05000461/LER-2011-003, Regarding Inadequate Procedure Direction Results in Missed Response Time Testing

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Regarding Inadequate Procedure Direction Results in Missed Response Time Testing
ML11293A045
Person / Time
Site: Clinton Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/13/2011
From: Noll W
Exelon Nuclear
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
U-604040 LER 11-003-00
Download: ML11293A045 (4)


LER-2011-003, Regarding Inadequate Procedure Direction Results in Missed Response Time Testing
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
4612011003R00 - NRC Website

text

Exelon.

Nuclear Clinton Power Station 8401 Power Road Clinton, IL 61727 U-604040 10 CFR 50.73 October 13, 2011 SRRS 5A.108 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 NRC Docket No. 50-461

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 2011-003-00 Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2011-003-00: Inadequate Procedure Direction Results in Missed Response Time Testing. This report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this report.

Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact S. Fatora, at (217)-

937-2500.

Respectfully, William G. Noll Site Vice President Clinton Power Station RSF/blf

Enclosures:

Licensee Event Report 2011-003-00 cc:

Regional Administrator - NRC Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Clinton Power Station Office of Nuclear Facility Safety - IEMA Division of Nuclear Safety

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10-2010)

, the NRC may reach block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the digits/characters for einformation collection.

3. PAGE Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 05000461 1 OF 3
4. TITLE Inadequate Procedure Direction Results in Missed Response Time Testing
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR N/A N/A FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 31 2011 2011 003 00 10 13 11 N/A N/A

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

[: 20.2201(b)

EJ 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 El 20.2201(d)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

[I 20.2203(a)(1)

[I 20.2203(a)(4)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

[I 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0l 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

El 73.71 (a)(4) 97.0 El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71 (a)(5)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

[

50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in not lead the work planner to determine that the TS SR of a Response Time Test was required to be performed.

D.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The safety significance of this event was minimal. Although the affected channels were not tested at the time of replacement, there is reasonable assurance that the channels would have performed their safety function as demonstrated by Response Time Testing conducted with acceptable results in subsequent refueling outages following the switch replacements. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function for any of the channels.

Additionally, had the TCV Fast Closure function for any of the affected channels not been able to meet TS SRs, at least two of the four channels were always available and properly tested with current surveillances and would have provided adequate protection to satisfy the two-out-of-four logic for RPS actuation.

E.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Procedure MA-AA-716-012, "Post Maintenance Testing," has been revised to identify that a Response Time Test needs to be considered as possible PMT for replacing a pressure switch.

Model Work Orders for TCV Fast Closure Pressure Switch Replacement will be revised to include the required Response Time Testing PMT.

F.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A review for previous occurrences did not identify similar events at CPS.

G.

COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

This is not applicable, as no component failure occurred.