ML20030C194
| ML20030C194 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1981 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8108250497 | |
| Download: ML20030C194 (2) | |
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DUKE POWER COMPm Powtu Urruno E
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re:
Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
On March 3, 1981, the resident inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station was informed of an incident in which six Unit 3 Emergency Power Switching Logic Cables were discovered to be damaged. Although this event does not constitute a reportable occurrence, this report is provided for your information. This letter report supercedes that submitted by my letter of April 13, 1981.
On March 2, 1981, Unit 3 was at cold shutdown, Unit I was at cold shutdown, and Unit 2 was at 74% F.P. when the incident was discovered. At 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br />, six Unit 3 Emergency Power Switching Logic Cables were discovered to be damaged.
The damage was apparently caused by the close proximity of the cable tray to valve 2FDW-9, causing heat and moisture damage. This was the result of con-struction/ installation deficiency.
The cable tray was re-routed and all six cables were replaced and re-tested by March 5, 1981.
During the replacement of the cables, portions of the damaged cables were inadvertently removed from the l
electray resulting in their being considered seismically inoperable. This was f
the result of personnel error.
Standby Bus 2 was declared inoperable as a precaution from March 2, 1981 to March 5, 1981 since there was a possibility that B2T-9 would not work properly.
(B2T-9 is the Keowee Underground (CT-4) feeder to Standby Bus 2.)
Standby Bus 1 was operable during the entire event.
towever, Bus 1, phase "C" and Bus 2, phase "B" signals to Units 2 and 3 were removed from service in order to tie in the new cables.
During this time, Technical Specification 3.7.1(b) was met at all times.
Emergency power was available from two independent paths. Therefore, plant safety was maintained, and the public h ~f.
,nd safety were not endangered.
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director April 23, 1981 Page 2 The six damaged cables were run in two 4" electrays.
The two field-run trays have been in operation since Unit 3 start-up.
They were physically installed about 6" above 2FDW-9.
The two 4" electrays were re-routed around 2FDW-9 to eliminate the possibility of any further direct heat damage.
The six damaged cables were replaced with new cables. This is the first incident of this type on safety-related cable at Oconee. This appears to be an isolated occurrence and no further action is recommended at this time.
Appropriate disciplinary action has been taken concerning the Personnel Error involved in this incident.
Ver - truly yours,
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' William O. Parker,Jr.[.
JLJ:pw cc: Director Mr. Bill Lavallee office of Management & Program Analysis Nuclear Safety Analysis Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 10412 Washington, D.C.
20555 Palo Alto, California 94303 l
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