ML19331C062
| ML19331C062 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000131 |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1980 |
| From: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Mullon T DEPT. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTER, OMAHA |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008140111 | |
| Download: ML19331C062 (1) | |
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_,r June 24, 1980 In Reply Refer To:
Dockct No. 50-131 Omaha Veterans Administration Hospital ATTN:
Mr. T. P. Mullon Hospital Director 4101 Woolworth Avenue Omaha, Nebraska 68105 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-14 is forwarded to you for infor:::ation.
7.f there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
's.
Karl V. Seyfrit Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Circular No. 80-14 2.
List of IE Circulars Recently Issued cc:
Omaha Veterans Mninistration Hospital ATTN:
A. J. 31occky, Reactor Supervisor 4101 Woolworth Avenue Omaha, Nebraska 68105 acoeuo \\n-
SSINS.: 6830 UNITED STATES Accession No.:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8005050074 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.
20555 IE Circular No. 80-14 Date:
June 24, 1980 Page 1 of 2 RADI0 ACTIVE CONTAMINATION 0F PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER SYSTEM AND RESULTANT INTERNAL CONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL This circular describes an event which occurred at a nuclear power facility; however, the generic implications may be applicable to research reactors, and fuel cycle facilities.
On March 17, 1980, a licensee infomed the NRC resident inspector that portions of the plant demineralized water (DW) system were found to be radioactively contaminated. A temporary hose used to add demineralized water to the spent fuel pool was the pathway for the cross-contamination.
After this fuel pool makeup was completed on March 14, the temporary DW line (still connected to the DW header) was inadvertently left submerged in the fuel pool.
Since the DW header pressure at the point of supply was relatively low (a DW booster pump had been secured), a siphoning action occurred, resulting in radioactive contamination of portions of the DW header.
On March 17, 1980, while perfoming routine secondary s stem chemical analyses, the licensee discovered that the demineralized water top in the chemistry lab contained high levels of boron and had activity of 1.5 x 10-4 uCi/ml (mainly Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-58, Co-60 and Mn-54).
It was subsequently discovered that demineralized water from the chemistry laboratory supply tap had been used to make five (5) pots of coffee.
The remaining coffee was confiscated and the twenty-three (23) individuals who had consumed this coffee were whole+tody counted.
All involved individuals showed no intake greater than an equivalent 0.01 MPC-HRS. Analysis perfomed by the licensee's radiation consultant, based on the maximum concentration of radioactivity found in the coffee, indicated that the resultant 50-year dose corrrnitment to an individual drinking eight ounces of this coffee would be less than 1 millirem.
Further licensee investigation revealed that the non-radiological chemistry DW supply tap was the only DW supply point outside the Auxiliary Building controlled area.
This DW supply tap was tagged prohibiting human consumption to prevent a similar event in the future.
It is recommended that you review your facility's use of demineralized water (DW) via temporary connections and give attention to the following:
1.
Provisions should be made to assure that radioactive materials are not inadvertently introduced into your facility's DW system via the improper use of temporary connections.
A temporary cross connection between contaminated systems and the DW system without adecuate physical controls to prevent cross-contamination should be prohibited.
{
IE Circular No. 80-14 Date:
June 24, 1980 Page 2 of 2 2.
In addition to some physical means of preventing backflow into the DW system, appropriate administrative controls should be established to ensure that the DW supply valve is secured and temporary hosing is disconnected from the DW supply header after use.
3.
Use of plant-supplied DW for human consumption should be prohibited.
The potable water system should be the only authorized source of water for human consumption.
4.
Examine potable and demineralized water systems to determine if pathways exist allowing or having the potential to allow contamination of these systems including temporary connections whereby siphons could cause situations described above.
No written response to this Circular is required.
Your review of this matter to determine its applicability to your facility and any corrective and preven-tive tctions taken or planned, as appropriate, will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
IE Circular No. 80-14 June 24, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject Date Issued To No.
Issued 80-09 Problems With Plant 4/28/80 All holders of a power i
Internal Communications reactor Operating License (0L)-
Systems or Construction Permit (CP) 80-10 Failure to Maintain 4/29/80 All holders of Reactor Environmental Qualifi-Operating Licenses (0Ls) cation of Equipment and Construction Permits (cps) 80-11 Energency Diesel Generator 5/13/80 All holders of a power r ilures reactor Operating License (0L)
Lube Oil Cooler a
or Construction Permit (CP) 80-12 Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator 5/14/80 All holders of Reactor Key May Fall Out of Place Operating Licenses (OLs)
When Mounted Below and Construction Permits Horizontal Axis (cps) 80-13 Grid Strap Damage in 5/18/80 All holders of Reactor Westinghouse Fuel Operating Licenses (OLs)
Assemblies and Construction Permits (cps)
Enclosure i
.