05000286/LER-2005-003, Regarding Inadvertent Actuation and Automatic Start of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps During Reactor Protection Logic Testing Due to Personnel Error
| ML052070759 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/2005 |
| From: | Dacimo F Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-05-086 LER 05-003-00 | |
| Download: ML052070759 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B), System Actuation |
| 2862005003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
En tery Entergy Nuclear Northeast Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Tel 914 734 6700 Fred Dacimo Site Vice President Administration July 15, 2005 Indian Point Unit No. 3 Docket Nos. 50-286 NL-05-086 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-Pl-17 Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Licensee Event Report # 2005-003-00, "Inadvertent Actuation and Automatic Start of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps During Reactor Protection Logic Testing Due to Personnel Error."
Dear Sir:
The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2005-003-00 is the follow-up written report submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This event is of the type defined in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an event recorded in the Entergy corrective action process as Condition Report CR-IP3-2005-02626.
There are no commitments contained in this letter. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Patric W. Conroy, Manager, Licensing, Indian Point Energy Center at (914) 734-6668.
Fred R. Dacimo Site Vice President Indian Point Energy Center
Docket No. 50-286 NL-05-086 Page 2 of 2 Attachment: LER-2005-003-00 cc:
Mr. Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator - Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office Resident Inspector Indian Point Unit 3 Mr. Paul Eddy State of New York Public Service Commission INPO Record Center
Abstract
On May 16, 2005, at approximately 10:39 hours, both motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps automatically started after exceeding the actuation circuit 28 second time delay during performance of the low-low level steam generator water level section of procedure 3-PT-M13B1, Reactor Protection Logic Channel Functional Test.
The steam driven AFW pump did not start.
Upon recognition of pump start, operators secured the pumps.
The apparent cause was personnel error due to failure to utilize adequate work practices.
An Instrumentation and Control technician timing the AFW actuation circuit after being armed, stepped into the control room board area and became distracted and failed to notify the test technician for release of the arming signal.
Corrective actions included briefing I&C personnel on the event and counseling I&C personnel on management expectations for remaining focused on the job.
The test procedure will be revised to eliminate the need to leave the test area and minimize the time needed for an arming signal to be present.
High intensity training will be established for I&C personnel on selection and use of human performance tools.
The event had no effect on public health and safety.
(If more space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Event Analysis
The event is reportable under 10CFR50.73Ca)(2)(iv)(A).
The licensee shall report any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
Systems to which the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) apply for this event include the AFWS.
This event meets the reporting criteria because the AFWS was actuated on a low-low steam generator level signal due to actuation of the logic during testing.
Past Similar Events A review of the past two years of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for events that involved an ESF actuation identified no LERs.
Safety Significance
This event had no effect on the health and safety of the public.
There were no actual safety consequences for the event because Operators were aware of the possibility of an inadvertent AFW pump start during testing and have alarms/indications alerting them to AFW pump start. The operators had adequate time to terminate AFW pump operation and limit any addition of AFW into the SGs.
Operators during this event recognized the AFW pump start and took appropriate actions in accordance with plant procedures to limit the effects of an inadvertent AFW actuation.
Operators did not observe any reactivity changes as a result of this event.