ML18095A845
| ML18095A845 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1991 |
| From: | Blumberg N, Caphton D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18095A843 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-90-28, 50-311-90-28, 50-354-90-24, NUDOCS 9104090024 | |
| Download: ML18095A845 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000272/1990028
Text
Report Nos.:
Docket Nos.:
License Nos.:
Licensee:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/90-28
50-311/90-28
50-354/90-24
50-272
50-311
50-354
Public Service Electric and Gas Company
80 Park Plaza - 17C
Newark, New Jersey
Facility Name: Salem Units 1&2 and Hope Creek Generating Station
Inspection At: Hancocks, Bridge, New Jersey
.inspection Conducted:
December 3 - 7, 1990
Inspectors:
Approved by:
cp-;((fi~
D. L. Caphton, Senior Technical
Team Leader, Operations Branch,
Reviewer,
P. D. Drysdale, Senior Reactor Engineer
H. K.
Lathrop~ Resident Inspector Hope Creek
D. R. Taylor, Reactor Engineer
~~y-
N. J. Blumberg, Chief
Operational Programs Section
Operations Branch, DRS
---~/!6/91
' Date
Date
1
Inspection Summary:
Inspection December 3 - 7, 1990 (Combined*Report Nos.
50-272/90-28, 50-311/90-28 and 50-354/90-24)
Areas Inspected:
Special inspection to review the licensee 1s maintenance work
order backlog, material/spare parts unavailability, and material/spare parts
handling and storage as related to maintenance.
Results:
Of the areas inspected, one violation, failure to perform preventive
maintenance on a safety-related core spray pump motor in storage, was iden-
tified.
The licensee 1s inventory records for materials and spare parts was
inaccurate.
Salem 1s work order backlog was relatively higher than for Hope
Creek.
Safety-related equipment spare parts are being provided when needed.
A
new procurement and material control department has been established, improved
management controls are being implemented, and improvements were noted.
9104090024 910326
ADOCK 05000272
G
Executive Summary
An inspection at Salem and Hope Creek was performed on December 3 through
December 7, 1990, to assess the effect of parts unavailability and backlog on
maintenance and operational safety.
Continuing material control problems were
readily apparent to both the inspection team and the licensee.
However, the
overall direction and goals of the Procurement and Material Controls (P&MC)
program, if fully implemented, should correct these problems.
The inspectors
found that when safety significant spare parts were needed, management atten-
tion commensurate with the level of.importance was dir~cted towards obtaining
~he parts.
No cases were identified where the unavailability of safety-related
spare parts impacted adversely upon operational safety.
The inspectors acknowledged management involvement in overcoming material
control problems; however, they noted progress to be slow, especially in the
effort to reconcile the total quantity of existing warehouse material with
inventory records.
Background
NRC inspection reports have noted that a large number of maintenance work
orders have been delayed or not scheduled, due to spare parts unavailability.
The NRC staff also expressed concerns regarding the large backlog of maintenance
work orders for both Salem units.
At the time of this inspection, Salem 1/2
had outstanding more than 2900 corrective and planned non-outage work orders
and approximately 900 overdue preventive maintenance (PM) work orders.
Based
on a licensee performance indicator report for January through August 1990,
Salem's percentage of corrective maintenance work orders greater than 90 days
old was slightly higher than the industry median while Hope Creek was below the
median.
More significant was the percentage of overdue PM's at Salem which was
approximately seven times higher than the industry median.
Hope Creek was
below the median.
Approximately three years ago, Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) initi-
ated a program to address problems with parts availability and inventory
control.
They established a centralized materials and spare parts storage
warehouse (TB-1).
Subsequent to this initiative, the warehouse was condemned
and evacuated because of structural inadequacies; materials and spare parts
were relocated to other buildings ~nd onsite warehouse space restraints resulted
in the receiving warehouse being relocated to Salem, New Jersey.
The relocation
of materials and spare parts impacted adversely on inventory control and the
ability to locate spare parts in the inventory.
The computer software existing
at the time could not handle more than three possible location entries.
At the
time of this inspection there were eight storage locations for Artificial Island.
A general manager was appointed in April 1990 to address and correct problems
relating to procurement, receipt, storage and handling of materials, spare
parts and equipment.
The P&MC department was reorganized under his direction .
Results/Findings
The inspectors noted that spare parts problems and the maintenance work order
backlog were considerably greater for the two Salem units than for Hope Creek.
More than 11% of Salem's approximate 3700 non-outage work orders were on hold
because of parts unavailability.
The inspectors noted this percentage to be
high, considering the large parts inventory for the two sites.
The total inventory of materials and spare parts for both sites was estimated
by licensee representatives to be approximately 97,000 line items ( 11 class'codes 11 ).
T_hey also estimated that approximately 30% of this inventory was obsolete.
In
addition, the inspectors found that actual material quantities on hand often
did not match the inventory records.
Inaccurate and out-of-date records were
used as original input data for the computerized inventory currently in use.
To increase the level of confidence in the inventory, the licensee assigned two
people to an inventory reconciliation effort.
This effort was initiated in
August 1990; however, at the time of this inspection, only 2,807 of the 97,000
line items were completed.
The inspectors noted that thi~ effort was inadequate
relative to the inventory size.
Additionally, PSE&G has employed a company for
an estimated three-year initiative to research bills-of-mate1*ial for updating
component identification and material class codes.
The
inspe~tors concluded
that problems exist in inventory control and that the licensee still does not
know with an adequate level of confidence what spare parts are available in
inventory.
Improvement goals for the new P&MC organization were established and progress
was documented; however, the inspectors considered improvements to be slow.
Improvements in many areas appeared to be tied to completion of the new ware-
house, which had already been delayed.
When completed, the new warehouse will
be used to consolidate most of the materials and spare parts inventory, includ-
ing receiving and inspection, into one central warehouse facility for both
sites.
This is now scheduled for completion in the Fall of 1991 at an onsite
location directly accessible to both stations.
Under the new P&MC organiza-
tion, many other improvements have been initiated such as the addition of a
state-of-the-art computer invento*ry software program called Warehouse
Automated Material Management System (WAMMS).
The WAMMS program is currently
in place, and its use is being expanded as new and updated data is entered into
the system.
The inspectors identified one violation involving the failure to provide stor-
age controls required by standards and procedures for a spare safety-related
core spray pump motor.
Preventive maintenance had not been performed as
required on the motor, and required space heaters were not connected.
Other findings included:
A number of work orders and spare parts are currently on hold due to the
loss of identification and traceability (Paragraph 6.0) .
After materials and spare parts were issued, it took two days to input
information into the WAMMS to adjust the computer inventory.
This delay
was caused by the batch loading process used by PSE&G (Paragraph 6.0).
Onsite QA personnel at Hope Creek were not certified to perform receipt
inspection for safety-related or commercial materials that were directly
delivered to Hope Creek Station (Paragraph 3.0).
The general condition of the Salem storeroom was found to be overcrowded
(Paragraph 4.0).
Attachment 1 lists attendees at meetings conducted during the inspection, and
Attachment 2 provides a listing of documents reviewed .
DETAILS
1.0 Maintenance Backlog
The objective of this area of inspection was to gain a historical
perspective of the maintenance backlog at the Salem and Hope Creek sites
and to determine which types of maintenance are in the backlog.
Findings
Maintenance backlog status at Salem and Hope Creek is presented to management
weekly during one of the daily management summary meetings.
Maintenance
backlog is obtained through the Material Management Information System
(MMIS).
This system has the capability to list backlog in various arrays,
for example, preventive maintenance (PM) work orders on hold for parts.
For Salem, the information currently presented to ~anagement includes
corrective maintenance (CM) work orders greater than 90 days old, outage
and non-outages overdue PM 1 s, work activities on hold, and the total
number of corrective and planned maintenance work orders.
Hope Creek 1s
report is formatted differently from Salem; however, tne information
presented is basically the same.
To gain a perspective of how the licensee compares to the industry median,
the inspectors reviewed the licensee 1s comparative performance indicator
reports.
These reports present percentages of the corrective maintenance
backlog, preventive maintenance overdue, and the preventive maintenance
ratio (PM manhours/(PM +CM) manhours).
Data from these reports follow.
1989 Indicator
Salem
Ho12e Creek
Industry Median
Corrective Maintenance Backlog
48.8
44.7
50.7
Preventive Maintenance Overdue
19.3
3.4
3.4
Preventive Maintenance Ratio
51. 9
57.4
49.7
1990 Indicator through 8/90
Salem
Ho12e Creek
Industry Median
Corrective Maintenance Backlog
53.7
42.6
51.0
Preventive Maintenance Overdue
30.0
2.-3
4.3
Preventive Maintenance Ratio
34.4
40.0
47.5
The 1990 report showed that while performance had declined in all three
categories at Salem, Hope Creek generally showed *improvements.
The most
notable statistic was the preventive maintenance overdue indicator.
Salem's 1990 PM overdue indicator of 30 was approximately seven times
6
the industry median.
However, it should be noted that both units at Salem
were shutdown during portions of the 1990 reporting period which would
tend to drive this number higher because of the corrective maintenance
focus during outages.
At the time of the inspection, Salem had approximately
900 overdue PMs.
Of these, only a small percentage were held up for
parts.
The majority had a low priority rating.
Although the number of PM
work orders on hold for parts was low, the total number of activities on
hold for parts at Salem was much higher.
At the time of the inspection,
there were over 420 work activities on hold for parts.
This represented
greater than eleven percent of the total number of
non-outage planned and
corrective maintenance work orders and PMs that were overdue.
The 420
activities did not include activities on hold for engineering because of
parts-related concerns. Activities on hcild for parts are discussed further
in the next section.
At the time of this *inspection there were 975 non-outage corrective main-
tenance work orders greater than 90 days old at Salem.
This number was as
high as 1425 in September of 1990.
Hnpe Creek's corrective maintenance
backlog was 461 and overdue PMs were 57.
Conclusion
Both Hope Creek and Salem keep management informed of backlog status by
reports and a weekly meeting.
The current backlog at Salem is high, and
performance indicators generally show Salem to be worse than the industry
median for the three categories provided.
2.0 Maintenance Awaiting Spare Parts
To assess what affect maintenance awaiting spare parts had on plant
safety and reliability, the inspectors examined safety-related (SR) and
nonsafety-related (NSR) maintenance work orders on hold for parts,
interviewed licensee representatives and reviewed documentation.
Findings
Work order priorities at Salem and Hope Creek are defined in Nuclear
Administrative Procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0009 (Q), Rev. 2, "Work Control
Process.
11
Work order priorities for non-outage maintenance ~re divided
into seven categories; A, 8, 1, 2, 3, 4, or S.
11A11 is the highest priority
and is reserved for emergency work requiring immediate attention, while a
priority
11 4
11 is reserved for plant betterment activ-ities such as painting
and general housekeeping.
Priority
11 S
11 reflects any work pertaining to
the safety of personnel regardless of severity.
For outages, work orders
are given priorities 01, 02; or 03 depending on the type of the work to be
performed.
7
To determine the effect that spare parts unavailability is having at
Salem, the inspectors examined work activities in a hold-for-parts (HP)
status or a pre-stage (PS) hold-status.
Salem classifies an activity as
HP or PS if the part required for the activity is a non-stock item or
normally stocked, but shows a iero balance in inventory.
At the time of
this inspection, .over 420 non-outage work activities were in a PS or HP
hold-status.
Of these approximately one third were designated as SR.
Only one was assigned a priority of B; however, it was later changed to a
priority one.
Of the remaining activities in a PS or HP hold, over 50%
were assigned a priority 1.
A third hold category used, hold-for-
engineering, had work orders in a hold-status because of parts related
problems.
This category included activities such as parts requiring an
engineering evaluation because of obsolescence.
As a result of sampling SR and NSR work orders and as indicated by
interviews with maintenance planners, operations, and warehouse personnel,
the inspectors noted that on occasion the wrong part is issued and arrives
at the job site.
One example of this was a ten-turn adjustable potentio-
meter used for high voltage adjustment on nuclear instrumentation (NI)
drawers.
Procurement and Material Control Department Problem Report (PR)
2402643185 reflects this p~oblem. The work for this job was initiated by
Work Order (WO) - 880825096 to replace a defective source range adjustment
The work was put on hold when a screwdriver adjustment
type potentiometer was provided to replace the currently installed knob
adjustment type potentiometer.
The work order was subsequently transferred
over to W0-891012133 which was still in a hold status at the time of this
inspection.
Interviews conducted with planners and warehouse personnel
indicated there were other occasions where a wrong part was provided to
the job site.
No case was identified by the inspectors where a wrong
part was actually installed.
The corrective and preventive maintenance backlog because of parts-related
problems at Hope Creek was much lower than at Salem.
For example, of the
159 work orders on engineering hold, only ten were parts-related (as of
12/4/90).
Operations personnel interviewed indicated that spare/replace-
ment parts for SR equipment had been available when needed or if unavail-
able, management had not hesitated to obtain the parts as expeditiously as
possible.
One supervisor stated that spares would often be ~rovided and
staged
11 just in case
11 , a practice which, for example, allowed the timely
replacement of a safety auxiliaries cooling water pump casing in
October 1990, avoiding a unit shutdown.
Even though a large number and
percentage of work orders were in a hold-for-parts status at Salem, it did
not appear that safety-significant problems were being held up by parts.
While safety-significant parts problems at Hope Creek appeared to be
resolved in a timely manner, some operations people interviewed indicated
that spare parts problems of lesser significance had been long standing,
for example, control room nuisance alarms, loose parts and vibration
monitoring and river water level instrumentation .
8
The inspector also noted a number of parts/equipment issues related to
equipment obsolescence, a problem already noted by various regulatory and
nuclear inqustry organizations.
The licensee stated that to date, equip-
ment problems had not adversely affected unit operation.
The inspectors
noted a number of spares had been obtained from equipment belonging to the
previously cancelled Hope Creek second unit.
Conclusion
Corrective and preventive maintenance problems related to parts were more
evident at Salem than at Hope Creek.
Concerns regarding the time frame in
which lower priority parts problems are resolved appeared at both sites.
However, interviews and inspection indicated that safety-significant parts
problems are handled expediently at both Salem and Hope Creek.
3.0 Receiving Inspections
A number cf aspects associated with the* receipt inspection of both commer-
cial grade and quality control materials were evaluated with respect to
their impact on the timely availability of the correct spare/replacement
parts at the job site.
Findings
Receipt inspections are performed at both the Artificial Island receiving
warehouse (in Salem, NJ) and the Salem/Hope Creek sites.
The vast majority
of received material goes to the Artificial Island receiving warehouse;
however, direct/local deliveries, radioactive components and nuclear fuel
are typically received at the appropriate reactor facility.
The rec.eiving
warehouse in Salem has been in operation since August 1989.
Plans are
being made to relocate receiving to a new warehouse building onsite which
is scheduled to open in the fall of 1991.
An inspection of the receiving warehouse was performed on December 6, 1990.
The receiving warehouse was found to be clean and operated in an orderly
manner.
Materials arriving at the loading dock are checked by stock handlers
for damage, correct quantity, logged in and located to an appropriate
receiving holding grid.
All materials are subsequently subjected to a
commercial receipt inspection performed by certified stock handlers.
If
the materials pass the commercial receipt inspection and are not designated
SR materials, the materials are appropriately tagged and repacked for
shipment to a designated on-site warehouse.
Safety-Related materials are
processed through a receipt inspection performed by the Material Compli-
ance Quality Assurance (MCQA) inspection staff.
QA also maintains a
laboratory at receiving for use in verifying critical characteristics of
materials being inspected when required by procurement documentation .
9
The inspector sampled several SR-items already inspected and interviewed
inspection personnel.
Inspected items were found to be properly tagged.
A location was set aside for nonconforming materials.
Based upon interviews
with personnel, current processing time for receiving SR-materials is
running from 18 to 25 days.
Provisions do exist to expedite materials
through the receiving process when required.
Receipt for a few items bypass the Artificial Island rece1v1ng warehouse
and go directly to the site, for example, fuel and contaminated items.
These are classified as direct delivery items.
Several concerns were
identified with receipt inspection of direct delivery quality related
material at Hope Creek. For example, Nuclear Quality Assurance Procedure
GMA-QAP-4-1,
11 Receiving Inspection
11 , Section 6.3.1, stated that
11 receipt
inspection of Q-listed (SR) items on equipment received directly at the
station shall be inspected by Station Quality Assurance.
11
Hope Creek's
station quality assurance (SQA) inspectors, however, were not certified to
perform all such receipt inspections except for deliveries of nuclear fuel.
Several receiving inspections performed by the SQA inspectors (receipt of
neutron monitoring equipment in October 1990 and three safety-relief valves
in October 1989) did not provide all verification information required by
Section 6.3.3 of GMA-QAP4-l.
The *information and requirements necessary
to enable physical verification by SQA had not been provided by MCQA, as
directed in Section 6.3.3 of GMA-QAP-4-1.
SQA personnel indicated that
such information was not usually available at the time surveillances were
performed.
However, the receipt inspection performed by SQA was in ac-
cordance with their procedures.
The inspector concluded that a weakness
in the licensee's quality assurance program existed, namely, responsi-
bilities and qualifications for several interacting quality assurance
groups were not adequately integrated in applicable implementing procedures.
This concern remains unresolved pending the licensee's implementation of
corrective actions (discussions upon which were initiated before the
inspection ended) and demonstration of their effectiveness (UNR 90-24-01
and 90-28-01).
Conclusions
Receiving inspections of SR-materials were relatively slow, taking from 18
to 25 days to process through receiving.
Provisions do exist to expedite
materials through the process when required.
A weakness was identified
regarding direct delivery of SR items to the reactor facilities in that
the responsibilities and qualifications for the interfacing quality as-
surance groups were not well described procedurally.
The receiving
inspections conducted at the receiving warehouse were observed to be
adequate.
4.0 Warehouse Activities
The inspectors visited warehouses onsite and offsite to observe the
general physical conditions of material storage areas, and to assess the
10
state of cleanliness and the level of protection provided.
Walkdown
inspections of stored items were conducted to determine if identification
and quantities were in accordance with inventory records.
Interviews with
warehouse and maintenance department personnel were also conducted to
assess the methods and levels of control over stored material/spare parts
including release of items to user organizations.
Findings
PSE&G currently operates eight separate warehouses and storerooms for all
the material needs of both Salem and Hope Creek stations.
This situation
has evolved over a number of years dating from original construction of
each unit and from the need to keep certain warehouse activities separate.
In 1987, a decision was made and implemented to consolidate and simplify
the overa 11 materi a 1 contra 1 processes for a 11 units by centra 1 i zing a 11
warehouse activities at Artificial Island into one facility (building
TB-1)
In 1989, TB-1 was discovered to have major structural and foundation
problems and the licensee was forced to evacuate the entire building.
All
warehouse activities were consequently redistributed into the eight
separate locations which exist today.
Some existing facilities were
converted to warehouse space from other functions, and an additional
facility in the town of Salem, NJ was acquired for the purpose of mafntain-
ing one central receiving station.
The current facilities are designated
for separate storage functions (e.g., bulk storage, hazardous material
storage, staging of materials for plant modifications, etc.).
Large
quantities of material are often transferred between warehouses from the
time they ar~ initially received until they are eventually released to a
user organization.
With the exception of the Salem and Hope Creek
storerooms, each warehouse is involved in providing material needs for all
three units.
A concern arising from observations of warehouse activities is the licensee 1 s
practice of not physically segregating nonconforming from conforming
material, or non safety-related (NSR) from safety-related (SR) material.
No instances were witnessed by the inspectors where this practice allowed
the wrong material to be released from the warehouse.
However, licensee
representatives reported that the release of improperly identified material
from the warehouses was not a rare occurrence.
Station QA p~rsonnel
reported that special non-routine surveillances of the Salem and Hope Creek
storerooms had been performed recently because of problems encountered
while observing field maintenance activities.
Instances had.been noted
where the wrong material was released for use in plant equipment.
The
inspectors reviewed selected surveillance reports and noted several
significant problems reported as follows:
Eleven Limitorque MDV motors in storage were damaged and not tagged
as nonconforming material to prevent their issue.
Heat/Lot/Batch numbers of various materials were not identified on
their respective QA tags.
11
QA tags did not identify the type of material to which they were
attached.
Safety classification of various materials could not be identified.
Loose, safety-related a*nd commercial grade material was contained in
the same storage bin.
Improper labeling and storage of hazardous and flammable chemicals
existed.
Training of warehouse personnel was not maintained current.
The inspectors also reviewed recent routine audits of warehouse activities
performed by the Nuclear Quality Assurance Department.
In addition to
repeat occurrences of the types of problems identified above, these audits
revealed other concerns reported as follows:
Required storage area inspections had not been completed.
Materials were not being maintained in the proper storage
environment.
Storage practices were permitting materials to be exposed to
potential damage.
Inadequate housekeeping; accumulation of dirt and debris; standing
water in material storage areas.
Inadequate disposition of previous QA findings concerning labeling of
hazardous chemicals.
All of the items identified above were entered into the licensee 1 s
11Action
Tracking System
11 to ensure that management attention was applied and that
corrective actions were tracked.
Since some of these items were very
recently identified (within the previous 6 months) by the licensee 1 s QA
organizations, the inspectors observed current warehouse activities to
assess the status of corrective actions and to determine if tither types of
material control problems existed.
In general, the inspectors considered
that the QA organizations had identified the most significant types of
problems within the warehouses.
However, additional items were identified
by the inspectors which indicate that in some areas, corrective actions
have not been aggressively pursued or fully achieved.
Inspectors placed
emphasis upon the Salem and Hope Creek storerooms because they usually
represented the final point where material was released to the field.
Inspectors* concerns are identified as follows:
Eight individual SR studs (class code 60-0644) were observed to be
loosely contained (not wrapped or boxed) within one storage bin .
Only one material identification tag was in the bin for all eight
studs.
12
One SR solenoid operated valve (class code 28-7098) was staged for a
scheduled work order.
No material identification tag was attached to
the valve or to its packaging.
Storeroom personnel made a new tag
and attached it to the valve packaging after tracing its identification
through the work order.
Two different styles of SR pipe flanges were stored in a single bin
location under a single class code (60-2405).
The entire bin of
flanges was supposed to be on hold, however, this fact was
. identified by only one material nonconformance (NCR) tag in the bin
tied to three flanges of one style.
The inspector noted two
purchase order numbers written on the NCR tag and only the remarks
section of the tag indicated the one NCR tag's applicability to "two
style flanges."
Warehouse personnel stated that one would have to
read the tag to realize that the untagged flanges were also
nonconforming.
The inspector considered this to be an example of
inadequate identification of nonconforming material.
Numerous SR studs (class code 60-0427) were loosely contained in o~e
storage bin locatfon.
Only two material identifications tags were in
the bin representing the two separate purchase orders under which
they were procured.
No means were available to associate any stud
with either purchase order because they were loosely contained, and
because some of the heat numbers stamped on the studs did not cor-
respond with the numbers listed on the identification tags.
Problem
Report No. 6004271850001 had been initiated on October 24, 1990, to
investigate this problem.
The storeroom bins used for staging material and components prior to
issue at Salem consisted of numerous large open plastic containers
which were each uniquely identified by location.
Storeroom practice
for staging materials allowed any item to be staged in any bin where
room was available.
The inspectors noted heavy items (valves,
flanges, etc.) pre-staged in the same containers with small and soft
items (gaskets, fittings, etc.). Although no specific examples of
damaged material was observed, damaged packaging was observed.
The
inspectors concluded that a clear potential for material damage
existed under these conditions and that damaged material may go un-
detected until after items were released to the field.
Also, no
provisions were made for physically segregating SR from NSR items in
these staging bins.
The Hope Creek storeroom contained.SR material
that had been packaged in accordance with the station's "Critical
Surfaces" program.
However, some NSR material was observed to have
damaged packaging.
Storeroom personnel reported that the incidence
of damage to material packages had improved over recent months, but
they estimated that approximately 5% of all material (SR and NSR)
currently had damaged packaging.
The potential for release of
damaged material from both storerooms still appears to be significant.
The inspectors considered this to be primarily due to the material
storage and handling practices at both stations where adequate protec-
tion or careful handling is not always provided.
13
The Hope Creek storeroom was observed to be generally clean and neat,
and parts were well marked.
Overall the Salem storeroom was observed
to be clean; however, the general condition appeared to be very
overcrowded.
Much material had been placed on pallets and in boxes
in the open floor spaces creating difficulties with storage and
access.
Aisle spaces between storage bins were generally clear and
most material was directly accessible.
Salem storeroom personnel
indicated that the total floor space available had recently been
reduced by approximately 50% to create space for other purposes
(primarily office spaces).
The inspectors reviewed the Problem Report (PR) system used by the P&MC
department for resolving nonconforming material conditions in the ware-
houses.
In the past, this system had been very loosely controlled and no
mechanism existed for formally tracking each report or ensuring that they
were resolved in a timely manner.
The licensee is currently making an
effort to enter all PRs into a computerized status program; however, this
is not happening on a consistent basis and no pe~son or group appeared to
.have overall responsibility to ensure that this wou*:d occur.
The inspec-
tors noted several PRs generated recently which had not been entered into
the status program and some which did not reflect the PR 1 s current status.
The licensee still has no system to ensure that PRs are processed and
resolved in a timely manner.
Several PRs were noted to be greater than
12 months old, and some were noted to repeat a nonconformance that had
been reported over 12 months ago but which had never been formally addres-
sed or resolved.
Some were noted to be greater than 2 years old.
The
immediate result of unresolved PRs is that warehouse material is put
on-hold and not released to the field.
New material received under class
codes on-hold is also usually put on-hold.
The inspectors reviewed the
problem descriptions in PRs, causing materials to be on-ho~d in the
warehouses.
Significant problems reported are as follows:
Material was arriving into the warehouses without the Purchase Order
number on the identification tag.
Material was arriving into the warehouses with NSR identification
tags attached, while planning documents indicate that the items
should be SR material.
Material received into the warehouses had lost its identification or
traceability.
Fasteners were stamped with numbers which were not consistent with
the ASTM numbers called for in the class code descriptions.
During walkdowns of warehouses No. 13 and No. 4, it was noted that parts,
materials and equipment were generally stacked neatly.
Warehouse No. 13
contained a considerable amount of materials in several aisles.
Some
crates were noted to be in disrepair creating a damage potential for the
contents.
Outside warehouse No. 13 a length of SR stainless tubing was
5.0
14
observed to be missing a cap at one end.
The tubing end had also been
damaged.
The inspector noted that a potential exists that stainless steel
material stored outside Warehouse No. 13 may be subjected to chlorides
from the cooling towers.
This appeared to be an undesirable environment
for SR stainless steel, for example, the open stainless tubing.
In warehouse No. 4, the inspector observed a core spray pump motor for
Hope Creek stored without its space heaters connected and energized.
Further checks found that scheduled PMs had not been performed per issued
work orders.
Maintenance personnel were stated to have received the WO;
but, when they checked the computer inventory to locate the motor, a zero
balance was indicated.
Subsequently, the work order was cancelled.
The
work order called for checking the heaters, lubrication and performing
resistance checks.
The motor was stated to have been in storage since
August without the required PMs being performed. *Failure to perform the
PMs and maintain the space heaters, as required by the applicable industry
standards and licensee.procedures, is a violation (50-354/90-24-01).
Conclusion
Inspectors concluded that significan: material control problems at Arti-
ficial Island were being identified by the licensee's QA organization and
by the P&MC department.
Management attention and action have been applied
to these areas in most cases; however, due to the continuing existence of
many typical problems, it appears that corrective actions either have not
been aggressively pursued or management systems being put in place have
not yet been effectively implemented.
Current material control practices
appear to be preventing nonconforming material from being released; however,
a clear potential for this still exists.
The general physical warehouse
setup and controls appear to be cumbersome and prone to error given the
amount of material in the system and some of the outdated methods utilized
for control.
At the present time, areas where management has identified a
means for improving conditions and practices, implementation progress
was noted; however, it appeared to be slow.
Management Initiatives
The objective of this area of inspection was to assess management
initiatives and actions relative to establishing an adequate .spare parts
and procurement program.
Findings
The licensee had initiated a number of programs over the past several years
in efforts to resolve its perceived material control and parts availability
issues.
As presented to Regional NRC management at the two previous Salem/
Hope Creek mid-cycle Systematic Appraisal of Licensee Performance (SALP)
reviews, the licensee had identified a number of root causes, among which
15
were the increasing age/obsolescence of plant equipment, poor material
control and identification, lack of suitable centralized storage and
inadequate procedures.
Early initiatives to address and correct these
root causes were not generally successful.
For example, the attempt to
provide a centralized warehousing facility was frustrated when the selected
building (TB-1) was determined to be structurally unsound.
This resulted
in a rapid dispersal of material to a number of separated locations.
An
NRC maintenance team inspection at Hope Creek in October 1989 highlighted
the unavailability of spare parts for day-to-day maintenance to be a
significant contributor to the units* work order backlog; however, they
noted that the safety significance of the backlog was low.
A similar
assessment was made for the Salem units in April 1990 during its maintenance
inspection.
Later that same month, the licensee reorganized the procurement
department.
A general manager was placed in charge to oversee and
coordinate the upgrade of the entire procurement effort.
A project team
was formed to implement the activities associated with the upgrade.
Additionally, in December 1990, an Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
(INPO) team was on site to assist in various upgrade efforts at both Salem
and Hope Creek.
Corrective actions currently underway include a complete
inventory reconciliation, additional computer software programs, personnel
training, an aggressive review of previous audits and evaluations to
assure that applicable corrective actions were effectively integrated into
the upgrade program, and the construction of a single warehouse to serve
as a focal point for the great majority of equipment and spare parts now
housed in storage areas about the site and in the town of Salem, NJ.
Procurement and Material Control (P&MC) department administrative and
implementing procedures (approximately 48 procedures) have, for the most
part, been put in place.
These are contained in two manual volumes M38-l
and -2.
These procedures cover the functional units of the P&MC depart-
ment.
There will be two higher level procedures to cover the major depart-
ment policy, organization, responsibilities, processes and programs.
One
of these NC .. NA-AP.ZZ-0019(Q), Revision 0,
11 Procurement of Materials and
Services
11 was issued on October 12, 1990.
The second procedure,
11Material
and Control Program, 11 is scheduled to be issued by December 31, 1990.
The
top tier procedure, NC.VP-PO.ZZ-0003(q),
11 Procurement and Material Control
Program,
11 is scheduled to be issued by the end of December 1990.
This
procedure will establish responsibilities for vice presidents, general
managers, and managers reporting to the vice president and chief nuclear
officer.
This procedure will supersede several existing procedures to
afford improved management controls.
P&MC department people are being trained to the procedures.
The P&MC
department has also succeeded in bringing on board qualified managers and
consultants to staff key positions and functions .
16
Conclusions
The team concluded that management initiatives in the aggregate could
provide an adequate spare parts and procurement program if the current
initiatives and program direction are aggressively pursued to completion
in a timely manner.
The team noted, however, that several initiatives had
either slipped behind schedule (e.g., warehouse completion) or were being
prosecuted too slowly to adequately support the upgrade programs comple-
tion goals, for example, inventory reconciliation.
6.0 General Material Control Problems
This area of inspection identifies a sample of material control problems
of a general nature that were identified during the inspection.
Findin~
The insp?ctors noted several potential problems which appeared to hamper
the effectiveness of material control.
Included in this category are
problems associated with pre-staging of parts, traceability/identification
of parts, and inventory control.
The inspectors examined several work orders (WOs) on hold for parts that
were past their planned and/or scheduled work date.
Although on-hold-for-
parts, the same part was available and pre-staged for other jobs scheduled*
for a later date.
An example of this type problem was WO 900902119, a PM
associated with the diesel generator air starting motor regulator.
This
WO had a planned start date of November 15, 1990, however; was in a
hold status for parts.
Three other WOs with a scheduled start date 1ater
than this WO already had the same part available and, pre-staged.
Two of
. the three had a scheduled start date in 1992.
Interviews with planners
indicated this type of problem to be fairly common.
The inspectors saw
this as a general problem that causes delays in processing WOs because of
the
11 appearance
11 of parts unavailability.
The planners also indicated
that the material coordinator could arrange for material previously
prestaged for a later job to be physically transferred to th~ WO already
past its planned or scheduled start date.
The inspectors identified several apparent problems concerning material
traceability and identification.
All material arriving into the licen-
see1 s material control and distribution system is required to have an
identification tag affixed to it.
The tag is affixed after it has received
an initial
11 Commercial Receipt Inspection.
11
This applies to both SR and
NSR items.
Many items which are subsequently transferred tb the site
warehouses and storerooms were received without their required tags.
The
licensee's representative stated that they were unable to determine whether
or not the tags were lost ~n transit or were never attached during receipt
inspection.
The inspectors observed that the tags were attached to materials
17
by two methods:
directly with an adhesive or separately by a string.
Tags were also noted to be loosely placed inside of bags containing several
items.
The inspectors noted a potential to exist for losing these tags
during handling.
The inspectors observed no instances where untagged
material was issued from the warehouses; however, a SR valve staged for
installation was observed to have no identification tag attached.
A
related concern was noted in the site warehouse used for staging material
specifically designated for plant modifications.
Many items were observed
to have identification tags attached, but they were not listed on the Bill
of Material contained in the Modification Package for which the material
was procured.
Other material had identification tags attached, but in the
course of handling, including transit on-site, information on the tags had
become obscured by some means, for example, either wear of the tag or
contact with water.
The inspectors noted material stored outside and
through weathering had some illegible identifying information.
The licensee 1s practice of not requiring excess or unusable material to
be returned to the wa~ehouse and entered into the stock system can cause a
loss of identification for that material.
Where one tag serves to iden-
tify several individual items, the tag is retained in the work package to
identify installed material.
Excess items (e.g., bolts, nuts, fittings)
lose identification and become unusable .
The inspectors noted several inventory problems mostly related to the
Managed Maintenance Information System (MMIS) not reflecting accurate
quantities.
The total inventory of ma~erials and spare parts was estimated
by licensee representatives to be approximately 97,000 line items (
11 class
codes
11 ) located in several warehouses.
It was further estimated that
approximately 30% of the existing inventory was unusable or obsolete.
This further complicated inventory control.
A contractor currently has a
three year task to research bills-of-material for upgrading part numbers.
When completed, this should aid in assuring that a correct inventory
exists and that the MMIS and Warehouse Automated Material Management
System (WAMMS) computer data records reflect valid information.
An
inventory reconciliation was initiated in August 1990 with two people
assigned to the effort.
As of this inspection, the reconciliation effort
had progressed through 2807 line items (
11 class codes
11 ) out of the
approximately 97,000.
The inspectors concluded that this effort was
inadequate relative to the inventory size and a need existed to promptly
establish a greater confidence level in the spare parts inventory.
The
inspectors further concluded that the computer maintained inventory could
not provide dependable spare parts quantity information.
To further
complicate inventory control, once parts are issued from the warehouse it
takes two days to correct the inventory due to the computer update batch
loading process used by PSE&G.
Conclusions
Observations made by the inspectors confirmed that a number of material
control problems existed.
The team concluded that the existing general
material control problems have potential to affect timely execution of
maintenance.
7.0
18
Managed Maintenance Information System (MMIS) and Warehouse Automated
Material Management System (WAMMS)
The purpose of this area of inspection was to review and assess the
systems used for controlling and tracking the procurement, storage,
handling, and use of spare parts (MMIS, WAMMS, & maintenance management
system (MMS)).
Findings
The need for a managed maintenance information system was identified by
PSE&G after the Salem anticipated transient without a scram (ATWS) event
in 1982.
By 1984/85, a system was installed to integrate subsystem programs
such as resource data, maintenance planriing, inventory control, and
purchasing.
A corporate maintenance management syste_m (MMS) inventory
accounting program was later installed in 1986.
Some of the subsystems
were eventually dropped, but an interface between the corporate MMS system
and the plant level MMIS system was maintained in ord~r to catalog parts,
and to plan maintenance work.
In 1987, the MMIS maintenance planning,
resource data, and inventory parts catalog were installed into the database.
All of these were integrated with the site work order system, and a corporate
MMS interface which linked them to a common database.
The WAMMS system
was purchased in 1989 and provided online inventory control with daily
updates to the MMS system.
WAMMS development was delayed for approximately
one year due to funding and priority delays.
Further development of the
project was later resumed in March 1990.
In accordance with the current PSE&G five year business plan, the WAMMS
system is to be fully implemented in two phases, in parallel with ware-
house relocation plan.
The first phase was initiated in October 1990, and
included the development of WAMMS operating procedures and the training of
P&MC personnel in the use of the system.
P&MC personnel are scheduled to
attend this training from January to June 1991.
The second phase is to
be in place in September 1991.
This includes the development of more
operating procedures and training for personnel outside of P&MC.
The
second phase is also to include further developments in the WAMMS system
including an automatic requisition capability within the procurement
process.
In addition, an inventory bar coding system tied to WAMMS will
be implemented to facilitate more efficient recordkeeping and reconcilia-
tion of inventory stock levels in the new warehouse.
A consultant, performing a projected 3-year initiative, has been developing
updated Bills of Material (SOM) for existing component class/codes.
Some
lack of coordination currently exists between P&MC and other groups in
getting material information installed in the WAMMS database used by site
groups.
For example, when new class/code specifications are defined and
applied to new purchases toward inventory stocks, the warehouse has not
always been notified of the change before the new material arrives onsite.
Problem reports have been written by the warehouse unnecessarily when this
19
happens, and delays in the processing of problem reports has kept material
on hold until the code/class is properly specified and storeroom personnel
are informed.
The corporate material management system (MMS) inventory control is not
fully compatible with MMIS or WAMMS.
Since material requisitions are
processed through the MMS system, additional time is required to convert
new requisition information from the WAMMS to the MMS system.
For
example, new
11 Stock Standard Note Codes
11 required by the MMS system are
different from those used in the WAMMS system, and the different versions
have to be processed for material requisitions initiated through WAMMS.
Consequently, additional time is required to manually designate these Note
Codes.
Also, when establishing a stock code number for material previ-
ously received as
11direct Charge,
11 a valid QA code must be determined and
entered into the MMS system.
If a valid QA code does not exist, the
requisition must be forwarded to Procurement Engineering or Procurement QA
for classification, review and assignment of a valid QA code.
8.0 Conclusions
A managed maintenance information system has been developing at Artificial
Island for over eight years.
The WAMMS
sy~tem is presently adequate for
its intended use; its present capability is limited until after it becomes
fully operational, that is, loaded with data for the complete inventory
for Artificial Island.
The system is being developed at a slow rate
because the information necessary for data input is being made available
at a slow rate.
The scheduled implementation dates are realistic, based upon the rate of
progress at the present time; however, .the magnitude of the inventory and
BOM to be incorporated into the. system indicated to the team that improve-
ment in the overall procurement and material control processes using WAMMS
will be slow.
9.0
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are an acceptable item or violatiDn.
One
unresolved item is discussed in paragraph 3.0.
10.0 Management Meetings
The licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the
inspection at the entrance interview on December 3, 1990.
The findings
of this inspection were discussed with the licensee representatives during
the course of this inspection and presented to the licensee management at
the exit interview on December 7, 1990.
Attachment 1 has a listing of
attendees and persons contacted during the cour~e of the inspection.
Attachment 1
Individuals Contacted
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
- K. Altenburg, Material Control Administrator
R. Antonow, Principal Engineer, Planning and Scheduling, Salem
D. Beckwith, Station Licensing Engineer, Hope Creek
W. Cherry, Storeroom Supervisor, Salem
- C. Connor, General Manager, Procurement and Material Control
J. DeFebo, Station QA Engineer, Hope Creek
- S. Funsten, Maintenance Manager, Hope Creek
S. Gillespie, Principal Safety Review Engineer
- R. Garybill, Manager, Procurement and Material Control
R. Griffith, Manager, Station QA, Hope Creek
J. Hark, Material Coordinator, Planning and Scheduling, Hope Creek
E. Harkness, Nuclear Shift Supervisor, Hope Creek
C. Hughes, Storeroom Supervisor, Hope Creek
F. Hughes, Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor, Hope Creek
S. LaBrunna, Vice President, Nuclear Operations/Acting General Manager,
Salem Operations
E. Maloney, Station QA Engineer, Hope Creek
C. Manges, Engineer, Nuclear Licensing
- J. Morrison, Project Manager, P&MC
- E. Mushnick, Project Engineer Supervisor
W. 0
1Brien, Senior Planning & Scheduling Supervisor, Salem
- A. Orticelle, Maintenance Manager, Salem
- P. Ott, Salem Technical Engineer
- D. Perkins, Manager, QA Engineering and Procurement
M. Raps, Standards and Assurance Supervisor, E&PB
L. Reiter, General Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance/Nuclear Safety Review
W. Reuther, Principle Engineer, QA/NSR
M. Rosenzweig, Manager, Nuclear Purchasing
M. Shedlock, Outage Manager, Hope Creek
- G. Sayor, Procurement Administrator
- J. Samson, Inventory Control Administrator
- W. Schultz, Station QA Engineer, Salem
R. Savage, Nuclear Quality Assurance, Auditor
C. Smith, Principal Engineer, Planning and Scheduling, Hope Creek
- F. Thomson, Assistant to General Manager, Salem
- E. Villou, Station Licensing engineer, Salem
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- N. Blumberg, Chief, Operations Program Section, RI
T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on December 7, 1990.
Other technical and management personnel were contacted during the course of
the inspection.
i
. I
Attachment 2
Documents Reviewed
QA Monitoring Reports
MR-90-L-003, Storage and Handling of Welding Electrodes in the Hope Creek
Storeroom
MR-90-L-006, Storage and Handling of Hazardous and Controlled Chemicals in
Central Receiving
MR-90-L-003A-O, Storage and Handling of Controlled Chemicals at Salem and Hope
Creek Storerooms, Warehouses 2/9, 10, 13, and Central Receiving
QA Surveillance Reports90-399, Salem Storeroom Surveillances90-383, Warehouse #13 Motor Inspection 90-227, Component Cooling Pump Surveillance
Problem Reports
PR# 600957185001, 7/31/90, Class Code 60-0957
PR# 600897185001, 6/7/90, Class Code 60-0897
PR# 316167185, 2/7/90, Class Code 31-6167
PR# 316166185, 2/7/90, Class Code 31-6166
PR# 401996185000, 10/11/89, Class Code 40-1996
PR# 974122185001, 8/11/89, Class Code 97-4122
PR# 974052185000, 8/22/89, Class Code 97-4052
PR# 387838185000, 8/24/89, Class Code 38-7858
PR# 580697185, 6/20/90, Class Code 58-0697
PR# 595527185, 12/6/90, Class Code 59-5527
PR# 597019185, 11/21/90, Class Code, 59-7019
PR# 595833185, 11/22/90, Class Code, 59-5833
PR# 37963118500, 11/26/90, Class Code, N/A
PR# 404098185000, 11/30/90, Class Code, 40-4098
PR# 40409918500, 11/30/90, Class Code, 40-4099
PR# 6004271850001, 10/24/90, Class Code, 60-0427
_PR# 974044185000, 7/25/89, Class Code, 97-4044
Work Orders
Work Orders (Cont'd.)
WQ
891012133
Procedures
NC.VP-PO.ZZ-0003(Q)
NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0018(Q)
NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0019(Q)
VPN-PRP-01
VPN-PRP-02
PM-AP.ZZ-OOOl(Q)
PM-AP.ZZ-0200(Q)
PM-AP.ZZ-0220 (Q)
PM-AP.ZZ-0300 (Q)
PM-AP.ZZ-0308 (Q)
PM-AP.ZZ-0309 (Q)
PM-AP.ZZ-0400 (Q)
PM-AP.ZZ-0500 (Q)
NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0009 (Q)
Revision 0 (Draft)
Procurement and Material Control
Program
Revision 0 (Draft)
Revision 0
Revision 2
Revision 0
Revision 0
Revision 0
Revision 0
Revision 0
Revision 0
Revision 0
Revision 0
Revision 0
Revision 2
Material Control Program
Procurement of Material and
Services
Nuclear Department Procurement
Material and Inventory Control
Manual Procedures and Instructions
Preparation and Control
Process Nuclear Department
Purchase Requisition (NDPR)
Receipt of Materials
Storage and Handling of Materials
Preventive Maintenance of Stored
Material
Ident ifi cation and Traceabi 11 ty of
Materials
Issuance of Materials
Inventory Control
Work Control Process