ML19326A059
| ML19326A059 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1972 |
| From: | Erb C, Hayes D, Vetter W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19326A052 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-72-03, 50-346-72-3, NUDOCS 8001310633 | |
| Download: ML19326A059 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000346/1972003
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U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY-OPERATIONS
REGION III
RO Inspection Report No. 050-346/72-03
Subj ect: Toledo Edison Company
License No. CPPR-80
Davis-Besse
Priority: N/A
Oak Harbor, Ohio
Category: A
Type of Licensee:
Type of Inspection:
Announced
Dates of Inspection:
July 11-13, 1972
Dates of Previous Inspection: April 10-12, 1972
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Principal Inspector:
C.
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(Datb)
Accompanying Inspectors:
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(Dake)
T. E. Vandel
5 -9-Q
(Date)
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Other Accompanying, Personnel:
R. E. Wilson, PCA Observer
Portland Cement Association
,
W.E.Vetter, Chief [].
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Reviewed By:
Reactor Construction Branch
(Date)
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Proprietary Information: None
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SECTION I
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Enforcement Action
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A.
Noncompliance
1.
An incident involving damage to a primary coolant pump volute
was not reported by the licensee as required by 10 CFR Part 50.55(e).
(Paragraph 7)
2.
Storage of machined Q-listed items was in violation of 10 CFR
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Part 50, Criterion XIII.
B.
Nonconformance
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None
C.
Safety Items
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None
Licensee action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters
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In an RO:III letter, dated May 22, 1972, apparent nonconformance to
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Bechtel purchase specification M-7749-M-190 was identified.
The
apparent nonconformance involved failure of the Class I piping manu-
facturer to complete required NPP-1 data reports.
The licensee's letter of response, dated June 19, 1972, identified
corrective action which required that the authorized code inspector
fill in the missing information on the NPP-1 forms and forward
completed forms to the site. During the current inspection, the
inspector examined several of the corrected data reports and found
them to be acceptable.
Consequently, this matter is considered to
be closed.
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Unresolved Items
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A.
Several of the welding procedures and qualification records for
four waste gas decay tanks were not available onsite for review.
(Paragraph 8)
B.
The scope of NSS system component quality documentation, which
is to be provided to the licensee to justify receipt acceptance,
has not been established by Babcock and Wilcox (B&W).
(Paragraph 9)
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C.
Presently prepared site storage procedures fail to adequately
define long tenn storage protection.
(Paragraph 10)
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items
A.
Flange Bolts for Waste Gas Decay Tanks
Quality certifications from Stanscrew-Capewell for these flange
bolts, not available during the previous inspection, were examined
by the inspector. These bolts were furnished on PO No's. 40181 and
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40454 and conform to A-307, Grade 2.
This item is considered to
be closed.
B.
Concrete
Approved copies of revised concrete sampling and testing procedures
had been produced since the previous inspection and were examined
and found to be adequate by the inspector. This matter is considered
to be closed.
C.
Qualification Records on NDT Personnel
The above records have been requested from Bechtel for NDT
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personnel working on stesn generator supports but were still
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unavailable at the site.
The fabricator is P-X Engineering
Company. This item is still open and will be reviewed during
the next inspection.
D.
Reactor Vessel Flange Material
Mr. R. L. Brown, Region I, during a B&W inspection on April 11-14,
1972, questioned the material certification for the reactor vessel
flange material in the Davis-Besse vessel. Midvale-Heppenstall,
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the flange material supplier, has submitted a revised test report
to B&W listing the stress relief conditions. This report is on
file at the Mt. Vernon, Indiana, plant.
This matter is also con-
sidered to be closed.
Design Changes
None
Unusual Occurrences
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Damaged Primary Coolant Pump Volute
This pump volute was dislodged from the truck, as the result of a
traffic accident while enroute to the site from Los Angeles, California.
(Paragraph 7)
Persons Contacted
Toledo Edison Company (TECO)
- Glenn J. Sampson, Vice President, Power
- J. D. Lenardson, Quality Assurance Engineer
- L. E. Roe, Chief Mechanical Engineer
- G. W. Eichenauer, Field Quality Assurance Representative
- R. M. Slaybaugh, Superviser, Production Purchasing
- E. M. Wilcox, Field Quality Assurance
- W. G. Moring, Field Quality Assurance
Babcock and Wilcox (B&W)
R. Klingler, Project Manager
Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I)
W. Hiser, Quality Assurance Manager
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Del Sobhren, Project Superintendent
Grinnell Corporation (Grinnell)
J. J. Rafferty, Project Manager
J. F. Duderstadt, Production Engineer
D. R. Giguere, Quality Control Manager
Bechtel Corporation (Bechtel)
- A.
S. Martin, Quality Assurance Engineer (Lead)
- R. L. Likens, Quality Control Engineer
- S. B. Boesel, Project Field Engineer
- G.
Sullivan, Field Coordinator
Hartford Steam Loiler Insurance Company
J. Wharton, Tuspector
- Attendees at management meeting.
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Management Interview
In addition to the TECO personnel listed above under " persons Contacted,"
Mr. N. L. Wadsworth, TECO Construction Superintendent, was also in
attendance during the management interview.
The incident involving damage to a primary coolant pump volute in
transit was not reported by the licensee as required by AEC Regulations,
10 CFR Part 50.55(e). The licensee stated that they had deliberately
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kept out of this matter because the volute had not been officially
received onsite and because the action taken was to be determined by
B&W, the insurance company for the carrier, and the vendor, Byron-
Jackson.
However, they agreed that Region III should have been informed,
and Mr. Roe said that a written report would be provided on an expedited
basis.
The storage of certain Q-listed items was described by the inspectors
as unsatisfactory and in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion XIII.
They explained that the reactor pressure vessel supports, machined
bolts, and other Q-listed items were found to be exposed to the weather
and without adequate blocking to keep them off the ground.
In addition,
it was explained that these items were very close to a roadway where
they were subjact to damsge from passing vehicles. TECO stated that they
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would endeavor to improve the storage for critical items.
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The quality control release forms provided by B&W for receipt of NSSS
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equipment were not uniform in content, and it was felt this area should
be investigated.
Mr. Lenardson stated that he would review this matter
during an inspection at the B&W home office scheduled for July 17, 1972.
The inspectors pointed out that some of the storage procedures for
critical equipment were incomplete in that they identified means to
identify desiccant failure, but included no corrective action instructions.
Mr. Lenardson stated he would question B&W on this matter also.
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SECTION II
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Additional Subjects Inspected, Not Identified in Section I, Where No
Deficiencies or Unresolved Items Were Found
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1.
General
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On July 12, 1972, the engineering effort was estimated to be 82%
complete and plant construction 23% complete. The present work
. force is 1,005, which represents a substantial increase over the
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737 reported man work force in June of this year.
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The hydro test on the Davis-Besse reactor vessel was started on
July 16 at B&W and was witnessed by TECO quality assurance
personnel.
A Portland Cement Association representative, Mr. R. Wilson
observed RO inspection of concrete operations at the site as a
guest of TECO. His observations will be used in developing ACI
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standards and also for inclusion in a training program envisaged
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for concrete inspectors.
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2.
Class I Concrete
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a.
Record review
b.
Observed concrete manufacture
c.
Observed placement
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3.
Containment - Steel
a.
Fabrication records on plates
b.
Material certification
c.
Metallurgical test results - tensile, impact, etc.
d.
Qualification records - welders
e.
Radiography
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f.
Qualification records - NDT
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Hartford Steam Boiler Insurance Company representative activities
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4.
Pressurizer
a.
Observed storage protection
b.
Installation specification and procedures
5.
Review of Class I Piping - Grinnell
a.
Quality assurance program and implementation
b.
Quality control system
c.
Qualification of NDT personnel
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d.
Receipt quarantine of nonconforming materis.1
e.
Storage
f.
Protective closures
6.
Review of TECO and Bechtel audit surveys of B&W and Grinnell Corporation.
Details of Subjects Discussed in Section I
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7.
Damaged Reactor Coolant Pump Volute
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The pump volute (part No. 70lN0241) was being shipped from Byron-
Jackson (B-J) Los Angeles, California, to the site when it was
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dislodged from the truck during a traffic accident in Tulsa,
The accident occurred on, or about June 2, 1972. The
volute, weighing approximately 12 tons, is a stainless steel casting
made by the General Electric Company, Schenectady, New York, was
returned to B-J for repair.
Prior to return of the volute to B-J,
insurance representatives and a B-J representative made a photo-
graphic record of the volute damage. During the inspection, the
inspector examined accessible portions of the volute and noted
that the' weld preparation on part of the discharge nozzle had been
scratched and distorted, and that there were scratches and marks
on the seal area where the motor attachment is made.
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8.
Waste Gas Decav Tanks
Four tanks (Nos. T24-1 and T-25-1,
-2, and -3) manufactured by the
Brown-Minneapolis Company, Minneapolis Minnesota, were examined
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onsite. These large stainless steel tanks are fitted with welded
carbon steel legs. Welding procedures and welder qualifications
for these tanks have been requested from the fabricator.
9.
NSS Components Documentation
There was an apparent lack of procedural information prescribing
the necessary documentation to be available at the site to justify
quality acceptance of NSSS components by B&W.
A review of the
receiving inspection reports for a B-J supplied primary coolant
pump casing (not involved in the accident) revealed that receiving
inspection quality acceptance determination was based prinarily on
receipt of a shipping notice (Form PL-1) which has a quality control
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release stamped, dated, and signed. Specifically, casing No. 0242
was accepted, based on this form, while casing No. 0243 was rejected
...even though an identical Form PL-1 had been provided.
Mr. Lenardson
said that he would investigate this matter.
10.
Storage Protection
Storage requirements for critical items did not seem to be well
developed by TECO. The pressurizer is stored outside, as are six
pieces of primary coolant loop piping.
The pressurizer is protected
on the inside surfaces with a desiccant, and the storage procedure
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stated that:
"When paper in sight glass turns pink, the desiccant
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is no longer effective." However, corrective action in this event
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is not specified.
Mr. Roe said that this matter would be investigated
and resolved.
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