05000423/LER-1990-001, :on 910108,inoperable Fire Hose Stations Due to Insufficient Fire Hose Inventory.Cause Unknown for Fuel Bldg Fire Hose Rack & Procedural Inadequacy for Auxiliary Bldg Fuel Racks.Station Restored to Operable Status

:on 910108,inoperable Fire Hose Stations Due to Insufficient Fire Hose Inventory.Cause Unknown for Fuel Bldg Fire Hose Rack & Procedural Inadequacy for Auxiliary Bldg Fuel Racks.Station Restored to Operable Status

ML20070P477
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	03/18/1991
From:	Clement C, Freeman P, Scace S NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-001, LER-90-1, MP-91-237, NUDOCS 9103270302
Download: ML20070P477 (4)

LER-1990-001, on 910108,inoperable Fire Hose Stations Due to Insufficient Fire Hose Inventory.Cause Unknown for Fuel Bldg Fire Hose Rack & Procedural Inadequacy for Auxiliary Bldg Fuel Racks.Station Restored to Operable Status

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)
4231990001R00 - NRC Website

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HARTFORD. CONNECTIOUT 00414-0270 L

Nvineast tuew rne gv mpany (2031665-5000 Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)

March 18, 1991 MP-91-237 U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission Document Contr'ol Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference:

Facility Operatine License No. NPF-49 Docket No. 50-423 Licensee Event Report 90-001-0:

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 90-001-01, which is being submitted to revise corrective action information. Licensee Event Report 90~001-00 was submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1), any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specification.

I Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY FOR: Stephen E. Scace Director, Millstone Station f

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BY:

arl

. Clemen Millstone Unit 3 Director SES/PAF:mo I

Attachment: LER 90-001-01 cc:

T. T. Martin, Recion 1 Administrator W. J. Raymond,' Senior Resident inspector, Millstone Unit Nos.1, 2 and 3 D. H. Jaffe, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit Nos. I and 3 kc'c) 3XI 91 OcA.* A m sM e Mp2{gggg Q, TA

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o., aeorocai,,y im., img... es:. iyo.orm.s un.i3 ne, On January 6,1990 at approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />, with the plant at 100G power (Mode 1), 2 50 psia and 556 degrees Fahrenhen, it was discovered that a fire hose rack located in the Fuel Buildmg had insufficient lengths of fire hose to fulfill Plant Technical Specification hose station operabihty requirements. In accordance 'with the appheable Technical Specification, hose station operabihty was restored within one hour of discovery by installation of additional hose lengths. In response to the discovery of the deficient Fuel Building hose rack all other Technical Specification hose racks outside the Containment Building were inspected. Seven additional racks m the Auxihary Buildmg were found wnh insufficient hose lengths. Each deficient rack was restored to operable status wnhin one hour of discovery.

The cause of the hose rack found deficient in trie Fuel Building is undetermined. The cause of seven hose racks found deficient in the Auxihary Buildmg is procedural inadequac) in that the surveillance procedure did not accurately reflect minimum fire hose length requirements.

As action to prevent recurrence, the surveillance procedure was changed to accurately reflect the mintmum fire hose lengths requtred. On February 14, 1991, during a scheduled refueling outage, the hose racks inside the Contamment Buildmg were inspected to the requirements of the updated procedure. Five hose racks were found to be deficient and were restored to operable status.

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De-Mn of Event On January 8,1990 at approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />, with the plant at 100r power (Mode 1), 0250 psia c

and $16 degrees Fahrenheit, it was discovered that a fire hose rack located on the elesen foot elevation of the Fuel Buildmg had insufficient lengths of fire hose to fulfill Plant Design Basis hose station operabihty requirements. This deficiency was drcosered during the performance of the Technical Specification suncillance of Unit 3 fire hose racks by site Engineering and Maintenance department personnel. The suneillance procedure required a minimum of 75 feet of hose, but only one 50 foot section was on the rack. Additionally, further invesugation revealed that the procedure was not m agreement with the series 14 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&lDs) shown in the fire protection l

cvaluauon, which required 125 feet of hose. These P&lDs are the diagrams used to defme minimum required hose lengths at hose stauons to mamtain Technical Specificauon operabihty. In accordance with the appheable Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO 3.7.12.5 " Fire Hose Stations"), hose stauon operabihty was restored wnhin one hour of discovery by addmon of enough hose lengths to meet the requirements of the P& ids.

In response to the discovery of the aforementioned deficient hose rack, all other Techmcal Specificanon hose racks. outside the Containment Building, were inspected on January 6,1990. The hose racks -

mside the Containment Buildmg were excluded from this inspection because of inaccessibihty due to personnel safety / radiation exposure considerations. Seven additional racks m the Auxihary Buildmg were found with insufficient hose lengths and were declared inoperable. In these cases however, the number of hose lengths did meet the requirements of the surveillance procedure, but the procedure was not in comphance with the P&lDs. Each deficient tack was restored to operable status ulthin one hour of discovery in accordance with LCO 3.7.12.5 by addmg the required hose lengths.

11.

Cause of Es ern The cause of the hose rack tound deficient in the Fuel Buildmg can not be positively determined. A resnew of the previous month's surveillance data indicates the correct amount of hose lengths were in place. However, there appears to have been some confusion by persons performing the surveillance in determmmg hose length by visual inspecuon. They were not aware that all fire hose utilized at Unit 3 (ulth the exception of one case) are in 50 foot length. During the visual surveillance inspection, it was most likely assumed the one length hanging on the rack was 75 feet in length.'

The root cause of seven hose racks found deficient in the Auxiliary Building is procedural inadequacy.

The appbcable surveillance procedure did not accuratel) reflect fire hose length requirements as shown on the P&lDs. It is uncertain how the incorreci fire hose lengths were incorporated into the procedure.

During the ume penod when the procedure was revised to include Unit 3 fire hose stations, continuing fire hose length evaluations and modifications were being performed to fulfill regulatory requirements.

Ill.

Analveic of Event 4

This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR$0.73(a)(2)(i), as a condition prohibited by Plant Technical Specibcations.

Fire suppression for the affected areas consists of the unit fire brigade. Conservatism was estabbshed when the initial fire hose length evaluations were performed. Field testing has verified that, in each case invohang the Fuel and Auxihary Buildmgs, there was adequate hose lengths at the Technical Specification Hose Stations to fulfill fire fighting requirements pertinent to each fire zone. The Containment building is classified as one fire area as discussed in the Unit 3 Fire Protection Evaluation Report. While fire fightmg capabihues were degraded with the reduction of fire hose inventory, combined fire hose lengths allowed for fire fighting coverage of the Containment Building. Therefore, the health and safety of the pubhc was not jeopardned and the event posed no significant safety consequences, j

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Corrective Action

immediate corrective action was to restore all fire hose stations, outside the Containment Buildmp, to l

operable status withm one hour of discosery. This was accomphshed by ensuring all fire hose stations were in comphance with the series 116 P&lDs.

The action to present recurrence is two part. First, the appheable surveillance procedure was changed to reflect fire hose lengths as listed on the P&lDs. Also, the procedure has been revised to require a senior heensed operator review pnor to presentation to the Site Operations Review Comtr'ttee for approval.

incorporatian of this requirement was completed on May 1,1990.

Personnel performing the hose station surveillances have received departmental trammg to increase familiarization with the Unit's fire fighting apparatus. They base also received formal trainmg by attendmp the stations Nuclear Trammg Department's course for fire exunguisher/ hose inspecuon and maintenance. In addition, a recent department reorganization has placed the group responsible for performance of the applicable hose station surveillance within a site engmeermg group to ensure adequate techrucal guidance.

Addiuonally, signs were posted on all Technical Specification Hose Stations requiring that the Unit Shift Supemsor be notif ed when removmp any equipment from the stat on. All signs were mstalled at stations outside of the Containment Buildmg by February 7,1990.

Followmg the scheduled plant shutdown for the refuehng outage (which began on February 2,1991),

signs were posted on the Technical Specification hose station by February 6,1991.

On February 14, 1991. during the refuelmg outage, the hose stations inside the Containment Building were inspected to the requirements of the revised surveillance procedure. Five hose racks were found to be deficient and were restored to operable status.

Y.

AddnionM Information i

There has been one previous similar event to date. Licensee Event Report (LER) 89-023-00 reported i

that insufficient hose lengths were discovered at outdoor hydrant hose houses resulting in inoperability of j

the hydrant hose houses. In LER 89-023, the root causes were personnel error and procedural inadequacy. The corrective action was: to verify all suffic ent hydrant hose house inventory, to post t

caution signs at the hydrant hose houses, and to require a senior heensed operator review of procedural revisions. In retrospect, these correcuve actions were limited in scope. Had the corrective actions been applied to all Technical Specification hose stations, the events discussed in this LER could have been prevented.

I Ells Cc, des System Comnonents e

Fire Protection (water) - KP Hose Houses Hoses i

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