20 P
(+)
(-)
F 2-4 B
2019 NRC Gary S
032AK3.02 (T1/G2)
No comments.
21 REF
(+)
H 2-4 x
M U
Q now S 033G2.4.20 (T1/G2)
Cred. Dist.: The presentation contrast between the two options in the second part of the answers does not allow for much plausibility in the distractors. The logic exercise goes as follows: If pushing the buttons sequentially one at a time will work, then pushing them simultaneously would also likely work. Therefore, the answer must be pushing them simultaneously because we know only one answer can be correct.
Q modified to only ask if simultaneously pushing the buttons is required.
Q is now sat.
22 REF
(+)
H 2-4 N
S 060AA2.01 (T1/G2) - PREREVIEW QUESTION No comments.
DRAFT EXAM SUBMITTAL.
No changes made from prereview question. Still satisfactory.
23 P
(+)
(-)
F 2-4 x
N E
Q now S 061AK1.02 (T1/G2)
LOK: Q appears to be fundamental knowledge (memory).
Cred. Dist.: R-11&12 values need to be present in the stem to add credibility to the containment isolation choices. Then the second Q statement can be revised to solicit whether a containment ventilation isolation signal is generated from the stated conditions above.
I will leave this Q an E until I can view the larger picture and evaluate the plausibility of distractors with the information being proposed.
Upon review of the implementation of my comments stated above, my intention was not to create a situation where the correct answer would change, but to place R-11&12 in an elevated state, but less than the Hi/Hi setpoint. In hindsight, I think the question is satisfactory without the R-11&12 values.
Delete the -11&12 values and simply revert back to asking whether CHRMS circuitry (is)/(is NOT) expected to send a signal to isolate the containment ventilation system.
Above comment incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 24 P
(-)
F 2-4 x
M 2017 NRC E
Q now S 076AA1.14 (T1/G2)
Stem Focus: Other monitors, such as R-19, can also cause ANN H1/4 to alarm. The question forces the applicant to make an
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level
(+)
Joe assumption that ANN H1/4 is only in alarm due to R-20. It may be necessary to state that the other monitors are not in alarm.
Concern addressed by removing alarm from the stem.
Q is now sat. MAB 25 P
F 2-4 x
x M
2017 NRC Joe U
Q now S WE15EK2.08 (T1/G2)
Stem Focus: Containment pressure needs to be specified in the question statement, otherwise there may not be a correct answer.
I.E. With a containment pressure of 5 psig, __(1)__ is the MINIMUM Containment Recirculation Sump Level.
Above comment incorporated, Cred. Dist.: B(2) and D(2) are not plausible. When considering why this question would be asked and that no harm would occur to keep the TSC informed of any plant condition, let alone sump level and activity, why would any applicant choose these distarctors?
Lets assume that the distractors were the correct choice - Does it make sense to deny an applicant a license if they think that it makes sense to keep the TSC informed of these conditions? In other words, using a little common sense, the distractors for this part of the answers are not credible. The second part requires modification.
Above comment addressed by incorporating the suggestion stated below.
Suggest asking if Z.2 directs operators to ensure containment purge exhaust and supply fans OFF - OR - has them direct nuclear chemistry to sample sumps. The purge fans are from Z.3, which seems credible to secure purge if you are unsure of the source of the water.
Above comment incorporated.
Q is now sat. MAB 26
(-)
(-)
F H
1 2-4 x
B M
2009 NRC Pt, Beach E
Q now S WE08EK2.10 (T1/G2)
Cred. Dist.: None of the distractors are plausible. The question was rated as E due to appearing on a previous NRC exam. With a large hole in the RCS, PTS is obviously not a concern - how do you pressurize with a large hole in the RCS? Question requires replacement. If needed, NRC can likely write the question - your choice.
Comment addressed with new Q. New Q K/A is acceptable because ECCS is maintaining pressure in the RCS, but not high enough to warrant actions within P.1.
Q is now sat. MAB
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 27
(-)
(+)
F 1
2-4 x
N U
Q now S 003K1.10 (T2/G1)
Cred. Dist.: The RCPs function is to push water through the core to pick up heat and transfer it to the SGs. Taking suction from the hot leg is not credible. Information being tested is too basic for an acceptable level of discrimination validity. LOD is unacceptably low.
They did not choose to use my suggested question replacement.
Above comment addressed by replacing half of the Q.
Q is now sat. MAB 28 H
2-4 x
B 2010 NRC Bruno E
Q now S 004K4.07 (T2/G1)
Cred. Dist.: wrt C - A letdown valves failure position will always be closed - not credible to think that letdown valves are designed to fail open.
Distractor replaced.
Q is now sat. MAB 29 F
2-4 M
2017 NRC Joe S
005A3.02 (T2/G1)
No comments.
30
(-)
(-)
F 2-4 N
S 006A1.18 (T2G1)
No comments.
31 F
2-4 N
S 006K1.11 (T2/G1)
No comments.
32 P
(+)
F H
2-4 N
E Q now S 007A2.05 (T2/G1)
A unit designation should be made in the question. Suggest making it Unit 4 since most questions are written as Unit 3 questions.
Unit 4 added.
Question only provides a PRT pressure yet the alarm is associated also with level and temp. The applicants are forced to make an assumption on level and temp. Suggest stating PRT temperature and pressure level at values that are within their normal operating bands. Place all three parameters in bullets and then ask if the ARP requires actions to be performed.
Above comment incorporated.
LOK: question really only tests whether they know the alarm setpoints and whether a relief valve exists. There is not much if any higher cognitive thought process. Question was rated as LOK=F.
Q LOK is H.
Q is now sat.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 33 P
H 2-4 B
2015 NRC Bates S
008A4.09 (T2/G1)
No comments.
34 P
(+)
H 2-4 M
2019 NRC Gary S
008G2.2.38 No comments.
35
(-)
H 2-4 x
B M
2016 NRC Phil E
Q now S 010A4.03 (T2/G1)
The controller is already in automatic - what is the output?
The original controller output was not added. If the original output was already sufficiently low, then the operator placing the controller in manual and trying to lower output will have no impact on stabilizing pressure. To ensure that a correct answer exists, it may be necessary to know what the original controller output is.
Discuss with TP staff to ensure further enhancement not required.
The first part of the question asks what an operator will do, but the operators actions are not even tied to a procedure. Who knows what an operator will do? If the first part is only intended to ask how the controller functions, then the question should be asked in that manner. I.E. IAW procedure XYZ. The operator is required to place the controller in manual and raise/lower the output to halt the pressure decrease. Knowing where the output is prior to going to manual may also be required, otherwise manually lowering an output that has already lowered with the controller in AUTO, may not provide the desired effect.
Above comment incorporated.
Several questions have already been taken from the 2016 exam.
To avoid having a predictability issue, change the output in the question stem to 90%. This will change the answer, but it will test the exact same knowledge. It will also prevent someone from simply recalling a bank item and answer the question based on bank knowledge rather than the knowledge that is intended to be tested.
Q left as E for now until the above open item with respect to controller output has been dispositioned. The above comment in question is associated with the first part of the question. Perhaps eliminating the end of the question statement.to stabilize preesure may be appropriate to address the concern. Because if the controller output was already low, the manual action will not stabilize pressure; however, the procedure still would have the operator lower output. Or another potential fix could be the operator (is) / (is NOT) required to place in MANUAL and raise the output to stabilize pressure. This comment may require some discussion if I am not adequately describing the concern.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level Minor modification made to address above comment. Q is now sat. MAB 36 REF
(-)
(+)
F H
1 2-4 x
x B
N U
Q now S 012 - GFE 191002K1.10 (T2/G1) - PREREVIEW QUESTION Cues: Providing the type of pressure detector is inappropriate cueing, which also acts to reduce the credibility of the distractors and lowers the LOD. In addition, by telling the applicant what kind of detector is used in that application, it eliminates any site-specific knowledge required to answer the question.
Suggestion: Provide a leak on the reference leg and test how the plant responds to the reference leg leak.
DRAFT EXAM SUBMITTAL Typo in fourth bullet.
Cred. Dist.: A(1) and B(1) are not credible. There is not much left to discriminate when looking at the provided figure. A leak anywhere in the vicinity of that PT will cause indicated pressure to be lower than actual.
Above concern addressed.
Consider the following which will allow much of the existing question to be salvaged: Test whether the reactor trips or not in half the question and then in the other half test how charging flow responds. Implementation of this suggestion may require a bullet to be added for which channel is selected as the control channel.
(NOTE: A suggestion was also made on Q59 which should address any overlap concerns).
The addressed the concerns. Q now sat. MAB 37 P
F 1
2-4 x
N U
Q now S 013K6.11 (T2/G1)
Cred. Dist.: C(1) and D(1) are not credible with a SGTR. A SGTR is essentially a LOCA inside of the SG and the steam lines have not been impacted other than with contamination.
Half the question was replaced. Q is now sat. MAB 38
(+)
(-)
H 2-4 x
M B
2010 NRC Bruno E
Q now S 022A2.07 (T2/G1)
Cred. Dist.: There is an interplay issue between the first and second parts of A. If the CCW flow is automatically terminated to the NCCs in the first part, then it is difficult to understand a misconception exists to then require the NCC fans to be loaded onto the EDGs. The distractor will likely require replacement.
Above comment addressed.
The distractor analysis is confusing. RCPs are off due to the LOOP, but with containment pressure being high, would likely have
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level required securing due to loss of SCM. I dont understand the persuasion of restarting RCPs would provide the necessity to restart NCC fans?
All comments addressed. Q is now sat. MAB 39
(-)
F 2-4 B
2017 NRC Joe S
026A3.01 (T2/G1)
No comments.
40 F
2-4 N
S 039G2.2.12 (T2/G1)
No comments.
41 H
2-4 B
2019 NRC Lanyi M
S 039K3.03 (T2G1)
No comments.
Condition in stem changed to solicit one of the other answer choices.
Q remains sat. MAB 42 F
2-4 x
B M
U Q now S 059K4.14 (T2/G1)
Cred. Dist.: When starting a MFW pump, why would an operator care more about an upstream condensate pump discharge pressure than the MFW pump suction pressure for the pump that is being started? Condensate pump discharge pressure is not plausible and requires replacement. Suggest testing the setpoint of 260 psig MFW pump suction pressure.
Comment addressed. MAB 43
(+)
H 2-4 M
2015 South Texas S
061A4.01 (T2/G1)
No comments.
44
(-)
(+)
F 2-4 x
x N
U Q now S 061K5.05 (T2/G1)
Stem Focus: The discharge line venting may not be required for any and all maintenance. The NOP provides instructions of how to do the venting after getting shift manager approval, but it does not state that under all circumstances venting is required regardless of the type of maintenance.
Cred. Dist.: It is obvious that venting would be required after maintenance. The part that contains any difficulty at all is whether periodic monthly venting is required. Suggest: IAW 3-NOP-075, Auxiliary Feedwater System, the AFW pump discharge lines (are /
are not) required to be periodically vented on a monthly basis.
Above comment addressed.
Supporting Material: Perhaps it was overlooked, but no supporting material for water hammer being the reason for venting after maintenance was provided. I also looked at the NOP and did not see the words water hammer when doing a word search.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level Supporting information needs to be provided to ensure that water hammer is the correct answer for conditions that are presented in the stem of the question.
I am still concerned that the supporting documentation does not directly support water hammer as the answer. You can test the KA implicitly by testing operational implications of venting. Suggest using the following to replace the water hammer half of the question:
While performing a shift manager approved venting of the A AFW pump following maintenance on the pump discharge piping, it (is) /
(is NOT) sufficient to terminate the venting procedure once a steady stream of water is first observed.
A version of the above suggestion was incorporated. Q is now sat.
MAB 45 H
2-4 M
2017 NRC Joe S
062A1.07 (T2/G1)
No comments.
46
(+)
(-)
H 2-4
?
M 2015 NRC Bates E/U Q now S 063A1.03 (T2/G1)
Is power available to any other battery chargers other than 3B1 and 3B2? The answer is likely yes - which impacts the credibility of ONLY 3B2. Because 3B2 appears in every answer choice, the problem can be fixed by more directly testing the knowledge. I.E.
Power (is / is not) available to 3B1.
Above comment incorporated.
Cred. Dist.: Are there parameters that can be read on VPA that are not on DCS? Especially as they pertain to DC electrical distribution? It would not be unusual for every parameter displayed on a control room panel to also be displayed on a computer. If all electrical parameters on control room panels are also on DCS, then the only discriminating aspect to be tested would be to test whether a parameter is on a control room panel - because of course they will be on DCS. Suggest: Vital DC bus voltage indication (is / is NOT) available on a control room panel.
Above comment incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 47 F
2-4 M
2013 NRC Laska S
063K2.01 (T2/G1)
No comments.
48 F
2-4 N
S 064K2.01 (T2/G1)
No comments.
49
(-)
(-)
H 2-4 N
E Q now S 064K5.09 (T2/G1)
LOK: Double check to see if you think the question should be designated as F or H.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level LOK is H. Q is sat. MAB 50
(-)
(-)
F 2-4 B
2016 NRC Phil S
073K1.04 (T2/G1)
No comments.
51 H
2-4 x
B 2009 NRC Lea E
Q now S 076K2.01 (T2/G1)
Stem Focus: Add parentheses around the (s) in Pump(s) in the first question statement because not all answer choices refer to more than one pump.
Above comment incorporated.
Was this question on the 2010 Turkey Point NRC exam? It looks like it did appear as Q65 on the 2009-302 exam.
Above comment incorporated.
Q now sat. MAB 52 F
H 2-4 N
E Q now S 078K3.11 LOK: 3-ONOP-013 provides indications that include a loss of feed with full demand on the controllers. The LOK should be designated as F - they simply need to recall this statement from the ONOP or if they simply recall that the valve is fail-closed, as it is designated F.C. on the print.
Incorporated.
Q is now sat. MAB 53 P
(+)
H 2-4 x
M 2019 NRC Lanyi E
Q now S.
103A2.06 (T2/G1)
Typo in last bullet - capitalize the I in NIs Comment incorporated.
Stem Focus: For the first part, I do not know what the RO will do.
Question would be better asked if it simply solicited whether red or orange path criteria are met for containment CSF.
Comment incorporated.
Q is now sat. MAB 54
(+)
H 2-4 x
N U
Q now S 103K6.11 (T2/G1)
Cred. Dist.: B(2) and D(2) are not credible. Nuclear systems are designed so that everything is okay if only one train is impacted.
For this question only one trains EDG is impacted, so it is obvious that containment design pressure will not be exceeded. Suggest that a condition is added to the stem that would cause an applicant to doubt the ability of the other train to perform its safety function thereby creating plausibility for the second half distractors.
Above comment addressed by modifying the second part to solicit the containment design pressure. Q is now sat. MAB
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 55 P
(-)
(+)
H 2-4 x
N E
Q now S 001A2.22 (T2/G2)
Stem Focus: In the stem state the control rod position with the lead bank slightly inserted. This would add credibility to rods being able to move in either direction vs. assuming that rods are fully withdrawn.
Above comment incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 56
(-)
H 2-4 x
B M
2017 NRC Exam Joe E
S 002K1.19 (T2/G2) - PREREVIEW QUESTION Stem Focus: The question lacks symmetry by having two answer choices asking about level and two asking about fan trips.
Suggestion: In each answer choice ask whether the SFP Level lowers and ask whether the supply fan trips.
I.E: (with the stated conditions)
Which one of the following correctly states the response of SFP level and the containment purge supply fan.
The containment purge supply fan (will / will NOT) trip and the SFP level (will / will NOT) lower.
DRAFT EXAM SUBMITTAL No further comments. Previous comments incorporated.
57 F
2-4 B
2019 NRC Lanyi S
016K5.01 (T2/G2)
No comments.
58 P
F 2-4 x
N E
Q now S 017A4.03 (T2/G2)
Stem Focus: The question asks whether the crew is required to bypass the alarm or the affected CET, but I do not see where the procedure requires that to be done. The procedure says to evaluate whether it should be done and then provides instructions for how to do it if they decide to do it. A decent operator would likely make the choice to bypass the affected CET, but is there a procedure that requires it. If so, then the question statement should solicit the answer IAW with that procedure. If there is no procedure requirement to bypass, then perhaps the same or similar information can be asked in a slightly different way.
Above comment incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 59
(-)
(+)
H 2-4 M
2017 NRC Joe E
Q now S 191002K1.09 (T2/G2)
Use of the word ONLY often either damages the credibility of a distractor or renders the correct answer to not be technically correct. Usually there is a better way to test the same thing. In this question, if ANY other thing changes as a result, even something that the exam author was not trying to test (maybe even something insignificant like a computer alarm), then there is no correct
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level answer. We all know the indication is changing - that is not really being tested.
Above comment addressed.
To ensure there are no overlap issues with suggestions on Q36 refer to the following suggestion:
Suggestion testing the impact on backup heaters and letdown in the first half and then either a required operator action or which procedure contains actions to fix the problem, etc.
A.
B/U Pzr heaters energize; X B.
Letdown isolates X C.
B/U Pzr heaters do NOT energize; Y D.
Letdown does NOT isolate; Y Q modified to test letdown isolation in addition to charging pump speed. Overlap with Q 36 is acceptable. Q is now sat. MAB 60
(-)
(-)
F 2-4 M
2016 NRC Phil E
Q now S 029K6.10 (T2/G2)
Can purge flow be monitored ANYWHERE else other than than DCS? It is usually safer to test what is different in the answer choices rather than using the word ONLY. DCS is in each answer choice, so the difference is whether or not purge flow indication is on VPB. The question is more directly tested by asking if flow indication is on VPB. Then, if there is any way to determine flow anywhere else in the plant, even something that the author did not know about, the intended answer is still correct.
Above comment was addressed.
Second question statement also revised. Q now sat. MAB 61 F
2-4 M
2013 BrdWd E
Q now S 035A1.02 (T2/G2)
Question appears to be Modified from the source question; however, the question documentation also has a number designator in the space for a Bank question, creating confusion as to whether the question may be a Bank question. Double check and clarify the question source.
Bank question number removed. Q is now sat. MAB 62 P
(+)
(-)
H 1
2-4 x
x x
N U
S 050K3.06 (T2/G1) - PREREVIEW QUESTION Cred. Dist.: B and C can be compared to each other and because they both have no indication and because they both cannot be correct, an applicant can make an educated guess and eliminate these two distractors. Also, the importance of these two locations is lower than the actual operating areas of the control room ventilation envelope, which also reduces their credibility.
Cred. Dist.: By providing the pictures for both trains, I can see that the fan and damper alignments are different for the two trains.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level Therefore, I can quickly settle on that answer choice as being a logical guess just by using the basic visual comparison.
Partial: the part of the answer choices which test for adequacy of the alignment may not provide a clear correct answer. A LOCA without fuel failure may allow the radiation levels to be completely adequate. Also, usually having one train of something will satisfy the safety function of a system - that is the purpose of having redundant trains - does this mean that the alignment is actually adequate to remove radioactivity? To address this, it would be better to simply ask for the correct component alignment given the plant conditions - that is really all that is being tested anyway.
Stem Focus: The small pictures embedded in the question do not appear to match the bigger pictures that are supplied as a reference. For instance, in the smaller picture embedded in the question, D-1A has recirc closed light lit and OPEN light dark; but, the big picture has the recirc closed light dark and the OPEN light lit.
For D the answer contains the fan, but the justification for the answer only discusses the damper?
A change in Rev 12 (ES-4.2, Section B.6.d) causes us to include control board mimics as a reference. Although, there is no limit on references, the exam is largely considered a closed book exam.
This is an attribute that is being tracked to inform operator licensing on the need for future NUREG revisions if too many references are being used. In this case, the mimics allow for a comparison which reduces the credibility of distractors.
DRAFT EXAM SUBMITTAL Changes are satisfactory.
63 H
F 2-4 x
B 2016 NRC Phil N
E Q now S 055A4.01 (T2/G2)
Cred. Dist.: C(1) and D(1) are not credible. It is not reasonable to think that condenser vacuum would improve when the equipment designed to maintain vacuum is malfunctioning. The K/A allows for testing interlocks; therefore a question could be written to solicit information pertaining to various interlocks.
Q rated as E due to use on previous NRC exam.
Q was replaced.
The new question uses the word MINIMUM in the question statement. Should this be MAXIMUM? The most direct method
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level would be to specifically solicit the setpoint. I.E. Steam dumps to the condenser will automatically close at a Tave setpoint of _____.
Q status left as E until this discussion point is resolved.
Setpoint now directly solicited. Q now sat. MAB 64 F
1 2-4 x
N U
Q now S G2.1.18 (T3)
Cred. Dist.: The level of credibility of the distractors is not acceptable. The question does not have the ability to discriminate and is LOD 1.
Suggest (my wording is unpolished, but the idea is presented below):
IAW OP-AA-100-1000, the receipt of an expected alarm A.
Is not required to be announced on the first occurrence or subsequent occurrences.
B.
Is required to be announced on the first occurrence and this announcement should include the reason. The CRS may permit subsequent alarms to not be announced.
C.
Is required to be announced on the first occurrence, but OP-AA-100-1000 does not state that the reason should be included in the announcement. The CRS may permit subsequent alarms to not be announced.
D.
Is required to be announced on the first occurrence and this announcement should include the reason.
Announcement of subsequent annunciations of the alarm are required, but the operator is not required to announce the reason on subsequent annunciations.
Above suggestion was incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 65 F
2-4 x
B 2016 NRC Phil E
Q now S G2.1.28 (T3) New KA G2.1.2 K/A: The question does not test a generic concept, rather it is testing Tier 2 Systems level knowledge only. Suggest testing generic component knowledge that transcends many different systems and in the process test a generic concept. If this is not possible, the K/A can re resampled.
If you cannot write to the original K/A, you may use the following re-sampled K/A: G2.1.2 - Knowledge of operator responsibilities during any mode of plant operation. (IR=4.1)
Randomly re-selected KA was used to develop an acceptable Q.
Q is now sat with the exception of missing words in the first question statement. The question status was left as E until the question statement is ensured to be correct. MAB Question statement revised. Q is now sat. MAB
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 66 F
2-4 x
B 2017 NRC Joe E
Q now S G2.2.12 (T3)
K/A: The question does not test a generic Surveillance concept. It is okay to test a piece of systems knowledge, but a generic surveillance procedure concept is still required to be tested.
Rated as E due to being on previous NRC exam.
Some recommendations include:
If a tech spec surveillance is not met, then the actions of the LCO are required to be entered. You can even use a specific LCO as an operational valid way to test the generic tech spec rules of usage.
Surveillance procedures many times have ALERT ranges, etc for results of the test where certain actions are required for acceptance criteria that fall in an ALERT range.
Some surveillance tests, such as startup physics testing, are considered Infrequently Performed Tests and Evolutions, and come with a host of requirements for IPTEs (but some of this may be SRO-only fodder).
Q was replaced and is now sat. MAB 67
(-)
F 1
1-2 x
N B
U Q now S G2.2.21 (T3)
Cred. Dist.: Performing post-MAINTENANCE testing following the performance of maintenance does not leave much room for plausibility of the other choice.
Cred. Dist.: Is there a situation at your facility where pre-conditioning valves is required. Not much credibility in requiring preconditioning.
LOD: Question does not discriminate at an appropriate level and requires replacement.
Q was replaced and is now sat. MAB 68
(+)
F 1-2 2-4 x
B 2019 NRC Lanyi E
Q now S G2.3.12 (T3)
Typo in first question statement: as MINIMUM should be a MINIMUM of.
License level: Many times the second part of this question would be accepted as SRO-only level knowledge. This comment is intended to ensure that the facility management agrees PTN considers this to be RO knowledge. The question is not whether an RO will know the answer, but whether or not the tested information comes from the pool of knowledge only required of SROs (and not ROs).
Operations stated that this was RO knowledge at TP.
Use of the word only can introduce unintended consequences to the integrity of a question as discussed in an earlier comment. The only knowledge being tested in the second half of the question is
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level whether or not the RP Managers approval is required. The question can more directly tests this knowledge by asking an (is) /
(is NOT) question for whether the RP Manager approval is required. This will test the exact same knowledge without introducing the unintended consequences of the word only.
Comment incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 69
(+)
F 1
2-4 N
U Q now S G2.4.45 (T3)
LOD: Red being the highest priority does not discriminate between competent and less than competent operator knowledge. Some of the information in the distractor analysis could be used to write a discriminating question.
Suggest:
IAW 0-ADM-219, a Priority 2 alarm is distinguished by a (YELLOW/BLUE) border and they (DO / Do NOT) require immediate response.
The above suggestion was incorporated. Q is now sat, but the status was left as U until the wording in the question statement and the answer choices are corrected - subject/verb agreement.
Above comment incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 70 H
1 2-4 x
B N
U Q now S 192006K1.13 (T4)
Cred. Dist.: The interplay between first and second parts of the answer choices damage the plausibility. I.E. It is extremely basic to understand that Xe is a poison. Buidl-up of a poison adding positive reactivity as stated in B is not credible.
LOD: Question does not discriminate at appropriate level.
Suggest:
Following a reactor trip from 100% power:
Shutdown margin 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after reactor trip will be (HIGHER THAN
/ THE SAME AS) shutdown margin immediately following the reactor trip - AND - Xe-135 concentration 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> after reactor trip will be (HIGHER / LOWER) than the Xe-135 concentration immediately following the reactor trip.
The above suggestion was incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 71
(-)
(+)
F 2
B S
192007K1.01 (T4)
No comments 72 H
1 2-4 x
x B
U Q now S 192008K1.12 (T4)
Partial: Tech Specs allow for a slightly positive MTC with a new core. Positive MTCs at this point in a fuel cycle are not uncommon.
The question needs to have a condition that would eliminate this as a potential correct answer. Suggest providing a burnup representative of MOL.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level The above comment was not addressed. Q status will remain as U until the comment is dispositioned. If MTC is positive, which is allowed by Tech Specs, then the correct answer is not actually correct.
LOD: Boration will always cause power to go down. Nothing else is really plausible when this is one of the choices.
Suggest:
IAW 3-GOP-301 Critical data (is / is NOT) required to be taken as soon as indications are indicative of a critical reactor - AND - the highest (SR / IR) nuclear instrument reading is required to be recorded as part of the critical data.
Licensee did not use the above suggestion. Instead, they replaced the first distractor.
See first comment - we need to ensure the first comment has been dispositioned prior to changing the status of this question.
EOL (not MOL) was added. Q is now sat. MAB 73 REF P
(+)
H 1
2-4 x
N U
Q now S 193003K1.02 (T4)
Cred. Dist.: A is not credible. Feedwater flow is going down quickly, yet SG level is going up. No plausible misconception present.
Cred. Dist.: B is not credible. Feedwater flow is going up and SG level is going down without much change in steam flow. No plausible misconception present.
Suggest:
Use similar conditions with blue channel steam pressure failing high. The test whether SG level initially goes up or down and then test something about how the operator is required to respond (perhaps whether immediate operator actions are required, or which procedure addresses the condition, etc.)
Above suggestion incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 74 H
F 1
2-4 x
B U
Q now S 193004K1.11 (T4)
Cred. Dist.: A and B are not credible. The condenser malfunctions with a lower circ water flow and these distractors are stating that the plant is more efficient? If lower flows through the condenser was more efficient then they would operate like this all the time.
The above comments was addressed. Q is now sat. MAB 75 H
2-4 x
x B
M E
Q now S 193009K1.02 (T4)
Stem Focus: In parentheses my translation is that it states that the laws of physics do not apply unless the question states that they apply. I am referring to core xenon does not change unless
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level stated. If xenon would change based on other conditions presented in the question, then the question cannot suspend the laws of physics. A question cannot be asked that relies on suspending the laws of physics.
Above comment addressed by deleting parenthetic statement.
Stem Focus: The question may be technically correct, but it may be presented in a confusing manner. This is just a check to see if you and both your Operations and Training Management are comfortable with any potential confusion. The goal of a test question should be for students without required knowledge to get the wrong answer and those with the knowledge to get the correct answer - the test question should not produce an unreliable result due to confusion.
I think what prompted my question is the question asking what will most significantly decrease the maximum There may be a way to test a similar concept by asking how parameters in the control room will change.
Cred. Dist.: In its current form, B does not contain much credibility as it pertains to the impact on axial power.
Modifications now make the question sat. MAB 76 H
2-4 x
M 2017 NRC Joe E
Q now S 011EA2.05 (T1/G1)
Stem Focus: To ensure that RHR pumps have been shut off, it may be necessary to state the ES-1.2 step that is being performed to ensure that they are beyond Step 2 where they would secure the RHR pumps. I.E. Slightly reword the second bullet to somethings like: Operators are performing the Step in ES-1.2 to verify SG Levels.
Third bullet states that RHR pumps are off. Q is sat. MAB 77 H
2-4 M
2016 NRC Phil S
026G2.4.2 (T1/G1)
No comments.
78 REF H
2 x
X x
M 2015 NRC Exam Bates E
E Q now S 029G2.4.28 (T1/G1) - PREREVIEW QUESTION Cred. Dist.: It is difficult to have all four levels of emergency classification be plausible with the same set of conditions. This format was accepted on a previous exam but I have not analyzed the conditions for plausibility of the distractors for that exam.
However, for this set of conditions with the reactor failing to trip from the control room and CETs at 750F, I can eliminate NOUE immediately. Also, with references provided, it is difficult to see how GE is plausible unless there is something that could be interpreted incorrectly to lead someone to the potential failure of the third barrier.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level Cues: Although it has been done in the past, providing the EAL Tables on a closed book written exam introduces a detailed cross-check exercise to ensure other questions are not impacted by any of the information in the provided references. Every piece of information would need to be scrutinized and cross-checked with all of the other questions on the test to ensure that no hints are provided on any of those other questions.
Suggestion: Is it possible to test how and whom to direct to shutdown the reactor outside of the control room during a security event? Also, consider which operators are supposed to report to certain stations, such as auxiliary shutdown panel, etc. It is difficult for me to provide specific suggestions without having your procedures that would be employed during such an event, but some of these ideas may work better than an E-Plan classification.
Classifications are more operationally valid when tested in a JPM or following a simulator scenario, although it is not entirely prohibited on written exams.
DRAFT EXAM SUBMITTAL Stem Focus: For the second part of the question, the question statement does not fit with the answer choices. The question statement or the answer choices require correction.
Question statement revised. Q is now sat. MAB 79 H
2-4 B
2019 NRC Lanyi S
055EA2.07 (T1/G1)
No comments.
80 H
2-4 x
N U
S 057G2.3.5 (T1/G1) - PREREVIEW QUESTION Cred. Dist.: Providing the Tech Spec as a reference renders 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to not be credible. I do not have any good ideas on how to make it plausible in its current form. Providing a reference is appropriate as we do not require the completion times greater than one hour to be committed to memory; however, when providing the reference, the distractors still need to be credible.
DRAFT EXAM SUBMITTAL Question is now satisfactory.
81 H
2-4 B
2016 NRC Phil S
WE04EA2.03 (T1/G1)
No comments.
82 H
2-4 N
S WE06EA2.16 (T1/G2) - PREREVIEW QUESTION
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level Typo: Question statement reads awkwardly with required NEXT required DRAFT EXAM SUBMITTAL Question remains satisfactory.
83 H
2-4 B
2017 NRC Joe E
Q now S 078AA2.07 (T1/G2)
The second question statement should solicit the required actions in accordance with a procedure. I.E. IAW the correct procedure selected in the first part of the question,..
Comment incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB Facility has listed as F, but it appears to be more of an H.
84
(-)
H 2
x N
U E
Q now S WE13G2.4.21 (T1/G2) - PREREVIEW QUESTION Cred. Dist.: The first part for FR-H.3 is not credible when S/G NR levels are not high.
Suggestion: Raise NR SG level for 3B SG to 85%. This would meet the criteria for FR-H.3 based on level, but the status tree would not take the operator to FR-H.3 because they would get directed to FR-H.2 before getting to the decision block for level being greater than 80%.
DRAFT SUBMITTAL Question is now satisfactory, but was rated E just to flag the following comment for consideration.
Yellow Path procedures are not required to be performed. I am just making one final check to ensure that you require SROs at Turkey Point to know Yellow Path Criteria and that Operations Management and Training Management is comfortable with this question being used to inform a licensing decision.
Operations management has stated that this is required closed-book knowledge. Q is sat. MAB 85 REF H
2-4 M
2017 NRC Joe S
WE16G2.4.41 (T1/G2)
EAL Tables will need to be reviewed against all other questions to ensure no information on the Tables provide inappropriate cues to other questions.
86
(-)
H 2-4 B
2019 NRC Lanyi M
S 003A2.06 (T2/G1)
No comments.
Condition in stem changed to solicit a different answer.
Q remains sat. MAB
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 87
(+)
H 2-4 x
N E
Q now S 004A2.06 (T2/G1) - PREREVIEW QUESTION Is Tref relevant when in Mode 3?
Cred. Dist.: C is not credible. Nothing is presented in the stem for an operator to doubt SRNI operability. Both channels are reading the same, so malfunction is not credible.
Cred. Dist.: D is not credible. Power is so low and they are in Mode 3, so it is obvious that PRNIs would indicate zero.
License Level: ROs are required to know abnormal operating entry conditions; therefore, the question is not testing SRO-only material.
Two blocks above the block that was highlighted in the SRO flowchart, asks if the question can be answered with AOP entry condition knowledge.
DRAFT REVIEW Is Tref relevant in Mode 3? Tref usually is determined by turbine first stage pressure, but turbine is not online in Mode 3.
Tref bullet was deleted.
Is there a way to not make the reason for the dilution be a clearance misposition which provides extra reasons for the student to get the second part of the answer correct. If the ONOP entry requires AOM notification anyway, then the clearance error information should be deleted. Perhaps an I&C error caused the dilution but was identified and corrected?
Clearance error was deleted. Q is now sat. MAB 88 REF H
1 2-4 x
B 2011 NRC Lea E
Q now S 005G2.2.45 (T2/G1)
Once an RHR pump is restored, it is obvious that LCO 3.5.2 covers the situation. Question rated as E due to being on previous NRC exam. See the following recommendation:
Sunday April 2:
13:00 3-OSP-50.2 begins for 3A RHR pump 13:30 3A RHR Pump Inop 13:57 3B RHR Pump Inop 1444 Shutdown starts 1551 3A RHR pump (the first pump that was inop) is OPERABLE (Note: Risk Informed Completion Time not to be considered)
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level At 13:57, after the 3B RHR Pump was declared inop, Tech Specs require the unit to be in Mode 3 by __1__ on Sunday April 2.
At 1551, after the 3A RHR Pump was declared OPERABLE, Tech Specs require the unit to be in Mode 3 by __2__ on Sunday April 9.
(1) (2)
A. 19:57 19:30 B. 20:57 19:30 C. 19:57 19:57 D. 20:57 19:57 Above suggestion incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 89
(-)
H 1
2-4 x
x B
M 2019 NRC U
Q now S 022A2.04 (T2/G1)
License Level: ROs are required to know Red and Orange Path SFST criteria. Therefore, no SRO only material is being tested.
Cred. Dist.: The first part distractors are not credible. With containment pressure very high, no spray pumps operating, and only one cooler operating with cooling water, it is obvious that another cooler is required. Even the justification for these distractors is based on them not recognizing that the outlet valve is closed.
NUREG-1021 requires the second part of the K/A to be tested, but it does not require the first part of the K/A to be tested. I mention this in case it helps with writing to meet the K/A at the SRO level.
The analysis for D states that E-0, Att 3, requires 3 running ECCs.
Is this a correct statement? Does Att 3 require 2 running ECCs?
Some ideas include:
containment flooding CCW leak in containment may impact RCS leak detection operability Replacement Question 2019-302 (Gary)
Stem Focus: Is there enough information in the stem to solicit a correct answer. In order to get through the Safety Function Status Trees and arrive at Z.2 for high sump level, a containment pressure must be provided in the stem. Also, providing containment spray status may enhance the plausibility? Suggest making containment pressure at 15 psig and spray pumps ON.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level Added containment pressure as suggested above. Q is now sat. MAB 90 F
2-4 N
S 062G2.4.42 (T2/G1)
No comments.
91 H
2-4 x
B 2017 NRC Joe E
Q now S.
034K1.06 (T2/G2)
Cred. Dist.: A subset issue exists for the first part of the answer choices. It is true that both HX & pumps must be operating in parallel prior to commencing offload, but it is also true that they must be operating if temp reaches 140F while moving fuel. This part of the question needs to ask in accordance with the NOP.
This may also require some minor rewording of the answer choices. I.E. IAW 4-NOP-033, which of the following correctly describes the requirement for SFP HX and pump operation?
A(1) and B(1): Both SFP heat exchangers and pumps are required to be placed in parallel operations prior to core off-load.
C(1) and D(1): Core off-load may commence with one SFP heat exchanger and pump in operation and the other SFP heat exchanger and pump in standby.
Source: How does this question differ in a material way from what was asked in 2017? If essentially no material difference exists, then the question should be labeled as a Bank question.
Q now designated as Bank. Q is now sat. MAB 92 REF
(-)
(+)
H 2-4 x
x x
M 2021 NRC Dave D U
Q now S E
Q now S 045G2.1.23 (T2/G2)
License Level: The procedure selection portion of the question can be answered using ONOP entry conditions, which is RO knowledge. In the SRO-only screening flow chart, the third evaluation block suggests this is an RO question. Suggest modifying the second part to tell the student that operators have entered 3-ONOP-90, then test whether the ONOP contains the steps to adjust MVARs or if the ONOP directs the operator to use the normal, or systems, operating procedure to make the adjustments.
Cred. Dist.: How is it credible for the MVAR limit to be higher than the current MVAR reading? Why would the US direct maintaining reactive load within a maximum limit for which they are already way under? Is there another value from the curve that could be used as the distractor - a value that is less than 350 MVAR?
Stem Focus: The first part of the question should directly solicit the information being tested, rather than asking for what an SRO might do. I.E. IAW the Steady State Stability Curves, the MAXIMUM Reactive Load is ______.
Question modified to test procedure content as well as the use of the capability curve. Q is now sat. MAB
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level Facility has requested that the question be replaced with Q93 from NRC exam 2019-302, but with a modified answer choice on the second half. Their justification is that the version of the question that was previously approved contained two correct answers.
Chief Examiner Comment: There is no reason to completely replace the question when the reason to replace the question can be fixed without testing completely different material. The second half question statement can be modified to: If MVAR indication is outside the allowable limit, the crew (is) / (is NOT) permitted to adjust MVAR using Attachment 5 of 3-GOP-301, Guidance for Adjusting System Voltage and Main Generator Reactive Load.
Testing whether it is permissible to use the GOP is a more meaningful evaluation that testing whether 3-ONOP-090 can be used (because of course it can). Incorporating the above comment allows for the same material to be tested as well as addresses the facilitys concerns as presented for two correct answers.
The above comment was incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 93 H
F 1
2-4 x
N B
2009 NRC U
Q now S 072A2.01 (T2/G2)
For the final submittal, ensure that the reference appears with the redacted information.
Cred. Dist.: There is only a problem with one channel in the stem of the questions. How is it credible for the student to think that there is an issue with two channels when no information is provided in the stem to even call into question the operability of another channel? With the reference provided, it is necessary to provide some information in the stem to call into question the operability of a second channel to create credibility in the second part-information that needs to be analyzed, yet in the end does not render the second channel inoperable.
The second question statement does not read correctly.
Cred. Dist.: Interplay issue with C between first and second half of question. If an applicant believes there is an inoperability of 2 channels, then they would choose immediately for the first half.
But then there is no possible misapplication to lead that person to also determine that they would be able to stay there indefinitely.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level With the reference provided it is pretty much a direct look-up to assess the operability of the channels. Consider degrading the voltage to one of the power supplies to the rad monitor that is still operable - assuming that the power supply would remain operable with a slightly degraded voltage. The question would then have the correct answer hinge on an operability determination at the SRO level. Then the Tech Spec could be supplied and test an acceptable level of knowledge. Using this suggestion, you could go back to the previous version and simply state that the one monitor failed low, then state a degraded voltage for the safety-related power supply for the second channel. This would eliminate the need for the tech spec tables with the setpoints.
Multiple NRC examiners agree that the facility proposed question does not discriminate at an acceptable level. See suggestion below.
Q98 from the 2013 exam tests knowledge of the KA and has previous NRC exam pedigree from the 2013 and 2009 NRC exams. This is an acceptable question for 2023 as well. I will send a password protected pdf file containing the question.
A version of the above question was incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 94
(+)
(-)
F 1
2-4 x
N U
Q now S G2.1.1 (T3)
Cred, Dist.: Events can happen any time night or day - it only makes sense that the SM has the say in when turnover occurs for his shift. In other words, the AOM is not a credible choice.
Cred. Dist.: It is common sense that turnover would not occur during a runback or transient. Therefore, the alternative distractors are not credible.
The lack of credible distractors results in LOD=1. The question does not discriminate at an acceptable level.
Suggest the following:
IAW OP-AA-100-1000, The STA (is) / (is NOT) required to complete a control board walkdown prior to taking the STA watch; AND, the SM (is) / (Is NOT) required to complete a control board walkdown prior to taking the SM watch.
Above suggestion incorporated. Q is now sat. MAB 95 H
2-4 x
M B
E Q now S G2.1.43 (T3)
Typo in question statement: withing Just double checking that the nomenclature of 4% is the correct display of the information for QPTR. Tech Specs are written as a decimal of 1 - I.E. 1.04. Your QPTR format may be correct for the format of those calculations, in which case no changes to the displayed information are needed. This comments is just intended
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level to ensure the information is provided in the question the same way it would be displayed in the plant.
Above comment addressed.
Also, I just want to double check that SROs are required to know greater than one hour actions from memory. Do not submit this question in your final submittal if both Operations and Training Management are not willing to accept this as memory level test material.
To address the above comment, the actual time requirement is no longer tested.
Q is now sat. MAB 96 F
2-4 x
N M
2019-301 NRC U
Q now S G2.2.15 (T3)
K/A: No generic concept is being tested. The material in the question is system-specific.
Suggest considering material for managing plant configuration such as whether or not a post-outage checklist can be closed out when components are being controlled by another process, such as being part of a tagout, etc. This is just an example to give you an idea of how to test a generic concept for a Tier 3 question.
Q modified.
Q is now sat. MAB 97
(+)
(+)
H 2-4 B
2017 NRC Joe S
G2.2.37 (T3)
No comments.
98 F
2-4 x
B 2017 NRC Joe M
U Q now S G2.3.11 (T3)
Wording suggestion for the question statement for soliciting what the US will do. The more appropriate question is to solicit which procedure is required to be performed.
K/A: The question does not test a generic knowledge item. The material is specific to equipment and malfunctions of that equipment.
Suggest testing administrative requirements associated with an SROs role for controlling radiation releases. Is temporary monitoring permissible? Whos approval is needed if certain unusual circumstances are present for a release? - SM? Rad Pro Manager? Etc.
Above suggestion incorporated.
Q is now sat. MAB 99 F
2-4 B
2016 NRC Phil S
G2.4.16 (T3)
K/A: Credit given for T3 concepts wrt whether it is permissible to perform an ONOP while in the EOP network.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 100
(+)
(-)
F 2-4 N
S G2.4.50 (T3)
No comments.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6.
Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia #/Units Logic Q-K/A License Level Instructions:
Refer to ES-4.2 for the definitions of terms used in this worksheet for the written examination. Review each question (Q) as submitted and as subsequently revised and document the following in the associated worksheet columns:
- 1.
Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2.
Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) from 1 (easy) to 5 (difficult); mark direct lookup questions (applicant can directly determine the answer from the provided reference) as LOD 1. A question is (U)nsatisfactory if it is LOD 1 or LOD 5.
- 3.
Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
Stem Focus: The stem lacks enough focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Cues: The stem or one or more answer choices contains cues (e.g., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
T/F: All of the answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Cred. Dist.: The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors require (E)nhancement, and more than one noncredible distractor in the same question results in an (U)satisfactory question.
Partial: One or more distractors are partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by the stem). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- 4.
Check the appropriate box if a job content flaw is identified:
Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid knowledge or ability (K/A) but, as written, is not operational in content). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed-reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- /Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Logic: The question requires backward or reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- 5.
Check the first box if a K/A mismatch flaw exists. Check the second box if the question is flawed because it is written at the wrong license level. Either condition results in an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- 6.
Enter the questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of ES-4.2.
- 7.
Based on the review performed in steps 2-5, mark the question as (U)nsatisfactory, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory.
- 8.
Fully explain the reason for any (U) in column 7 (e.g., how the psychometric attributes are not being met).
Save the initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound question is marked by an (S) on this form.
LOK (F/H)
LOD SF Cue T/F Cred.
Dist.
Par Job Link Minutia