ML24178A370
| ML24178A370 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/05/2024 |
| From: | Carrie Safford NRC/NMSS/DREFS/RRPB |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML24178A369 | List: |
| References | |
| NRC-2017-0227, RIN 3150-AK19, FR Citation: 89 FR 65226-65242; 08-09-24 FR Citation: 89 FR 65226; 8/9/2024 | |
| Download: ML24178A370 (60) | |
Text
[7590-01-P]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50, 52, and 73
[NRC-2017-0227]
RIN 3150-AK19
Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule and guidance.
SUMMARY
- The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its
regulations to provide certain alternativ e, risk-informed, performance-based physical
security requirements for advanced reactors that would result in greater regulatory
stability, predictability, and clarity in the licensing process and reduce the need for
exemptions. The term advanced reactors, as used in this rulemaking, refers to nuclear
power reactors that are light-water small modular reactors or non-light-water reactors.
Concurrently, the NRC is issuing for public comment a draft regulatory guide,
DG-5072, Guidance for Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Small Modular
Reactors and Non-Light-Water Reactors. The NRC also developed DG-5071, Target
Set Identification and Development for Nuclear Power Reactors, which is withheld from
public disclosure and can be made available to those members of the public with a need
to know.
DATES: Submit comments by October 23, 2024. Comments received after this date will
be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to ensure
consideration only for comments received before this date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods (unless this
document describes a different method for submitting comments on a specific subject);
however, the NRC encourages electronic comment submission through the Federal
rulemaking website:
- Federal rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC-2017-0227. Address questions about NRC dockets to Dawn Forder;
telephone: 301-415-3407; email: Dawn.Forder@nrc.gov. For technical questions contact
the individuals listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
- Email comments to: Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you do not receive
an automatic email reply confirming receipt, then contact us at 301-415-1677.
- Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301-
415-1101.
- Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
- Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. eastern time, Federal workdays; telephone:
301-415-1677.
You can read a plain language description of this proposed rule at
https://www.regulations.gov/docket/NRC-2017-0227. For additional direction on
obtaining information and submitting co mments, see Obtaining Information and
Submitting Comments in the SUPPLEME NTARY INFORMATION section of this
document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Technical information : Dennis Andrukat,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, telephone: 301-415-3561, email:
2 Dennis.Andrukat@nrc.gov; and Beth Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
telephone: 301-415-2130, email: Elizabeth.Reed@nrc.gov. Both are staff of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Guidance information : Lou Cubellis, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response,
telephone: 301-287-3670, email: Louis.Cubellis@nr c.gov; or Stanley Gardocki, Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research, telephone: 301-415-1067, email:
Stanley.Gardocki@nrc.gov. Both are staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001. Please do not in clude any potentially classified or
sensitive information in your email.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments A. Obtaining Information B. Submitting Comments II. Background A. Existing Physical Security Framework for Nuclear Power Reactors B. Emerging Interest in Advanced Reactor Technology C. Rulemaking Activity D. Public Comments on Regulatory Basis E. Public Interactions During Proposed Rule Development III. Discussion A. Scope B. Objective C. Licensing D. New or Modified Requirements in 10 CFR Part 73 E. Conforming Changes - 10 CFR 73.55(b)(9)(i), (e)(10)(i), and (k)(1) and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73 F. Contents of Application G. Change Control H. Regulatory Requirements for Documentation and Technical Analysis IV. Specific Requests for Comment V. Section-by-Section Analysis VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification VII. Regulatory Analysis VIII. Backfitting and Issue Finality IX. Cumulative Effects of Regulation X. Plain Writing
3 XI. Environmental Assessment and Proposed Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact XII. Paperwork Reduction Act XIII. Availability of Guidance XIV. Public Meeting XV. Availability of Documents
I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments
A. Obtaining Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2017-0227 when contacting the NRC about the
availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly available information
related to this action by any of the following methods:
- Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and
search for Docket ID NRC-2017-0227.
- NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public
Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the
search, select Begin Web-based ADAMS Search. For problems with ADAMS, please
contact the NRCs Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209,
301-415-4737, or by email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. For the convenience of the
reader, instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are provided
in the Availability of Documents section of this document.
- NRCs PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents, by
appointment, at the NRCs PDR, Room P1 B35, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make an appointment to visit the PDR, please send
an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between
8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
B. Submitting Comments
4 The NRC encourages electronic comment submission through the Federal
rulemaking website (https://www.regulations.gov). Please include Docket ID NRC-2017-
0227 in your comment submission.
The NRC cautions you not to include identif ying or contact information that you
do not want to be publicly disclosed in y our comment submission. The NRC will post all
comment submissions at https://www.regulat ions.gov as well as enter the comment
submissions into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for
submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying
or contact information that they do not w ant to be publicly disclosed in their comment
submission. Your request should state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment
submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions
available to the public or entering the comment into ADAMS.
II. Background
A. Existing Physical Security Framework for Nuclear Power Reactors
The NRC has established physical security requirements for the protection of
production and utilization facilities licensed under 10 CFR part 50, Domestic Licensing
of Production and Utilization Facilities, or 10 CFR part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and
Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants. The NRC requires these licensees to design,
implement, and maintain a physical protecti on program that provides high assurance 1
1 The Commission stated in staff requirements memorandum (SRM) SRM-SECY-16-0073 - Options and Recommendations for the Force-On-Force Inspection Program in Response to SRM-SECY-14-0088, dated October 5, 2016, that the concept of high assurance of adequate protection found in the NRC security regulations is equivalent to reasonable assurance when it comes to determining what level of regulation is appropriate. The Commission re-iterated this point in SRM-SECY-18-0076 - Options and Recommendation for Physical Security for Advanced Reactors, dated November 19, 2018.
5 that operation of the facility is not inimical to the common defense and security and does
not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. To satisfy this
performance objective, a licensees physical protection program must protect against the
design-basis threat (DBT) of radiological sabotage as set forth in § 73.1 of title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Purpose and scope. The physical security
requirements that a licensee must implement to protect against the DBT of radiological
sabotage are primarily set forth in 10 CFR part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and
Materials. The Commission-approved DBT de scribes the type, composition, and
capabilities of an adversary that a licensee can reasonably be expected to defend
against. Development of the DBT is based on threat assessments of the tactics,
techniques, and procedures used by international and domestic terrorist groups and
organizations.
The physical security requirements for the protection of nuclear power reactors
against the DBT of radiological sabotage can be found in § 73.55, Requirements for
physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological
sabotage. These requirements contain a mixture of performance-based and prescriptive
security requirements that provide applicants and licensees with the flexibility to
determine how to meet the established performance objective.
The focus of this proposed rule is on the physical security requirements related to
protection against radiological sabotage for advanced reactors. The term advanced
reactors, as used in this document, refers to nuclear power reactors that are non-light-
water reactors (non-LWRs) or small modular reactors (SMRs) as SMR is defined in §
171.5, Definitions.
The current physical protection program for power reactors is designed to protect
the plant features needed to provide fundamental safety functions, such as maintaining
reactor core cooling to prevent significant core damage from the DBT of radiological
6 sabotage. The loss of plant features providing these safety functions can lead to damage
of a reactor core or spent nuclear fuel sabotage, with a potential subsequent release of
radioactive materials. When compared to operating large LWRs, many of the advanced
reactor designs have smaller power outputs an d a correspondingly smaller inventory of
fission products available for potential release. In comparison to large LWRs, some
advanced reactor designs may include attributes that could result in smaller and slower
releases of fission products following the loss of certain safety functions. Accordingly,
some designs may warrant different methods for meeting the NRCs physical security
requirements, commensurate with the potential radiological consequences resulting from
radiological sabotage.
B. Emerging Interest in Advanced Reactor Technology
Concurrent with large LWR deployment and design evolution, nuclear power
reactor vendors have developed several different reactor designs that are either light-
water SMRs with passive safety features or reactors that do not use light water as a
coolant. This latter category is commonly re ferred to as non-LWR technology. Advanced
reactor designs using non-LWR technology include liquid metal-cooled reactors, gas-
cooled reactors, and molten-salt-cooled reactors. These advanced reactor designs could
have rated thermal power outputs that range from low to very high and may apply
modular construction concepts.
As advanced reactor designs evolved in the 1980s and early 1990s, the NRC
considered the need for a revised regulatory regime specifically for these emerging
technologies. The NRC issued its Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced
Nuclear Power Plants on July 8, 1986 (51 FR 24643), to provide the Commissions
policy regarding the review of, and desired characteristics associated with, advanced
reactors. In this policy statement, the NRC identified attributes that developers should
consider in advanced designs, including safety features that are highly reliable, the use
7 of the defense-in-depth philosophy of maintaining multiple barriers against radiation
release, and, as compared to large LWRs, less-complex heat removal systems, longer
time constants before reaching safety system challenges, and reduced potential for
severe accidents and their consequences.
On October 14, 2008, the NRC issued a revised Policy Statement on the
Regulation of Advanced Reactors (73 FR 60612), describing attributes that should be
considered in advanced designs to establish the acceptability or licensability of such
designs, including designs that include considerations for safety and security
requirements together in the design process such that security issues (e.g., newly
identified threats of terrorist attacks) can be effectively resolved through facility design
and engineered security features, and formulation of mitigation measures, with reduced
reliance on human actions. The Commission also observed that it will be in the interest
of the public as well as the design vendors and the prospective license applicants to
address security issues early in the design stage to achieve a more robust and effective
security posture for future nuclear power reactors.
Later, in SECY-10-0034, Potential Policy, Licensing, and Key Technical Issues
for Small Modular Nuclear Reactor Designs, dated March 28, 2010, the NRC identified
potential issues for SMRs based on the preliminary design information supplied in pre-
application interactions and discussions with SMR designers and the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE). The NRC noted that establis hing physical security requirements and
guidance for SMRs and non-LWRs was a key policy issue of high importance.
In SECY-11-0184, Security Regulatory Framework for Certifying, Approving, and
Licensing Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (M110329), dated December 29, 2011, the
NRC staff reported that the current security regulatory framework is adequate for SMRs,
including related elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. In the case of non-LWRs, the staffs
assessment of the suitability of the current security regulatory framework was based on
8 the limited information that was available at the time on reactor and fuel designs and
operations of these technologies. Based on this information, the staff stated that it was
not aware of any area in which the existing security regulatory framework would not
apply to non-LWRs and that the staff would continue to assess the suitability and
adequacy of the security and material control and accountability requirements for
proposed non-LWR technologies in order to identify any regulatory gaps and potential
technical or policy issues pertaining to certifying, approving, or licensing non-LWR
technologies.
The staff also indicated in SECY-11-0184 that the alternative measures provision
in § 73.55(r), Alternative measures, allows SMR and non-LWR designers and potential
applicants to propose alternative methods or approaches that provide a level of
protection that is at least equal to that which would otherwise be provided by the specific
security requirement in § 73.55 for which an alternative measure is being proposed.
These alternative methods or approaches may include increased reliance on engineered
systems that reduce the need to rely on oper ational requirements and staffing to meet
regulatory requirements.
Since the issuance of SECY-11-0184, discussions with external stakeholders
and within the NRC have turned to whether some type of generic regulatory action would
be preferable to the case-by-case approach described in SECY-11-0184. Reactor
designers and other stakeholders have raised concerns that the current prescriptive
physical security requirements could impose unnecessary regulatory burden for SMRs
and non-LWRs that is not commensurate with the risks posed by some of these designs.
In response, the NRC assessed potential regul atory changes that would modify existing
physical security requirements to make them commensurate with the risks associated
with advanced reactor designs. In proposing revisions to physical security requirements
for advanced reactors, the NRC considered t he inherent features of many advanced
9 reactor designs, such as lower fission product inventories and longer thermal time
constants, as well as safety and security feat ures that could be incorporated into facility
designs. As discussed previously, these types of attributes and design features have
been mentioned in the Commissions Policy Statement to reduce reliance on human
actions in responding to attempted acts of radiological sabotage. Initial interactions with
the public related to a possible rulemaking involved meetings on the Nuclear Energy
Institute (NEI) white paper, Proposed Physical Security Requirements for Advanced
Reactor Technologies, dated December 14, 2016. The NEI white paper suggested
consequence-oriented criteria for determin ing when an advanced reactor design would
be a candidate for alternative physical security requirements. The NRC subsequently
prepared a draft white paper on potential changes to the physical security requirements
for advanced reactors in November 2017.
C. Rulemaking Activity
On August 1, 2018, the staff submitted SECY-18-0076, Options and
Recommendation for Physical Security for Ad vanced Reactors, presenting alternatives
and a recommendation to the Commission on possible changes to the regulations and
guidance related to physical security for advanced reactors. The staff evaluated the
advantages and disadvantages of each alternative and recommended a limited-scope
rulemaking to further assess and, if appropriate, develop a limited set of alternative
security requirements that licensees of certain advanced reactor designs could
implement. The staff also recommended developing necessary guidance to address
performance criteria used to determine an advanced reactor applicant's eligibility for
using one or more of the alternative physical security requirements. In SRM-SECY 0076, dated November 19, 2018, the Commission approved the staffs recommendation
to initiate a limited-scope rulemaking and to interact with stakeholders to identify specific
requirements within existing regulations that would play a diminished role in providing
10 physical security for advanced reactors while at the same time contributing significantly
to capital and/or operating costs. The Commission also directed the staff to use
exemptions until the final rule is implemented.
In response to SRM-SECY-18-0076, on July 16, 2019, the NRC published a
Federal Register notice of the issuance of the regulatory basis for this rulemaking,
Regulatory Basis for the Physical Security of Advanced Reactors, for a 30-day public
comment period. The regulatory basis summarized the current physical security
framework for protecting large LWRs against radiological sabotage, described regulatory
issues that have motivated the NRC to pursue rulemaking, evaluated various
alternatives to address physical security for advanced reactors, and identified the
background documents related to these issues. In the Federal Register notice that
issued the regulatory basis, the NRC requested feedback from the public on specific
questions related to the eligibility criterion (referred to as performance criteria in the
regulatory basis), offsite licensee response approach, and cumulative effects of
regulation (CER).
Non-Concurrence Process (NCP):
On April 28, 2022, during the NRCs internal review of this proposed rule, a staff
member from the NRCs Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response submitted a
formal non-concurrence. This NCP, identified as NCP-2022-003, was reviewed and
closed without requiring changes to the proposed rule.
D. Public Comments on Regulatory Basis
The public comment period closed on August 15, 2019, and the NRC received
nine comment letters from six commenters, including three members of the public, one
non-governmental organization, one potential NRC applicant, and one industry group.
The letters provided various points of view; suggestions for clarifications, additions, and
deletions; and comments outside the scope of this rulemaking. In general, the industry
11 group commenter and the potential NRC applicant expressed support for the concept of
alternative physical security requirements for advanced reactors, while the public and
non-governmental organization commenters did not support the potential alternatives
discussed in the regulatory basis document.
The public comment documents are available as indicated in the Availability of
Documents section of this document. As stated in the Federal Register notice that
issued the regulatory basis, the NRC is not providing formal written responses to the
comments received on the regulatory basis.
As a result of SRM-SECY-18-0076, and in consideration of the public comments
received on the regulatory basis, the NRC is pr oposing this limited-scope rule to provide
a clear set of alternative performance-based physical security requirements for
advanced reactors licensed under 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52. This proposed rule
would reduce the need for advanced reactor applicants and licensees to request
alternative measures or exemptions from current physical security requirements. This
proposed rule also would provide benefits for advanced reactor applicants by
establishing greater regulatory stability, predictability, and clarity in the licensing process
while maintaining a level of security commensurate with the risk associated with these
facilities.
E. Public Interactions During Proposed Rule Development.
The NRC engaged with stakeholders throughout the development of the
proposed rule by holding public meetings, issu ing draft versions of preliminary proposed
rule language, and requesting public feedback. These interactions included discussions
on the draft regulatory guidance. The following table shows the public interactions
conducted during the proposed rule development.
12 INTERACTION DATE TOPIC NEI White December 14, NEI white paper, Proposed Physical Security Paper 2016 Requirements for Advanced Reactor Technologies Public Meeting December 13, NRC draft white paper, November 2017 2017 Public Meeting August 8, NRCs request for additional potential alternatives 2019 Public Meeting December 12, NRCs initial proposed rule approach and path 2019 forward Stakeholder January 10, NEI letter regarding additional input for the rule Letter 2020 Public Meeting February 20, Periodic Advanced Reactor Stakeholder meeting; 2020 NRCs proposed rule approach, guidance development, and screening of public comments Draft Guidance April 10, 2020 NEI 20-05, Draft A submission Preliminary April 13, 2020 Initial release of preliminary proposed rule language Proposed Rule that incorporated public comments Language Draft Guidance April 13, 2020 NEI 20-05, Draft B submission Public Meeting April 22, 2020 Initial preliminary proposed rule language and draft guidance Preliminary September 14, Release of revised preliminary proposed rule Proposed Rule 2020 language Language Draft Guidance September 17, NRC letter to NEI regarding May 2020 comments 2020 Draft Guidance March 2, 2021 NRC comments on NEI 20-05, Draft B Public Meeting April 21, 2021 Eligibility criteria, unmitigated terminology, and NRCs review of NEI 20-05, Draft B Public Meeting May 14, 2021 Eligibility criteria Draft Guidance May 14, 2021 NEI 20-05, Draft D submission Public Meeting August 17, Eligibility criteria, target set terminology, and 2021 guidance Public Meeting September 16, Three eligibility criteria 2021 Public Meeting September 29, Target set process, three eligibility criteria, 2021 consequence analysis Public Meeting October 19, Single eligibility criterion and revised target set 2021 process Draft Guidance November 24, NRC letter ceasing review of NEI 20-05 2021 Preliminary December 14, Release of revised preliminary proposed rule Proposed Rule 2021 language Language Public Meeting January 20, Revised preliminary proposed rule language and 2022 key guidance elements
III. Discussion
13 A. Scope
This proposed rule would establish certain risk-informed and performance-based
alternative physical security requirements that eligible advanced reactor applicants and
licensees could elect to implement. The physi cal security requirements under § 73.55 for
which alternative security requirements have not been developed would remain in effect
and applicable to SMR and non-LWR power reactors.
This proposed rule does not include alter natives for large LWRs, fuel cycle
facilities, or non-power production and utilization facilities. Large LWRs were not
included in the scope of this proposed rule because a physical security regulatory
framework and provisions for requesting alte rnative measures already exist for those
reactors under § 73.55(r). Additionally, licensees for existing large LWRs have not
requested changes to the existing physical protection program to adopt the proposed
consequence-based alternatives. The current fleet of operating nuclear power reactors,
consisting entirely of large LWRs, would continue to be regulated by the current
established framework for physical security in § 73.55 and appendices B and C to 10
CFR part 73.
Fuel cycle facilities and non-power production and utilization facilities are not
subject to 10 CFR 73.55 and therefore were not included in the scope of this proposed
rule.
B. Objective
In accordance with the rulemaking plan approved by the Commission in SRM-
SECY-18-0076, this limited-scope proposed rule would retain the current overall security
framework in § 73.55 to protect against radiological sabotage. This proposed rule would
create specific voluntary, risk-informed, and performance-based alternative physical
security requirements for SMR and non-LWR power reactors licensed under 10 CFR
14 part 50 or 10 CFR part 52. These alternative physical security requirements would 1)
enhance regulatory effectiveness by providing greater stability, predictability, and clarity
in the licensing process for implementing phy sical security for advanced reactors; 2)
reduce requests for exemptions from certain physical security requirements; 3) consider
technological advancements in reactor designs and their associated design features
impacting the possible loss of safety functions from malicious acts and any resulting
consequences; and 4) provide alternatives for meeting certain physical security
requirements under § 73.55 commensurate with the potentially lower risks posed by
advanced reactors.
The current fleet of large LWRs protects against the DBT of radiological
sabotage by preventing significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage. However, this
requirement may not be appropriate for all SMRs or non-LWRs. Accordingly, this
proposed rule would add a new technology-inclusive requirement for advanced reactors
to protect against the DBT of radiological sabotage. This new provision would require
that an advanced reactor licensees physical protection program be designed to prevent
a significant release of radionuclides from any source. The proposed rule would
establish certain alternative physical securi ty requirements available to those advanced
reactor applicants and licensees who can meet this performance standard and the
proposed eligibility criterion. The proposed eligibility criterion would be based on
demonstrating that the consequences of a postulated radiological release are below
prescribed dose reference values.
C. Licensing
There are differences between non-LWR and SMR designs, and large LWR
designs. These include potentially smaller reactor core sizes, lower power densities,
lower probability of severe accidents, slower accident progression, different source term
15 characteristics, and smaller offsite consequences of accidents. These differences have
led DOE, designers, potential operators, and the NRC to examine the physical security
requirements necessary to safely operate such advanced reactors.
The NRC anticipates that some advanced reactor vendors and applicants may
design their facilities and site protective strategy to account for reliance on passive
features, active engineered systems, and automation to achieve security functions with
less reliance on human actions. Based on these design features, advanced reactor
applicants may seek alternative measures for achieving security functions that differ
substantially from the approach at the existing fleet of large LWRs. Without this
proposed rule, applicants for or holders of advanced reactor licenses likely would
request alternative measures or exemptions fr om certain physical security requirements.
This is because the current regulatory framework does not establish alternative
requirements for varying types and sizes of advanced reactors and an eligibility criterion
authorizing these applicants to use alternative requirements.
This proposed rule would establish voluntary alternatives to certain prescriptive
physical security requirements under § 73.55 for advanced reactor licensees. These
alternative physical security requirements w ould continue to provide high assurance of
adequate protection in the event of a security-initiated event. Although the exemption
process could also result in relief from requirements that may not be necessary for a
specific applicant or licensee, regulati ng by exemption generally provides less
opportunity for public engagement and can lead to less regulatory certainty and
increased costs for the NRC and the applicant or licensee. Proceeding by rulemaking
rather than exemptions therefore supports the NRCs principles of good regulation,
including openness, clarity, and reliability.
D. New or Modified Requirements in 10 CFR Part 73
16 10 CFR 73.55(a)(5) - Watts Bar, Unit 2 - remove and reserve
Although not specific to the scope of this rulemaking, the NRC is proposing to
remove the requirements under paragraph (a)(5) of § 73.55 that relate to the Tennessee
Valley Authoritys Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 as a construction permit holder. This
paragraph is no longer necessary as the Tennessee Valley Authority now has an
operating license for this facility and no longer holds a construction permit.
10 CFR 73.55(b)(3) - General requirements revised to address advanced reactors
Currently, nuclear power reactors licensed under 10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR
part 52 must protect against the DBT of radiological sabotage. The existing fleet of large
LWRs meets this objective by preventing significant core damage and spent fuel
sabotage. This proposed rule would not change this requirement for large LWRs.
The NRC anticipates that many of the non-LWR designs will not have reactor
cores similar to those of the existing fleet of LWRs. Therefore, the objective of
preventing significant core damage may not be appropriate for these types of advanced
reactors, although they would still need to protect against the DBT of radiological
sabotage. Accordingly, this proposed rule would add a new technology-inclusive
requirement to the introductory text of paragraph (b)(3) of § 73.55 to require that a non-
LWR advanced reactor licensees physical protection program be designed to prevent a
significant release of radionuclides from any source.
Although SMRs are defined as LWRs for the purpose of this rule and may
therefore have reactor cores similar to thos e of the existing fleet of LWRs, the NRC is
proposing to apply this technology-inclusive requirement of preventing a significant
release of radionuclides from any source to SMRs as well as to non-LWRs. While there
would likely be differences between non-LWR and SMR designs, both types of designs
17 could potentially result in smaller and slower releases of fission products following the
loss of certain safety functions when compared to large LWRs.
In this context, the phrase a significant release of radionuclides from any source
would encompass a postulated security-initiated event that would cause a release to the
environment exceeding that analyzed in the des ign basis accident licensing basis. This
would ensure that a licensees physical prot ection program considers and protects
against significant release from all areas with high radiological inventories, including
reactor cores and spent fuel pools common to LWRs, as well as other physical locations
with radiological inventories in non-LWR designs that need to be protected from a DBT
adversary (e.g., waste processing and storage systems).
10 CFR 73.55(s) - Alternative physical security requirements
The proposed rule would establish new § 73.55(s) to contain the alternative
physical security requirements, found in § 73.55(s)(2). These alternative physical
security requirements could be used by advanced reactor applicants and licensees who
meet the proposed general requirements in § 73.55(s)(1).
10 CFR 73.55(s)(1) - General requirements
Proposed § 73.55(s)(1)(i) would establish that an applicant for or holder of a
license for an advanced reactor under 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 may elect one
or more of the alternative physical security requirements specified in proposed
§ 73.55(s)(2).
Proposed § 73.55(s)(1)(ii) would establish that, to be eligible to use the
alternative physical security requirements in § 73.55(s)(2), the applicant or licensee must
demonstrate that the consequences of a postulated radiological release that results from
a postulated security-initiated event do not exceed the offsite dose reference values
18 defined in §§ 50.34, Contents of applications; technical information, and 52.79,
Contents of applications; technical information in final safety analysis report.
Proposed § 73.55(s)(1)(iii) would establish that the applicant or licensee must
identify the specific alternative physical secu rity requirement(s) it intends to implement
as part of its physical protection program and demonstrate how the requirements set
forth in § 73.55 are met when the selected alternatives are used. The applicant or
licensee would be free to choose any combination of the proposed physical security
alternatives under proposed § 73.55(s)(2). The applicant or licensee would not be
required to elect all of the alternatives, nor would it be restricted to only invoking a single
alternative.
Proposed § 73.55(s)(1)(iv) would require that an applicant or licensee perform a
technical analysis to evaluate the potential offsite radiological consequences from a
postulated security-initiated event to demonstrate eligibility to use the alternative
physical security requirements. The technica l analysis would not need to be submitted to
the NRC for review and approval but would be subject to audit or inspection. This
proposed provision also would require the licensee to maintain the analysis until the
submittal of the licensees certifications for permanent cessation of operations and
permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel required by § 50.82(a)(1) or §
52.110(a).
10 CFR 73.55(s)(2) - Specific alternative physical security requirements
This proposed rule would provide new phy sical security requirements, in
proposed § 73.55(s)(2), that are voluntary alternatives to selected existing requirements
in § 73.55 for an applicant or licensee satisfying the provisions of proposed
§ 73.55(s)(1). The proposed requirements in § 73.55(s)(2) would include alternatives for
armed responders, interdiction and neutralization, physical barriers, onsite secondary
19 alarm stations, and vital areas that would provide flexibility in how applicants and
licensees would design their physical protecti on program to meet the requirements of
proposed § 73.55(b)(3) for protecting against the DBT of radiological sabotage. These
proposed alternative physical security requirements are intended to provide greater
regulatory stability, predictability, and clarity in the licensing process, reduce the need for
applicant or licensee requests for exemptions or alternatives to current physical security
requirements, and reduce resources that would otherwise be required to review specific
exemptions in accordance with the provisi ons of § 73.5, Specific exemptions, or
alternative measures under the provisions of § 73.55(r), Alternative measures.
§ 73.55(s)(2)(i) - Alternative requirement for armed responders
The proposed physical security alternativ e in § 73.55(s)(2)(i) would permit a
licensee to be relieved from the current requirement for the minimum number of armed
responders in § 73.55(k)(5)(ii). Under this proposal, a licensee would be permitted to
design a physical protection program that potentially could have fewer than ten onsite
armed responders, including no onsite armed responders, if appropriate. This alternative
would give an advanced reactor licensee the flexibility to determine and use the number
of onsite armed responders necessary to meet the requirements of proposed
§ 73.55(b)(3). The number of onsite armed responders may be reduced to zero if the
licensee also implements the alternative requirements under proposed § 73.55(s)(2)(ii)
that would allow the licensee to rely on law enforcement or other offsite armed
responders to fulfill the interdiction and neutralization functions to protect against the
DBT of radiological sabotage. Licensees would use existing methods, such as those
currently used by operating reactor licensees, for determining the necessary number of
onsite armed responders.
20 For an applicant or licensee that designs it s physical protection system to rely on
onsite armed responders to perform interd iction and neutralization to achieve the
performance objective and requirements of § 73.55(b), General performance objective
and requirements, the proposed physical security alternative only provides relief from
the prescriptive requirement for the minimum number of armed responders; all other
existing requirements associated with onsite armed personnel would continue to apply.
§ 73.55(s)(2)(ii) - Alternative requirements for interdiction and neutralization
The proposed physical security alternativ e in § 73.55(s)(2)(ii) would permit a
licensee, if appropriate, to rely on law enforcement or other offsite armed responders,
rather than using onsite licensee security personnel, to fulfill the interdiction and
neutralization functions required by § 73.55(b)(3)(i). Use of this alternative would be
available only if a licensee were to have no onsite armed responders.
The current requirement in § 73.55(b)(3)(i) states that the physical security
program must ensure that the capabilities to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize
threats, up to and including the DBT of radiological sabotage, are maintained at all
times. An advanced reactor applicant or licensee that demonstrates it meets proposed
§ 73.55(s)(1) without relying on an onsite armed response force may use this alternate
approach for meeting the requirements for the interdiction and neutralization capabilities
required by § 73.55(b)(3)(i). Such an applicant or licensee may, under proposed
§ 73.55(s)(2)(ii), rely on law enforcement responders (local, State or Federal) or other
offsite armed responders (e.g., licensee proprie tary or contract security personnel who
are positioned offsite), rather than using onsite armed responders to fulfill the interdiction
and neutralization capabilities required in § 73.55(b)(3)(i).
The proposed rule would not relieve a licensee from the responsibility to interdict
and neutralize threats up to and including the DBT of radiological sabotage; rather, it
21 would provide a licensee with an alternative method of fulfilling these responsibilities.
Applicants and licensees relying on law enforcement responders to carry out the
interdiction and neutralization capabilities would be relieved from the majority of the
training and qualification requirements in appendix B, General Criteria for Security
Personnel, to 10 CFR part 73, except for the performance evaluation program
requirements in section VI.C.3. The proposed rule would not create any NRC regulatory
jurisdiction over, or requirements for, law enforcement responders.
Associated requirements for security response personnel in current § 73.55(k)(3)
through (7); § 73.55(k)(8)(ii); 10 CFR part 73, appendix B, section VI (except for section
VI.C.3); and 10 CFR part 73, appendix C, section II.B.3.c.(iv) would not be applicable
where a licensees design of its physical pr otection system would require no armed
responders onsite and the licensee would rely on law enforcement to fulfill the
interdiction and neutralization functions required by § 73.55(b)(3)(i). For example, a
licensee approved to implement the proposed alternative in § 73.55(s)(2)(ii) would be
relieved from the requirement in § 73.55(k)(8)(ii) to initiate response actions to interdict
and neutralize threats when relying on law enforcement to initiate the response actions
to interdict and neutralize threats in accordance with the requirements of part 73,
appendix C, section II, the safeguards contingency plan, and the licensee's response
strategy. The licensee would continue to be required to detect and assess the threat and
then communicate threat information to law enforcement.
The proposed requirements in § 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)( 1) through (5) would establish
specific requirements to ensure that the use of law enforcement or other offsite armed
responders to fulfill the interdiction and neutralization functions would still enable the
licensee to protect against the DBT of radiological sabotage. Consistent with the existing
regulatory framework in § 73.55, the requirement in proposed § 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)( 1)
would reiterate a licensees responsibility to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize
22 threats up to and including the DBT of radiological sabotage. As discussed below,
allowing a licensee to rely on law enforcement responders to fulfill the interdiction and
neutralization capability does not relieve the licensee of this responsibility and therefore
remains consistent with the existing regulatory framework.
Proposed § 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)(2) would establish that a licensee must provide
adequate delay for threats up to and including the DBT of radiological sabotage to
enable law enforcement or other armed responders located offsite sufficient time to
respond to the site and to interdict and neutralize those threats. In other words, the
cumulative delay time would need to be equal to or greater than the security bounding
time for a specific SMR or non-LWR site. The proposed calculation methodology for
security bounding time for SMR and non-LWR sites is contained in appendix C to DG-
5072.
The proposed requirement in § 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)( 3) would require a licensee to
provide necessary information about the site and make available periodic training to law
enforcement or other offsite armed responders to support site-specific preparedness to
fulfill the interdiction and neutralization functions in safeguards contingency events at the
licensees site (i.e., within the owner controlled area, the protected area(s), vital areas,
and other site facilities). Neither the NRC nor licensees can compel law enforcement to
participate in the periodic training; however, the proposed requirements would ensure
that licensees make the necessary information and training available to law
enforcement.
The proposed requirement in § 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)( 4) would establish a
requirement for a licensee relying on law enf orcement or other offsite armed responders
to fulfill the interdiction and neutralization functions to describe in its security contingency
plan the role that law enforcement or the other offsite armed responders will play in the
licensees protective strategy. This would require a licensee to identify and plan for the
23 role of law enforcement or other offsite armed responders in a safeguards contingency
event. In accordance with the requirements of § 73.55(c)(5), a licensee shall establish,
maintain, and implement a safeguards contingency plan that describes how the criteria
set forth in appendix C, section II, to 10 CFR part 73 will be implemented. In applying
this alternative, the licensee would address the role that law enforcement or other offsite
armed responders would fulfill as a substitute for what would otherwise be the duty and
responsibility of onsite armed responders associated with implementing contingency
responses to safeguards events.
The proposed requirement of § 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)( 5) would establish that a
licensee must identify criteria and measures to compensate for the degradation or
absence of law enforcement or other offsite armed responders and propose suitable
compensatory measures that meet the requirements of § 73.55(o)(2) and (3) to address
this degradation. Unlike armed responders and armed security officers for currently
operating power reactors, who are required by current regulations to be available at the
site for response, a licensee that would rely upon law enforcement or other offsite armed
responders must consider the potential that offsite response may be impeded by events
outside of or independent from the safeguards event at the site. While the existing
requirement in § 73.55(o), Compensatory measures, is specific to security systems and
equipment performing required functions, the addition of the proposed alternative in
§ 73.55(s)(2)(ii) creates the new potential for degradation or unavailability of the
personnel relied on to perform security functions such as interdiction and neutralization.
The proposed requirement would rely on the requirements in § 73.55(o)(2) and (3) for
establishing suitable compensatory measures to address degradation or loss of
interdiction and neutralization functions.
A licensee would be relieved from the requirements in § 73.55(k)(3) through (7),
§ 73.55(k)(8)(ii), 10 CFR part 73, appendix B, section VI (except for section VI.C.3.), and
24 10 CFR part 73, appendix C, section II.B.3.c.(iv) with respect to law enforcement
responders, when the licensee relies on the law enforcement responders to fulfill the
interdiction and neutralization functions required by § 73.55(b)(3)(i). When an applicant
or licensee relies on other offsite armed responders for interdiction and neutralization,
the applicant or licensee would be relieved fr om the location-related requirements in
§ 73.55(k)(5)(iii) and 10 CFR part 73, appendix C, section II.B.3.c.(iv), because the
armed responders would be housed outside a facilitys protected area. One requirement
from which a licensee would not be relieved would be the performance evaluation
program requirements related to armed response personnel in 10 CFR part 73, appendix
B, section VI.C.3. A licensee would be required to satisfy these performance evaluation
program requirements for all armed response personnel, including law enforcement. The
performance evaluation program requirements would continue to apply because
implementation of the performance evaluat ion program provides assurance of the
effectiveness of the requirements proposed in § 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)( 1) through (4) when a
licensee relies on law enforcement or other offsite armed responders to perform the
contingency response and interdiction and neutralization functions that protect the site
against the DBT of radiological sabotage. The implementation of a performance
evaluation program would provide assuranc e that any vulnerabilities or weaknesses
resulting from the reliance on law enforcement or other offsite responses to safeguards
contingencies would be identified and corrected and that a licensee would maintain an
adequate response as is required to meet the requirements of § 73.55(b)(3).
§ 73.55(s)(2)(iii) - Alternative requirements for physical barriers
The proposed alternative in § 73.55(s)(2)(iii) would permit a licensee to apply
means other than physical barriers as defined in § 73.2, Definitions, in the design of its
physical protection system to achieve the intended delay functions and access denial
25 and meet the performance objective and requirements of § 73.55(b) to protect against
the DBT of radiological sabotage. A licensee would be permitted to consider other
methods that include the use of engineered systems or human actions, or both, where
reliable and available, to achieve delay f unctions necessary to facilitate security
responses after the successful detection and assessment of threats up to and including
the DBT of radiological sabotage. For example, a licensee could potentially use
engineered systems designed to disperse ma terial that physically impedes or
physiologically interferes with the adversary, such as obscurants and irritants, to achieve
the delay function rather than relying on physical barriers as defined in § 73.2. The
alternative methods would permit consideration of active engineered security systems
performing interdiction and neutralization functions, which may delay the DBT adversary
(e.g., increasing task time, increase travel time, interrupt adversary action, etc.), as well
as serving other functions. A licensee may consider physical spatial distances, terrain,
and other natural features that increase adversary task times, after successful detection
and assessment, in order to achieve delay functions in its design of a physical protection
system. The proposed alternative also would permit a licensee to consider methods
other than physical barriers for physical a ccess controls in implementing the access
authorization program, including restricting access to vital areas.
§ 73.55(s)(2)(iv) - Alternative requirements for onsite secondary alarm stations
The proposed alternative in § 73.55(s)(2)(iv) would permit a licensee to locate a
secondary alarm station offsite, where the capabilities of receiving and monitoring
signals for intrusion detection; receiving and monitoring video image signals to assess
intrusion; communicating with onsite security to assist with implementing a security
response; providing command and control of the security response; and summoning
offsite local, State, and Federal law enforcement assistance are redundant and
26 equivalent to that of the onsite central alarm station. This could include, for example,
having a co-located alarm station offsite that provides secondary alarm station functions
for multiple reactor sites, using a commercial security service certified by an independent
testing organization, or other approaches that provide the functions required of a
secondary alarm station.
The proposed alternative would require that an offsite secondary alarm station be
able to perform the same functions as the onsite central alarm station, but a licensee
would be relieved from the requirements in § 73.55(i)(4)(iii) to construct, locate, and
protect the secondary alarm station to the same standards as the central alarm station.
For example, an SMR or non-LWR licensee would not need to locate the secondary
alarm station inside a protected area, ensure that the interior of the secondary alarm
station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area, or construct the secondary
alarm station to be bullet resistant. A licensee would be permitted to install equipment in
the secondary alarm station that is different than the central alarm station, as long as the
secondary alarm station can perform the equivalent and redundant functions of the
central alarm station.
§ 73.55(s)(2)(v) - Alternative requirements for vital areas
The proposed alternative in § 73.55(s)(2)(v) would permit relief from the
requirements to designate the secondary alarm station as a vital area and locate the
secondary power supply systems for the offsite secondary alarm station in a vital area.
The primary purpose of designating areas as vital is to control access in order to protect
vital equipment or operations important to sa fety or security. This is accomplished by
limiting the number of site personnel that are authorized unescorted access to these
areas and requiring security measures such as locks, alarms, and periodic armed
security checks to control physical access and detect unauthorized access. These
27 control measures, along with other controls implemented in accordance with a licensees
insider mitigation program, protect against the DBT insider threat. Locating the
secondary alarm station offsite and separate from the central alarm station minimizes
the risk of the insider threat to affect or disrupt alarm station functions. This reflects the
assumption that not every individual who is authorized unescorted access to an onsite
alarm station would have authorized unescorted access or physical access to a
secondary alarm station that would be located offsite. In addition, a secondary alarm
station does not include activities that involve special nuclear material that would pose a
risk of significant release of radionuclides from any source. Thus, a secondary alarm
station would not be an element of a target set that an adversary would likely seek to
destroy.
E. Conforming Changes - 10 CFR 73.55(b)(9)(i), (e)(10)(i), and (k)(1) and Appendix B to
This proposed rule would establish that, for SMRs and non-LWRs, the physical
protection program must be designed to protect against a significant release of
radionuclides from any source and would therefore be designed to protect against
radiological sabotage as defined in § 73.2.
The NRC proposes to amend current requirements under § 73.55(b)(9)(i),
(e)(10)(i), and (k)(1) and section VI.A.1 of appendix B to 10 CFR part 73 to provide
conforming requirements for SMRs and non-LWRs. The current requirement under
§ 73.55(b)(3) of designing the physical protection program to prevent significant core
damage (e.g., non-localized fuel melting or core destruction) and spent fuel sabotage
was established as the means of protecting against radiological sabotage for LWRs.
However, the term core damage may not be universally applicable to all advanced
reactor designs, such as those that are based on non-LWR technology. For example, in
28 some technologies, such as molten salt reactor technologies, the nuclear fuel may be in
a liquid form. Also, for some advanced reactor designs, core damage may not result in a
release of radionuclides that would constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and
safety. The proposed conforming requirements for SMRs and non-LWRs under
§ 73.55(b)(9)(i), (e)(10)(i), and (k)(1) and section VI.A.1 of appendix B to 10 CFR part 73
continue to apply the definition of radiological sabotage under § 73.2, and establish the
new requirement for the design of the physical protection program to protect against
significant release of radionuclides from any source.
F. Contents of Application
The NRC is proposing to amend the requirements for the content of applications
for operating licenses under § 50.34 and for combined licenses under § 52.79. The
current regulations under § 50.34(c), Physical security plan, and § 52.79(a) require
license applicants to include in their applications a physical security plan that describes
how the applicant will meet the applicable requirements of 10 CFR part 73. Therefore,
an applicants election of a proposed alternative under § 73.55(s) would be described in
the physical security plan included in the license application. The NRC is proposing to
add paragraph § 50.34(c)(4) and § 52.79(a)(35)(iii) to require each applicant electing to
apply an alternative in § 73.55(s)(2) to provide a description of the technical analysis
required by § 73.55(s)(1)(iv). The technical analysis itself does not have to be submitted
to the NRC for review and approval. Eligible licensees that would elect to use one of the
proposed alternative requirements under § 73. 55(s) would need to amend their security
plans in accordance with the requirements in § 50.54(p).
G. Change Control
29 The NRC is proposing to amend the requirements for controlling changes to the
physical security plan in § 50.54(p) by adding new paragraph (p)(5). Proposed
§ 50.54(p)(5) would apply to all licensees who use the alternative physical security
requirements of § 73.55(s). This proposal would require that the applicable
requirements proposed under § 73.55(s)(1)(ii) continue to be met if a licensee makes a
change to plant features or becomes aware of a change to offsite support resources
described in the site-specific analysis required by proposed § 73.55(s)(1)(iv). In such
cases, the licensee would need to consider the effect of the change on the analysis. The
licensee would also need to amend the information in the physical security
plan prepared under § 50.34(c) or § 52.79(a) to describe how the change continues to
meet the requirements in proposed § 73.55(s)(1)(ii), as applicable.
H. Regulatory Requirements for Documentation and Technical Analysis
Proposed § 73.55(s)(1)(iii) would require the identification and documentation of
the alternative security requirements bei ng implemented as part of the physical
protection program and demonstration of how the requirements set forth in § 73.55 are
met when one or more of the selected alternatives are used.
Proposed § 73.55(s)(1)(iv) would require a technical analysis be performed to
demonstrate eligibility to use the alternat ive physical security requirements. This
technical analysis can use information from both the safety analysis and the target set
identification process to support a finding of eligibility. This technical analysis would be
separate from the documentation in a licensees physical security plan describing how
the licensee plans to implement any alternativ e physical security requirements as part of
its physical protection program. Under propos ed § 73.55(s)(1)(iv), the licensee would be
required to maintain the technical analysis until the certifications required by
§ 50.82(a)(1) or § 52.110(a) have been submitted. Proposed § 50.34(c)(4) and
30
§ 52.79(a)(35)(iii) would require each applicant electing to apply an alternative in
§ 73.55(s)(2) to provide a description of the technical analysis required by
§ 73.55(s)(1)(iv). However, the technical analysis itself does not have to be submitted to
the NRC for review and approval but would be subject to audit or inspection.
IV. Specific Requests for Comment
The NRC is seeking advice and recommendations from the public on the
proposed rule. We are particularly interested in comments and supporting rationale from
the public on the following:
(1) Some advanced reactors may have designs that are significantly different
from the current operating large LWRs. These large LWRs must meet the requirement
found in § 73.55(b)(3) for preventing significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.
The NRC is proposing that advanced reactors meet a new technology-inclusive
requirement that would prevent a significant release of radionuclides from any source.
(a) If non-LWRs and SMRs should use a different requirement, then what other
suitable requirement besides preventing a significant release of radionuclides from any
source could be applicable to SMRs and non-LWRs? Please provide the basis for your
response.
(b) The NRC also considered using a more specific technology-inclusive
requirement, such as the dose reference values currently found in §§ 50.34(a)(1)(ii)(D)
and 52.79(a)(1)(vi). How could the NRC implement the use of such a dose-based
requirement (e.g., offsite dose reference values) in the context of evaluating physical
security for a site? If there should be alternative value(s) (such as a different dose-based
or safety-based value(s)), what would be a suitable alternative value(s)? Please provide
the basis for your response.
31 (2) The NRC is not proposing a hybrid approach that would allow a licensee to
rely on a combination of onsite armed responders and law enforcement or other offsite
armed responders to implement the licensee's protective strategy. Why should or
shouldnt the NRC establish requirements and supporting guidance to allow for such a
hybrid approach? What changes are necessary to the proposed rule and supporting
guidance to address potential hybrid approaches? Please provide the basis for your
response.
(3) The NRC recognizes that allowing licensees to rely entirely or partially on law
enforcement, rather than onsite armed responders, to interdict and neutralize threats up
to and including the DBT of radiological sabotage, is a novel approach to meeting the
performance objectives in § 73.55(b). Has the NRC adequately addressed the
uncertainties associated with the proposed requirements at 10 CFR 73.55(s)(2)(ii)?
Please provide the basis for your response.
(4) Some advanced reactors may have design characteristics or engineered
safety features that would contribute to the ability of a designer to show that the criteria
in proposed § 73.55(s)(1) are met. However, the NRC is not currently proposing to add
any submittal requirements in this regard for standard design certification applications
under subpart B to 10 CFR part 52. What would be the potential benefits and challenges
if the NRC were to add optional submittal requirements on such design characteristics or
engineered safety features to § 52.47, Content s of applications; technical information,
similar to those for emergency plans for early site permit applicants in § 52.17(b)(2) and
(3)? To what extent should the NRC consider security matters resolved under
§ 52.63(a)(5) for a standard design certification when the information that would be
required to show that the criteria in proposed § 73.55(s)(1) are met is provided by a
design certification applicant and reviewed by the NRC as part of the certification
process?
32 V. Section-by-Section Analysis
The following paragraphs describe the specific changes within this rulemaking.
§ 50.34 Contents of applications; technical information
This proposed rule would add a new paragraph (c)(4) to add a submission
requirement that licensees of SMRs and non-LWRs electing to use one or more
alternative security requirements in § 73.55(s)(2) must provide a description of the
technical analysis required under § 73.55(s)(1) when submitting the application
documentation required under § 50.34.
§ 50.54 Conditions of licenses
This proposed rule would add a new paragraph (p)(5) to add change control
requirements that licensees of SMRs and non-LWRs must follow when there is a change
that impacts the documentation required under § 73.55(s).
§ 52.79 Contents of applications; technical information in final safety analysis
report
This proposed rule would add a new paragraph (a)(35)(iii) to add a submission
requirement that licensees of SMRs and non-LWRs electing to use one or more
alternative security requirements in § 73.55(s)(2) must provide a description of the
technical analysis required under § 73.55(s)(1) when submitting the application
documentation required under § 52.79.
§ 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear
power reactors against radiological sabotage
33 This proposed rule would remove and reserve paragraph (a)(5) as it is no longer
relevant since Tennessee Valley Authority now has an operating license for Watts Bar
Unit 2 and no longer holds a construction permit.
This proposed rule also would revise paragraph (b)(3) introductory text, revise
paragraph (b)(9)(i) introductory text, add paragraphs (b)(9)(i)(A) and (B), and revise
paragraphs (e)(10)(i)(A) and (k)(1) to add requirements for SMRs and non-LWRs and to
distinguish between SMRs and other LWRs.
This proposed rule also would add new paragraph (s) containing the alternative
physical security requirements for SMRs and non-LWRs. Proposed paragraph (s) would
include both the general and specific requirements that must be met by those licensees
who elect to apply the alternatives to physical security requirements.
Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73 - General Criteria for Security Personnel
This proposed rule would revise paragraph VI.A.1 to add requirements for SMRs
and non-LWRs and to distinguish between SMRs and other LWRs.
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), as amended at 5 U.S.C. 601 et
seq., requires that agencies consider the impact of their rulemakings on small entities
and, consistent with applicable statutes, consi der alternatives to minimize these impacts
on the businesses, organizations, and government jurisdictions to which they apply.
In accordance with the Small Business Administrations (SBAs) regulation at
13 CFR 121.903(c), the NRC has developed its own size standards for performing an
RFA analysis and has verified with the SBA Office of Advocacy that its size standards
are appropriate for NRC analyses. The NRC size standards at 10 CFR 2.810, NRC size
standards, are used to determine whether an applicant or licensee qualifies as a small
34 entity in the NRCs regulatory programs. Section 2.810 defines the following types of
small entities:
A small business is a for-profit concern and is a(1) Concern that provides a
service or a concern not engaged in manufacturing with average gross receipts of $8.0
million or less over its last 5 completed fiscal years; or (2) Manufacturing concern with an
average number of 500 or fewer employees based upon employment during each pay
period for the preceding 12 calendar months.
A small organization is a not-for-profit organization which is independently
owned and operated and has annual gross receipts of $8.0 million or less.
A small governmental jurisdiction is a government of a city, county, town,
township, village, school district, or special district with a population of less than 50,000.
A small educational institution is one that is(1) Supported by a qualifying
small governmental jurisdiction; or (2) No t State or publicly supported and has 500 or
fewer employees.
Number of Small Entities Affected
The NRC is currently not aware of any known small entities as defined in § 2.810
that are planning to apply for an advanced nuclear reactor construction permit or
operating license under 10 CFR part 50 or an early site permit or combined license
under 10 CFR part 52, and would be impacted by this proposed rule. Based on this
finding, the NRC has preliminarily determined that the proposed rule would not have a
significant economic impact on a subst antial number of small entities.
Economic Impact on Small Entities
Depending on how the ownership and/or operating responsibilities for such an
enterprise were structured, applicants for an advanced nuclear reactor rated 8
megawatts electric (MWe) or less could conceivably meet the definition of small entities
as defined by § 2.810. Owners that operate power reactors rated greater than 8 MWe
35 could generate sufficient electricity revenue that exceeds the gross annual receipts limit
of $8 million, assuming a 90 percent capacity factor and the June 2021 U.S. Department
of Energys Energy Information Administration U.S. average price of electricity to the
ultimate customer for all sectors of 11.3 cents per kilowatt-hour.
Although the NRC is not aware of any small entities that would be affected by the
proposed rule, there is a possibility that future applications for an advanced nuclear
reactor permit or license could be submitt ed by small entities who plan to own and
operate an advanced nuclear reactor rated 8 MWe or less. Advanced nuclear reactors
that are rated 8 MWe or less would most likely be used to support electrical demand for
military bases or small remote towns, or would provide process heat for a variety of
industrial applications (e.g., desalination, oil refining, hydrogen production), so they
would not directly compete with larger adv anced nuclear reactors that would typically
produce electricity for the grid. As a result of these differing purposes, the NRC would
expect that small and large entities would not be in direct competition with each other.
Therefore, the NRC preliminarily concludes that this proposed rule would not
have a significant economic impact on a s ubstantial number of small entities.
Request for Comments
The NRC is seeking comments on both its initial RFA analysis and on its
preliminary conclusion that this proposed rule would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities because of the likelihood that most
expected applicants would not qualify as a sma ll entity. Additionally, the NRC is seeking
comments on its preliminary conclusion that if a small entity were to submit an advanced
nuclear reactor application, the small entit y would not incur a significant economic
impact as it would most likely not be in competition with a large entity.
36 Any small entity that could be subject to this regulation that determines, because
of its size, it is likely to bear a disproportionate adverse economic impact should notify
the Commission of this opinion in a comment that indicates
- 1. The applicants size and how the proposed regulation would impose a
significant economic burden on the applicant as compared to the economic burden on a
larger applicant;
- 2. How the proposed regulations could be modified to take into account the
applicants differing needs or capabilities;
- 3. The benefits that would accrue or the detriments that would be avoided if the
proposed regulations were modified as suggested by the applicant;
- 4. How the proposed regulation, as modified, would more closely equalize the
impact of NRC regulations or create more equal access to the benefits of Federal
programs as opposed to providing special advantages to any individual or group; and
- 5. How the proposed regulation, as modified, would still adequately demonstrate
compliance with the NRCs obligations under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended.
VII. Regulatory Analysis
The NRC has prepared a draft regulatory analysis for this proposed rule. The
analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the NRC. The
conclusion from the analysis is that this proposed rule and associated guidance would
result in net averted costs to the industry and the NRC of $80,000 using a 7-percent
discount rate and $130,000 using a 3-percent discount rate due to reductions in
exemption requests. The NRC requests public comment on the draft regulatory analysis,
which is available as indicated in the Availability of Documents section of this
37 document. Comments on the draft regulatory analysis may be submitted to the NRC as
indicated under the ADDRESSES caption of this document.
VIII. Backfitting and Issue Finality
This proposed rule would contain new alternative requirements for advanced
reactor applicants and licensees. Because these alternative requirements would not be
imposed upon current applicants and licensees and would not prohibit any applicant or
licensee from following existing requirements, the proposed requirements would not
constitute backfitting under 10 CFR 50.109, Backfitting, or affect the issue finality of
any approval issued under 10 CFR part 52.
As described in the Availability of Guidance section of this document, the NRC
has prepared two draft regulatory guides (DG-5072 and DG-5071) that, if finalized,
would provide guidance on methods acceptable to the NRC for complying with this
proposed rule. Issuance of these DGs in final form would not constitute backfitting under
§ 50.109 and would not affect the issue finality of any approval issued under 10 CFR
part 52. As discussed in the Implementation section of the DGs, the NRC staff does not
intend to use the proposed guidance in these draft regulatory guides to support NRC
staff actions in a manner that would constitute backfitting or affect the issue finality of an
approval under 10 CFR part 52. If, in the fu ture, the NRC seeks to impose positions
stated in the DGs in a manner that would constitute backfitting or forward fitting or affect
the issue finality of an approval under 10 CFR part 52, the NRC would need to make the
showing as required in § 50.109 for backfitting or Management Directive 8.4,
Management of Backfitting, Forward Fitting, Issue Finality, and Information Requests,
for forward fitting, or address the regulatory criteria in the applicable issue finality
provision, as applicable, that would allow the NRC to impose the position.
38 IX. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
The NRC is following its CER process by engaging with external stakeholders
throughout this proposed rule and related regulatory activities. Public involvement has
included: (1) the publication of the regulatory basis for public comment (84 FR 33861;
July 16, 2019); (2) numerous public meeti ngs to examine potential performance-based
alternatives and eligibility requirements for physical security for advanced reactors; and
(3) the publication of numerous versions of preliminary proposed rule language. The
NRC is considering holding additional public meetings during the remainder of the
rulemaking process.
In parallel with this proposed rule, th e NRC is issuing two draft implementing
guidance documents for comment to support informed external stakeholder feedback.
Section XIII, Availability of Guidance, of this document describes how the public can
access the draft implementing guidance.
In addition to the questions in the Specific Requests for Comments section of
this document, the NRC is requesting CER feedback on the following questions:
- 1. In light of any current or projected CER challenges, does the proposed rules
effective date provide sufficient time to implement the new proposed requirements,
including changes to programs, procedures, and the facility? Please explain your
answer.
- 2. If CER challenges currently exist or are expected, what should be done to
address them? For example, if more time is required for implementation of the new
requirements, what period of time is sufficient?
- 3. Do other (NRC or other agency) regulatory actions (e.g., orders, generic
communications, license amendment requests, inspection findings of a generic nature)
influence the implementation of the proposed ru les requirements? Please explain your
answer.
39
- 4. Are there unintended consequences? Does the proposed rule create
conditions that would be contrary to the proposed rules purpose and objectives? If so,
what are the unintended consequences, and how should they be addressed?
- 5. Please comment on the NRCs cost and benefit estimates in the regulatory
analysis that supports this proposed rule. The draft regulatory analysis is available as
indicated under the Availability of Documents section of this document.
X. Plain Writing
The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-274) requires Federal agencies to
write documents in a clear, concise, and well-organized manner. The NRC has written
this document to be consistent with the Plain Writing Act as well as the Presidential
Memorandum, Plain Language in Government Writing, published June 10, 1998 (63
FR 31885). The NRC requests comment on this document with respect to the clarity and
effectiveness of the language used.
XI. Environmental Assessment and Proposed Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, as amended, and the Commissions regulations in subpart A, National
Environmental Policy Act - Regulations Implementing Section 102(2), of 10 CFR part
51, Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related
Regulatory Functions, that this proposed rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, and an environmental
impact statement is not required. This env ironmental assessment focuses on those
aspects of the proposed alternative physical security requirements for advanced reactors
rulemaking where there is a potential for the revised requirements to affect the
40 environment. The NRC has concluded that ther e would be no significant environmental
impacts associated with implementation of the alternative security requirements for
advanced reactors rule requirements for the following reasons:
(1) The proposed alternative requirements for physical security would provide
an equivalent level of security as that for existing requirements; therefore, the
environmental impacts would be the same because the resulting risk is similar.
(2) The proposed revision to the power reactor security requirements would
not result in changes to the design basis requirements for the protection of structures,
systems, and components (SSCs) in potential lic ensee facilities that function to limit the
release of radiological effluents during and following postulated accidents. All the SSCs
associated with limiting the releases of offsite radiological effluents would therefore
continue to be able to perform their functions, and as a result, there would be no
significant radiological effluent impact such that there would be no significant release of
radionuclides from any source.
(3) The standards and requirements applicable to radiological releases and
effluents would not be affected by the limited-scope security rulemaking and would
continue to apply to the SSCs affected by the limited-scope security rulemaking.
The principal effect of this action is to revise the governing regulations pertaining
to power reactor security, create alternative security requirements applicable to a certain
class of licensees, and add additional requirements consistent with the rulemaking
objective and requirements discussed earlier. None of the proposed revisions would
affect current occupational exposure requirements; consequently, the NRC has
concluded that this action would have no impact on occupational exposure.
For the reasons discussed above, the acti on would not significantly increase the
probability or consequences of accidents, nor result in changes being made in the types
41 of any effluents that may be released offsite, and there would be no significant increase
in occupational or public radiation exposure.
With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, implementation of the rule
requirements would not have a signific ant impact on the environment. The proposed
requirements would not affect any historic sites and would not affect non-radiological
plant effluents. Therefore, there would be no significant non-radiological environmental
impact associated with this proposed rule. Accordingly, the NRC finds that there would
be no significant environmental impact associated with this rulemaking action.
The determination of this environmental assessment is that there would be no
significant effect on the quality of the human environment from this action. Public
stakeholders should note, however, that comme nts on any aspect of this environmental
assessment may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES caption.
The environmental assessment is available as indicated under the Availability of
Documents section.
The NRC has sent a copy of the environmental assessment and this proposed
rule to all State Liaison Officers and has requested comments.
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act
This proposed rule contains new or amended collections of information contained
in parts 50, 52, and 73 that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq). The collections of information have been submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget for review and approval. Existing collections of information
were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0002
(part 73), 3150-0011 (part 50), and 3150-0151 (part 52).
Type of submission, new or revision: Revision
42 The title of the information collection: Alternative Physical Security Requirements for
Advanced Reactors
The form number if applicable: Not Applicable.
How often the collection is required or requested: On occasion.
Who will be required or asked to respond: Future power reactor licensees or license
applicants for advanced reactors to be licensed under 10 CFR part 50 or part 52.
An estimate of the number of annual responses: 6.66 (0.33 for part 50, 3 for part 52, and
3.33 for part 73).
The estimated number of annual respondents: 3.33 (0.33 for part 50, 3 for part 52, and
3.33 for part 73).
An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to comply with the information
collection requirement or request: 9,437 (110 for part 50, 1002 for part 52, and 8,325 for
part 73).
Abstract: The proposed rule would result in changes in reporting, recordkeeping, and
third-party disclosure requirements relative to existing rules by providing certain
alternative, risk-informed, performance-based physical security requirements for
advanced reactors. Part 50 and part 52 advanced reactor applicants electing to apply an
alternative would need to provide a descripti on of the technical analysis required by
43 proposed § 73.55(s)(1)(iv) relating to eligibility to use the alternatives. These part 50 and
part 52 advanced reactor applicants or licensees would also be required to maintain a
record of the technical analysis related to eligibility until the certifications of cessation of
operations required by §§ 50.82(a)(1) or 52.110(a) have been docketed by the NRC. In
addition, advanced reactor licensees relying on law enforcement or other offsite armed
responders would need to provide information about the facilities and make available
periodic training to these responders. Finally, the proposed rule would require part 50
and part 52 advanced reactor licensees, who make changes to or are aware of changes
to plant features or offsite support resources described in the technical analysis, to
prepare a report that considers the effect of changes and describes how the licensee will
continue to meet the requirements in proposed § 73.55(s)(1)(ii) that the consequences of
a postulated radiological release that results from a postulated security-initiated event
does not exceed the offsite dose reference values. These new and amended information
collections would be required to ensure the NRC has the necessary information to
review whether an applicant or licensee has demonstrated they have met the proposed
requirement to be eligible to use any of the proposed alternatives. The collected
information would also be used by the NRC to review and determine whether the
applicant or licensee has met the requirements for each elected alternative.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking public comment on the
potential impact of the information collection(s) contained in this proposed rule and on
the following issues:
- 1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the information will have
practical utility? Please explain your response.
- 2. Is the estimate of the burden of the proposed information collection
accurate? Please explain your response.
44
- 3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information
to be collected? Please explain your response.
- 4. How can the burden of the proposed information collection on
respondents be minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques or other
forms of information technology?
A copy of the OMB clearance package and proposed rule is available in ADAMS
under Accession Nos. ML22131A161, ML22131A167, ML21334A009, and
ML21334A003 or may be viewed free of charge by contacting the NRCs Public
Document Room reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737, or by email to
PDR.resource@nrc.gov. You may obtain information and comment submissions related
to the OMB clearance package by search ing on https://www.regulations.gov under
Docket ID NRC-2017-0227.
You may submit comments on any aspect of these proposed information
collection(s), including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the above issues, by
the following methods:
- Federal rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC-2017-0227.
- Mail comments to: FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch, Office
of the Chief Information Officer, Mail Stop: T6-A10M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001 or by e-mail to
Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov or to the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (3150--0011, -0151, -0002), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503.
Submit comments by September 9, 2024. Comments received after this date will
be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC staff is able to ensure consideration
only for comments received on or before this date.
45 Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond
to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection
displays a currently valid OMB control number.
XIII. Availability of Guidance
The NRC is issuing for public comment dr aft guidance for the implementation of
the proposed requirements in this rulemaking: DG-5072, Guidance for Alternative
Physical Security Requirements for Sma ll Modular Reactors and Non-Light-Water
Reactors. DG-5072 is available at https ://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket
ID NRC-2017-0227.
DG-5071, Target Set Identification and Development for Nuclear Power
Reactors, contains Official Use OnlySec urity Related Information (OUO-SRI) and is
withheld from public disclosure. This DG may be made available to those affected
stakeholders who have established a need-to-know. For access to DG-5071, contact the
individuals listed for guidance information in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
DG-5072, Guidance for Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Small Modular
Reactors and Non-Light-Water Reactors
This draft regulatory guide describes an approach that the NRC staff considers
acceptable to develop the radiological consequence analysis required to demonstrate
eligibility for the use of any alternative physical security requirement listed under
§ 73.55(s)(2). This analysis is performed by the applicant or licensee to determine
radiation doses at the exclusion area boundary and the outer boundary of the low
46 population zone from postulated radiological releases as a result of a postulated
security-initiated event. This draft regulatory guide includes a description of an
acceptable approach for demonstrating the ability to meet the requirements set forth in
§ 73.55 with the identified alternative physica l security requirements incorporated into
the security plans. This draft regulatory guide al so provides a description of acceptable
implementation guidance for each physical securi ty alternative listed under § 73.55(s)(2),
including guidance for licensees to provide information and conduct training and
exercises with offsite law enforcement.
DG-5071, Target Set Identification and Development for Nuclear Power Reactors
This draft regulatory guide describes an approach that the NRC staff considers
acceptable for applicant or licensee analysis, development, documentation, and
evaluation of target set elements and target sets. This includes operator actions and
mitigative measures that may be credited to prevent: 1) the target sets high-level
objective, 2) significant core damage or 3) loss of spent fuel coolant and exposure of
spent fuel for large LWRs, and to prevent significant release of radionuclides from any
source for SMRs and non-LWRs.
XIV. Public Meeting
The NRC may conduct a public meeting on the proposed rule for the purpose of
describing the proposed rule and implementation guidance to the public and answering
questions from the public on the proposed rule and implementation guidance.
The NRC will publish a notice of the public meetings location, time, and agenda
on the NRCs public meeting Web site at least 10 calendar days before the meeting.
Stakeholders should monitor the NRCs public meeting Web site for information about
the public meeting at: https://www.nrc.gov /public-involve/public-meetings/index.cfm.
47 XV. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to interested
persons through one or more of the following methods, as indicated.
DOCUMENT ADAMS ACCESSION NO /
FEDERAL REGISTER CITATION SRM-SECY-18-0076, Options and ML18324A478 Recommendations for Physical Security for Advanced Reactors, November 19, 2018 SECY-22-0072, Proposed Rulemaking: ML21334A004 Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors (RIN 3150-AK19), August 2, 2022 SRM-SECY-22-0072, Staff Requirements - ML24170A753 (Package)
Proposed Rulemaking: Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors (RIN 3150-AK19), June 18, 2024 Draft Environmental Assessment for the ML24178A374 Proposed RuleAdvanced Reactor Security Requirements, Docket No. NRC-2017-0227, July 2024 Draft Regulatory Analysis for the Proposed Rule: ML24178A372 Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors, July 2024 OMB Clearance Package ML21334A009, ML22131A161, ML22131A167 DG-5072, Guidance for Alternative Physical ML20041E037 Security Requirements for Small Modular Reactors and Non-Light-Water Reactors, July 2024 NCP-2002-003 Non-concurrence on the ML22161A919 Proposed Rule, April 28, 2022 Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced 51 FR 24643 Reactors, July 8, 1986 Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced 73 FR 60612 Reactors, October 14, 2008 SECY-10-0034, Potential Policy, Licensing, and ML093290268 Key Technical Issues for Small Modular Nuclear Reactor Designs, March 28, 2010 SECY-11-0184, Security Regulatory Framework ML112991113 for Certifying, Approving, and Licensing Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (M110329),
December 29, 2011 NEI White Paper, Proposed Physical Security ML17026A474 Requirements for Advanced Reactor Technologies, December 14, 2016
48 NRC Draft White Paper on Potential Changes to ML17333A524 Physical Security Requirements for Small Modular and Advanced Reactors, November 2017 Regulatory Basis for the Physical Security of 84 FR 33861 Advanced Reactors, July 16, 2019 Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A144 from Jordan Lewis, August 14, 2019 Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A150 from Pia Jensen, August 14, 2019 Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A159 from Alan Medsker, August 14, 2019 Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A166 from Pia Jensen, August 15, 2019 Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A171 from Pia Jensen, August 15, 2019 Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A180 from Phillip Hammond (NuScale Power, LLC),
August 15, 2019 Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A184 from Michael D. Tschiltz (Nuclear Energy Institute), August 15, 2019 Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A186 from Edwin Lyman (Union of Concerned Scientists), August 15, 2019 Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A192 from Pia Jensen, August 15, 2019 Preliminary Proposed Rule Language, April 13, ML20072F620 2020 Revised Preliminary Proposed Rule Language, 85 FR 56548 September 14, 2020 Revised Preliminary Proposed Rule Language, ML21336A004 December 14, 2021 December 13, 2017, Public Meeting Summary ML17354B266 August 8, 2019, Public Meeting Summary ML19221B611 December 12, 2019, Public Meeting Notice ML19344D035; https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do
=details&Code=20191290 NEI Additional Input for the Rulemaking for ML20029E959 (Package)
Physical Security for Advanced Reactors, January 10, 2020 February 20, 2020, Periodic Advanced Reactor ML20054A703 Stakeholder Meeting Notice https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do
=details&Code=20200135 April 22, 2020, Public Meeting Notice ML20112F411 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do
=details&Code=20200250 April 21, 2021, Public Meeting Summary ML21183A004 May 14, 2021, Public Meeting Notice ML21124A174
49 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do
=details&Code=20210600 August 17, 2021, Public Meeting Notice ML21218A150 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do
=details&Code=20211046 September 16, 2021, Public Meeting Notice ML21246A143 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do
=details&Code=20211155 September 29, 2021, Public Meeting Notice ML21260A177 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do
=details&Code=20211158 October 19, 2021, Public Meeting Notice ML21279A152 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do
=details&Code=20211310 January 20, 2022, Public Meeting Summary ML22024A063 NEI 20-05, Methodological Approach and ML20104A306 (Package)
Considerations for a Security Assessment to Demonstrate Compliance with the Performance Criteria of 10 CFR 73.55(TBD), Draft A, April 10, 2020 NEI 20-05, Methodological Approach and ML20107D894 Considerations for a Technical Analysis to Demonstrate Compliance with the Performance Criteria of 10 CFR 73.55(a)(7), Draft B, April 13, 2020 NEI 20-05, Methodological Approach and ML21137A057 Considerations for a Technical Analysis to Demonstrate Compliance with the Eligibility Criteria of 10 CFR 73.55(a)(7), Draft D, May 14, 2021 NRC Letter to NEI regarding May 2020 ML20212L397 comments, September 17, 2020 NRC Comments on NEI 20-05, Draft B, March 2, ML21049A029 (Package) 2021 NRC Letter to NEI ceasing NRC review of draft ML21307A120 NEI 20-05, November 24, 2021 Management Directive 8.4, Management of ML18093B087 Backfitting, Forward Fitting, Issue Finality, and https://www.nrc.gov/reading-Information Requests, September 20, 2019 rm/doc-collections/management-directives/volumes/vol-8.html
Throughout the development of this rule, the NRC may post documents related
to this rule, including public comments, on the Federal rulemaking website at
https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2017-0227.
50 List of Subjects
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting, Classified
information, Criminal penalties, Education, Emergency planning, Fire prevention, Fire
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalties,
Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Whistleblowing.
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Combined license, Early site
permit, Emergency planning, Fees, Inspection, Issue finality, Limited work authorization,
Manufacturing license, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Probabilistic risk assessment,
Prototype, Reactor siting criteria, Redress of site, Penalties, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Standard design, Standard design certification.
Criminal penalties, Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, Imports, Nuclear
energy, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalties, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended;
and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR parts 50, 52, and 73
as follows:
51 PART 50DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
- 1. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 11, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 122, 147, 149, 161, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2014, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2138, 2152, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2239, 2273, 2282); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, sec. 306 (42 U.S.C. 10226); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C.
4332); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note; Sec. 109, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 783.
- 2. Amend § 50.34 by adding paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:
§ 50.34 Contents of applications; technical information.
(c) * * *
(4) Each applicant electing to apply an alternative in § 73.55(s)(2) of this chapter
must provide a description of the technical analysis required by § 73.55(s)(1)(iv) of this
chapter.
- 3. Amend § 50.54 by adding paragraph (p)(5) to read as follows:
§ 50.54 Conditions of licenses.
(p) * * *
(5) A licensee that meets § 73.55(s)(1) of this chapter and makes changes to or
becomes aware of a change to plant features or offsite support resources described in
the technical analysis prepared under § 73.55(s)(1)(iv) of this chapter must consider the
effect of the change(s) on the analysis. The licensee must amend the information in the
52 application prepared under § 50.34(c)(4) or § 52.79(a)(35)(iii) of this chapter to describe
how the licensee continues to meet the requirements in § 73.55(s)(1)(ii) of this chapter.
PART 52 - LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS
- 4. The authority citation for part 52 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 103, 104, 147, 149, 161, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2235, 2236, 2239, 2273, 2282); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
- 5. Amend § 52.79 by adding paragraph (a)(35)(iii) to read as follows:
§ 52.79 Contents of applications; technical information in final safety analysis
report.
(a) * * *
(35) * * *
(iii) Each applicant electing to apply an alternative in § 73.55(s)(2) of this chapter
must provide a description of the technical analysis required by § 73.55(s)(1)(iv) of this
chapter.
PART 73PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
- 6. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 147, 149, 161, 161A, 170D, 170E, 170H, 170I, 223, 229, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2201a, 2210d, 2210e, 2210h, 2210i, 2273, 2278a, 2282, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, secs. 135, 141 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
Section 73.37(b)(2) also issued under Sec. 301, Public Law 96-295, 94 Stat. 789
53 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).
- 7. Amend § 73.55 by:
- a. Removing and reserving paragraph (a)(5);
- b. Revising paragraph (b)(3) introductory text;
- c. Revising paragraph (b)(9)(i) introductory text;
- d. Adding paragraphs (b)(9)(i)(A) and (B);
- e. Revising paragraphs (e)(10)(i)(A) and (k)(1); and
- f. Adding paragraph (s).
The revisions and additions read as follows:
§ 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear
power reactors against radiological sabotage.
(b) * * *
(3) A licensee holding an operating license under the provisions of part 50 of this
chapter or a combined license under the provisions of part 52 of this chapter for a light-
water reactor, other than a small modular reactor, as defined in § 171.5 of this chapter,
must design the physical protection program to prevent significant core damage and
spent fuel sabotage. A licensee holding an operating license under the provisions of part
50 of this chapter or a combined license under the provisions of part 52 of this chapter
for a small modular reactor licensee or a non-light-water reactor licensee, must design
the physical protection program to prevent a significant release of radionuclides from any
source. Specifically, the program must:
(9) * *
- 54 (i) The insider mitigation program must monitor the initial and continuing
trustworthiness and reliability of individuals granted or retaining unescorted access
authorization to a protected or vital area, and implement defense-in-depth
methodologies to minimize the potential for an insider to adversely affect, either directly
or indirectly, the licensees capability to prevent the following:
(A) For light-water reactors, other than small modular reactors, as defined in
§ 171.5 of this chapter, significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.
(B) For small modular reactors, as defined in § 171.5 of this chapter, or for non-
light-water reactors, a significant rel ease of radionuclides from any source.
(e) * * *
(10) * * *
(i) * * *
(A) Design, construct, install, and maintain a vehicle barrier system, to include
passive and active barriers, at a stand-off distance adequate to protect personnel,
equipment, and systems nec essary to prevent:
(1) For light-water reactors, other than small modular reactors, as defined in
§ 171.5 of this chapter, significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage due to the
effects of the design basis threat of radiological sabotage land vehicle bomb assault.
(2) For small modular reactors, as defined in § 171.5 of this chapter, or for non-
light-water reactors, a significant release of radionuclides from any source due to the
effects of the design basis threat of radiological sabotage land vehicle bomb assault.
(k) * * *
(1) The licensee shall establish and maintain, at all times, properly trained,
qualified and equipped personnel required to interdict and neutralize threats up to and
55 including the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as defined in § 73.1, to
prevent:
(i) For light-water reactors, other than small modular reactors, as defined in
§ 171.5 of this chapter, significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.
(ii) For small modular reactors, as defined in § 171.5 of this chapter, or for non-
light-water reactors, a significant rel ease of radionuclides from any source.
(s) Alternative physical security requirements.
(1) General requirements.
(i) Applicability. The requirements of this section apply to an applicant for or
holder of a license under part 50 of this chapter or part 52 of this chapter for a small
modular reactor, as defined in § 171.5 of this chapter, or a non-light-water reactor.
(ii) Eligibility. The applicant or licensee must demonstrate that the consequences
of a postulated radiological release that could result from a postulated security-initiated
event do not exceed the offsite dose reference values defined in §§ 50.34(a)(1)(D) and
52.79(a)(1)(vi) of this chapter.
(iii) Identification and documentation. The applicant or licensee must identify the
specific alternative physical security requirem ent(s) it intends to implement as part of its
physical protection program and demonstrate how the requirements set forth in this
section are met when the selected alternative(s) is used.
(iv) Analysis. The applicant or licensee electing to meet one or more of the
alternative security requirements in paragraph (s)(2) of this section must perform a
technical analysis demonstrating how it meets the criteria in paragraph (s)(1)(ii) of this
section. The licensee must maintain the analysis until submittal of the licensees
certifications required by § 50.82(a)(1) of this chapter or § 52.110(a) of this chapter.
(2) Specific alternative physical security requirements.
56 (i) Alternative requirement for armed responders. A licensee that meets
paragraph (s)(1) of this section is relieved from the requirement for the minimum number
of armed responders in paragraph (k)(5)(ii) of this section.
(ii) Alternative requirements for interdiction and neutralization. A licensee that
meets paragraph (s)(1) of this section and has no armed response personnel onsite
whose primary duty is to respond to, interdict, and neutralize acts of radiological
sabotage:
(A) May rely on law enforcement or other offsite armed responders to fulfill the
interdiction and neutralization functions required by paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section.
(1) The licensee must maintain the capability to detect, assess, interdict, and
neutralize threats as required by paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section.
(2) The licensee must provide adequate delay for threats up to and including the
DBT of radiological sabotage to enable law enforcement or other offsite armed
responders to fulfill the interdiction and neutralization functions.
(3) The licensee must provide necessary information about the facility and make
available periodic training to law enforcem ent or other offsite armed responders who will
fulfill the interdiction and neutralization functions for threats up to and including the DBT
of radiological sabotage.
(4) The licensee must fully describe in the safeguards contingency plan the role
that law enforcement or other offsite armed responders will play in the licensees
protective strategy when relied upon to fulfill the interdiction and neutralization
capabilities required by paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section. The description must provide
sufficient detail to enable the NRC to determine that the licensees physical protection
program provides high assurance of adequate protection against threats up to and
including the DBT of radiological sabotage.
57 (5) The licensee must identify criteria and measures to compensate for the
degradation or absence of law enforcement or other offsite armed responders and
propose suitable compensatory measures that meet the requirements of paragraphs
(o)(2) and (3) of this section to address this degradation.
(B) Is relieved from applying:
(1) The requirements in paragraphs (k)(3) through (7) of this section and the
requirement in paragraph (k)(8)(ii) of this section to law enforcement responders.
(2) The training and qualification requirements related to armed response
personnel in section VI of appendix B to this part for law enforcement responders,
except for the performance evaluation program requirements related to armed response
personnel in section VI.C.3 of appendix B to this part, which the licensee shall continue
to satisfy for all armed response personnel, including law enforcement.
(3) The location-related requirements in paragraph (k)(5)(iii) of this section and in
section II.B.3.c.(iv) of appendix C to this part related to armed responders.
(iii) Alternative requirements for physical barriers. A licensee that meets
paragraph (s)(1) of this section may utilize means other than physical barriers and
barrier systems to satisfy the physical protection program design requirements of
paragraph (e) of this section. Acceptable means can be any method(s) that
accomplishes the delay and access control functions necessary to allow the licensee to
implement its physical protection program.
(iv) Alternative requirements for onsite secondary alarm stations. A licensee that
meets paragraph (s)(1) of this section:
(A) May have one alarm station located offsite notwithstanding the requirement in
paragraph (i)(2) of this section to have at least two alarm stations located onsite. The
central alarm station must remain onsite.
58 (B) Is relieved from the requirement in paragraph (i)(4)(iii) of this section to
construct, locate, and protect the offsite secondary alarm station to the standards for the
central alarm station. The licensee is not relieved from the requirement in paragraph
(i)(4)(iii) of this section that both alarm stations shall be equipped and redundant, such
that all functions needed to satisfy the requirements of paragraph (i)(4) of this section
can be performed in both alarm stations.
(v) Alternative requirements for vital areas. A licensee that meets paragraph
(s)(1) of this section:
(A) Is relieved from the requirement in paragraph (e)(9)(v)(D) of this section to
designate an offsite secondary alarm station as a vital area.
(B) Is relieved from the requirement in paragraph (e)(9)(vi) of this section to
locate the secondary power supply systems for an offsite secondary alarm station in a
vital area.
- 8. Amend appendix B to 10 CFR part 73 by revising paragraph VI.A.1 to read as
follows:
Appendix B to Part 73General Criteria for Security Personnel
VI. * *
- A. * * *
- 1. For light-water reactors, other than small modular reactors, as defined in
§ 171.5 of this chapter, the licensee shall ensure that all individuals who are assigned
duties and responsibilities required to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel
sabotage, implement the Commission-approv ed security plans, licensee response
strategy, and implementing procedures, meet minimum training and qualification
59 requirements to ensure each individual possesses the knowledge, skills, and abilities
required to effectively perform the assigned duties and responsibilities. For small
modular reactors, as defined in § 171.5 of this chapter, or for non-light-water reactors,
the licensee shall ensure that all individuals who are assigned duties and responsibilities
required to prevent a significant release of radionuclides from any source, implement the
Commission-approved security plans, lic ensee response strategy, and implementing
procedures, meet minimum training and qualification requirements to ensure each
individual possesses the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively perform
the assigned duties and responsibilities.
Dated: August 5, 2024.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/RA/
Carrie Safford, Secretary of the Commission.
60