05000286/LER-2005-001, Regarding Plant in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Error Making Control Room Ventilation System Inoperable
| ML050910143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/2005 |
| From: | Dacimo F Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-05-029 LER 05-001-00 | |
| Download: ML050910143 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2862005001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Entergy Nuclear Northeast Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB
- -"Ent a vP.O.
Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Tel 914 734 6700 Fred Dacimo Site Vice President Administration March 23, 2005 Re:
Indian Point Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-286 NL-05-029 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Stop O-P1-17 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2005-001-00, "Plant in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to Error Making Control Room Ventilation System Inoperable"
Dear Sir:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. (ENO) hereby provides Licensee Event Report (LER) 2005-001-00. The enclosed LER identifies an event where the plant was operated in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). This condition has been recorded in the ENO Corrective Action Program as Condition Report CR-IP3-2005-00315.
There are no new commitments identified in this letter. Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Patric W. Conroy, Manager, Licensing at (914) 734-6668.
Sincerely, d R. Dacimo Site Vice President Indian Point Energy Center cc: next page
NL-05-029 Page 2 of 2 cc: Mr. Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator - Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office Indian Point Energy Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Paul Eddy New York State Public Service Commission INPO Record Center 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339-5957
Abstract
On January 26, 2005, at approximately 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br />, with steady state reactor power at 100%, Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) determined that the Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) "B" damper was operating with linkage in the reverse position and therefore was inoperable (it would open on a close signal and close to the incident mode on an open signal).
Damper B is designed to allow filtered outside air intake in the 10 Percent Incident mode and to isolate outside air intake during normal operation and the 100 Percent Incident mode.
This condition was determined to have existed since May 5, 2001.
The apparent cause of this event was incomplete work instructions in that no details as to how to connect the linkage were included in the installation work package.
These details were not available when the work package was issued.
Contributing was the failure of the post work test to determine that damper B was not closed in the Normal and 100 Percent Incident mode.
The condition was determined to be a violation of Technical Specifications.
Corrective action was taken to repair damper B. Additional corrective action will be taken to determine why the post work test did not detect that damper B was incorrectly configured and to initiate corrective action on how to determine the damper is closed.
There was no significant effect on the public health and safety since the system maintained required functional capability.
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
EVENT ANALYSIS
This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant operating in a condition prohibited by TS.
Damper B has been inoperable since May 5, 2001.
The TS bases state that "The CRVS is considered Operable when the individual components necessary to limit operator exposure are OPERABLE in both trains."
This includes damper B. The damper remained inoperable until repaired after entry into TS 3.7.11 condition C on January 25, 2005 to perform tracer gas testing.
A review was conducted of Licensee Event Reports (LER) in the past two years for non-compliance with TS.
LER 2003-004 reported a TS non-compliance due to improper document use.
EVENT SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE This event had no significant effect on the health and safety of the public.
There were no actual safety consequences because the plant was not challenged, while damper B was inoperable, by an actual event that could affect the habitability of the Control Room.
Additionally, there was no loss of safety function for the CRVS.
As demonstrated by surveillance test, the 10 Percent Incident mode flow requirements were met with the inoperable damper. During normal operation the open damper B would not affect charcoal filter operability since the dampers to the two booster fans were closed effectively eliminating flow.
The 100 Percent Incident mode, which was affected, is entered for toxic gas and smoke events, but is not solely relied upon to maintain CR habitability.
The CR requires the use of self contained breathing apparatus, with backup air bottles, by CR personnel to maintain habitability for a toxic gas or smoke event.
The close signal to damper B during the 100 Percent Incident mode would allow the introduction of a greater amount of toxic gas due to the damper opening.
However, SCBA are donned prior to loss of habitability. The operators also had the manual outside air isolation damper available to isolate the CR (it is intended to be redundant to damper B should it fail).
Therefore the function of the 100 Percent Incident mode was maintained.
Since the CR functions were not lost, the event had no significant effect on public health and safety.