NRC-91-0086, Provides Response to Recommendations Contained within NRC Station Blackout Safety Evaluation Requested in . Activities Determined Necessary to Meet Station Blackout Rule Completed

Provides Response to Recommendations Contained within NRC Station Blackout Safety Evaluation Requested in . Activities Determined Necessary to Meet Station Blackout Rule Completed

ML20076C663
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	07/17/1991
From:	Orser W DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CON-NRC-91-0086, CON-NRC-91-86 NUDOCS 9107230121
Download: ML20076C663 (36)

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July 17, 1991 NRC-91-0086 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn Document Control Deck Washingt on, D. C.

20555

References:

1)

Fermi 2 NkC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43 2)

Detroit Edison Station Blackout Submittal to NRC. NRC-89-0061, dated April 17. 1989 3)

NUMARC Letter " Station Blackout (SBO)

Implementation: Request for Supplemental Sb0 Submit tal to NRC." data! January 4.1990 4)

Detroit Edison Letter. NRC-90-0060. " Detroit Edison Response for Supplemental SB0 Submittal to NRC."

dat ed Ma rch 29, 1990 5)

NRC Letter. "Ferui-2 Conf ormance to Station Blackout Rule 10CFR50.63 (TAC No. 68545)." dated June 12. 1991 Subject Station Blackout Rule Implementation This letter provides a response to the six recommendations contained within the NRC Station Blackout Safety Evaluation as requested by Reference 5.

A discussion of each recommendation and the proposed resolution of each recommendation is provided below.

1.

NRC Recoeusendation:

Test the alternate AC source to show that it can be started and connected to the safe shutdown loads within one hour. Describe how the Combustion Turbino Generator meets the criteria of NUMARC 87-00. Appendix B.

Detroit Edison Response Testing has been performed which has demonstrated various aspects of the alternate AC capability. However. Detroit Edison has determined that a new test should be performed to demonstrate the DY 9107230121 910717 PDR ADOCK O'"000341 1

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USNRC July 17. 1991 NRC-91-0086 Page 2 ability to black start and connect saf e shutdown loads within one hour. This testing will consist of the following:

1.

Isolate CTG 11 buses and all AC power feeds into CTG 11-1.

Black start CTG 11-1 and demonstrate the ability to energize the de-energized output buses. Document the time required to perf orm these operations. Forni 2 buses will continue to be supplied by of fsite power during this tert.

2.

Perf orm a timed walkdown (simulation) of the control switch manipulations required to energize safe shutdown loads subsequent to energizing the PTG buses (st ep 1). This walkdown would be performed at the unit control panels or at the simulator as determined appropriate.

The summation of times provided in steps 1 and 2 above will demonstrate the ability to black start and to connect safe shutdown loads within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> time requirement. The monthly CTG 11-1 surveillance t est demonstrates the ability of CTG 11-1 to supply a load. Testing in this manner deronstrates the ability to black start the CTG and to connect safe shutdown loads within one hour without deenergizing all Division I essei.tial buses and making 2 EDGs inoperable. Division I buses could not be fully deenergized during plant operation and deenergizing all Division I buses and making 2 EDGs inoperable during an outage is contrary to shutdown risk initiatives. The proposed test can be conduct ed during plant operation.

A description of how CTG 11-1 meets the criteria of NUMARC 87-00 is contained in Det roit Edison Design Calculation DC-4986. A copy of that design calculation is attached.

2.

_NRC Recoenmendation:

Verify and confirm that the Condensate Storege Tank Inventory is adequate for decay heat removal Reactor Coolant System leukage, and reactor vessel depressurization, should it be needed.

Detroit Edison Response The design calculation on CST inventory was reperf ormed using the 18 gpm per pump seal leakage plus the 25 gpm maximum allowable Technical Specification leakage for a total 61 gpm leak rate.

Decay heat parameters remain unchanged. Additionally, reactor vessel depressurization was assumed to be required. The result s of that calculation indicate that 126,480 gallons are required which is less than the 150,000 gallons HPCI/RCIC Condensate Storage tank reserve capacity provided by that tank's st andpipe suction design.

It should be not ed that our original submit t al indicat es that this 150,000 ga2 lons is required by the plant

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USNRC July 17, 1991 NRC-91-0086 Page 3 Technical Specifications.

Since our Technical Specifications are based on the GE Standard Technical Specifications (STS) Revision 4 (1982), a specific requirement to maintain a minimum of 150,000 gallons in the CST during all operating conditions does not exist as it did in earlier versions of the STS.

Our Technical Specifications refer to this 150,000 gallon minimum capability only in terms of being part of the 300,000 gallon CST inventory required in opercting conditions 4 and 5 without an operable suppression chamber. The 150,000 gallon minimum CST inventory is, however, guaranteed by that tank's standpipe design. This design feature is a design basis for the CST tank as described in Section 9.2.6 of our UFSAR.

3.

NRC Recommendation:

Verify equipment operability in the relay room and the HPCI toom at the calculated temperatures during a Station Blackout event.

Detroit Edison Responset Equipment in the HPCI and RCIC rooms has been evaluated and determined to be operable at the calculated temperatures of 180 F and 158 F respectively.

Initial evaluation of relay room equipment indicates that the equipment will be able to operate at 122.3 F which is the maximum tieperature calculated for that room under SB0 conditions. The design calculation revision required to document and support that determination is expected to be complete by July 31, 1991.

4.

NRC Recommendationt Verify that the SB0 equipment is covered by an appropriate Quality Assurance Program consistent with the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155.

Detroit Edison Responset A Quality Assurance program consistent with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.155 is in place f or Station Blackout equipment. Quality Assurance activities have been implemented as were determined appropriate for the existing equipment consistent with the guidance in Appendix A of that Regulatory Guide.

5.

NRC Recommendations An Emetgency Diesel Generator (EDG) reliability program should be developed in accordance with the guidance of RG 1.155. Section 1.2.

If an (EDG) reliability program currently exists, the program should be evaluated and adjusted in accordance with RG 1.155.

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USNRC July 17. 1991 NRC-91-0086 Page 4 Det roit Edison _ Responses An EDG reliability program has been integrettd within other existing programs and plant procedutos and is consistent with the guidance of RG 1.155, Section 1.2.

The t arget reliability of the EDGs is 95% which is consistent with the plant category and coping durations in the regulatory guide. Monthly surveillance testing is perf ormed as required by Fermi 2 Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2. a.

EDG s t a rt logs and history logs are maintained by the Technical Engineering group.

Preventive Maintenance (FM) for EDGs is prescribed under the PM program to ensure that the target EDG reliability is achieved. Any valid EDG f ailure must be reported and evaluated under the Deviation Event Report (DER) program.

Start / Failure logs are maintained and reviewed periodically to ensure the 95% availability is maint a ined. Responsibilities for the major program elenents have been identified and a management oversight program de in place to ensure that the reliability program is functioning proporly.

6.

,NRC Recommendation:

Provide a means to ensure that valves which must be capable of being closed or that must be operated (cycled) under SB0 conditions can be positionoi independent of the AC power supply with indication other than by observation of a valve's stem position. Any valve needing additional position indication should be identified and the means proposed to obtain such indication should be included in appropriate procedures.

Detroit Edison _ Response _t Valves necessary for containment isolation or which must be operated (cycled) during a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SB0 event can be positioned (with indication) independent of the preferred and blacked out unit Class IE emergency power supply. Means of closure include manual operation DC-powered operation. Alternate AC-powered operation and air-operated valves that fail close on loss of air, as discussed as acceptable in NUMARC 87-00.

Valve position can be determined by either control panel indicating lights or by mechanical valve position indicators at the valve. These mechanical indicators consist of arrows indicating valve position, stem travel red indicators and dial gauge indication.

Verification and documentation supporting the above inf ormation will be included with all other documentation maintained in support of the Station Blackout Rule Response.

The testing proposed in response to Recommendation 1 above will not require a unit shutdown. That testing will. however. require that a

procedure be written and approved to control and document test

4 4

0 USNRC 4

July 17, 1991 NRC-91-0086 Page 5 activitfec and results. Detroit Edison will complete this demonstration of SB0 capability by January 31, 1992. The design calculation required to support relay room SB0 equipment operability will be complete by July 31, 1991. All other activities that have been determined necessary to meet the SB0 rule have been completed.

If there are any questions regarding this submittal, plessa contact Mr. Robert J. Salmon at (313) 586-4273.

Sincerely,

/

Attachment cc C. E. Carpenter. Jr.

A. B. Davis R. W. DeFayette S. Stasek

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a E DC 49S6 I Pg2.L.g74 1 3.2.5. Consideration should be given to using sedable

2. There should be a minimum potential for common noa.eafety-r-lated equipment, as well as safety-related

.cause failure with the prefernd or the blacked out equipment, to cope with a station blackout provided unit's onsite emergency ac power sources. No such equipment meets the recommendations of Regula. single-point vulnerability abould exist whereby a tory Positiona 3.3.3 and 3.3.4. Onsite or nearby alternate weather related event or single active failure could oc (AAC) power. sources that an independent and disable any portion of the blacked-out unit's onsite diverse frem the normal Qaas IE emergency ac power emergency ac power sources or the prtferred power sources (e.g., gas turbine, separate dksel engine, steam sources and dmuitaneously fail the AAC power supplies) will constitute an acceptable station blackout source. coping capability provided an analysia is performed that demonstrates the plant has this capability from the

3. The AAC power source should be avanable in a caset of station blackout untD the AAC power source timely manner after the onset of station blackout or sources are started and lined up to operste all equip-and have providons to be snanusily connected to ment mammy to cope with station blackout for the one or all of the redundant safety busca as required.

required durstion. He time nquind for making this equipment available should not be more than ihout as in general, equipment required to cope with a station demonstrated by test. If the AAC power source blackout during the first 8 hours should be available on can be demonstrated by test to be available to the alte. For equipment sat located on the site, condo-power the shutdown buses within 10 minutes of erstion abould be given to tra svallability and accessibility the onset of station blackout, no coping analysia As the time required, including consideration of weather es requind. conditi+sa likaly to prevail during a loss of offsite

4. The AAC power source should have sufficient power.

capacity to operste the systems necessary for If the AAC source or sources meet the recommende-coping with a station blackout for the time required tions of Section 3.3.5 and can be demonstrated by test to bring and maintain the plant in safe shutdown. b to be stanable to power the shutdown buses within 10 ~ minutes of the onset of station blackout, no coping 5.The AAC power system should be inspected, analysis is required. maintained, and testad periodically to demonstrate operabnity and rsliability. The reliability of the 3.2.6. Condderation should be given to timely opera. AAC power smem should meet or exceed 95 per-tot actions indde or outdde the control room that cent as determined in accordance with NSAC.!O4 would increase the length of time that the plant can (Ref.1!) or equivalent methodology, wope with a station blackout provided it can be demon-strated that these actions ces be canted out in a timely An AAC power source sening a multiple-unit site faahlon. For saample, if station battery capacity is a where onsite emergency ac sources are not shared limiting factor in coping with a station blackout, shed. between units should have, as a minimum, the capacity ding noneesential loads on the batteries could extend and capability fwr coping with station blackout in any the time.until the battery la depleted. If load ahedding of the units, or othat operator actions are conddered, corresponding procedures should be incorporated into the plant 4pecille At dtes wlore onsite emergency sources are shand techntesi guidelines and emergency openting proceduna. between units, the AAC power sources should have the capacity and capability to enrun that ai! units can be brought to azi maintained in safe shutdown (Le., utoes 33.5. If sa AAC power source is selected spechny plant conditions defined in plant technical specifications for antisfying the requimments for station blackout, the ' as Hot Standby or Hot Shutdows, as appropriate) Plants design should meet the following criteria: have the option of maintaining t'as RCS at norsaal operating temperatures or at redaad tempratures.

1. The AAC power source should not normally be directly connected to the prciened or b Plants that have mors than the required ndundancy of emergency ac sources for loss-of.offsitatower condb blackad out unit's ondta emergency ac power system.

tions, on a per nuclear unit basis, may use one of the saisting emergency sources as an.AAC power source provided it meets the applicable criteria for an AAC $, 7bC.6@ TS NOM source. AdditionaDy, emergency diesel genentors with l 1.out of 2.shand and 2-out-of.3.ehand ac power magms. / MG. b U i DE' k. \\ 5 5-tiam may be u,ed m AAC power sources. m -

~ ' ' ~~ ' ~ g{gg fo, 2. 3 $$7 00z9 I EMA otar:LtNEs AND n CNNICA1, B ASg3 POR RM ARC INmATIVE.g APPENDIX B. ALTERNATE AC POWER CRITERIA y Els appendia de cribes the cdteds that must be met by a power supply in order to be classified as an Alternste AC power source. De criteria focus on ensuring that stadon blackout equipment is not unduly suscepdble to dependent failure by estabikhing indepnknce of the AAC sysum horn the emergency and non-Class 1E AC power systems. AAC Fewer Seunt Cdtede B.! De AAC system and its m.p.cr.ts need not be designed to meet Class 1E or safety sysum requirements. If a Class 1E EDO is used as an Alterram AC power sourca, this enhdng Class 1E EDO must cor.dnue to meet all applicable safety relsendcriterk B.2 Unless otherwise provided in this critaria, the AAC spann need not be protected asainst the effects of: (1) fauum or misopet ssion of mechanical equipment, including (1) firs, (11) pipe whlp, (111) jet g '- Impingement, (iv) water sprey, (v) flooding from a pipe break, (vi) redladon, pressurhadon, elevated temperature or humidity cau'ud by high or medium energy pipe break, and (vil)inissues resu!dng hom the failure'of totating equipment or high energy sys' ems; or (2) selsm!c events. B.3 Components and subsystems shall be protectad against the effects of IIkaly weather-reland events that may initiate l the loss of off sim power event. Protecdon may be provided by sulosing AAC componens whhin structures that conf:rm with the Uniform building Code, and burying saposed elecedcal cable run between buildings (i.e conna: dons betwnen the AAC povs sourts and the Shutdre bosus). BA Physical separsdon of AAC components from safety related components or equipment shall conform with the separadon cdteda spplicable for the unit's licensing basis. Connectabillry se AC Fewer Systenns B.5 Failure cd AAC components shall rd adversely affect Class lE AC power systems. B.6 Electrical isolation of AAC power shad be provided through an approham isoladon device. If the AAC source connecad to Ciais iE buses, isolation shian ce provided by two ehtuti breiteri in sciies (one Ciass iE breaker si O 31

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P) 25 j 2 7 Ot?IDELINES AND TECHNICAL B ASE.5 FOR NLIM ARC 1hTRATIVE.8 NtfMARCt?.00 t the Class 1E but and one noncas: 1E bre sker to protect the source). fs 5.7 De /.AC poww soun;e shall not formally be directly connected so the preferred or on site emergency AC poww systein for the unit affected by the blackout. In addition, the AAC system shall not be capable of automade j loading of shutdown equipment fmm the blacked out imit unless licensed w% such capabuity, Minimal Potential for Common Cause 'Fallure B.8 There shall be minimal potential for crmmon cause failure of the AAC power source (s). De following system featurse provide assurance that the minims! potendal for commcen cause fauurn has been adequately addressed. I (a) De AAC poww systern shall be equipped with a DC poww source that is electrically ladspendent from the blacked.oet units profwred and Qas 1E poww system. (b) De AAC poww system shall be equipped with an air start system, as applicable, that is ladependent of the profemd and the blacke41 unit's ;rsferred and Cass IE power supply. j l i (c) De AAC poww system shan be provided with a fuel ou supply, as applicable, that la separats { l from the fuel oil supply for the casite emergency AC poww system. A separate day tank supplied from a common storage' tank is-accf.>ble provided $e fuel ou is sampled and 1 analysed consistent with applicable standards prior to transfw so the day tak. I (4 If the AAC power source is an untical machine to the emergency wite AC power snurce. active fauures of the emergency AC poww scurce shall be evaluated for app!!cability and comctive action taken to rehoe subsequent fauures. (e) No single point vulnerabnity than exist whereby a !*aly weather.related event or single active fauare could disable any poetion of the onsite emergency AC poww sources or the preferred L poww sources, and simultaneously fall the AAC power source (s). (f) De AAC poww system shall be capable of operahng during and after a station blackout l without any support systems powered from the preferred power supply, or the blacked out units Class IE poww sources affected by the event. (g) De partions of the AAC power sysum sub,tected to maintenarze activities shall be tested prior to returning the AAC power system to urvice. B.2 v-

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Dt4% n.. F M 4 27 7 GL'IDELINLI AND TECHNICAL B ASE3 FOR NLM ARC INITIATIVE.8 NLMARCs7 00 I Arallability After Onset of Station Blackout (s The AAC power sptem shall be shed tg carry the reqEl' red shutdown loads for the required coping duradon B.9 determined in Seedon 3.2.5, and be capable of maintaining voltage and frequency within limits consistent with established Industry standa ds that wl!! not degrade the peformance of any shutdawn aystem or component. At a muld unit site, except for 1/2 Sha.ed or 2/3 emergency AC power configurations, an adjacent unit's Class lE power source may be used as an AAC pwar source for the blackad-out unit if it is capable of powering the requiredloads se both units. Capsetty and Reliabl!Ity B.10 Unless otherwise governed by techrdeal specificadons, the AAC power source shall be started and brought to operadng condidons that are conshtent with its funedon as an AAC source at intervah not longer than three months, following m, Jacturst's recommendadons or in accordance with plant developed pocedures. Once every refueling outage, a timed start (wkhin the dme period rpeelflod under blackout condidons) and rated load capacity ' te.t shallbe performed. B 11 Unless otherwise governed by technical speel0cadons, surveillance and maintenance procedures for the AAC .e syntem saall be implemented comidering manufxturer's recommendadons or in accordarse with plant developed poca& area. B.12 Unless otherwise swerr. sal by technical specificadons, t.1e AAC system shall be demonstrated by initial test to be capable of powering required shutdown equipment within one hour of a stadon blzkout event. l l B.13 The Non Class IE AAC system should anempt to meet the target reliability and availability goals specified below, depending on normal system state. In this context, reliability and evallability goals apply to the overall AAC system rather than individual mzhines, where a system may compise more than one AAC power source. (a) Systems Not Nrmm!!v Oncrated (Standhv systemii System reliabt!!ty should be maintained et or above 0.95 per demand, as detenrdned in accordarce with NS AC 108 methodology (or evdvalent). (b) Svstems Normilly Owrmd (Online Svstemi) Availability AAC systerra normally online should attempt to be available to its associeted unit at leas; 95% of the time the reactor is operating. Reliability No reliability targets or standards are establist.ed for online i systems.

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