ML20079K677

Motion for Reconsideration of ASLB 821222 Memorandum & Order Granting NRC 821029 Motion for Summary Disposition of Issue 3.NRC Motion Should Be Granted in Entirety.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20079K677
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	01/06/1983
From:	Silberg J CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8301100104
Download: ML20079K677 (16)

Text

e CCCKETED January 6, 1983 Urm:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '83 JU!-7 N0:17 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et al. ) 50-441

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE LICENSING BOARD'S DECEMBER 22, 1982 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION OF ISSUE NO. 3 I. INTRODUCTION.

By Memorandum and Order dated December 22, 1982 (" Memorandum and Order"), the Licensing Board granted the NRC Staff's motion for summary disposition of Issue No. 31! with the exception of the following genuine issues of fact, which the Board admitted for trial:

The existence, cause, severity, duration and extent of an alleged instance in which

( applicant's quality assurance program failed by not properly ' controlling its electrical contractors.

l 1/ See "NRC Staff's Motion For Summary Disposition Of Issue No. 3", dated October 29, 1982. Applicants supported the Staff's <

motion. See " Applicants' Answer In Support Of NRC Staff's Motion For Summary Disposition Of Issue No. 3", dated December 3, 1982 (" Applicants' Answer"). Sunflower Alliance Inc., et al.

(" Sunflower") opposed the motion. See " Sunflower Alliance Inc.

et al. Brief In Opposition To Staff's Motion For Summary Dispo-sition On Issue Three (Quality Assurance)," dated December 2, 1982 (" Sunflower's Answer"). By filing dated December 20, 1982, counsel for Sunflower submitted an affidavit characterized by counsel as "in support of Sunflower's opposition to Staff's Motion l for Summary Disposition on Issue 3". The Licensing Board ruled l that this second filing by Sunflower was not authorized by the regulations and was therefore not considered. Memorandum and Order, p. 7 n.l.

l 0301100104 0 PDR ADOCK 0 PDR o pSoj) .

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Whether the alleged deficiencies in properly controlling electrical contractors extend to the proper control of other contractors.

Whether deficiencies in the control of con-tractor activities have resulted in unsafe conditions at Perry.

Whether applicant has an adequate system for periodically reviewing its program for assuring the quality of contractor performance and ascertaining and correcting deficiencies that have arisen, particularly in systems essential to safe plant operation.

Memorandum and Order at 16. For the reasons stated herein, Appli-cants respectfully request that the Licensing Board reconsider its admission of the above issues and grant in its entirety the Staff's motion for summary disposition of Issue No. 3. /

, II. SUNFLOWER'S ANSWER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH COMMISSION REGULATIONS AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERTAINED.

The procedures relating to motions for summary disposition are set forth in 10 CFR S2.749. These rules are quite explicit ~

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! in specifying the requirements for answers opposing summary dis-position motions.

There shall be annexed to any answer opposing -

the motion a separate, short and concise state-ment of the material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be heard. All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the f moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required j to be served by the opposing party.

10 CFR S2.749(a).

2/ Although this pleading is styled as a motion for reconsideration, It is functionally equivalent to an answer to a motion for litigable issues -- which is what Sunflower's Answer essentially was.

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Sunflower's Answer totally failed to comply with these re-quirements. It contained no statement of material facts. Sunflower should have been aware of its obligations under S2.749 since it cited that.section in.its. Answer.(at 1)... .

Sunflower.is represented.

by counsel. Compare Memorandum and Order (Concerning Discovery from Staff on Hydrogen Issue) at 3 (December 23, 1982). Having failed to meet the mandatory requirements of S2.749, Sunflower's Answer should not have been entertained. l III. SUNFLOWER HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT ELECTRICAL CONTRACTOR ISSUES ARE RELATED TO THE 1978 STOP WORK ORDER.

Issue 3 is premised upon the February 1978 stop work order and the NRC Region III confirmatory action letter. As made clear in the Board's September 9, 1981 Memorandum and Order, LBP-81-35, 14 N.R.C.

682, 687 (1981), the contention deals with the stop work order, the efforts to corr.ect those deficiencies that led to the order, I

problems, and the residual deficiencies (if any) related to those deficiencies. Since Sunflower "did not provide the basis for any other allegations relating to quality assurance", id., the scope ]

of Issue No. 3 can extend no further than the basis provided by Sunflower. ALAB-675, 15 N.R.C. 1105, 1115 (1982).

Sunflower attempts to link quality assurance deficiencies experienced by Applicants' electrical contractor, L.K. Comstock,$!

3/ While the Licensing Board's first and second issues of fact refer to " electrical contractors" in the plural, there is only one electrical contractor involved in any of the documents cited by Sunflower.

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with the February 1978 stop work order. The December 22 Memoran-dum and Order describes this attempt as follows:

Sunflower has pointed out to us that one deficiency noted in the February 8, 1978 staff letter, confirming

. . applicant's7stop-work order,s appears..to have recurred. ,

recently. The 1978~1etter required, on page 4, that:

6. CEI will establish an effective contract specification and control system ....

7. CEI or an independent agent will perform audits of the on-site organizations covered by the CEI quality assurance program (inclu-ding the Construction Quality Assurance (CQA) and Construction Quality Control (CQC) Ele-ments) to determine the adequacy of established indoctrination, training and retraining programs, and the implementation of these programs. Additionally, specific emphasis will be placed on the identification and documentation of nonconformances'to gainfully utilize your established nonconformance trend analysis system.

Memorandum and Order at 6. However, a reading of the 1978' letter shows that neither item 6 nor item 7 has any relationship to the Comstock problems.

Item 6 deals with the control of a specification in a con-tract for concrete placement and the use of outdated design specifications. The entire item reads as follows:

CEI will establish an effective contract specification control system and will evaluate the acceptability of the placement batched by the National Mobil Company to a super-ceded design specification during the time period from August 5, 1977 until the present date.

The Edelman/Farrell Affidavit filed with Applicants' Answer (para.

14) explicitly dealt with this item, with references to the NRC 1 l

~

d inspectio'n reports signing off on this concern. A detailed re-sponse in Applicants' May 1, 1978 letter to NRC was also provided as an attachment to the Affidavit. The Affidavit also stated, with no contradictory evidence.in the record,.that "[.s]ince February 1978, no breakdowns of the type covered by this item have occurred". Id.

Nor is item 7 in the February 1978 letter directly relevant to any Comstock issues. That item, quoted above, deals with indoctrination, training and retraining and the use of the nonconformance trend analysis system. The resolution of this issue was also presented in the Edelman/Farrell Affidavit and the May 1, 1978 letter attached thereto. The record contains no contradictory evidence.

Other than 'the fact that the Comstock issues and the February 1978 stop work order both involve quality assurance, Applicants have been unable to find any commonality. The Com-stock issues cannot be accurately characterized as " residual deficiencies that may be described as the afterbirth of [the stop work) order". Memorandum and Order at 4. .

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IV. SUNFLOWER'S ANSWER RAISES NO ISSUES BEYOND COMSTOCK QA ISSUES.

Sunflower attempted to use the NRC's investigation of the activities of Comstock to bootstrap itself into a generalized attack on all of Applicants' QA efforts. A reading of the docu-ments already in tLe record does not support this attempt.

4 The documents relied upon by Sunflower provide no evidence that the problems identified as to Comstock extended to other contractors. The most that they indicate is Region III's con-cern for the possibility- that other contractors' work might have similar problems.

In regard to your comments concerning the overseeing of contractor activities, we agree that the identified concerns dealt primarily with the coating contractor early in the assessment period and the electrical con-tractor subsequent to the assessment period.

However, it was and is still our opinion that the multitude of problems identified in the electrical area could be systemic warranting an assessment of other contractor activities.

We believe you also recognized this potential when you outlined your corrective action program for the problems in the electrical area and included a reassessment of management controls over other contractors.

July 13, 1982 letter from Region III to Applicants (emphasis added). The SALP report attached to the July 13 letter itself gives Category 1 and 2. ratings to all areas except Comstock.

And the July 13, 1982 letter states that Applicants' overall performance is satisfactory -- a conclusion quoted by the Board in its December 22, 1982 Memorandum and Order at 7. If any QA <

breakdown occurred, there is no evidence that it extended beyond the activities of Comstock.

The Memorandum and Order can arguably be read as defining the issue to be litigated as the quality assurance of all contractors' performances. This is obviously too broad. All construction

activities at Perry are performed by contractors.A! If the scope of Issue No. 3 is now defined as the quality assurance of con-tractors' work at Perry, the scope of the issue has been widened enormously. .The issue would become "a generalized attack.on the Applicant's entire quality assurance program", notwithstanding l

the Board's express ruling that Issue No. 3 did not reach this far.

LBP-81-35, 14 N.R.C. 682, 687 (1981). If the scope of the Issue is now to be read as reaching every contractor's QA performance, the Board's ruling would also be inconsistent with the December 22, 1982 Memorandum and Order's holding that Sunflower had not justified

! a hearing on "each of the deficiencies indicated in the 1978 confirmation of the stop work order and the 1978 Notice of Violation". Memorandum and Order at 10. All of the deficiencies indicated in the 1978 confirmation of the stop work order and the 1978 Notice of Violation involved contractors. Since the Board determined that Sunflower had failed to support a generalized attack based on the 1978 letter and Notice of Violations, the issues of fact cannot sensibly be interpretted to allow Sunflower to probe the control of all contractors' activities at, Perry.

! V. NO QA BREAKDOWN OCCURRED AT COMSTOCK.

Sunflower's only predicate for its entire a'rgument is that a major quality assurance breakdown occurred with respect to 4/ As stated in Applicants' October 29, 1982 Answer to Sunflower's Third Set of Interrogatories, more than 80 contractors and sub-contractors have contracts to perform construction activities at Perry. Id at 13.

Comstock's work. Sunflower supports this by reference to Region III's July 13, 1982 SALP Report and to Region III's September 27, 1982 inspection report. Unfortunately, Sunflower's selective submittal of portions.of NRC. documents-presents a false and mis-leading picture.

Subsequent to the July 13, 1982 SALP report, Region III com-pleted its extraordinarily detailed review of Comstock's activities.

That review is set forth in the September 27, 1982 inspection report. Sunflower's Answer relied heavily on Region III's September 27, 1982 inspection report. See Sunflower Answer at 7-9. Sunflower included as Exhibit E to its Answer the Notice 6f Violation'from that inspection report. Sunflower-(Answer at 7) quoted the following from Region III's September 27 letter to Applicants in which Region III indicated its concern with the Comstock situation:

We are concerned that even though your continuing assessment of the electrical con-

-tractor's performance showed degradation of the quality assurance program, you failed to investigate in a prompt manner the elements contributing to the poor performance and require adequate corrective action to upgrade the program.

Sunflower did not provide the entire September 27 letter to the Licensing Board. And, more significantly, Sunflower withheld from the Board the key conclusion reached by Region III on the Comstock inspections, a conclusion set forth just two sentences after the quote which Sunflower lifted out of context:

As a result of discussions with you and members of your staff during a management meeting on February 10, 1982, and during the enforcement conference held at our office on June 18, 1982, we concluded that a significant breakdown in the electrical contractor's quality assurance had not occurred and that ,

you were taking corrective action to upgrade the contractor's program. (Emphasis added.)

Sunflower's selective presentation was -- at the very least --

misleading. It failed to inform the Licensing Board that Region III had concluded that no QA breakdown occurred -- despite the undeniable fact that Sunflower was aware of this conclusion. This is not to claim that there were no QA problems associated with Comstock 's performance. But it does demonstrate that the Comstock situation did not involve the kind of programmatic breakdown which was covered in the February 1978 letter. Sunflower's failure to call this key conclusion to the Board's attention (or at least attach the entire letter as an exhibit) is totally inexcusable and is reason enough to disregard Sunflower's Answer and grant summary disposition on all of Issue No. 3. The entire September 27 letter and accompanying inspection report is attached hereto for the Licensing Board's information.

VI. SUNFLOWER SHOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM ITS FAILURE TO PRESENT A COMPLETE RECORD ON THE COMSTOCK ISSUE AND ITS FAILURE TO IDENTIFY COMSTOCK ISSUES ON DISCOVERY.

The Memorandum and Order appears to rely, at least in part, on inadequacies in the record before the Board for its deter-mination that there are genuine issues of fact to be litigated.

For example, the Board notes that the record gives no indications of serious deficiencies in Applicants' QA program between February 1978 and July 1982, that the " allegations" concerning Comstock were not contained in the record, that the significance of the violations to the overall construction program is not presented in the record, or that the record does not contain evidence on the scope or intensity of Applicants' or NRC review.

If the record is deficient, the blame lies with Sunflower.

Indeed, reliance by Sunflower on Comstock QA issues was improper because of Sunflower's failure to identify Comstock issues in any of its discovery responses. This was the reason that Applicants did not discuss Comstock in greater detail in their Answer to the Staff's summary disposition motion.5!

On October 15, 1981, Applicants served their first set of interrogatories and request for production of documents on Sun-flower. The interrogatories asked Sunflower to identify con- ,

struction deficiencies caused by QA problems, including those which had been corrected and those which had not. See, e.g.,

interrogatories 27 and 28. The interrogatories specifically re- <

minded Sunflower of the need to supplement its answers based upon l

new information. Applicants' Interrogatories, at 2.

Sunflower's November 19, 1981 answers to the interrogatories referred to no QA problems with Comstock and indeed identified no I

! 5/ The Memorandum and Order noted that "neither the applicant nor l Ehe staff appear even to have mentioned the current investigation

) in their filings". The absence of a discussion of the NRC's inves-tigation is hardly surprising in view of Sunflower's discovery failure. The Edelman/Farrell Affidavit attached to the Applicants' Answer, at $19, did, however, mention the Comstock stop work order anu discussed the Comstock situation in general terms.

construction deficiencies anywhere in the electrical area. The only construction deficiency cited by Sunflower involved a speci-fic concrete placement. Sunflower Responses to Interrogatory 27 (b) , . 28 (b) . Applicants relied upon the completeness of Sun-flower's responses in preparing their answer to the Staff's motion and addressed this claimed deficiency. Edelman/Farrell Affidavit, para. 17. Applicants also relied on Sunflower's identification of other QA program deficiencies (Sunflower Response to Interrogatory

26) and specifically addressed these allegations. Edelman/Farrell Affidavit, para. 18. Sunflower never supplemented its interroga-tory responses to identify any concerns with Comstock's efforts.

Having failed to properly meet its discovery obligations, Sunflower should not be permitted to take advantage of its own failures. Due to Sunflower's discovery default, Applicants were unable to anticipate Sunflower's reliance on Comstock and therefore could not present in their Answer to the Staff's motion a complete description of the Comstock issues.b/

The September 27, 1982 inspection report, attached hereto, provides many (if not all) of the missing pieces of information _

noted by the Board. As to the " allegations", it shows that generally they either involved no items of noncompliance with NRC requirements or were not found to be accurate. Of the noncompliances 6/ Compare, for example, Applicants' Answer to the Staff's motion for Summary Disposition of Issue 4, dated December 14, 1982, in which Applicants were able to anticipate OCRE's criticisms of the 30* steam sector test because OCRE had identified those criticisms in responding to Applicants' interrogatories.

e found, none were deemed to be of a significant severity level.

The report does not provide a basis for concluding that the Comstock " deficiencies ... are of great potential importance".

, te . . .. .

Memorandum and Order at 8. Such a conclusion is flatly contra-dicted by Region III's September 27 letter, discussed above but withheld by Sunflower.

Since the-incompleteness of the record is attributable to Sunflower, it would be unfair to penalize Applicants. Yet the Memorandum and. Order does just that. The Staff and Applicants submitted sworn affidavits describing in some detail Applicants' QA program as it related to the 1978 stop work order. Sunflower presented bits and pieces of NRC. documents relating to an episode far (if not totally) removed from the 1978 stop work order. The Memorandum and Order frames genuine issues of fact for trial based (at least in part) on the absence of a complete story on Comstock. But only Sunflower'was in a position to provide the l

complete story on Comstock. With Sunflower's failure to identify Comstock issues in its discovery responses, Applicants could not have anticipated the need to provide any information on Comstock in its Answer. Sunflower's failure should not be permitted to redound to its benefit.

Given Sunflower's failure to present an adequate record to support genuine issues of fact for trial on Comstock, and the absence of any record at all to support genuine issues of fact as

to other contractors, we believe that the Board should not have presumed that " apparent deficiencies have caused safety problems".

Memorandum and Order at 9. The Board had previously required Sunflower to demonstrate that QA deficiencies were linked to unsafe conditions. LBP-81-24, 14 N.R.C. 175, 212 (1981); LBP-81-35, 14 N.R.C. 682, 687 (1981). While the Board now seems willing to waive this requirement in light of Sunflower's alleged identi-fication of "a QA problem in the management of the QA program itself", Memorandum and Order at 9, we would submit that Sunflower has not identified any such problem. Certainly the September 27, 1982 letter from Region III negates any such conclusion.1!

ei VII. CONCLUSION.

As discussed above, the record before the Licensing Board on Issue No. 3 does not support the four genuine issues of fact for trial set forth in the Memorandum and Order. There was only one 7/ Since Sunflower has from the start alleged the existence of such QA deficiencies, Applicants are somewhat puzzled by the statement in the Memorandum and Order that the Board "did not -

anticipate that Sunflower would identify a QA problem in the management of the QA program itself". Id. For example, at the Special Prehearing Conference, Sunflower rs counsel stated:

I set forth the contention that there has been a general inability of the applicant to comply with the quality assurance program.

Tr. 605-6; see also Tr. 337-344. Sunflower has consistently alleged that Applicants' overall QA program was inadequate.

electrical contractor at issue. That contractor's QA program did not suffer a significant breakdown. The violations found by NRC in Comstock's work were not based on allegations, but were found during a comprehensive NRC. investigation. The. violations were of the lowest severity levels. No evidence was presented suggesting

the existence of unsafe conditions as a result of these violations.

No evidence supports an expansion to other contractors of whatever concerns the Board might have as to Comstock. If the Board really intended to open the hearing to the control of all contractor acti-vities at Perry, then the issue has become a generalized attack on Applicants' entire QA program. The Board has repeatedly and properly disclaimed that' broad a QA issue.

For all these reasons, Applicants respectfully request that the Licensing Board reconsider that portion of its December 22, 1982 Memorandum and Order which admitted four genuine issues of fact for trial and, instead, grant in its entirety the Staff's Motion for Summary Disposition of Issue No. 3.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE -

l BY ,M U {

J Y E. SILBERG,fP.C.

Counsel for Applicants 1800 M Street, N.W., Suite 900 South Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 DATED: January 6, 1983

January 6, 1983 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et al. ) 50-441

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) -

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that copies of the foregoing " Applicants' Motion For Reconsideration Of The Licensing Board's December 22, I

1982 Memorandum And Order On Summary Disposition Of Issue No. 3" were served by deposit in the United States Mail, first class, .

postage prepaid, this 6th day of January, 1983, to all those on the attached Service List.

n f JA E. SILBERG DATED: January 6, 1983 d

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY ). 50-441

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

SERVICE LIST Peter B. Bloch, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Rcgulatory Commissiod Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 l Dr. Jerry R. Kline Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissiod Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Glenn O. Bright James M. Cutchin, IV, Esquire '

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Executive U.S. Nuclear Regulato'ry Commission Legal Director Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio!

Washington, D.C.. 20555 Christine N. Kohl, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Ms. Sue Hiatt Appeal Board OCRE Interim Represbntative U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8275 Munson Aven'ue i Washington, D.C. 20555 Mentor, Ohio 44060 Dr. John H. Buck Daniel D. Wilt, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Post Office Box 08159 Appeal Board Cleveland, Ohio 44108 l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Donald T. Ezzone, Esquire Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Gary J. Edles, Esquire Lake County Administration Center; Atomic Safety and Licensing 105 Center Street Appeal Board Painesville, Ohio 44077 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 John G. Cardinal, Esquire Prosecuting Attorney Atomic Safety and Licensing Ashtabula County Courthouse Board Panel Jefferson, Ohio 44047 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Terry Lodge, Esquire 915 Spitzer Building Toledo, Ohio 43604

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September 27, 1982 l r.ESCi8!cN Docket No. 50-440 Docket No. 50-441 The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company I i

ATTN: Dalwyn R. Davidson i Vice President - System i Engineering and j Construction Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 .

Gentlemen:

This refers to the investigation conducted by Messrs. C. D. Braund, i K. R. Naidu, C. H. Weil and C. C. Williams of this office during the period October 27, 1981 through March 19, 1982, of activities at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant authorized by NRC Licenses No. CPPR-148 and No. CPPR-149 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. M. R. Edelman at the conclusion of the investigation.

The enclosed ccpy of our investigation report identifies areas examined during the investigation. Within taese areas, the investigation consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.

During this investigation, certain of your activities appeared to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements, as specified in the enclosed Appendix. '

A written response is required.

We are concerned that even though your continuing assessment of the electrical contractor's performance showed degradation of the quality assurance program, you failed to investigate in a prompt manner the elements contributing to the poor performance and require adequate correc-tive action to upgrade the program. Because of the several examples of noncompliance which we identified, we seriously considered whether these )

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The Cleveland Electric 2 September 27, 1982 Illuminating Company items collectively represented a breakdown in your electrical contractor's quality assurance program, and therefore whether a civil penalty was warranted. As a result of discussions with you and members of your staff during a management meeting on February 10, 1982, and during the enforcement conference held at our office on June 18, 1982, we concluded that a signif-icant breakdown in the electrical contractor's quality assurance program had not occurred and that you were taking corrective action to upgrade the contractor's program. Consequently, no civil penalty is being proposed at this time. However, we wish to emphasize that escalated enforcement action will be considered if it is subsequently determined that the electrical contractor or any other contractor at your site operates with a degraded quality assurance program.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you (or your contractors) believe to be exempt from disclosure under 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4), it is necessary that you (a) notify this office by telephone within ten (10) days from the date of this letter of your intention to file a request for withholding; and (b) submit within twenty-five (25) days from the date of this letter a written application to this office to withhold such information. If your receipt of this letter has been delayed such that less than seven (7) days

, are available for your review, please notify this office promptly so that a new due date may be established. Consistent with Section 2.790(b)(1),

any such application must be accompanied by an affidavit executed by the owner of the Laformation which identifies the document or part .ought to be withheld, and which contains a full statement of the reasons which are the bases for the claim that the information should be withheld from public disclosure. This section further requires the statement to address with specificity the considerations listed in 10 CFR 2.790(b)(4). The informa-tion sought to be withheld shall be incorporated as far as possible into a separate part of the affidavit. If we do not hear from yon in this regard within the specified periods noted above, a copy of this letter, the enclosures, and your response to this lette r will be placed in the Public Document Room.

The responses directed by this letter (and the accompanying Notice) are i not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

o 9 The Cleveland Electric 3 September 27, 1982 Illuminating Company We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely, A

$ C {

/ James G. Keppler Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. Appendix, Notice of Violation

2. Investigation Reports No. 50-440/81-19 and No. 50-441/81-19 cc w/encis:

DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)

Resident Inspector, RIII Harold W. Kohn, Power Siting Commission Daniel D. Wilt, Attorney I Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio Robert M. Quillin, Ohio Department of Health l

Appendix NOTICE OF VIOLATION Cleveland Electric Illuminating Docket No, 50-440 Company Docket No. 50-441 As a result of the investigation conducted during the period October 27, 1981 - March 19, 1982, and in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, 47 FR 9987 (March 9, 1982), the following violations were identified:

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, states in part, "The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy

. of design, such as by the performance of design reviews ... performed by individuals or groups other than those who performed the original design ..."

CEI Corporate Quality Assurance Program Section 0300 states in part, "CEI performs a design coordination function consisting of selected reviews and design control monitoring program . . . These procedures

• shall assure that ... Design activities are conducted in a planned and systematic manner ... Perry Safety Analysis Report requirements have been appropriately addressed in design documents ... Design requirements can be controlled and inspected and/or tested to specified acceptance criteria."

CEI Specification, Electrical Installations, requires compliance with the AWS D1.1 Codes.

Contrary to the above, Gilbert Associates (the Architect Engineer) failed to adequately review Gould Inc. Drawings E-35-51-958 E231 and E233, in that the review failed to determine that the " plug weld" specified to weld 7/16" diameter holes in the switchgear did not meet I

the AWS D1.1 Code requirements. This resulted in welds being made l which did not meet the specified code requirements.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement II).

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Appendix 2 .

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states in part, " Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, and drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances ...

, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, t

procedures ..."

a. Gilbert Associates Incorporated Drawing D-215-001, Revision J, Criterion 13. states in part, "The total of all bends between pulling points in any run of conduit shall not exceed 270*;

I sufficient pull boxes are shown on drawings to meet this criteria." Further CEI letter PY-50/33-5357, to L. K. Comstock,

! dated January 20,- 1981, instructs Comstock to use the pull boxes as pulling points.

Contrary to the above, the instructions were not incorporated into the procedure and on November 16, 1981, the inspectors observed cable being pulled through a conduit with bends totaling more than 270' (by at least 160') without using the installed pull boxes as pulling points.

b. Paragraph 3.2.24 of L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.3.3 states in part, " Care shall be exercised in supporting coils to prevent kinking or exceeding the minimum bend training radius . . ."

Contrary to the above, LKC Cable Pulling Procedure 4.3.3 was not appropriate to the circumstances in that it did not prescribe alternate methods to store partially pulled cables to preclude violating the established minimum bending radii. As a result the inspectors observed cables identified as 1M32R8B,1M32R9B, and 1M32R11B coiled, and suspended by a single tie wrap in such a manner that the bend radii of the inner turns of subject cables were less than the minimum bend radii established by the manufacturer.

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c. Paragraph 5.2.6 of the L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.11.1, Nonconformance Items and Corrective Action, states in part,

" Initiated NRs may be voided by the QA Manager or his designee . . ."

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Appendix 3 Contrary to the above, L. K. Comstock Nonconformance Reports No. 531 and No. 454 (dated February 25,-1981 and November 21, 1980 respectively) were voided by QC inspectors who were not authorized to do so.

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d. The L. K. Comstock Company Quality Assurance Manual requires separate positions for,a QA Manager and a QC Supervisor.

Contrary to the above, from April 1981 until February 1,1982, one individual holding the position of QA/QC Supervisor was filling the positions of QA Manager and QC Supervisor. The lack of adequate staffing contributed to L. K. Comstock's poor per-formance.

e. The manufacturer of cable tray hardware materials, in their letter dated December 20, 1978, specified a maximum allowable torque of 45 ft. Ibs to tighten 3/8"-16 3/4" rib neck carriage bolts supplied for the cable tray splice joints.

Contrary to the above, L. K. Comstock's applicable cable and conduit installation procedures were not appropriate to the cir-cumstances in that this torque requirement was not incorporated.

Additionally, further inspections revealed there were no records to indicate that this requirement was met for any cable tray installed prior to this inspection (examples of improperly torqued bolts are discussed in paragraph 5.C below).

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement II).

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI, states in part, " Measures shall be established to control the issuance of documents, such as ...

drawings, including changes thereto, which prescribe all activities affecting quality . . ."

L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.2.1, Drawing and Specification Document Control, states, in part, in Paragraph 3.5.4, " Returning void drawings, the recipient shall sign the Field Drawing Transmittal (Form 52A -

Void Issue Returned Line) and return it with the void drawings to the l

Document Control Coordinator," and in Paragraph 3.6, " Void drawings j will be returned by recipients from the field by the General Foreman within two (2) working days of the issuance date noted on the Field Drawing Transmittal Form."

. e Appendix 4 Contrary to the above, L. K. Comstock Company failed to return the voided copies of six drawings (Gilbert Associates, Inc. Nos.

4549-58-027; 4549-58-028; 4549-58-030; 4549-58-031; 4549-58-032; and 4549-58-033). Revision 1 of each of these drawings was found at a L. K. Comstock foreman's work area on the 620' elevation of the Control Complex instead of the most recent Revision (revision 4).

Revision 1 was issued in 1977 and Revision 4 was issued in 1981.

This is a Sevarity Level V violation (Supplement II).

4. 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VIII states in part, " Measures shall be established for the identification and control of materials, parts ... assemblies. These measures shall assure that identifica-tion of the item is maintained by heat number, part number, serial number or other appropriate means, either on the item or on records traceable to the item, as required throughout fabrication, erection, installation, and use of the item."

The CEI Corporate Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Section 0800, in paragraph 1.2, states, in part, " Measures shall be established to implement the following requirements .. . Identifying and controlling material, parts and components including partially fabricated sub-assemblies or subdivided materials to preclude the use of incorrect or defective items."

Contrary to the above, the electrical contractor, L. K. Comstock ,

Corporation, failed to escablish adequate measures to control pur-chased hardware such as bolts, nuts, and cabic mouncing bases and store them in the stockroom in such a manner that defective items could not be traced to the appropriate documentation or shipment to preclude the use of incorrect or defective items.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement II).

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, states, in part, "A program for inspection of activities affecting quality shall be established and executed by or for the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with the documented instructions, procedures, and drawings for accomplishing the activity."

Appendix 5

a. CEI Corporate Nuclear Quality Assurance Program, Section 1000, Paragraph 1.1 states in part, "A program for inspection shall be established by CEI to ensure that all safety-related components ...

affecting those items meet the required quality standards."

Contrary to the above:

(1) The electrical contractor failed to inspect the inside diameter of the containment vessel nozzles and the concrete shield wall penetrations to verify that concentricity and/or dimensional tolerances were within the limits established by the manufacturer.

(2) An inspection program to verify the adequacy of installation of the 4160 volt /480 volt switchgear and the 480 volt Motor Control Centers (including the sequence of assembly such ,

as, shimming, tarquing of bolts, fitup and welding) was not established and therefore not performed.

b. The electrical contractor's (L. K. Comstock) Cable Pulling Procedure, Section 4.3.3.1.10, requires verification that raceways are clean and free from abrasions and sharp edges which might cause cable damage during cable installation.

Contrary to the above, the NRC inspectors observed sharp edges and burrs in the following cable trays:

. Tray B1313, elevation 604'.

. Tray B1303, elevation 574'.

. Tray Bi324, elevation 620'.

. Tray A3021, elevation 620'.

Several safety related cables had been installed in cable trays B1324 and B1303.

c. L. K. Comstock's Cable Tray Installation Inspection Checklist Form #17, Item 1.6, requires verification that bolts are tight on splice joints.

Contrary to the above, the following cable trays contained l

improperly seated bolts:

i t

Appendix 6 (1) Cable tray A1699 located at Column Line D-11 at elevation 599' in the Auxiliary Building. Three out of eight splice bolts observed were not properly seated. This cable tray contains cables.

(2) Cable tray 1E21HIA located at Column Line F-8 at elevation

. 579'. in, Room. No. 2 of the Auxiliary Building. Two out of.

eight splice' bolts observed ~were not properly seated.

~

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement II).

6. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, states in part, " Measures shall be established to control the handling, storage, shipping, cleaning and preservation of material and equipment in accordance with work and inspection instructions to prevent damage or deter-ioration."

a. CEI Construction Quality' Assurance Procedure No. 2-1301 in Paragraph 1.2.3, states in part, " Monitor housekeeping on a continual basis while performing storage and maintenance inspections. Forward any deviation noted on an Action Request, to Project Safety Supervisor."

Contrary to the above, the inspectors observed that the protective covers on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and Residual Heat Removal instrument panels had deteriorated and the storage and i maintenance inspection had not identified this condition prior l to the NRC inspection.

I

b. CEI Specification N. SP-33-4549, Procurement Specification for Electrical Installations, paragraph No. 2:16.1, states in part, "The contractor shall keep the premises clean at all times during the progress of the work and shall remove dirt and rubbish as directed by the Site Organization ..."

Contrary to the above, on December 4, 1981, the inspectors i observed potential fire hazards, consisting of large amounts of paper and other combustible materials, on the scaffolding in the Unit 1 annulus at elevation 649'. CEI was notified of this potential fire hazard on December 4, 1981. Licensee personnel advised Region III the hazard would be removed by i

l l

s

Appendix 7 December 7, 1981. On December 10, 1981, Region III personnel reinspected this same area and found a fire had occurred.

Interviews revealed that the licensee did not know when the -

fire started or when it was extinguished. There was no damage to safety related equipment as a result of the fire.

.This is a Severity. Level IV violation (, Supplement.II). ,

7. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, statos in part, " Measures shall be established to control ... parts, or components which do not conform to requirements in order to prevent their inadvertent use or installation: These measures shall include, as appropriate, proce-dures for identification, documentation, ... and notification to affected organizations. Nonconforming items shall be reviewed and accepted, rejected, ... in accordance with documented procedures."

CEI Corporate Nuclear Quality Assurance Program, Section 1500, Revision 2, Paragraph 1.1 states in part, "Nonconformance Reports shall be used to identify materials, parts, components, structures or systems which are not in compliance to the requirements of specifications, codes, drawings, and detailed installation or manu-facturing program requirements."

L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.11.1, Nonconformance Items and Correc-tive Action, paragraph 5.5.1 states in part, "... Nonconforming Items are either segregated, marked, or identified with a Hold Tag (Attach-l ment No. 7), to indicate their status and prevent inadvertent use or installation."

Contrary to the above, 4.16 KV switchgear with hold down welds known to be nonconforming by the licensee were not identified and controlled with Hold Tags. ,

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement II).

8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states in part, " Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, and drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances . . .

and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures ..."

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a. CEI Electrical Installation Specification SP-33-4549-00 requires S '

a one inch minimum separation between, conduits containing Class /

1E circuits and conduits containing Non-Class 1E circuits.' l /

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, w Contrary to the above: ' ,

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' (1) Installed Class 1E conduit 1R331024A and Non-Class 1E conduit '

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1021R36X, did n'ot meet the'one inch separation req'airement.

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(2) Class 1E conduit 1R33R516A was separated by 1/2 of, an inch ,,

trom non-Class 1E conduit 1R52W91X located at elevation N .\ 1, 568' in the Auxiliary Building above the RCIC instrument' *

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panel 1H22-P017. , , ,g.' '

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b. CEI Electrical Installation Specification SP-33-4549-00 requires /

'i v' a minimum horizontal and vertical separation of six inches. ~ ' -'

between conduits of different divisions in cable spreading roces. ',-

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't (1) Division 3 conduit 1R33A129C was installed ~4eparated by ^ '

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2-1/2 inches from Division 2 conduits 2R33R919B and

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1C11B3B at elevation 639' in the cable spreading room. ,j  !'*'

, . , , .s (2) Division 2 conduits 1R33R788B, 1R33R786B'and 1R33R926B [ .(/ /

were installed separated by 1 1/2 to 3,1/2 inches from

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Division 3 conduits 638' in the 1R33C2809Cand1R33C20p/<

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(3) Division 2 conduits 1R33R920B.and 1R33C30335.were sepahated s. ,, ,' _

by 3 1/2 inches from Division 3 conduits 1R33R2071C, 1R33C28090, y

1R33C2914C, and 1R33A129C located at'eleyktion 638' in'the '

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(4) Division 2 conduit 1R33T329B was separated'by l' 1/2 in'ches ',

from Division 3 conduit 1R33T330C.Iocated'at elevatidn 638' -

in the cable spreading room.

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Appendix. 9 (5) Division 2 conduit 1R33T329B was separated by 2 1/4 inches

! fram Division 3 conduit IR33C291C located at elevation 638' in the cable spreading room.

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,4 c. CEI Electrical Installation Specificacion SP-33-4549-00 requires that clie minimum separation may be reduced to one inch for

- , conduits of redundant divisions when routed.through wall and

' floor penetrations.

Contrary to the above, Division 1 conduit 1R33C1098A was separated

• i by 3/4 of an inch froo Division 3 conduit 1R33R334C through a floor b ' '

penetration at elevation 606' in Room 1 of the Auxiliary Building.

, / F: s

,g This is ,a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement II).

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9. 10 CFR 53, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, states in part, " Measures shall

, .I be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as

/ j.. nonconformance's are promptly identified and corrected."

s , \ / /

f CEI Corporate, Nuclear Quality Assurance Program, Section 1600,

, 1 Paragraph 1.2.b states in part, " Requests for corrective action shall

- I iinclude address of the action required to correct the adverse condi-

' Itlon and to preclude continuation or recurrence......The NQAD shall s

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i , verify compliance to corrective action measures through audit, sur-

/ j veillance and inspection of project organizations and other QA evalua-tion and control techniques such as nonconformance trend analyses."

l r, I 'p ; ; ' Contrary to the above, eight L. K. Comstock Nonconformance Reports

, / I written during the period August 14-November 20, 1981, indicated the

,/ reason for the nonconformances was inadequate attention to installa-

'g

• tion details by L. K. Comstock personnel. These Nonconformance Reports were int reviewed to trend the reason (s) for the inattention to installation details. Prompt corrective action was not taken.

t This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement II).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each item of noncompliance: (1) corrective action taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to avoid further noncompliance; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown.

' V h Dated' i [/ James G. Keppler i Regional Administrator

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Reports No. 50-440/81-19(EIS); 50-441/81-19(EIS)

Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Licenses No. CPPR-148; CPPR-149 Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company

' Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 1

Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Investigation Conducted: October 27, 1981 through March 19, 1982 Investigation At: Midland, MI, Glen Ellyn, IL, and Perry and Mosrow, OH Investigator: [ // A C. H. Weil Date l

(Assisted by G. A. Phillip on December 1, 1981; and J. E. Foster l

onJaguary 22, 1982)

Inspectors ,I i // , / w 23f hL K. R. Na'idu Date

( O ' M M w fcn. ah2/9x C. D. Braund Dats Inspection Assistant (Accompanied by C. C. Williams l on March 19, 1982)

Reviewed By: A f t C. C. Williams, Chief Date /

Plant Systems Section GA.# VlS 2 R. F Warnick, Director Dafe /~

Enforcement and Investigation Staff l 7 3 i '1 0 7 ? y -

Investigation Summary Investigation on October 27, 1981 through March 19, 1982 (Reports ,

No. 50-440/81-19(EIS); 50-441/81-19(EIS)) g A_reas Investigated: Unannounced investigation into allegations pdytaining t4 the L. K. Comstock Company (electrical subcontractor) and the Cdeveland Electric Illuminating Company at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Un'its 1 and

2. The following areas were inspected in addition to the areas examined during the investigation: electrical hardware procurement, drawing control, electrical cable tray installation, ele.ctrical and instrumentation hanger installatien, and installed switchgear'. This investigation involved 711 man-hours, both on and offsite, by six NRC representatives.

j Results: This investigation resulted in nine items of noncompliance with NRC requirements. (10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control; Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings; Criterion VI, Design.

Control; Criterion VIII, Control of Purchased Haterial, Equipment and Services; Criterion X, Inspection; Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping; Criterion XV, Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components; and Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.) On November 16, 1981, as a result of joint observations by the NRC and the utility, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company directed the L. K. Comstock Company to stop all safety-related cable pulling activities. This was confirmed by Region III on November 18, 1981, with the issuance of a Confirmation cf Action Letter.

t.

s.

2

REASON FOR INVESTIGATION On October 7.7, 1981, IndividualAprovidedinformationtoNuclearh Regulatory Commission Region III (RIII) personnel concerning the pgrform-anpo of the L. K. Comstock Company (the electrical subcontractor) Jt. the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Individual A stated six allegations dekling with the L. K. Comstock Company's adherence to quality control procedures and the installation of electrical systems.

SUMMARY

OF' FACTS An investigation was initiated into the L. K. Comstock Company activities at the Perry Nuclear Power plant as a result of the information provided by Individual A. As a result of joint observations by the NRC and the utility, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company directed the L. K. Comstock Company to stop all safety-related cable pulling activities. This was con-firmed by RIII with the issuance of a Confirmation of Action Letter.

Individual B was interviewed during the course of the investigation regard-ing the electrical penetrations. Individual B stated his supervisor had threatened to fire him if he (Individual B) did not sign the penetration checklists. Subsequently, Individual B signed the checklists. Individual B's supervisor denied threatening Individual B. Also, Individual B stated

' signatures on four penetration checklists were not his; although he had accomplished the inspections and had found the inspected areas to be acceptable. The person signing Individual B's name to the penetration checklists was not identified.

During the investigation, Individuals C, D, E, and F, advised RIII they had been told not to write Nonconformance Reports on the performance of the L. K. Comstock Company. The persons, identified by Individuals C, D, E, and F, as telling them not to write Nonconformance Reports, denied the allegations. Review of Nonconformance Reports and Action Requests authored by Individuals C, D, or F did not disclose a trend by which it could be deduced that Individual C, D, or F stopped writing Nonconformance Reports or Action Requests. The investigation revealed that Individual E did not submit any Nonconformance Reports or Action Requests either before or after the. alleged order to stop writing the reports. Individual E was known to former co-workers for not turning in any reports during his employ-ment at Perry.

The investigation identified nine items of noncompliance with NRC require-ments. The items of noncompliance dealt with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control; Criterion V, instructions, Procedures, and ,

Drawings; Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material Equipment and Services; -

Criterion X, Inspection; Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shfpping; Criterion XV; Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components; and Criterion XVI, L

Corrective Action.

3

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted 1.1. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) s

'+D. R. Davidson, Vice President - Systems Engineering and Construction

'+*M. R. Edelman, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department

'+R. L. Farrell, Manager, Quality Assurance Department

"*B. L. 'Barkley, Nuclear Test Section : '^

R. M. Bonner, Responsible Engineer G. R. Leidich, Construction Quality Section D. R. Green, Senior Project Engineer

• J. H. Bellack, Nuclear Design and Analysis Section

• R. L. Vondrasek, Project Quality Section

'+*E. Riley, Construction Quality Section

*J. G. Marjenin, Construction Quality Section

• J. A. Kline, Nuclear Construction Section

• B. D. Walrath, Nuclear Quality Analysis Section T. B. Stear, Electrical Engineer

• H. Wall, Nondestructive Examinations Supervisor

• M. Lastovka, Nuclear Construction Engineering Department

• P. P. Martin, Training and Administrative Service F Pluebell, Nuclear Test Section W. J. Wright, Nuclear Test Section S. P. Tulk, Construction Quality Section T. J. Thompson, Construction Quality Section 1.2 Westinghouse Electric Cor2pration l W. R. Lankenau, Senior Penetration Engineer 1.3 Gilbert Associates Incorporated (GAI)

C. Angstadt, Structural Engineer' K. Pech, Assistant Manager J. G. Shingler, Electrical Engineer

• J. W. Mehaffey, QA Program Manager H. R. Reppert, Field Mechanical Engineer 1.4 Kaiser Engineers K. Cimorelli, Electrical Quality Control Inspector

• P. L. Gibson, Project Quality Assurance Manager S. H. Halpin, Lead Electrical Operations Quality Control Inspector J. M. Daugan, Associate Engineer S. Armknecht, Industrial Relations Manager W. J. Kacer, former General Supervising Quality Engineer R. G. Peters, Electrical Quality Control Inspector M. 0. Roe, Electrical Quality Control Inspector 4

J. B. Metcalf, Construction Quality Engineering Inspector Two former Quality Control Inspectors 1.5 L. K. Comstock Comoany M. W. Confer, Engineer Squad Leader, Cable Tray Design Group D. Dilelio, General Foreman T. Dietsch, Foreman E. Freeman, General Foreman C. W. Hart, Quality Control Supervisor (Perry)

E. Luciano,_' Area Manager-R. E. Marino, Manager, QA/QC Services (Corporate)

C. Mitchell, Assistant Project Manager

• P. R. Merlin, Quality Assurance Manager (Perry)

W. L. Gilbert, Area Manager W. Neuman, Field Engineer R. Troff, Project Engineer S. Valeriano, Vice President - Atlantic Region

• T. J. Woodman, Project Manager (Perry)

Thirteen Quality Control Inspectors Two former Quality Control Inspectors Twenty-five Craft-workers 1.6 Individuals Individual A Individual B Individual C Individual D.

Individual E Individual F

(+ Denotes those present at management meeting on February 10, 1982 in Glen Ellyn, Illinois.)

(* Denotes those present at Exit Meeting on March 19, 1982, at the-Perry site.)

(* Denotes those present at an enforcement meeting on June 16, 1982, in Glen Ellyn, Illinois.)

2. Introduction l

l The Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, are under construction j by the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company CEI) in Perry Township, i Ohio. Gilbert Associates, Inc. is the architect-engineering firm. The facility will utilize boiling water reactors (BWR) supplied by the General Electric Corporation.

The L. K. Comstock Company has been designated to provide and install the electrical systems for the Perry plant. The systems serve both safety-related and nonsafety-related areas of the plant.

5 i - . - . __ __ _ .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, sets forth eighteen quality assurance criteria applicable to nuclear power plant construction activities.

CEI and its contractor organizations, among them Gilbert Associates, Kaiser Engineering, Inc. and L. K. Comstock Company have prepared qaality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC) Manuals and Procedures

' setting forth the specific requirements applicable to their activi-ties at the Perry site. These documents also specified that certain activities will meet specific industry codes and standards.

.The following documents, applicable to the electrical installations were examined during this investigation and were used as a basis for determining compliance or noncompliance with NRC requirements; -

CEI Corporate Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Procedures; CEI Specification No. SP-33, Procurement Specification for Electrical Installations; CEI Specification No. SP-660, Procurement Specification of the Containment Liner Plate;

, CEI Specification No. SP-667, Procurement Specification for Miscellaneous Embedded Steel; L. K. Comstock Company Quality Assurance Manual and Quality Control Procedures; Westinghouse Electrical Corporation Instruction Book for Electrical Penetrations, Revision IV, February 3, 1981; American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Material Specifications No. SA-333 and No. SA-530; ASME Sectica IX; American Welding Society (AWS) D1.1; and; Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Nuclear Standards.

3. Receipt of Allegations On October 27, 1981, Individual A contacted RIII. Individual A stated he was quite concerned with the performance of the L. K. Comstock Company, the electrical subcontractor, at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant construction site. Individual A provided six allegations, detailed in Paragraphs 3.1 through 3.6, regarding L. K. Comstock Company activities at the site.

3.1 Intimidation of Comstock Quality Control Inspectors 3.1.1 Allegation i During August 1981, Thomas Woodman, the L. K. Comstock Project Manager, and Clarence Hart, the L. K. Comstock QA/QC Manager, held a meeting with the L. K. Comstock Quality Control Inspectors. During this meeting Woodman threatened to terminate all of the inspectors for "being unprofessional and for not being " team players." Woodman told the inspectors their job was to inspact for acceptance, not rejection." Individual A stated the purpose of the meeting was to intimidate the inspectors.

6

i i

3.1.2 Findings 3.1.2.1 On December 2, 1981, Woodman provided the following information:

Prior to August 1981, he had become increasingly concerned with the conduct of the inspectors and the effect of their actions upon production. Most notable were their poor time and attendance and their delay in responding to field inspection points.

Woodman felt the inspectors were wasting time, as he had observed the inspectors taking almost thirty minutes in the morning and after lunch before reporting to their work assignments. Many times groups of 2-3 inspectors would gather and would do nothing but talk to each other for excessive periods of time. Also, he had observed inspectors coming into the office from their field assignments for coffee, when coffee was available to them in the field. Woodman felt the inspectors' activities contributed to slowing production and had so informed Hart.

During August 1981, a group of prospective customers toured the L. K. Comstock facilities.

While in the Comstock offices, the visitors passed through the Quality Control Section. The inspec-tors had left the field approximately one half hour before quitting time, had congregated in the office, and were quite rowdy. The group was beisterous' -

with two inspectors flying paper airplanes, while several others hung professional football pennants on the office walls. One of the prospective customers commented to Woodman about the conduct of L. K.'Comstock employees, and these comments embarrassed Woodman. Woodman' informed Hart the inspectors' behavior could not be tolerated any longer. Hart and Woodman called the inspectors to a meeting, also attended by the Assistant Production Manager and the Production Area Managers. Woodman addressed the group about his concerns. He readily admitted he was forceful in

! his speech and mannerisms. Woodman stated he did not single out any individual during the meeting.

His intention was not to intimidate anyone, but to motivate the group. Woodman advised he was con-cerned with the inspector' tardiness, creating disturbances and "doing a fair job for fair money."

He stated he told the group that " clerks in the office were conducting themselves more profes-sionally thr they," that they should "get aboard 7

l ship," and they should become more productive and

" inspect for acceptance." Woodman reiterated his speech was "not meant to belittle anyone."

3.1.2.2 On December 2, 1981, Hart was interviewed and pro-vided essentially the same information as Woodman regarding the August 1981 meeting with the inspectors. Hart continued, he was distressed by Woodman's forceful presentation and discussed the matter with Robert Marino, the L. K. Comstock

. Company's Manager of QA/QC Services. The following day, Marino came to the Perry site and discussed the problems with Hart and Woodman. Marino later l discussed the problems with inspectors. Hart

! stated that no one was singled out during the inspectors' meeting with Woodman and no one was intimidated. Hart stated Woodman has never appro-ached him to terminate the employment of any inspector.

3.1.2.3 During the period December 1-3, 1981, 13 of the 22 Comstock Quality Control Inspectors were selected at random and interviewed. Each recalled the August 1981, meeting with Woodman. Many felt Woodman had been too forceful and determined in his approach to the meeting. Some were embarrassed to have Woodman make the presentation to the inspec-tors in the presence of production supervisors.

Others felt some of Woodman's remarks were unnecessary, especially the comparison of the inspectors to clerks. While others felt Woodman's comments were necessary to motivate other inspectors.

~

All agreed that no one was singled out during the meeting, and none felt his/her job was in jeopardy due to Woodman's remarks. None felt Woodman's remarks affected the performance of his/her inspec-

~

tion activities. All agreed they have not been harrassed or intimidated while working for the L. K. Comstock Company.

No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified.

3.2 Support of Conduit 3.2.1 Allegation The L. K. Comstock Quality Assurance / Quality Control program does not provide specific guidance concerning situations involving the issuance of Audit Finding Reports (AFR). As an example, Conduit No. 1R33R660A on the 574' elevation of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building, exits the back of a junction 8

box, goes thcough the wall to Room One, and climbs to the ceiling for the length of the conduit run. The installation criteria required all conduits to be supported within two feet of a junction box. Conduit No. 1R33R660A was not supported in this manner. The project and field engineers, as well as the Comstock Quality Control Manager, were apprised of the problem. None could agree on the proper means (AFR or Nonconformance Report) to document this problem; therefore, the problem was never documented. Also, similar conditions could be found with other conduits installed in the vicinity of Room One, north hallway, -

elevation 574' of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building.

3.2.2 Findings 3.2.2.1 L. K. Comstock Company Procedure No. 4.11.1, Nonconformance Control, was reviewed. Para-graph 4.1 of this procedure states in part,

"...Comstock Quality Control Department is responsible for: . . . Assuring that nonconforming items or activities are identified and reported.

Nonconformance Reports are reserved for hardware deficiencies. Program or procedural deficiencies are reported and resolved using the Audit Finding Report."

3.2.2.2 The drawing applicable to the installation of conduit and electrical boxes (Drawing No. 40-4549-SS-215-007, Sheet No. 21, Revision E, dated September 29, 1981) was reviewed. Note j No. 12 of this drawing states, "All conduits

! attaching to boxes shall be supported at a maximum distance of 2'0" from the face of the box..."

3.2.2.3 Nonconformance Report No. LKC-767, dated October 12, 1981, was reviewed. This nonconformance report pertained to the installation of four conduits, including Conduit No. 1R33R660A, installed on the 574' elevation of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building.

The description of the nonconformance was listed as, "the following conduits were installed per latest revisions of approved drawin s, but does i not meet the 2' support distance as specified in l

Drawing SS 215 007 SH. 21...IR33660A..." The cause of the nonconformance was described as,

" hanger support mounting problem." The proposed disposition of the nonconformance was " conduit. . .

cannot be supported within the two foot criteria.

'Use-as-is' - consider box connection as a support." The step to prevent recurrence was listed as, " Future cases such as these will be 9

brought to the attention of engineering before installation." This Nonconformance Report-was revised on November 12, 1981, to include a sketch of the problem. The revised Nonconformance Report was accepted by the Gilbert Associates engineer on November 23, 1981.

3.2.2.4 RIII personnel made numerous trips into the various structures at the Perry site, including the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building, throughout the investigation.

During these field trips, numerous conduits were.

examined (including those in the vicinity of Room One and the North Hallway on the 574' elevation of the Auxiliary Building) and were found to meet the attachment criteria. Conduit No. 1R33R660A (located along the North Hallway on the 574' elevation of the Auxiliary Building) was examined by RIII personnel.

The conduit was two feet long and ran between two junction boxes. The junction boxes were mounted on either side of a wall, which was two feet thick.

The conduit was between the boxes inside the wall.

Since the conduit was inside the wall, it could not be fastened in the normal manner on the surface of the concrete. The conduit was supported by fastening it to the back and each junction box; effectively supporting the conduit within two feet of either box.

No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified.

3.3 Cable Pulling 3.3.1 Allegation During the period September 28-30, 1981, numerous safety-related cables were pulled from Manhole No. 1 through Manhole No. 2 to the Emergency Service Water Pumphouse.

One circuit consisted of three separate 4/0 cables. A Raceway Change Installation Modification (RCIM), which gives the maximum cable pulling tension, was not provided in advance of this cable pull. The L. K. Comstock Quality Control Inspectors assigned to this cable pull were not trained in the methods for calculating the maximum tension requirements. Since the inspectors were not trained, they located a RCIM for a similar cable pull (three, triplexed, 4/0 cables). The inspectors used the cable pull cension calculation from the RCIM for the triplexed cable for the pulling tension of the three, separate, 4/0 cable.

10

1 3.3.2 Findings 3.3.2.1 Engineers from CEI and Gilbert Associates, the Kaiser Project Engineer, the L. K. Comstock QA/QC Manager, and the L. K. Comstock Lead Cable Design f

Group Engineer were interviewed. Each advised i triplex cables were never installed by the L. K. Comstock Company, except for temporary ligting. Calculating the maximum cable pulling

.. . tension for,ductbank. pulls;(i.e.. between.the .

manholes and the Emergency Service Water Pumpheuse) was the responsibility of the Project Engineer.

The L. K. Comstock Company was required to notify -

the Project Engineer a minimum of forty-eight hours

in advance of a ductbank pull in order for the Project Engineer to have sufficient time to complete the Maximum cable pulling tensions cal-culations for the upcoming cable pull. The i L. K. Comstock Company Cable Design Group Engineer was responsible for the calculations of individual

! conduit pulls.

During these interviews RIII personnel learned the Project Engineer was calculating the maximum cable pulling tensions at 100% and 125%. The' engineer explained the calculation at 100% was

. an optimum value for cable tension and the Quality Control Inspectors had been instructed to write a Nonconformance Report when this value l was exceeded. The 125% value was a point where j damage to the cable could be anticipated and the l point where cable would be scraped. Only,the 100%

i of cable tension was communicated to the Quality Control Inspectors in order "to insure a measure l .of conservatism."

3.3.2.2 L. K. Comstock Cable Pull Inspection Checklists were reviewed for the period September 28-30, 1981.

This review determined only one circuit of three 4/0 cable, Circuit No. 1R23F15B, pulled from Manhole No. 1 to the Emergency Service Water Pump-house during this period. The Raceway and Cable Installation Modification (RCIM) for Circuit No. 1R23F15B was dated September 23, 1981, and indicated a maximum pulling tension of 1200 pounds for the three cables involved (Cables No. 1R33H2011B, 1R33H2008B and 1R33H2006B). The Cable Pull Inspection Checklist indicated the Cabic Pull Slips for Circuit No. 1R23F15B were f released on September 25, 1981. The inspsetion checklist also indicated " pre-pull inspections 11 l

complete and released for cable pull" on September 30, 1981. The Cable Pull Inspection Checklist for this circuit showed the maximum cable pulling tension of 1200 pounds was exceeded by 2000 pounds. Nonconformance Report No. 760 was prepared as a result of the excessive tension and i the Perry Project Organization (CEI and Gilbert Associates) was notified on October 1, 1981, of this nonconforming condition.

3.3.2.3 The ' training records of the L. K. - Comstock '

! Quality Control Inspectors, including those re-sponsible for inspecting Circuit No. 1R23F15B, were reviewed. This review indicated all inspectors had received training on L. K. Comstock Procedure 4.3.3, Cable Pulling. Within Procedure No. 4.3.3 were the instructions for calculating the l maximum cable tensions. During November 1981, the l L. K. Comstock QA/QC Manager administered an

( examination to the Quality Control Inspectors, l including questions on maximum cable tension cal-I culations. The Quality Control Inspectors involved in the inspection of Circuit No. 1R23F15B on September 30, 1981, received passing scores on the examination and they correctly answered the cable tension calculation questions.

l No items of noncompliances with NRC requirements were identified.

3.3.3 Review of Cable Pulling Nonconformance Reports L. K. Comstock documents for cables pulled through the ductbank from Manhole No. 1 to the Emergency Service Water Pumphouse were reviewed. Numerous Nonconformance Reports ,

were generated to document instances where cable pulling '

tensions were exceeded. In all instances a Raceway and j Cable Installation Modification (RCIM) was issued in advance I of each cable pull with the project engineer providing the maximum cable pulling tension for each cable on the RCIM. )

Many of the Nonconformance Reports identified errors in the rigging of the dynamometer to measure the tension placed on  ;

the cable. The following Nonconformance Reports were reviewed:

3.3.3.1 Report No. LKC-759, dated September 25, 1981, concerning four circuits (No. 1P45C13C, 1P45C25C, 1R25C7C and 1E22A9C). RCIM No. 821, dated September 19, 1981, had a maximum pulling tension calculated at 535 pounds. The corrected tension ,

for using a dynameceter at a 90' angle was 573 '

l

\

! 12

l pounds. The calculation for 125% pulling tension I was placed at 716 pounds. The Nonconformance i Report indicated the 573 pounds requirement had l been exceeded, but not the 716 pounds requirement. l Interviews of the project engineers disclosed the two values were given in order to provide a con-servative margin by which the cable pull could continue (the lesser number, 573 pounds) without damage to the cable (the greater number, 71 pounds).

The proposed disposition of Nonconformance Report No. LKC-759 was to "use-as-is." The justification was that' RCIM-824, ' dated Septe'mber 24,1981, had been issued and it superseded the original RCIM (No. 821). RCIM 821 specified 535 pounds, and l upon re-examinatin it was determined the correct value was 553 pounds; therefore, RCIM 824 was i issued to show the correct value of 553 pounds. l In turn, RCIM changed the dynamometer correction j to 779 pounds at the 100% reading and 973 pounds l at the 125% reading. The Nonconformance Report i indicated the steps to prevent recurrence was to "use accurate data in preparing cable pull tensions." I i

3.3.3.2 Report No. LKC-755, dated September 23, 1981.

During ductbanl pulls of 13 cables the dynamometer reading exceeded 125% of the maximum allowable cable tension. The RCIM designated a straight line tension of 1038 pounds. The dynamometer correction factor at 90' and at 125% was calculated to be 1802 pounds. During the course of the cable pull the dynamometer indicated a tension of 1850 pounds. At that point the cable pull was stopped l by L. K. Comstock Quality Control. Revised dy-namometer mounting instructions were given, as well as instructions to scrap the cable if the 125%

calculated value was exceeded with the dynamometer ,

in the new position.

No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified.

3.3.4 Observation of Cable Pulling Activities 3.3.4.1 On November 16, 1981, RIII personnel, accompanied by CEI's Lead Electrical Quality Engineer, observed L. K. Comstock employees pulling Cable No. 1R24F3C inside the Emergency Service Water Pumphouse. The design length of this cable was 1340 feet. Approx-imately 1200 feet of cable had already been in-stalled in the ductbank when RIII personnel observed the L. K. Comstock cable pulling crew 13

i l

had pulled the length of the cable to Motor Control Center No. 124S0030 without using the installed pullboxes as interim cable pulling points. The total number of degrees of angle had not been calculated prior to starting the cable pull. The total of the degrees of angle exeeded the 270' maximum specified in Note 13 of Drawing No. 04-4549-D-215-01, Electrical Conduit Layout

- Legend, Notes and References by at least 160'.

This is considered to be an item of noncompliance

' ^ contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B',~ Criterion V.

(440/81-19-01; 441/81-19-01).

3.3.4.2 The CEI Quality Control Inspector accompaning the RIII personnel observed the following deficiencies in the pulling of Cable No. 1R24F3C

A nonconforming condition was not identified and cleared prior to commencing the cable pull.

The maximum sidewall pressure was not calculated and the designated pull points were not utilized.

The maximum cable pulling tension was not cal-culated and documented prior to commencing the cable pull. The maximum cable pulling tension was verbally given to the Comstock Quality Control Inspector overseeing the cable pull, and this tension requirement was violated; The L. K. Comstock Quality Control inspector ~

did not walk-down the conduit prior to the beginning of the cable pull, and the inspector did not insure the conduit had all of the required identification markings attached to it.

Also, it was noted the dynamometer used during the l cable pull ranged from 0 pounds to 10,000 pounds in 2000 pounds increments. The maximum pull tension for this cable had been calculated at 747 pounds; therefore, the tension could not be accurately determined with the dynamometer employed during this cable pull.

3.3.4.3 Based upon the above factors the CEI Lead Quality Engineer decided "L. K. Comstock's QA program was no longer effectively controlling their cable pulling activities." On November 16, 1981, CEI Corrective Action Request (CAR) No. 81-08, was issued to the L. K. Comstock Company. CAR No. 81-08 resulted in CEI issuing Stop Work 14 4

. Notification No. 81-02 on November 16, 1981, to l the L. K. Comstock Company. The L. K. Comstock Company was directed to stop "all cable pulling activities for Specification SP-33 (Class IE)."

Subsequently, RIII issued a Confirmation of Action Letter, dated November 18, 1981 (Exhibit I),

confirming CEI's stopping the work of the L. K. Comstock Company. The Stop Work Notification was released on January 7,1982 (Paragraph 6.6 of this report).

~

Violation o'f Cable' Pull'ing'Stop Work Notidi cation

~

3.'3.5 ,

3.3.5.1 On December 1, 1981, while reviewing L. K' Comstock

Nonconformance Reports, RIII personnel discovered Nonconformance. Report.No. LKC-821, dated November 25, 1981, in the L. K. Comstock "Open" Nonconformance Report files. The description of the nonconforming condition was, "After Stop Work Notification 81-02 was issued on all safety cable pulls, cables (IP45C3A and IP45C4A) were pulled through conduit (1R33C1230A) without QC notification and issuance of final route pull cards." The L. K. Comstock QA/QC Manager advised this NR was open and CEI had not

been notified. Subsequently, RIII personnel notified CEI of the violation of their Stop Work Notification 81-02.

3.3.5.2 On December 2, 1981, RIII personnel inquired into the reasons for the violation of the CEI Stop Work Notification and the RIII Confirmation of Action Letter. The L. K. Comstock Project Manager advised

! he had informed his cable pulling crews to cease all safety-related cable pulling activities. However, he had forgotten that cable termination crews

" final routed" (pulled) the.last few feet of cable prior to making the cable termination. On November 20, 1981, a cable termination crew pulled the final 13' 4-1/4" of cables IP34C3A and IP45C4A for termination. On November 23, 1981, the L. K. Comstock Cable Engineer reviewed the cable termination crew's Daily Termination Report and ditcovered the two cables had been pulled in violation of the CEI Stop Work Notification. The Cable Engineer notified the L. K. Comstock Quality Control Section and Nonconformance Report No. LKC-821 was prepared.

The Comstock Project Manager readily admitted he was in error for not notifying the cable termination crews. He stated this was not a willful act on his 15

part, but an oversight. The oversight was caused by Comstock's accepted work practice allowing the termination crews to final route the last few feet of a cable, rather than having the cable final routed by the cable pulling crew. The Project Manager advised that to preclude a repetition of this event, all Cable Termination Slips for safety-related cables had been retrieved from the cable termination crews.

This appeared to' be' an ' isolated- instance and since tho ' -

Comstock Production Manager had already taken the necessary corrective action and the action to prevent recurrence, this matter was not considered to be an item of noncompliance with

.NRC requirements.

3.3.6 Partially Pulled Cables 3.3.6.1 Several cables in the Emergency Service Water Pump-house had been partially pulled with the free length of the cable coiled, pending final routing through the conduits. The coils were tied and suspended, by a single tiewrap with a rag between the cable and the tiewrap, from either cable tray hanger supports or from Seismic Category 1 con-duits. The diameters of the inner turns of the coils for Cable Nos. 1M32R8B, IM32R9B and 1M32Rllb were measured and were less than the minim 1m train-ing bend radius specified in Attachment L or L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.3.3, Cable Pulling i

Procedure. All had a measured training radius of l 3", which is below the required minimum training radius of 3.2".

3.3.6.2 This is considered to be another example of an item of noncompliance contrary.to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. (440/81-19-01; 441/81-19-01).

3.3.7 Review of Cable Pulling Procedures L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.3.3, Cable Pulling Procedure, was reviewed. This review indicated this L. K. Comstock Procedure had not received an adequate review by Gilbert Associates, Inc., the architect-engineers, as the following errors were not identified and corrected:

3.3.7.1 Paragraph 3.1.1 of Procedure No. 4.3.3 incorrectly references Paragraph 3.2.22 of that procedure in-stead of Paragraph 3.2.24 for requirements to store partially pulled cables.

16

3.3.7.2 Paragaph 3.2.24 of Procedure No. 4.3.3 states in part, "When cable pulling is completed, the cable shall be coiled and supported to keep cable off the floor to prevent cable damage and safety hazards.

The coil shall be tied so that the tie does not damage the cable jacket.... Care shall be exercised in supporting coil to prevent kinking or exceeding the minimum bend training radius. Coils shall bear distinct cable identification on the coiled portion."

3.3.7.-2.1 The above requirement-is incorrect. There-would not be any problem if the minimum bending radii was exceeded. However, there would be permanent damage to the cable conductors if the inner turns of the coiled cables were below, rather than exceeding, the minimum bending radii.

3.3.7.2.2 Minimum bending radii should be used instead of minimum bend training radii.

Minimum bend training radii are used when cable is trained through cable boxes or during cable training in panels or switch-gear where no excessive pressure is used.

3.3.7.2.3 The procedure does not specify the ways of storing partially pulled cables. For example, the use of a cable saddle, or suspending the cable at two points so that the inner turns are'above the mini-mum bending radii. As a matter of routine, partially pulled cables were coiled and suspended by a single tie wrap. A piece of rag was routinely placed between the tie wrap and the cable jacket to protect j the jacket. However, a piece of rag between a single tie wrap and the cable jacket does not mitigate the permanent deformation of the conductor strands.

These were considered to be additional examples of noncompliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. (440/81-19-01; I 441/81-19-01).

3.3.7.3 Paragraph 5:08.15.3 of Specification SP-33-4549, Electrical Installations, Revision II, states in part, "All conduit sloping to equipment and embedded conduits shall have their ends covered l with capped bushings containing a blank insert (penny). Insert to remain in place until cable is pulled." The Conduit Instc11ation Checklist, 1

17

Form No. 82, attached to Comstock Procedure No. 4.3.1, Cable Pulling Procedure, also required the capping of installed conduits. The RIII in-spectors observed vertical Conduit No. 1R33R517A in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building without a cap.

CEI was notified of the missing cap and stated the contractor would be instructed to cap the conduit.

The above requirement was for the installation of indoor conduit and outdoor conduit above grade.

Par,agraph 5:08.16 of-Specification SP-33-4549- -

covered the requirements for conduit installations in ductbanks and manholes. A requirement did not exist to protect the ends of embedded conduit.

The inspectors observed that Conduits No.1R33C2006B,1R33C2003B and 1R332009B in manhole No. 2 were not capped with blank inserts. The rationale for the lack of adequate requirements to protect outdoor embedded conduits, especially where it is being exposed to construction debris and inclement weather was questioned. The li-censee stated that this matter will be reviewed with the architect engineers. This matter was considered unresolved. (440/81-19-02; 441/81-19-02) 3.4 Electrical Penetrations 3.4.1 Allegation The electrical penetrations between the Unit 1 Containment and Intermediate Buildings were improperly installed. Most of the penetrations were either misaligned or " jammed through without concern for the 0.04" seismic tolerance required by the installation procedure.

3.4.2 Findings 3.4.2.1 Twenty-nine electrical penetrations, manufactured by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, were instal-led in Perry Unit 1. The electrical penetrations consisted of an annulus tube assembly bridging the I three feet (annulus) between the walls of the -

l Containment and Shield Buildings. The annulus tube assemblies were attached to containment vessel nozzles, supplied by Newport News Industrial Corporation, on the Containment Building wall. The annulus tube assemblies were attached to embedded steel, supplied by Pittsburgh Bridge and Iron, on j

the Shield Building wall.

l l 3.4.2.2 The icilowing information was obtained from a review of the Westinghouse Electrical Corporation l

l l

18 l

l

l

Instruction Book for Electrical Penetratations

" Insert the Annulus Tube Assembly (long) through the containment building nozzle and into the shield building nozzle such that the end containing the Fixed Point Locking Nut touches the Shield Tube Assembly.

" Align the outboard end of the Annulus Tube Assembly with the Shield Tube Assembly such that there will be minimum. interference.at the assembly

( interface when the Secondary Seal and cable is pulled through the tubes.

" Finger tighten the two Fixed Point Nuts and one Sliding Nut.

" Center the inboard end in the nozzle by adjusting the three inboard Sliding Nut Supports. Loosen the two top inboard Sliding Nut Supports and place a

.04" shim on top of each pad. Tighten the two top pads until both shims touch the nozzle. Lock in place with the lock nuts. Remove the shims.

" Secure the outboard end by tightening the two Fixed Point Nuts (12-15 ft. Ibs.). Lock the two pointed nuts and the flat pad in place using the locking nuts."

3.4.2.3 The Westinghouse Panetration Engineer was inter-

! viewed. He advised the 0.04" tolerance was to allow movement within the electrical penetration during a seismic event. The original Westinghouse calculations used 0.03" as the tolerance, but it was determined 0.04" would be more practical for installation. By using a 0.04" tolerance a readily available 0.04" " feeler guage" could be used during installation. The Penetration Engineer continued, if the annulus tubes were "jemmed through" or if a

" perfect fit" were not achieved, the effect of either would not be significant, even in a seismic event. The annulus tubes were designed to move

, during a seismic event without damaging the cables

'~

i inside the tubes. In a subsequent letter to CEI, dated December 22, 1981, the Westinghouse Engineer stated, " Movement between the Containment Building and the Shield Building in the installation des-cribed (The support tube (annulus tube) of the cable support tube assembly in contact with the outboard end of the containment sleeve) may cause the support tube to deform. This would not cause a disruption in operation provided the insulation 19

1 l

l of the cable inside the tube support was not damaged. Cable insulation damage would not occur at the combined maximum accumulative vertical or horizontal displacement of 1.4" described in  !

Table 12 of Technical Specification SP-563-4549-00."

3.4.2.4 The installed penetrations were examined by the Westinghouse Engineer and RIII personnel on December 10, 1981. The tolerance between interior components of the penetrations could not be mea-

' ' ~ "- ' sured'. The Westinghouse' Engineer was requested' '

to postulate the "as installed" measurements. In correspondence to CEI on December 22, 1981, and received by RIII on January 14, 1982, the

. Westinghouse. Engineer stated:

" Question: How much clearance would there be between the upper two legs of the  ;

Sliding Nut Support and the sleeve I.D. after removing a 0.04" shim from between the bottom leg and sleeve I.D.?"

" Comment: The relationship is such that the distance between the top two legs would l be 1/2 the distance set between the lower leg and the I.D., therefore 0.02" in this case.

"A clearance of 0.03" to 0.12" between the bottom leg and sleeve I.D. or 0.02" to 0.06" between the top two legs and sleeve I.D. would be acceptable.

"In reviewing the installation instruc-tions it was noted that Section B-B of E-40047 is not-a true representation of the installation or the installation instructions . The 0.03" clearance should be as described in 111A. and 111B. of PEN-TR-78-17 at the Sliding Nut Supports, not at the Fixed Point Support.

, "The installation instructions will be l revised to include the tolerances on the l sliding nutsleeve I.D. spacing and a revised E-40047."

! 3.4.2.5 The L. K. Comstock Company Area Manager, General l Foreman, Foreman, and Field Engineer responsible

! for electrical penetration installations were interviewed. Each advised they could not recall encountering any significant problems during the 1

l 20 l l

1 l

actual installation of the penetrations. None recalled any penetrations being " jammed through."

However, it was noticed the alignment of the con- .

tainment penetration nozzle and their corresponding embedment pipes was incorrect. Comstock personnel reported the misalignment to the site engineers using " Field Question" sheats. (Field Question Nos. 12159, 12173, 12230, 12249 and 12295 dated January 23 - February 2, 1981.) Each Field Question concerned whether " variation in penetra-tion ~ sleeve -dimensions". was acceptable. Tha site engineer's response was that with the exception of a few, most were acceptable; the unacceptable pene- -

trations required further review with Westinghouse, the manufacturer. The Field Engineer authoring the Field Questions advised the meaning of the "varia-tion in penetration sleeve dimensions" was intended to communicate the misalignment between the containment vessel nozzles and the embedment pipe.

3.4.2.6 The RIII personnel could not determine the dimensions of the containment vessel nozzles from either the Field Questions, the weld records generated by Pullman Power Products (who welded the penetration to the nozzle), or through visual inspection. Specification No. SP-33-4549-00 Procurement Specification for Electrical Installa-tion, Paragraph 5:08.1.4.a, Page V-23 states in part:

"Before welding, the contractor shall inspect the inside diameter of the containment vessel nozzle and the concrete shield wall penetra-tion to assure concentricity and/or dimensional tolerances within the limits established by the manufacturer."

The Dimensional tolerances for the above as stated in Paragraph No. 3:06.6 of Specification No.

SP-660-4549-00, the Specification for the Procure-ment of the Containment Vessel Nozzles, are as follows:

"The material for penetraion sleeves in nominal sizes up to and including 20" in diameter inclusive shall be SA-333, Grade 6, in accordance with ASME Code Section II."

ASTM-A-333 refers to ASTM-A-530 Table 1, which specifies the permissible variations in the outside diameter of nominal 8" to 18",

(

i 21 l

inclusive, diameter pipe size should not be over 3/32" or under 1/32".

Based on the above requirements, the penetration inspection reports were reviewed. The available.

documentation did not reflect the above inspections had been performed.

3.4.2.7 The failure to inspect the containment vessel nozzles and embedded pipe to ascertain whether the requiremen'ts of the specifications were met is an item of noncompliance contrary to the requirements '

of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X.

(440/81-19-03; 441/81-19-03) 3.4.3 Review of Electrical Penetration Checklists 3.4.3.1 The electrical penetrations were to be installed

. to L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.3.10, Installa-I tion of Electrical Penetrations, which reflected the manufacturer's recommendations. The inspec-tion results were to be documented in a checklist attached to the procedure.

! 3.4.3.2 The Penetration Installation Checklist was reviewed and it was found the inspector signoff on several of the line items on the checklist did not ade-quately specify what was inspected. The inspector's signature on certain checklist paragraphs contained multiple inspection steps and it could not be j determined which steps had been completed and which l remained to be finished.

l 3.4.3.3 The inspectors discussed this matter with the l Westinghouse representative. He agreed to provide a list of attributes with acceptance / rejection criteria which would specifically reflect the acceptability of an electrical penetration in-l sta11ation. Pending receipt of this information i from Westinghouse this matter is considered unre-l solved. (440/81-19-04; 441/81-19-04) 3.4.4 Alleged Forgery of Inspector's Signature 3.4.4.1 The Penetration Installation Checklists were l

reviewed with the four Quality Control inspectors l conducting the penetration inspections. In a written statement (Exhibit II) one inspector, Individual B, advised although his name appeared on Item No. 6 (Hole Verification) en four of the i checklists (Penatration Nos. 1R72-dO11, 1R72-S017,

! IR72-S027 and IR72-S028), it was not his signature.

l l 22 l

l

Individual B stated he had conducted the inspections, verified the hole location, but he had never signed the chenklists. Individual B continued, he had on one occasion given his permission to an inspector he was training to sign his (Individual B's) name.

Individual B explained, both he and Phil Romano

' (the trainee) were inspecting the penetrations.

Individual B was on one side of a wall and Romano on the other side. The inspection checklists were in Romano's possession, and Individual B told

' Romano to sign-for Individual B to save either of them the effort of climbing down from the scaf-folding. In a written statement Romano (Exhibit III) denied signing Individual B's name to the Penetration Installation Checklists. On December 9 and 19, 1981, the other inspectors responsible for penetration inspections were interviewed.

Both were formerly employed by L. K. Comstock Company at the Perry site and have since departed.

Both stated they had not signed Individual B's name to the Penetration Installation Checklists.

Also, both stated had they needed to sign a check-list, they would have signed their own name not Individual B's. Additionally, the Comstock QA/QC Manager at the Perry site was interviewed and stated he had not signed either Individual B's or any other inspector's name to any checklists.

3.4.4.2 The CEI Manager of Nuclear Quality Assurance at the Perry site stated all four electrical penetra-tions would be reinspected for hole verification.

Pending receipt of this information from CEI this matter is considered unresolved. (440/81-19-05; 441/81-19-05) i 3.4.4.3 Individual B further advised that near the begin-ning of 1981 another instance arose where someone had signed a document for him. Individual B continued, an Audit Finding Report had been generated for a "punchlist" of items needing l

correction prior to final acceptance by quality control. Someone had initialed the punchlist for Individual B. Individual B was certain the Audit Finding Report and punchlist involved either conduit Nos. 1R33C1014A or 1R33C1021A on the 599' elevation of the Unit 1, Auxiliary Building.

Individual B notified the L. K. Comstock QA/QC Manager of this problem, and in turn the L. K. Comstock Project Manager was apprised. The Project Manager, the QA/QC Manager, the foreman for the area involved, and Individual B met to try to resolve the question of who initialed the 23

punchlist. Both the foreman and Individual B denied entering Individual B's initials on'the punchlist, and the matter was never resolved.

3.4.4.3.1 The L. K. Comstock Production Manager ,

and QA/QC Manager were interviewed.

Both recalled the incident involving Individual B's initials on a punchlist for an Audit Finding Report. Neither could recall the Audit Finding Report

' involved or inyr of the spe'cifics of the

' ~ '

punchlist.

3.4.4.3.2 The Conduit Installation Checklists were

.., reviewed for Conduit Nos. 1R33C1014A and 1R33C1021A. From this review it was de-termined the L. K. Constock Company had not installed a conduit bearing either number. A review of checklists for vari- .

ations of these numbers indicated an installation in the Emergency Service Water Pumphouse. The Conduit Installa-tion Checklist for this conduit was reviewed, and did not indicate either a punchlist or an Audit Finding Report having been prepared against the installation.

(

3.4.4.3.3 All Audit Finding Reports prepared by Individual B for the entire period of his employment were reviewed. All of the initials on these Audit Finding Reports and attached punchlists appeared to similar to those of Individual B.

3.4.5 Review of Electrical Penetration Quality Assurance Reco'rds 3.4.5.1 Documents were reviewed for the containment vessel nozzles (CVN) and embedded steel in the shield wall to which the electrical penetration were attached.

The CVNs attached to the containment liner plate were fabricated by Newport News Industrial Corporation. This document review indicated:

3.4.5.1.1 CVN, QC No. 77, (E-225) NNI-035; NNIC 300.

Certificate of Compliance, supplied by Capitol Pipe, dated January 6, 1976, in-dicated that 12 3/4' OD x S 80 ASME SA 333 Grade 6 pipes with heat Nos. 152758, A03480 and 152744 conforming to ASME Code Section III (1974 Edition, including 24 l

e s

addenda through Summer 1974) and ASME Section III (1974 Edition, including addenda through Summer 1974) for class

, MC materials. .U.S. Steel Corporation >

certified that 12.75" OD pipe, wall thickness 0.688 with heat No. A03480 conformed to ASME SA 333 had been supplied. The~ minimum average value of the impact tests was above 20, foot. pounds.

3.4.5.1.2-CVN, QC No. 77,,(E-225), NNI-035,

~

Assembly 93.7. .

Capitol Pipe had-provided the Certifi-cate of Compliance for the pipe supplied by Armco Steel Corporation. Armco furnished the Material Test Certificates for heat __Nos. 134872 and 134879. The physical and chemical test results met the applicable requirements. The impact test values for heat number 134872 did not meet the requirements when erroneously tested at -50*F. However,s Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory repeated -

the impact tests at the correct tempera-ture of 0*F and the test results'were acceptable.

The average impact test values for heat number 134879 were below the specified 20 foot pounds. This condition was l centrary to the follow'ing: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Specification SP-660-4549-00, Paragraph 3:06.6 which states in part: ."All sleeves shall be impact tested in accordance with the requirements of ASTM E 23-72. The minimum average value of the specimens shall be 20 foot pounds with no more than one specimen below 15 foot pounds ,

in which case the other two specimen shall absorb at least 20 foot pounds.

The test temperature shall be the same as used for the containment vessel plate."

3.4.5.2 At the NRC inspector's request, CEI audited the vendor's documentation on the CVNs. The inspec-tors reviewed the CEI audit and determined all sleeves were impact tested and met.the require-ments. The audit concluded that the sleeve with l 25

-r, the heat number 134879 had not been delivered to the Perry site.

3.4.5.3 At the RIII inspectors request, CEI performed an audit of the vendor documentation for the sleeve assemblies embedded in the shieldwall. A typical sleeve assembly consisted of a seamless pipe welded to a plate as shown in GAI Drawings S-422-012 and S-422-001. The sleeves were supplied by Pittsburgh Bridge and Iron (PBI). CEI Audit Report No. 637 indicated the audit was performed ~on -

December 8 and 9, 1981. The documentation package, identified as MR No. 1539, PBI shipment No. 30,

, was verified against the requirements of the relevant CEI Specification (No. SP-667, Procurement Specification'for Miscellaneous Embedded Steel) which required the material to conform to ASTM A-36 and A-53. The inspectors reviewed a typical test report supplied by Youngstown Sheet and Steel.

The Mill Certificate, including additional certification, confirmed the plate conformed to ASTM A-36-51. The certificate on a 12" diameter pipe, 2' 11 7/8" long, with heat Nos. 27510 and 31562 confirmed that the material conformed to ASTM A-53.

3.4.5.4 The RIII inspectors requested CEI to audit the welding records of Pullman Power Products (PPP),

as PPP had welded the electrical penet' rations to the CVN. The audit was performed to ascertain how mis =

matches between the CVN and the penetrations were

( corrected. The question of the mismatches arose from the CVN diameters documented in the five field questions identified in Paragraph 3.4.2.5 of this

report. A review of the dimensions on the field

{ questions indicated they were not within the toler ,

ances of ASTM A-333. Subsequent discussions with i L. K. Comstock craft workers, who had documented the dimensions, indicated accurate measurements had not been made. The CEI audit, dated December 3, 1981, concluded that the fit-up requirement of 1/8" t1/32" and the PPP weld procedure, SPS IT-12A, were not violated. RIII personnel concurred with the CEI audit findings.

3.4.5.5 The following information was obtained frem a review of the typical weld history sheet for penetration No. 1R71-S027:

PPP Veld Procedure Specification (WPS) 1T-12A was used to weld the penetration to the CVN.

26 l

,/

11 / s

s J .

, . ., v

) ,1 ,_ i

, // '

/

/

^

r -) ,

s Bare wire E-70S-2 was used for th'e root pass./'

E-7028 typs electrode was usef for the' veld. '

I

s. .', ,

Inspections were performed at;, :h'e identified. " held points." +

{/ , ;l' '

// !; ' ' ':

LiquidpenetrantandultraEonin# testr)sers p,er-formed on the completed weld. / Tast racords'wdre!

available.  !

/ ,

__ 1 ,

-t Material' req'uisition records'on ths'wel'd roi *

withdrawals were availab,la. i' ,

The material certifications on t'he gurchased =-

. material (i.e., CVNs, arbedded sleeves) and in- f '

spection records of the welding performed did not indicate the nonconforning conditi' ens, concerning '/

the CVN diameters described in the Field _ Questions. I.

3.4.5.6 The CEI Manager of Nuclear Quality Assurmice

, /, ,

stated a suitable explanation will.be attached to /

the " Field Questions" to reflect, the interptsta- /

tions and to update the QA records _vith pertinent ,

information contained in the Field Questions. '

This matter will be reviewed further and is con- J sidered unresolved. (440/81-19-06; 441/81-19-06) 3.5 Conduit Installed Disregarding Design Location ',

3.5.1 A11e2ation L. K. Comstock conduit installation procedures allowed the installation crews to relocate conduit 12" vertically /

horizontally from the design location to allow for physical .

obstructions. The procedure also permitted a variation of 12" from the design location to allow for physical obstructions. Many conduits have been installed without l

regard for the design location and the 12" variance for 1

obstructions was claimed as the reason for moving the conduit from the design location. One such instance was Conduit No. 1R33C4226B.

3.5.2 Findings l

3.5.2.1 Drawing No. 04-4549-SS-215-011, Sheet 1, Revision C, Electrical Tolerance for Avoiding Interferences During Conduit Installation, dated September 1, 1981, was reviewed. Note 1 of this drawing stated in part, "A horizontal and vertical installation tolerance of il2 inches for conduit. . .

may be used to avoid physical interferences with installed equipment and supports. . .The tolerance 27

l may be used at the contractor's discretion.to install offsets in the conduit plan." Note 2 of the drawing provides, in part..." Installation tolerance for conduit runs supported from engineer designed conduit support hangers shall be i2 inches horizontal and vertical for the GAI (Gilbert Associates, Inc.) designed supports."

3.5.2.2 L. K. Comstock Audit Finding Report No. 816, dated August 4,1981, was reviewed.. A Punchlist attached to this Audit Finding Report indicated Conduit No. 1R32C4226B was "2-3/4" west of CC/2 not 6" west of CC/2 as the DWG shows. . . conduit moved to miss physical obstruction." Audit Finding Report No. 816 was still open as of December 10,1981.

3.5.3.3 On December 10, 1981, RIII personnel inspected Conduit No. 1R33C4226B (located above the 679' elevation of the Control Complex) and reviewed Drawing No. 04-459-SS-215-162, Sheet 501, Revision A, Conduit Layout Control Complex West -

Elevation 679'6". The conduit was installed within the allowed tolerance to circumvent a physical obstruction and was in accordance with the drawing specifications, including the tolerances permitted.

3.6 Storage of Motor Control Centers 3.6.1 Allegation l

l The Field Storage Maintenance Requirements required motor control centers to be stored indoors and within a tempera-ture range of 40*F to 140*F. During the Surmer 1981, the motor control center heat strips remained energized and the temperature range was exceeded, l A Nonconformance Report was written on this matter.

l However, all temperature readings for the Nonconformance l Report had been taken in ambient air within 7" of the heat l strip and these temperature readings did not represent an "as-is" condition.

I 3.6.2 Findings 3.6.2.1 CEI Nonconformance Report No. CQC-2290, dated June 9, 1981, was reviewed. The description of the nonconformance was "MCC's listed on the MPL attachment are in violation of uniform heat and temperature control for Level B equipment i

storage..." " Improper storage" was given as the l cause of the nonconformance. The proposed dis-28 l

position of the nonconformance was, "the space i heaters shall be de-energized until September 15, i

1981. At such time a determination shall be made to see if the building climate control system is adequate to discontinue the use of space heaters."

On July 28, 1981, this Nonconformance Report was reviewed by the CEI Electrical Quality Engincer, who commented, " Building heat is currently being maintained in the area that the equipment is

! stored between 40*-140*F. Place NR in long term file until September 15. At that time submit Revision 1 of NR for ENG to review whether heat can be left off." On September 15, 1981, Noncon- '

l formance Report No. CQC-2290 was revised to read,

"...Re-issued because (1) no evaluation was made on MCC's as to possible damage from temperature; (2) since compartment temperatures vary, does

. the 40'F to 140*F limit apply to all locations inside MCC's? (i.e., can temperature right on or above heat strip exceed 140*F7)..." As of December 1, 1981, Nonconformance Report No. CQC-2290 was still open and a review by the Quality Engineer remained to be done.

3.6.2.2 On December 1, 1981, the CEI Quality Control Inspector authoring Nonconformance Report No. CQC-2290 advised the temperatures were taken at these locations within the motor control centers. Metal contact thermometers were placed at the top, the center, and near the heat strips inside the control centers. The motor control center doors were closed, the heat strips energized, and the centers were covered with tarpaulins to simulate the "as stored" condition.

Temperature readings were taken after a three hour interval. Of the five motor control centers involved, only one had temperatures within the 40*F to 140*F range. The temperature range of three motor control centers was exceeded at the l

thermometer located nearest the energized heat

( strip. The temperature range was not exceeded at the other thermometer locations within these control centers. The remaining motor control center had temperatures exceeding the prescribed range at all thermometer locations. This matter is considered unresolved. (440/81-19-07;

, 441/81-19-07) l

4. Preparation of Nonconformance Reports

! 4.1 Former Quality Inspectors Alleged they had been Prevented from

Preparing Nonconformance Reports I

I 29 l .

t .. ._.

4.1.1 On December 9, 1981, Individual C, an Electrical Quality Control Inspector previously employed by Kaiser Engineers, Inc. , provided the following information:

From approximately June 1979 until November 1980 his primary function was to perform electrical inspections of the L. K. Comstock Company. During April or May 1980 his supervisor, Steve Halpin, told him to stop writing Noncon-formance Reports involving the Comstock Company, as "Comstock was going under." When Individual C questioned Halpin about this decision, Halpin stated he "was up against a wall" and "it was a political decision." Individual C assumed the decision to not write Nonconformance Reports was

! made by either Stu Tulk or Bill Kacer, supervisors in the Quality Engineering Section, and this decision was given to Halpin by them. Individual C said two other electrical inspectors, Individuals D and E, were also told not to write Nonconformance Reports involving the Comstock Company.

Individual C stated that the instruction to stop writing Nonconformance Reports adversely affected his work perform-ance and led to his decision to terminate his employment with Kaiser Engineers.

4.1.2 On January 11-12, 1982, Individuals D and E were inter-viewed and provided essentially the same information as Individual C. Individual D was employed by Kaiser Engineers during the period February - November 1980, and Individual E was employed from December 1979 until June 1980.

4.2 Findings

4.2.1 Interview of Lead Electrical Quality Control Inspector On January 14, 1982, Steven H. Halpin, Lead Electrical Operations Control Inspector, provided the following l

- information:

During the period July 1979 - November 1980, he was the Lead l

Electrical Construction Quality Control Inspector and the supervisor of Individuals C, D, and E. He described In-dividuals C and D as good inspectors and Individual E as lazy (i.e., Individual E submitted only one Daily Inspection Report in the six months Individual E was employed at the Perry site). All three individuals had prior experience as "first line" quality control inspectors; however, each of the three were having difficulty adjusting to "second line,"

or performance surveillance inspections of a contractor.

He stated he never told anyone, including Individuals C, D, and E not to write Nonconformance Reports. He felt Individuals C, D and E had misunderstood the site policy to have the contractor (i.e., L. K. Comstock) write the Noncon-30 l

l

formance Reports on the contractor's problems, rather than having the Project Organization (CEI, Gilbert Associates, or Kaiser) prepare Nonconformance Reports for the contractor.

Halpin indicated the L. K. Comstock Company started install-ing safety-related conduits during the first half of 1980.

At that time the L. K. Comstock procedure specified a Nonconformance Report would be prepared after the conduit had been fully installed and their procedure did not allow for the preparation of a Nonconformance Report during the installation process. The Comstock procedure was later changed to allow the preparation of a Nonconformance Report -

while a conduit was being installed.

Halpin believed the reason the L. K. Comstock Company did j not prepare Nonconformance Reports during conduit installa-tion was the lack of sufficient numbers of qualified quality control inspectors. Comstock eventually hired additional inspectors after CEI placed " pressure" on Comstock. He believed the pressure to hire additional personnel was the

" political pressure" to which Individuals C, D, and E had referred.

He indicated he was never under pressure from Stuart Tulk,

' the Lead Electrical Quality Engineer, in either his job performance or decision making process.

Additionally, Halpin provided a signed sworn statement (Exhibit VII).

4.2.2 Interview of Lead Electrical Quality Engineer On January 13 and 14, 1982, Stuart P. Tulk, CEI's lead Electrical Quality Engineer, provided the following information:

Tulk stated he has never told anyone, including Individuals C, l

D, or E not to write Nonconformance Reports. He indicated his personal philosophy was to allow anyone working on the Perry site to prepare Nonconformance Reports. This philo-sophy was stated in Project Adminstration Procedure No. 1502, Project Nonconformance Control, Paragarph 1.2, Responsibilities and Requirements: "All Project Organiza-tion personnel shall have the authority to identify a nonconformance condition and report the nonconforming condition to their immediate supervisor by initiating an NR (Nonconformance Report)."

Steven Halpin never worked for him. Rather, Halpin was his point-of contact with the Kaiser electrical quality control inspectors. Halpin and he mutually agreed to foster a good working relationship, as there had been friction between 31

t their predecessors in quality control. He did not have direct contact with Individuals C, D, or E, as his interface with the Kaiser employees was Halpin.

He recalled Halpin had difficulties with Individual C over the submission of Daily Inspection Reports. Tulk recalled that each of the Individuals (C, D, and E) felt that Halpin was not qualified for his position; also, none of the three individuals particularly liked him (Tulk). .

Tulk provided a signed, sworn statement (Exhibit VIII).

4.2.3 Interview of former General Supervising Engineer l

l On January 22, 1982, William J. Kacer, former General Supervising Engineer, provided the following information:

He never told anyone, including Individuals C, D, or E not to write Nonconformance Reports. The Perry site policy allowed anyone on the site to prepare a Nonconformance Report, and to cease writing Nonconformance Reports would I

be a violation of the policy.

Kacer provided a signed, sworn statement (Exhibit IX).

4.2.4 Interview of Kaiser's Project Quality Assurance Manager On January 14, 1982, Patrick L. Gibson, the Project Qualit'y Assurance Manager for Kaiser Engineers, Inc. , provided the following information:

He has been employed at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant con-struction site since May 3,1976. In January 1979 he was appointed quality Assurance Manager.

On June 16, 1980, Individual E resigned. In his letter of resignation, Individual E wrote to Gibson and complained about Halpin's qualifications as a supervisor, Halpin's

" instructions to bypass procedures," and other matters within the Quality Control Program. Gibson conducted an investigation into Individual E's concerns and documented the results in a memorandum dated June 19, 1980 (Exhibit X).

Gibson did not find any substance to Individual E's allega-

! tions. (These areas were later reviewed and found to be acceptable by the NRC Resident Inspector at the Perry site and documented in IE Inspeciton Reports No. 50-440/80-16; 50-441/80-15, and 50-440/80-25; 50-441/80-23.) Gibson noted Individual E had not raised any issues or concerns with the Quality Control program while still employed at the Perry site. It was not until Individual E resigned that Individual E voiced any concerns.

32

Individuals C and D were interviewed by Gibson during the course of Gibson's inquiry into Individual E's concerns.

During these interviews neither Individual C nor Individual D identified any problems with the Quality Control Program.

All three Individuals had prior "first line" inspection experience before starting work at the Perry site. All three were good first line inspectors. However, all three had difficulty in adjusting to their positions as "second line" inspectors where they inspected a contractor's program performance and not the contractor's hardware. Second line inspection included helping a contractor implement the contractor's Quality Control Program by pointing out noncon-for2ing conditions to the contractor and having the contractor prepare the Nonconformance Report. In the instance where the contracto'r refused to acknowledge a nonconforming condition, the second line inspectors (Individuals C, D, and E) were to prepare the Nonconformance Report.

Individuals C, D, and E felt they should write Nonconformance Reports as soon as they identified a problem, using their Nonconformance Report to notify the contractor; rather than identifying the nonconforming condition to the contractor and having the contractor's quality control section prepare a Nonconformanc s Report. They were told on numerous occasions to pursue a nonconformance through the contractor's quality control program, rather than writing their own Nonconformance Reports.

Gilson considered Halpin to be a poor supervisor. Halpin would give incomplete directions to his subordinates by not explaining problems or his decisions in sufficient depth.

Other times he would not back his employees in their decisions. Therefore, the subordinates did not have faith in Halpin, as the people were not sura that Halpin would follow a problem through to its resulution. Similarly, Halpin thought Individuals C, D, and E were " knit-pickers."

Gibson considered the problems between Halpin and Individ-uals C, D, and E to be " people problems" caused by " lack of communication." In retrospect Gibson felt Halpin and the three Individuals were correct in their evaluation of each other (Halpin saw the Individuals as " knit pickers" and the individuals saw Halpin as a poor supervisor).

Gibson stated Halpin never worked for Tulk. In fact, many arguments occurred between Tulk and Halpin and Tulk and Gibson. These arguments were philosophical in nature over the manner in which things were to be accomplished. The arguments never involved questioning the technical compe-tence of the other party or the other party's technical decision in a matter.

33 l

l

Each of the three people interviewed, separately described Individual E as "not being satisfied with anything," "a habitual complainer," or " lazy." One person interviewed recalled Individual E never wrote any Nonconformance Reports, Action Requests, or Daily Surveillance Inspection Reports during the entire period of Individual E's employment at the Perry site.

Neither Individual C, D, nor E ever told any of the three former co-workers that they (Individuals C, D, or E) had been instructed not to write Nonconformance Reports or any other type of inspection document. The three former co-workers were never told they (the former co-workers) could not identify and document nonconformance conditions.

4.2.5 Interview of Former Co-Workers of Individuals C,'D, and E On January 13-14, 1982, three Kaiser employees who were co-workers of Individuals C, D, and E at the Perry site were interviewed.

All three had heard the Individuals express displeasure with the "use-as-is" disposition on many of the Individuals' Noncomformance Reports. The Individuals felt Halpin and Gibson were not supportive of their efforts. Each of the individuals has personality clashes with Tulk.

Each of the three people interviewed felt Individuals C, D, and E had not made a transition from "first line" to "second line" inspections. Individuals C, D, and E felt i they should write Nonconformance Reports on each item l (i.e., loose screws). The three people interviewed l considered the writing of Nonconformance Reports on separate items as a first line inspection activity, rather than identifying nonconformance trends which was a second line or " surveillance" inspection ~ activity.

One person interviewed specifically recalled Individual C was frustrated with having to identify a problem to L. K. Comstock in order to have Comstock document the nonconformance. Individual C felt he should write the Nonconformance Report and the report serve as the notice of Comstock instead of telling Comstock Quality Control l of the problem.

The three interviewees felt Individuals C and D vere excellent inspectors, but were not able to differentiate between first line and surveillance inspections.

Each of the three people interviewed, separately described Individual E as "not being satisfied with anything," a habitual complainer, " lazy." One person interviewed 34

recalled Individual E never wrote any Nonconformance Reports, Action Requests, or Daily Surveillance Inspection Reports during the entire period of Individual E's employment at the Perry site.

Neither Individual C, D, not E ever told any of the three former co-workers that they (Individuals C, D, or E) had been instructed not to write Nonconformance Reports or any other type of inspection document. The three former co-workers were never told they (the former co-workers) could not identify and document nonconformance conditions.

4.2.6 Review of CEI Quality Assurance Procedures A review of applicable CEI. Quality Assurance Procedures disclosed:

4.2.6.1 Construction Quality Section Procedures (CQSP)

No. 1001, Surveillance / Inspection Activities.

Revision 1, dated January 12, 1979, was the procedure in effect at the time Individuals C, D, and E alleged they were told not to write Nonconformance Reports. Paragraph 53 of that procedure stated:

" Documentation of Noncompliance Items" "Each noncompliance item noted shall be discussed with the contractor's QA/QC personnel and efforts

shall be made to have the contractor's QA/QC personnel document the nonconforming item and take

! the appropriate action in accordance with the contractor's QA/QC program. This should be noted on the daily surveillance / inspection report.

"Noncompliances shall be documented by the Quality Control Inspector in accordance with the type, magnitude and criticality of the item and will consist of one or more of the following:

"Nonconformance Reports (NR's) will be used to document items of noncompliance associated with the hardware, i.e., components / structures (per CQSP 1501) when the contractor refuses to issue a Nonconformance Report in accordance with his i QA/QC Program.

" Action Request (AR) will be used to document items of noncompliance associated with software, 35 i

in accordance with CQSP 1603 i.e., programmatic QA/QC systamatic and inadequate contractor inspection performance.

" Corrective Action Requests (CAR) are initiated in accordance with CQSP 1601 when specific deviations or nonconformances, if not corrected, could have a major impact on quality and other controlling measures which have proven to be ineffective."

4.2.6.2 CEI's Corporate Nuclear Quality Assurance Program l Project Administratica Procedure No. 2-1001,

( Surveillance / Inspection Activities, Revision 2, was issued on August 1, 1980. Paragraph 1.2 of Revision 2 superseded Paragraph 5.3 of Revision 1 of the Procedure (reviewed in the preceeding paragraph). Paragraph 1.2 of Revision 2 to CEI Procedure No. 2-1001 stated in part:

" Documentation of Nonconforming Items

" Inspector Quality Control. Discuss each noted item of nonconformance with the contractor's Quality Assurance / Quality Control personnel.

Make an effort to have the contractor's Quality Assurance / Quality Control personnel document the nonconforming item and take the appropriate action in accordance with the contractor's Quality Assurance / Quality Control Program. Note this on the Daily Surveillance / Inspection Report (DSIR)

(Attachment 1).

"If the above does not provide acceptable correc-tive action, document nonconformances in accordance with the type, magnitude, and criticality of the item consisting of one or more of the following:

"Use Nonconformance Reports (NR's) to document items

! of noncompliance associated with hardware, i.e.,

l components / structures, when the contractor refuses to issue a Nonconformance Report in accordance with the contractor's Quality Assurance / Quality Control Program.

"Use Action Requests (AR's) to dacument items of noncompliance associated with software, i.e.,

programmatic, QA/QC systematic and inadequate contractor inspection performance."

4.2.6.3 The current edition (Revision 4, dated November 16, 1981) of Procedure No. 2-1001 states in part:

1 36

4 "1.2.6 Identification and Documentation of Nonconformaing Items or Conditions" "Each contractor (safety-related) is respcnsible for reporting nonconformances in accordance with his quality program requirements and quality level specification attachments.

", Surveillance Inspector - When nonconforming condi-tions are observed during surveillance / inspections, discuss the condition with the contractor's QA/QC personnel. An effort should be made to have the

• contractor initiate a nonconformance report.

"If the nonconforming condition is not documented by the contractor or if the nonconforming condition cannot be traced to a particular contractor, the Surveillance Inspector will write a nonconformance report in accordance with Project A! ministration Procedure 1502. (Project Nonconformance Control)

If a contractor is habitually negligent in docu-menting nonconforming conditions, the Surveillance Inspector or Quality Engineer will issue an Action Request (AR) in accordance with Construction Quality Assurance Procedure."

4.2.7 Nonconformance Reports and Action Requests Trends Nonconformance Reports and Action Requests written against electrical installations at the Perry site for the period June 1, 1979, through December 31, 1980 (the period of Individual C's, D's and E's employ) were reviewed. The Action Requests and Nonconformance Reports covered five CEI specifications:

Specification Specification Number Title 033 Specification for Electrical Installations 097 Specification for Installation of Control Room Panels 552 Procurement of 4.16KV Switchgear 557 Procurement of Motor Control Centers 591 Procurement of Power Generation Control Centers l A review of Nonconformance Reports and Action Requests for

! these specifications for the period June 1, 1979, through December 31, 1980, is shown in Table 1.

l 37 l

l l

Iable 1 Review of Nonconformance Reports and Action Requests for the period June 1, 1979 through December 31,.1980 disclosed: -

Total Reports Reports Written Total No. or Reports Spec. Reports Written By By CEI Electrical Written By gumber Written Cont racto r Aa l i ty Cont ro l lod. C Ind. D Ind. E (Nonconformance 033 415 406 9 3 3 None Reports) 097 22 22 0 0 0 None 552 34 6 28 0 1 None 557 8 0 8 0 0 None

$91 jfj l W1 235 71 2Q None (TOTAL) 826 546 280 74 24 (Action Requests) O'3 173 N/A 173 8 4 None 097 44 N/A 44 2 0 None 552 None 557 None 591 Mone (TOTAL) 217 217 10 7 (NOTE: Action Requests are written on contractor's Performance b therorore, the number of Action Requests written by Contractor was marked "Not Applicable"y (N/A) CEI personnel; in the above table.)

4.2.7.1 Individual C wrote 74 Nonconformance Reports and ten Action Requests during his period of employ-ment, June 1979 - November 1980. The distribution of the reports was:

Number of Number of Nonconformance Action Month Reports Written Requests Written October 1979 0 1 November 1 December 0 2

{ January 1980 0 2 February 1 0 June -3 1 July 2 0 August 67 1 September 1 2 74 10 4.2.7.2 Individual D wrote 24 Nonconformance Reports and four Action Requests during his period of employ-ment, February - November 1980. The distribution of these reports was:

Number of Number of Noncenformance Action Month Reports Written Requests Written March 1 1 May 1 1 Jue 0 1 July 1 0 i

August 20 1 November 1 0 24 4 (The Nonconformance Reports written in August 1980 l by Individuals C and D dealt with the receipt and

! installation of Power Generation Control Centers (PGCC) which began that month. Normal receipt inspection in the warehouse was waived, as the PGCCs were delivered directly to the installation site at which point the receipt inspection was conducted.)

I 4.2.7.3 From the review of the above information it did not appear that either Individual C or Individual D stopped writing Nonconformance Reports or Action Requests after April or June 1980. (The time at l which they alleged they were told not to write Nonconformance Reports.) Individual E did not l

l 38

prepare any Nonconformance Reports or Action Requests during the entire period of his employ-ment (December 1979 - June 1980) at the Perry site.

4.2.8 Findings and Conclusions From the information gathered through interviews it appears Individuals C, D and E had a personality conflict with their supervisor. The information provided by former co-workers indicated CEI's philosophy was to have the contractors pre-pare Nonconformance Reports rather than the "second line" or

~

" surveillance" inspectors (Individuals C, D and E). Also, Individuals C, D, or E never told their former co-workers that they (the Individuals) had been told not to write Non-

! conformance Reports. The review of the Nonconformance i

Reports and Action Requests written by Individuals C and D did not indicate a trend from which it could be deduced that Individuals C and D stopped writing Nonconformance Reports.

The review of Nonconformance Reports and Action Requests ahowed Individual E did not write any reports during the period of Individual E's employment. This trend of Individual E's was also indicated in the. interview of '

former co-workers.

No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified.

4.3 Current Quality Control Inspector Alleged Nonconformance Reports Were Not Prepared 4.3.1 A11enations On February 1, 1982, Individual F contacted Region III.

Individual F advised he was a Quality Control' Inspector and was aware of several specific instances where inspectors had been prevented from writing Nonconformance Reports. The specific instances identified by Individual F are as follows:

(1) During December 1981, Individual F identified a problem involving the safekeeping of security related drawings in the possession of the L. K. Comstock Company.

Individual F stated he was told not to write a Noncon-formance Report on this matter by Gary Leidich, CEI's j Quality Engineering Supervisor.

(2) Individual F stated his supervisor, Stuart Tulk, had prevented Individual D from preparing a Nonconformance Report on the leveling and shimming of Motor Control Centers and switchgear.

39

(3) In July 1981, Quality Engineering Inspector Terry Metcalf was prevented by Tulk from preparing a Nonconformance Report on the welding and shimming of Motor Control Centers, Unit Substations and switchgear.

(4) Tulk had prevented Quality Engineering Inspector Max Roe from writing a Nonconformance Report in February 1982 for the overtensioning of a cable during a ductbank cable pull.

(5) During February 1982, Tulk told Quality Engineering Inspector Bob Peters not to write a Nonconformance Report on Comstock's failure to include the identity and calibration date of crimping tools on cable termination inspection records.

(6) Individual F also stated that Wendell Gilbert, an Area Manager for the L. K. Comstock Company, would not allow his employees (craft workers) to identify nonconforming conditions and write Nonconformance Reperts.

4.3.2 Uncontrolled Security Documents / Drawings 4.3.2.1 Interview of Individual F On February 1,1982, Individual F provided the following information:

On December 11, 1981, Individual F observed the L. K. Comstock security cabinets were unlocked and unattended. Individual F opened a cabinet, removed several documents and walked away from the area.

Individual F later returned the documents and notified his supervisor, Tulk, of the incident.

On December 18, 1981, Individual F observed an uncontrolled and unlocked file of security drawings was being maintained in the L. K. Comstock fore-men's shack on the 620' elevation of the Unit 2 Turbine Building. This incident was also reported to Individual F's supervisors. Individual F was told by the CEI supervising Quality Engineer, l Gary Leidich, that a Nonconformance Report should j not be written on this matter.

l 4.3.2.2 Interviews of Supervising of Quality Engineers 4.3.2.2.1 Attempts to Interview Supervising Quality Engineer Several attempts to interview l

Gary R. Leidich, CEI's supervising Quality Engineer, were made without success during the pei-iod February 1 -

40 l

March 19, 1982, as Leidich was either offsite or otherwise not available for interview. No additional attempts to interview Leidich were made as Leidich's signature on Corrective Action Request 81-10 indicated Leidich allowed Indivi-dual F to document the problem (Paragraph 4.3.2.3).

4.3.2.2.2 Interview of Lead Electrical Quality Engineer On March 18-19, 1982, Stuart P. Tulk, Lead Electrical Quality Engineer was interviewed. Tulk stated he was Individual F's supervisor from August 3, 1981 until January 2, 1982. During that time Tulk never told any inspector, including Individual F, to not write Non-conformance Reports. Tulk provided a written statement (Exhibit XI).

4.3.2.3 Review of CEI's Actions Individual F recorded the observation of the unlocked security container on Surveillance Inspection Report No. SE-868, dated December 11, 1981 As a result of the Surveillance Inspection Report, CEI issued Action Request No. 370 on December 16, 1981. The Action Request was followed by CEI's Corrective Actioa Request No. 81-10 on December 18, 1982. Both the Action Request and the Corrective Action Request were answered by the L. K. Comstock Company on March 18, 1982.

Action Request No. 370 was reviewed by Tulk.

Corrective Action Request No. 81-10 had the signatures of both Tulk and Leidich.

4.3.2.4 Review of CEI Procedures 4.3.2.4.1 CEI Corporate Nuclear Quality Assurance, Procedure No. 2-1603, Action Requests,

(

states in part:

"1.2 Responsibilities and Procedure Action Requesta (AR's) are used to document items of noncompliance that are software (Programmatic /QA/QC/

l Systematic) related.

l 41 ,

I 1

1

i l

1.2.1 Action Request Preparation ,

I ARs may be generated as a result of audit, surveil-lance / inspection or observation."

4.3.2.4.2 CEI Corporate Nuclear Quality Assurance Procedure No. 2-1001, Surveillance /In-

.spection Activities, states in part:

"1.2.7 Documenting Program Violaitons Quality Use Action Requests Engineer / (AR's) to document Surveil- activities in non-lance compliance associated with software, i.e.,

procedural violations or inadequate inspec-tion performance.

Inspector Initiate a Corrective Action Request (CAR) when specific deviations or noncon-formances, if not corrected, could have a major impact on quality and other controlling measures have been proven ineffective."

4.3.2.5 Findings and Conclusions After reviewing CEI Corporate Nuclear Quality Assurance Procedures No. 1-2001 and No. 1-2603, it appears the preparation of the Action Request and the Corrective Action Request was correct and the issuance of a Nonconformance Report in the matter of the security documents / drawings was not

! necessary. Further, the signatures of Tulk and l Leidich on the Corrective Action Request and Tulk's signature on the Action Request indicate Individual F's supervision did not prevent Individual F from identifying and recording a condition adverse to quality.

No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified.

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l 4.3.3 Shimming of Switchgear and Motor Control Centers j 4.3.3.1 Interview of Individual F I

During an interview on February 1,1982, )

Individual F stated the L. K. Comstock Company had installed motor control centers and switchgear with shims to level the equipment. Individual F stated he had reported this condition to his supervisor, Stuart Tulk, and Tulk had told Individual F not to write a Nonconformance Report on this problem.

4.3.3.2 Interview of Lead Electrical Quality Engineer On March 18-19, 1982, Stuart P. Tulk, Lead Electrical Quality Engineer, was interviewed and provided the following information:

The problem of leveling switchgear and motor control centers was caused by a difference in the requirements of two specifications. The electrical specification stated the concrete base for the equipment should not slope more than 1/8" in 10 feet; however, the specification for the concrete allowed a much greater slope. Several Field Questions were prepared and forwarded to the Project Engineer in order to clarify the discrepancies between the electrical installation and the concrete specifications. The Field Questions have not been answered.

Tulk stated he never told Individual F to not write a Nonconformance Report concerning the leveling of the switchgear and motor control centers. Rather, use the Field Questions to address the differences between the two specifi-cations. This would allow the Project Engineers to determine which of the two specifications was correct. If the engineers determined the switch-gear and motor control centers were improperly installed a Nonconformance Report would be witten at that time.

Tulk stated he was Individual F's supervisor from August 3, 1981, until January 2, 1982. Tulk stated he never told Individual F, or any other Quality Control Inspector, not to write Nonconformance Reports. Tulk provided a written statement (Exhibit XI).

43

l 4.3.3.3 Interview of Electrical Design Engineer On March 19, 1982, Tom B. Stear, Electrical Design Engineer, was interviewed. Stear advised L. K. Comstock had authored three Field Questions dealing with the leveling and alignment of the switchgear and motor control centers. The Field Questions were still open and disposition had not been proposed. The engineering staff was still

. gathering information dealing with the equipment manufacturer's installation criteria and recom-mendations, the differences between the electrical installation and concrete specifications, and the welding requirements.

4.3.3.4 Region III Inspection of Installed Switchgear and Motor Control Centers The installation, including shims, welding, and inspection of 4.16KV Switchgear, 480 volt motor control centers, and 480 volt unit transformer substations, was examined in the course of the Region III inspection of this equipment. This inspection was conducted during the week of January 5-7, 1982 and is documented in Para-graphs 6.9 - 6.11 of this report. The inspection of this equipment resulted in several instances of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X.

4.3.3.5 Findings and Conclusions The L. K, Comstock Company wrote Field Questions to the Project Engineers to address the problem of leveling and aligning .the switchgear and motor control centers. The Field Questions concerned the different allowances for the slope of the equipment bases provided in the CEI specification for concrete and the specification for electrical installations. Individual F's supervisor, Tulk, stated he never told Individual F not to write a Nonconformance Report. Rather, Talk desired the Field Questions be used to allow the engineers to determine if a nonconforming condition existed due to the equipment manufacturer's installation criteria and the differences in the slope permitted by the electrical installation specification and the concrete specification.

Region III reviewed the installation of the motor control centers, switchgear, and unit transformer 1

44 l I

l

substations, including the use of shims to level this equipment, and identified noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, in the instal-lation process. (Paragraphs 6.9-6.11 of chis report) 4.3.4 Welding and Shimming Inspections of Switchgear 4.3.4.1 Interview of Individual F During the interview of Individual F on February 1, 1982, Individual F stated he had asked -

Terry Metcalf, a Mechanical Quality Inspector, to assist in the inspection of the shimming of switchgear and motor control centers. Metcalf was more aware of the requirements of the American Welding Society codes than Individual F, as Individual F was an electrical inspector and Metcalf was a welding inspector. Metcalf inspected switchgear and motor control centers in the Emergency Service Water Pumphouse and the Control Complex and found numerous deficiencies in the shimming of this equipment. Metcalf prepared a Nonconformance Report, but Tulk would not allow the report to be processed.

Individual F provided the original, one yellow copy and one pink colored copy of Metcalf's Non-conformance Report. (Individual F did not provide any attachments with this Nonconformance Report.)

4.3.4.2 Review of Nonconformance Report The Nonconformance Report, provided by Individual F, j

was reviewed. The Report Number contained the letters "CQC," but'did not include any numbers.

The " Item Nwe" was " slot weld," and the " Item Identification Number" was listed as "MCC/R24 System." The number 29 was entered under the

" Quantity" heading. The report list'ed " Issued By" as "T. B. Metcalf (TBM), KEI CQC Mechanical," and was dated July 30, 1981. The " Description of the Nonconformance" was given as, "See Attachment per ECN 3484-33-449 on the requirements of leveling j

and shimming MCC's, unit-substations, and switch-t gears. Present installed shims are violating A.W.S. D.1.1-1975 2.8.4." There was no attach-ment. " Failure to conform to A.W.S. Code.

I A.W.S. D.1.1-1975 2.8.4," was listed as the "Cause of the Nonconformance."

l 45

The preprinted " Copy Distribution" at the end of the Nonconformance Report form indicated, "1-Docu-ment Center; 2-Follow up; 3-Originator."

4.3.4.3 Interview of Mechanical Quality Control Inspector On March 18, 1982, Terry B. Metcalf, Construction Quality Engineering Inspector-Mechanical, was interviewed. Metcalf was shown the Nonconformance Report described.in the proceeding paragraph, and he provided the following information after reviewing the Nonconformance Report: .

During the summer of 1981, someone (possibly Kevin Cimorelli or Individual F) from the electrical inspection group asked him (Metcalf) to inspect the welds in various items of electrical equipment.

The person from the electrical group explained their expertise was electrical and they needed assistance in examining welds. Metcalf advised the person from the electrical group that he did not have sufficient time to gather all the back-ground material for such inspections, but if that i person would collect the applicable procedures and drawings then Metcalf could give a limited i

amount of assistance.

While waiting for the background material to be delivered, Metcalf prepared the Nonconformance Report, described in the preceeding paragraph.

The handwritten Nonconformance Report was meant as a " draft" report and was prepared to save time.

Had he found nonconforming conditions, then all he had to add was the identity of the specific piece of equipment with a nonconforming condition. He o

realized the draft rep'rt should have been marked "For Information Only" to preclude a problem, such as the matter under investigation. Metcalf thought he gave the " draft" Nonconformance Report to Cimore111.

He inspected two pieces of switchgear (specifics not recalled) on the 620' elevation of the Control Complex, and he found all the welds were acceptable.

He did not perform any additional inspection of the switchgear or motor control centers, as the person from the electrical inspection group never returned with the applicable procedures and drawings.

I 1

46

Metcalf stated the handwritten nonconformance Report was never intended to be issued, since all Nonconformance Reports are typewritten. He has never been prevented from writing a Nonconformance Report, and Stuart Tulk has never told him that he could not write a Nonconformance Report.

4.3.4.4 Interview of Electrical Quality Control Inspector On March 18, 1982, Kevin Cimorelli, Electrical Quality Control Inspector, was interviewed.

Cimorelli recalled speaking to Metcalf about assisting the electrical inspection group with the inspection of switchgear welds. Cimorelli could not recall if Metcalf did assist or the outcome of Metcalf's inspection of switchgear welds.

Cimorelli stated he has never been told by anyone, including his supervisor, Stuart Tulk, that he could not write a Nonconformance Report. It has been Cimorelli's experience to discuss a matter with Tulk before issuing a Nonconformance Report to determine if a nonconformance exists and to insure the condition was fully and accurately described.

4.3.4.5 Interview of Lead Electrical Quality Engineer On March 18, 1982, Stuart P. Tulk, Lead Electrical Quality Engineer, provided the following informa-tion:

He recalled Metcalf had been approached to assist the electrical inspection group in the examination of switchgear welds. Metcalf seemed uninterested in helping and the matter of Metcalf's assistance was never pursued.

He stated he never told Metcalf, or any other Quality Control Inspector, not to write a Noncon-formance Report. Additionally, Tulk provided a written statement. (Exhibit XI) 4.3.4.6 Findings and Con'clusions Metcalf had drafted the Nonconformance Report in preparation for an inspection of switchgear welds.

Metcalf conducted a limited inspection of the switchgear and found the welds were acceptable.

The draft Nonconformance Report was never used. l Metcalf stated he has never been told by 1 1

47 l l

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Stuart Tulk, or any one else, not to write Non-conformance Reports. No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified.

4.3.5 Cable Overtensioning 4.3.5.1 During the investigation, Individual F stated Quality Control Inspector Max Roe had observed a cable pull by the L. K. Comstock Company on February 12, 1982. During the cable pull the cable was overtensioned and Tulk, Roe's supervisor, prevented Roe from writing a Nonconformance Report for overtensioning.

4.3.5.2 Interview of Electrical Quality Control Inspector l

l On March 17, 1982, Max 0. Roe, a Quality Control Inspector in CEI's Electrical Quality Engineering Section, provided the following information.

I He has been employed by Kaiser Engineers, Inc.,

at the Perry site since April 1981, and l

Stuart Tulk has been his supervisor since August 1981. No one, including Tulk, has ever prevented him from writing a Nonconformance Report. To his knowledge, problems have always been identified l

and documented in either Nonconformance Reports, l

Action Requests, or Audit Reports, and none of j the other inspectors have been stopped from documenting their concerns.

On February 12, 1982, he was present for the ductbank installation of circuit 1R23F6A. The maximum pulling tension on the cable was estab-lished at 2400 lbs. The maximum tension was reached and exceeded with "an instaneous spike" to l 2650 lbs. Tulk was notified of the overtension of l the cable, and Tulk told Roe a Nonconformance

! Report should not be written for overtension.

Tulk explained to Roe that the cable pull should be finished and a Nonconformance Report be written by L. K. Comstock's Quality Control for the excess tension. Roe was frustrated with the explanation and wrote in his Surveillance / Inspection Report l

No. SE-917, "I was directed by my lead (Tulk) not to write an NR for overtension....I was again J

directed by my lead not to write an NR for over-tension for the same reason as previously explained....As of this time 5:00 a.m. February 16, 1982 an NR has not been written to scrap the l cable." Roe did write Nonconformance Report No. CQA-229 for cuts in the cable jacket.

48 l l

Subsequently Roe learned L. K. Comstock Company had prepared a Nonconformance Report for the overtension of the cable. Roe did not have any additional concerns regarding the overtension of the cable on February 12, 1982.

4.3.5.3 Interview of Lead Electrical Quality Engineer On March 18-19, 1982, Stuart P. Tulk, Lead Electrical Quality Engineer, was interviewed.

Tulk stated he had been Roe's supervisor since August 3, 1981, and he has never told Roe, or any other inspector, to not write Nonconformace Reports. Tulk provided a written statement.

(Exhibit XI)

Tulk advised he had told Roe that he (Roe) should not write a Nonconformance Report himself, rather to have L. K. Comstock Quality Control prepare the report. L. K. Comstock Company was responsible for the Nonconformance Report, not CEI Quality Construction Section, in keeping with CEI Procedure No. 2-1001, Surveillance / Inspection Activities (reviewed in Paragraph 4.2.6.3 of this report) and CEI Procedure No. 1504, Contractor Initiated Nonconformance Reports (reviewed in the following paragraph).

4.3.3.4 Review of CEI Procedure CEI Project Administration Procedure No. 1504, Contractor Initiated Nonconformance Reports, states in Paragraph 1.2:

"It is intended that contractors employ their own measures with the guidance of this Project Adminis-tration Procedure to identify and control nonconforming items immediately. Nonconforming conditions within the contractor's scope of work which are first identified by Project Organization personnel shall be brought to the attention of the contractor's QA/QC personnel. Should the con-tractor fail to take action in documenting and controlling the Nonconformance, Project Organ-i:ation shall initiate the NR in accordance with Project Administration Procedure 1502. (Project Nonconformance Control)."

4.3.5.5 Review of Nonconformance Renort L. K. Comstock Nonconformance Report No. LKC-1056, dated February 23, 1982, was reviewed. The noncon-49

forming condition was described as, " Cable 1R23F6A, pulled on February 12, 1982, thru ductbank conduit 1R33H1011A indicated a maximum tension of 2400 lbs. per RCIM 1127 the cable had a maximum allow-able tension through this conduit of 2400 lbs. At this point the pull was stopped and the project organization (Engineering, design and quality engineering) was contacted. It was determined by using the footage markers on the cable and a sketch of the run that the cable was approximately l 18 ft. into the conduit past manhole No. 4 where there is a 15 bend. It was decided by the Project Organization Persennel that the pull shall continue using a greater pull tension to get the nose of the cable past the first bend. The pull recom-menced and 3800# (maximum) was applied as read on the dynamometer. After the cable moved less than 20 ft. the tension indication dropped rapidly to 700#. At this point the cable jumped in the tray inside the I.B. (Intermediate Building) 599 and slipped off a guide roller, the pull was stopped.

Further investigation revealed that the cable jacket received a 3-1/2 inch cut at footage marker 4399 ft. Nonconformance Report No. CQA 229 was

( written to disposition this condition (cut in jacket). The cable jacket was repaired by taping in accordance with Procedure LKC No. 4.3.3 (disposition on NR).

"The pull started again using a tension of 430 lbs.

The cable broke loose and wedged along side a roller in a sheave and caused the jacket of the cable to be opened up for a distance of approxi-mately 14" at footage marker 4360 ft. The pull was terminated and removed per LKC rework No; 10358."

l The disposition of Nonconformance Report No. LKC-1056 was to " scrap" the cable for the following reason: " Cable has been pulled out.

Damaged section will be scrapped. Reminder has been placed in cable yard QC Hold Area and will be turned over to site organization for temporary use."

4.3.5.6 Findings and Conclusions Roe stated he was frustrated by Tulk's explanation l of not writing a Nonconformance Report for the overtension of the cable in circuit 1R23F6A and that lead to Roe's writing in the Surveillance /

l Inspection Report, "I was directed by my lead not to write an NR for overtension." Roe recognized 50

L. K. Comstock had written a Nonconformance Report for the overtension and did not have any other concerns regarding the overtension of the cable.

Tulk stated he has never told any inspector not to write a Nonconformance Report.

L. K. Comstock Quality Control prepared Noncon-formance Report No. LKC-1056, albeit late, and identified the overtension of the cable. The cable was removed from the ductbank and scraped.

The preparation of this Nonformance Report was in accordance with CEI Project Administration -

Procedure 1504, Contractor Initiated Nonconform-ance Reports. No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified.

4.3.6 Crimping of Cable Terminations 4.3.6.1 Interview of Individual F During the investigation, Individual F stated Quality Control Inspector Bob Peters' supervisor, Tulk, would not allow Peters to write a Noncon-formance Report for L. K. Comstock's failure to include the crimp tool identification data on the electrical termination inspection forms.

4.3.6.2 Interview of Electrical Quality Control Inspector On March 17, 1982, Robert G. Peters, Electrical Quality Control Inspector, provided the following information:

He has been employed at the Perry site since January 1980, and he has never been told by anyone, including Tulk, that he (Peters) could not write a Nonconformance Report.

l l On February 2, 1982, Peters prepared Problem Identification Sheet No. E-003, which stated:

" Description of Problem: From June 1981, until l November 16, 1981, LKC craft was not following Termination Procedure 4.3.6, Item 4.1.10 which l

requires the LKC Termination Foreman to enter the termination Crimping tool number used and l calibration due date on the termination card.

Approximately 400 terminations were completed during this period of time, when LKC QC disccvered i

the problem NR LKC 891 was written on December 16, 1981. No disposition has been attempted since that date. The problem was discussed with i

51

Mike Confer in LKC Engineering. And he said he will do his best to resolve the problem (disposi-tion the NR). Sue Lynn, Cable Engineer for LKC, has assured me that steps were taken after November 16, 1981 to control this problem."

Peters advised his reason for preparing this Problem Identification Sheet was to inform his supervisor, Tulk, that L. K. Comstock had identi-fled a problem, but was slow in resolving it.

Peters stated he did not see the need for him to write a Nonconformance Report in this matter, as 7

a report had already been written by L. K. Comstock.

• Peters did prepare Action Request No. 394, dated February 5,1982, detailing Comstock's slow progress in dispositioning their Nonconformance

, Report.

4.3.6.3 Interview of Lead Electrical Quality Engineer On March 18-19, 1982, Stuart P. Tulk, Lead Electrical Quality Engineer, provided the following information:

Me was aware of L. K. Comstock Company's failure to include the crimping tool identification data on Comstock's Cable Termination Checklist, and he was aware L. K. Comstock Nonconformance Report No. LKC-891 had been written on this matter.

However, what appeared to be inaction by Comstock in dispositioning the Nonconformance Report was in effect Comstock's efforts to gather all of the information to determine the total number of termin-ations involved prior to Comstock proposing a disposition. Due to the number of terminations involved, the Nonconformance Report was in excess of 200 pages. Comstock began working on this problem in December 1981, and proposed a disposi-tion on March 5, 1982. During the interim, Comstock was collecting the information to identify all of the terminations.

Tulk stated he has never told Peters, or any other Quality Control Inspector, not to write a Nonconformance Report. Additionally, Tulk provided a written statement (Exhibit XI).

4.3.6.4 Review of L. K. Comstock Procedure for Cable Terminations L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.3.6, Instructions for Cable / Wire Terminations was reviewed.

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l Paragraph 4.1.10 of this procedure states:

"Upon completion of the cable termination, the Foreman shall enter the termination crimping tool number used and calibration due date on the Termination Card, Attach-ment 'A', and sign and date same. The Foreman shall also complete the Daily Termination Report, Attachment 'C', and forward a copy to the QC Department."

4.3.6.5 Review of L. K. Comstock Nonconformance Report L. K. Comstock Nonconformance Report No. LKC-891, dated December 16, 1981, was reviewed. The description of the nonconformance was listed as,

" Prior to November 18, 1981, all termination cards received, for Class IE safety related terminations, s, do not have crimping tool numbers entered on the cards..." The cause of the nonconformance was given as, " inadequate supervision." L. K. Comstock proposed disposition was, "use-as-is." The justi-fication for the "use-as-is" disposition was, "All crimpers were in calibration during the time period and two were lost prior to starting safety termina-tions. Perform pull test on a minimum of 120 cable ends (safety related) to prove crimp integrity.

Field and QC to coordinate for documentation of test results to be attached prior to close out of NR." L. K. Comstock continued, " Steps to prevent recurrence have already been taken. The field is now writing the crimper number on the termination cards." (Note: L. K. Comstock's Steps to Prevent Recurrence were verified by RIII personnel during the week of February 22-26, 1982. Also, i

L. K. Comstock has modified their Cable Termination

! Checklist form to include the crimp tool data.)

t L. K. Comstock Nonconformance Report No. LKC-891 was reviewed by the Project Organization Engineer on March 9,1982. The Project Engineer entered the following comments into the report: "Justi-fication for the 'USE-AS-IS' disposition and the pull test procedure is acceptable to Engineering.

L. K. Comstock shall ensure that the sample lot size of the 120 termination points is random and not duplicated on the same terminal points."

Cn March 9,1982, CEI's Quality Engineer reviewed Nonconformance Report No. LKC-891 and included the following comments in that report: "If any termina-tion fails the pull test, then all terminations in 53

1 that particular device shall be tested. (Note:

These additional tests shall not be taken as part '

- of the original sample size). Any terminations failing the pull test shall be documented on a revision of this NR. All terminations listed in this NR shall be finally inspected by LKC's QC in accordance with LKC Procedure 4.3.6, documented and attached to NR before close out. (Note that attached sheets 2 through 266 are L. K. Comstock QC's attestation that all crimpers in the field were in calibration during the time period in question.)" '

l As of March 16, 1982, the verification of the disposition of Nonconformance Report No. LKC-891 remained to be completed.

4.3.6.6 Review of CEI Procedure CEI Construction Quality Assurance Procedure No. 2-1001, Surveillance / Inspection Activities, was reviewed. Paragraph 1.2, " Responsibilities and Procedures," states in part:

" Identification and Documentation of Nonconforming l Items or Conditions Each contractor (safety-related) is respon-sible for reporting nonconformances in accord-

. ance with his quality program requirements and quality level specification attachments.

Surveillance Inspector - When nonconforming conditions are observed during surveillance /

- inspections, discuss the condition with the l

contractor's QA/QC personnel. An effort should l be made to have the contractor initiate a nonconformance report.

-- It the nonconforming condition is not documented by the contractor or if the

nonconforming condition cannot be traced to a particular contractor, the Surveil-lance Inspector will write a nonconform-ance report in accordance with Project Administration Procedure 1502.

-- If a contractor is habitually negligent in documenting nonconforming conditions, the Surveillance Inspector or Quality Engineer will issue an Action Reguest (AR) in accordance with Construction 54

Quality Assurance Procedure 2-1603, or a Corrective Action Request (CAR) in accordance with Construction Quality Assurance Procedure 2-1601, depending on severity."

" Documenting Program Violations Quality Engineer / Surveillance Inspector - Use Action Requests (AR's) to document activities in noncompliance associated with software, i.e.,

procedural violations or inadequate inspection

• performance."

4.3.6.7 Findings and Conclusions From June until November 1981, L. K. Comstock Company did not document the crimp tool data (i.e.,

tool identification number and calibration due date) on documents for safety related cable terminations.

This problem was documented in L. K. Comstock Nonconformance Report No. 891, dated December 16, 1981. On February 2, 1982, Peters wrote to his supervisor, Tulk, and stated "no disposition has been attempted" on the Nonconformance Report.

On February 5,1982, Peters wrote Action Request

[

No. 394 concerning Comstock's slow progress in dispositioning the Nonconformance Report. Peters stated he did not see the need for him to prepare a second Nonconformance Reporu on the same problem and Action Request No. 394 was sufficient. Peters stated he has never been told by Tulk, or any one else, not to write Nonconformance Reports. Tulk denied telling Peters, or any other Quality Control Inspector, not to write Nonconformance Reports. ,

The preparation of the Nonconformance Report and Action Request in this matter was in keeping with CEI Procedure No. 2-1001, Surveillance / Inspection Activities. Although Comstock had not completely verified the disposition of Nonconformance Report 891; Comstock had taken action to prevent recurrence.

Comstock's actions in preventing recurrence were l verified by RIII. No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified.

4.3.7 L. K. Comstock Craft Workers 4.3.7.1 Interview of Individual F During an interview on February 1,1982, Indivi-dual F stated, Wendell Gilbert, a L. K. Comstock Company Area Manager, did not allow the people 55

working for him to identify and/or document non-conforming conditions.

4.3.7.2 Interview of Comstock Area Manager On March 18, 1982, Wendell L. Gilbert, L. K. Comstock Company Area Manager, provided the following information:

He supervises approximately 40 craft workers (cable pullers and terminators) employed by the L. K. Comstock Company. His employees are respons- '

ible for the quality of their individual work as the work is done. His employees are not respons-ible for making the decision to accept or reject the work. The acceptance or rejection of completed work is the function of the L. K. Comstock Quality Control Department and the Quality Control Inspec-tors. The Quality Control Inspectors bear the responsiblity of preparing Nonconformance Reports.

He has never told his employees they could not identify or prepare a Nonconforman'ce Report. On numerous occasions he has identified nonconforming conditions to Quality Control Inspectors.

In many instances he has questioned the wording of Nonconformance Reports as he felt the verbage did not adequately or accurately describe the .

nonconforming condition. He believed this may have been misinterpreted by the Quality Control Inspectors. Additionally, Gilbert provided a written statement (Exhibit XI!).

4.3.7.3 Review of CEI Procedure CEI Corporate Nuclear Quality Assurance Program No. 1504, Contractor Initiated Nonconformance Reports, was reviewed. Paragraph 1.2 of Procedure No. 1504 states in part:

"All contractor personnel shall have the responsibility of identifying a nonconforming condition and reporting the nonconforming condition to their 6ppervisor or on the NR Form... It is int 4.ded that contractors employ their own measures with the guidance of this Project Administration to identify and control nonconforming items immediately. . . ."

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l e Q 4.3.7.4 Review of L. K. Comstock Procedure L. K. Comstock Company Procedure No. 4.11, Non-conformance Items and Corrective Action, was reviewed. Paragraph 5.1 of the procedure states in part:

" Initiation of Nonconformance Reports. When )

an item or activity is found to be in noncom-pliance with specified requirements, the Ernst-Comstock QC Inspector shall initiate a Nonconformance Renort.... The QC Inspector shall inform the QA Manager of any noncon-forming activity and the deficiency should be resolved through construction management."

4.3.7.5 Interview of L. K. Comstock Craft Workers Twenty-five craft workers, working for Area Manager Wendell Gilbert, were randomly selected by RIII personnel and interviewed. Each worker was aware he could prepare a Nonconformance Report, but also realized the peparation of Nonconformance Reports was the responsibility of the Quality Control Inspectors. None of the workers had been told by anyone, including Wendell Gilbert, they could not identify a non-conforming condition or they could not write a Nonconformance Report.

4.3.7.6 Findings and Conclusions L. K. Comstock Area Manager Wendell Gilbert stated he never told any of his employees they could not prepare a Nonconformance Report. Twenty-five of the approximately forty people working for Gilbert were selected at random and interviewed. Each stated Gilbert had never told them they could not identify a nonconforming condition or could not prepare a Nonconformance Report. No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements was identified.

4.3.8 Nonconformance and Audit Report Trends Nonconformance Reports and Action Requests written against electrical installations at the Perry site for the period January 1, 1981 - March 16, 1982, were reviewed (Table 2) to compare Individual F's performance against that of Individual F's three co-workers (C-W)to ascertain whether, or not, Nonconformance Reports and tetion Requests were being written. The Audit and Nonconformance Reports covered five CEI specifications:

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-- _]

J Table 2 Review of Nonconformance Reports and Action Requests prepared by the four Electrical Quality Control Inspectors working under the supervision of Stuart P. Tulk disclosed:

Total Reports Reports Written Total No. of Reports Spec. Reports Written By By CEI Electrical Written By Numbet Written Con t racto r Quality Control Ind. F C-W 1 C-W 2 C-W 3 (Nonconformance 033 619 562 57 29 3 8 3 Reports) 097 11 7 4 0 0 0 4 552 70 74 4 2 0 0 0 557 37 19 18 2 0 6 0 593 _1081 _5tg _50 0 0 0 __It (IOIAL) 849 715 133 33 3 14 11 (Action Requests) 033 98 N/A 98 18 0 10 15 097 44 N/A 44 0 0 0 3 552 None N/A 0 0 0 0 0 557 None N/A 0 0 0 0 0 591 _62 N/A _62 _Q 0 0 _Q (10iAL) 211 211 18 0 10 18

( Review Porlod Janua ry 1, 1981 through Ma rch 16, 1982) (NOTE: Action Requests are written on contractor's Performanco by CEI personnel; therefore, the number of Action Requests written by contractor was marked "Not Applicable" (N/A) in the above table.)

l l

Specification Specification Number Title 033 Specification for Electrical Installations l 097 Specification for Installation of Control Room Panels 552 Procurement of 4.16KV Switchgear 557 Procurement of Motor Control Centers 591 Procurement of Power Generation Control Centers i The review of Nonconformance Reports and Action Requests written by the four electrical Quality Control Inspectors showed the following distribution:

Nonconformance Reports Written By Action Requests Written By Month Ind. F C-W 1 C-V 2 C-W 3 Ind. F C-W 1 C-W 2 C-W 3 Jan 81 - -

0 - - -

0 -

Feb - -

0 - - -

0 -

March - - 2 - - - 0 -

April 0 - 4 0 0 - 0 0 May 2 -

2 0 1 -

1 0 June 1 -

3 3 1 -

1 3 July 2 -

1 5 2 -

0 0 Aug 7 -

1 0 0 - 0 1 Sep 0 -

1 0 0 -

0 0 Oct 3 - 0 0 3 - 3 8 Nov 6 - 0 0 3 -

0 0 Dec 81 11 1 0 1 7 0 4 3 Jan 82 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Feb 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Mar 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 33 3 14 11 18 0 10 16 Notes:

Individual F was employed at the Perry site April 13, 1981 through the period of this investigation.

Prior to December 1981, co-worker 1 was employed as an Engineering Aide. During December 1981, he became an Electrical Quality Control Inspector.

Co-worker 2 was employed at the Perry site January 2, 1980 through the period of this investigation. In early 1982 Co-worker 2 began training to become an auditor and has been in classes outside the inspection field.

Co-worker 3 was employed at the Perry site April 6, 1981 through the period of this investigation.

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4.3.9 Findings and Conclusions The preparatation of Nonconformance Reports and Action Requests appeared to be evenly distributed throughout the periods of employment of the four inspectors. The report distribution for Individual F, and his three co-workers appeared to be consistent with the report distribution for previously employed inspectors (para-graph 4.2.7 of this report). From this information it does not appear that Individual F ever stopped writing Nonconformance Reports or Action Requests.

No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified.

5. Interview of CEI Manager of Nuclear Quality Assurance On March 16, 1982, Ronald L. Farrell, Manager of CEI's Nuclea Quality Assurance Department, provided the following information:

He has recently held meetings with all Quality Engineers and Quality Control Inspectors, and separate meetings with the Supervisors in the Quality Department. He explained the matter under investigation and emphasized the necessity of Nonconformnce Reports. None of the engineers or inspectors identified instances where nonconformance reports had not been written, or, any instance of being prevented from writing Nonconformance Reports. None voiced any concerns to Farrell.

A Task Group was formed, independent of the discipline (i.e., electrical, mechanical), to review the discipline's Nonconformance Reports. The Task Group reviewed 400 Nonconformance Reports and found all reports were written under appropriate circumstances. The review did disclose problems in timely close-out and identification of problems to management.

The Task Group selected seventy Project Organization employees (quality .

control inspectors, quality engineers, and design engineers) at random and interviewed each person. None of the people interviewed indicated they had ever been told they could not write Nonconformance Reports or identify nonconforming conditions. None of those interviewed identified an instance where a nonconforming condition had not been identified and documented. ,

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6. RIII Observations and Inspections 6.1 Review of L. K. Comstock Nonconformance Reoorts The following information was obtained from a review of L.K. Comstock Nonconformance Reports (NR):

6.1.1. The following Comstock NRs were open and did not list a disposition:

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e 3 l 6.1.1.1. L. K. Comstock NR No. 725, dated September 3, 1981, identified that during cable pulling, a cut was found in the jacket of cable ('E12B11XB) at footage mark 443. The cut penetrated the jacket, but not the insulation of the individual conductors. The cause of the nonconformance was indeterminate and unknown. Disposition was incomplete.

6.1.1.2. L. K. Comstock NR No. 715, dated August 25, 1981, identified that fire and/or smoke damage was on the front of 480 volt load center No. 2R235009 at compartments 2F2A03, 04, 05, 06, and 2F2A07.

• It was not known if the wiring or instrumentation i was damaged.

The cause was not determined; disposition or corrective action was incomplete.

6.1.1.3. L. K. Comstock NR No. 753, dated September 22, 1981, stated that Quality Control noted a potential problem in Circuit No. 1M51C48A (bulge in outer jacket). The Project Organization was contacted and verbally instructed the craft to cut the outer jacketing in order to inspect.

After the engineer approved the cable, the craft was verbally instructed to tape the cut in the outer jacket with Okin'ite No. 33. The appro-priate documentation was not issued to justify work done. Corrective action was not listed.

6.1.1.4. L. K. Comstock NR No. 702, dated July 31, 1981, identified that during receipt inspection at the site warehouse, Part No. H51-P055A was found to have the paint scratched, chipp.ed and peeling.

Also, the fittings and connections were corroded.

The cause of the nonconformance was listed as, damage by others. Corrective action was not listed.

6.1.2. The following L. K. Comstock NRs indicated the L. K. Comstock construction personnel were inadequately supervised during the installation of safety-related work:

6.1.2.1. L. K. Comstock NR No. 781, dated October 23, 1981, identified Box No. TB/JB1-228 was installed on two 4" x 4" angles with a required weld of 1/8" at the box ends of the angles. The actual welds were underrun by approximately 1/32" to 1/16" since the box did not project 1/8" beyond the ends of the angles. The cause of the noncon-formance was, " incorrect dimension tolerance of 61

• 4 the drawing." The disposition was " rework the box to comply with welding requirements (3/16" ,

from end of angle) ." The step taken to prevent recurrence was, " closer observation by the l supervisor, prior to installation."

6.1.2.2. L. K. Comstock NR. No. 770, dated October 8, 1981, identified, " single Unistruts were used for Type H hanger at IB-6 for Type K hanger at IB-6, and for Type K hanger 5' north of IB-6.

Drawing calls for double Unistruts." The cause of the nonconformance was, "the drawing require-ments were not met." The disposition was, "(1) l i "B" hangers in place of "K" hangers do not meet loading requirements. Therefore, two additional "D" hangers are to be installed." The step to prevent recurrence was, " closer adherence to design drawings, per instructions given to field and general foreman."

r 6.1.2.3. L. K. Comstock NR No. 813, dated November 20, 1981, identified "the support steel in l Section 1-1 of SS213-342-TIS Revision is not in a vertical position." The cause of nonconform-ance was, " inadequate supervision." The disposition was, "the gaps which occurred should not affect the structural integrity of this support." The step taken to prevent recurrence I

was, " closer observation of supervision during installation."

6.1.2.4. L. K. Comstock NR No. 790, dated November 6, 1981, identified, "upon disposition inspection of NR No. 553 Revision - for touch-up work to be done to MCC 1R42-5015 on the right side of Section 1-4, it was found that the equipment had been set into plac'e and' welded, with the hold tag still attached. QC was not notified for the movement of the equipment." The cause of the nonconformance was "the supervisor failed to fellow instruction."

The corrective action was not indicated as having been taken.

6.1.2.5. L. K. Comstock NR. No. 788 dated November 5, 1981, identified, " single Unistrut supports were used where double supports were called for on the drawing." The cause of the nonconformance was, "the hanger supports do not meet the drawings requirements." The disposition was, "although single struts were installed, each of the existing hangers meet the weight load require-ments." Steps taken to prevent recurrence'was, 62

. 3

" closer adherence to design drawings per instructions given to field personnel and general foreman."

6.1.2.6. L. K. Comstock NR No. 783, dated October 27, 1981, identified the improper installation of an Engineering Change Notice (ECN) which added "a 5" x 5" x 3/8" to ICC3-T435, specifies a fit-up dimension for both of 1/2". Actual installed dimension on one edge of the angle is 3/4"." The cause of nonconformance was, "the drawing requirements were not mat." The dis-position stated, "the 1/4" fit s discrepancy of the angle should not compromise the design intent nor structural integrity of the support." The step taken to prevent recurrence was, " closer observation of the supervisor during fit-up."

6.1.2.7 L. K. Comstock NR No. 766, dated October 2, 1981, identified, "three Gusset Plates in Section 1-1 of SS213-342-T82, Revision A were installed with a full penetration weld with backing strip. The installation details require a partial penetra-tion weld." The cause of the nonconformance was, "the drawing requirements not met." The dis-position stated, "the installed weld is as strong as the indicated weld." The step that was taken to prevent recurrence was " closer observation by supervisor to welding details."

6.1.2.8 L. K. Comstock NR No. 706, dated August 14, 1981, identified, " hanger IC7-C28 was completed and accepted April 14, 1981. It was noted on August 14, 1981, that both vertical 3" X 3" angles were cut off just above the horizontal 3" X 3" at approximate elevation 713' 3". Also l channel' tray welds were cut from horizontal.

! NOTE: Possible damage to channel tray could have occurred." The cause of the nonconformance was,

" damage by others." The proposed recommendation j- was, "the remainder of IC7-C28 shall be removed and another 1C7-028 support fabricated and in-stalled. Also, the section of channel tray attaching to 1C7-C28 shall be removed and a new section installed." The step to prevent recurrence was " Site QA to reinform all con-tractors that no safety steel is to be cut unless directed to do so in writing." It could not be determined from the NR or other cor-respondence whether this was accomplished.

63

o 1 6.1.2.9 L. K. Comstock NR No. 778, dated October 21, 1981, identified, " Conduits 1R33R461B, 1R33R462B, 1R33C1147B, 1R33T124A, and 1G42F2B were installed per drawing; however, they have no supports within two feet of their respective junction boxes or pull boxes." The cause of nonconformance was, "the drawing requirements were not rat." The disposition was, "the conduit was installed per D-215-212 and conduit cannot be supported within the two foot criteria. Use as is consider the box as a support." The steps taken to prevent recurrence was, " future cases such as this will '

be brought to the attention of engineering before

.nstallation."

6.1.2.10 Cognizant CEI and L. K. Comstock personnel were itterviewed and indicated a trend analysis had not been done to determine the reason for in-adequate supervision and for not taking the nececsary actions to preclude repetition. This was considered to be an item of noncompliance contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. (440/81-19-08; 441/81-19-08) 6.2 Voided Nonconformance Reports 6.2.1 Among the foregoing Nonconformance Reports were three reports which were found to have been voided. The voided reports were:

6.2.1.1 NR No. 549, dated March 16, 1981, identified, the nozzle preparation for penetration No. 1R725001 did not meet the requirements of the Westinghouse Drawing No. E-40048. The drawing showed a 1/4"

~

land on the containment vessel nozzle pre weld area; however, no land was on the CVN nozzle.

The QA Manager voided this NR stating that the weld preparation was in progress and that when completed, a 1/4" land would be provided.

Procedural requirements were followed to void this NR.

6.2.1.2 NR No. 531, dated February 25, 1981, identified that damage to the shield tube assembly of low voltage penetration No. 1R725005 had been dis-covered during the uncrating process. All three tubes were out of round by 1/4" to 1/2". This NR was voided by two Quality Control Inspectors.

The inspectors wrote on NR 531 "the shield tube assemblies were inspected and accepted by the site Organization Engineer."

64

• 1 6.2.1.3 NR No. 454, dated November 21, 1980, identified the flexible conduit for penetration No. EIB6003 at elevation 654' in the Intermediate Building did not meet the minimum bend radius of l'6".

The acutal bend radius was l'. This NR was l voided by a Quality Control Inspector and not q by the QA Hanager or his designes. In voiding )

NR No. 454 the unacceptable condition was i transferred from the NR to Audit Finding Report (AFR) No. 629, which was still open.  ;

6.2.2 Paragraph 5.2.6 of L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.11.1, Nonconforming Items and Corrective Action states,

" Initiated NRs may be voided by the QA Manager or his designee at any time and marked " VOID", note the reason, initial, date the NR..."

6.2.3 The L. K. Comstock QA/QC Supervisor was shown copies of Nonconformance Report Nos. 454 and 531, and stated he had not authorized the voiding of either report.

Also, the QA/QC supervisor stated the Quality Control Inspectors voiding the two reports were not the authorized

" designee" referred to in Paragraph 5.2.6 of L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.11.1.

6.2.4 In voiding NR Nos. 531 and 454, Paragraph 5.2.6 of L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.11.1 was not followed in that unauthorized individuals voided the NRs. This was considered to be another example of failure to follow procedures, contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

(440/81-19-01; 441/81-19-01) 6.3 Review of L. K. Comstock QA Program Implementation On November 16, 1981, the staffing in the L. K. Comstock QA/QC Department was inconsistent with the organization chart attached to Comstock's QC Manual. The organization chart' depicted a separate QA Manager and a QC Supervisor onsite. However, since April 1981 one individual had occupied both positions and was designated QA/QC Supervisor. On February 1,1982, this situation was remedied with the hiring of a new Quality Assurance Manager and the reassignment of the former QA/QC Supervisor to the position of QC Supervisor.

Failure to fully staff the QA and QC positions is an item of non-compliance contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. (440/81-19-01; 441/81-19-01).

1 With respect to this item of noncompliance, the hiring of additional personnel and the separation of the QA/QC Supervisor position removed  ;

the nonconforming condition. A response to this item of noncompliance ,

is not necessary. J 65 1

l 6.4 Review of Audits 6.4.1 Section 3.1.5 of the L. K. Comstock Quality Assurance Manual related to the L. K. Comstock Corporate evaluation of the effec.tiveness of their Perry site organization's QA Program.

L. K. Comstock Quality Assurance Manual, Paragraph 3.2.,

Implementation, states, "At least four times a year, pre- i ferably once each quarter, a Review and Evaluation Report I will be preplanned and scheduled. Preparation for review and evaluation will be by selecting subjects to be reviewed i from Paragraph 2.2...of this manual."

According to Paragraph 2.2. the program review and evaluation subjects shall be:

l

a. Organization assignments and personnel qualifications.

b. On-site internal audit perforcance.

l c. Nonconforming items and corrective action status,

d. Verify implementation of selected procedures.

e. The need for clarification changes to correct program deficiencies.

f. Retrievability of documentation.

I However, the above listed subjects do not include the adequacy of the QA and QC staff in evaluating the work in progress.

One audit, during January 1981, covered compliance with L. K. Comstock Procedures No. 4.2.1 and 14.14.1. No discrepancies were identiflad.

A second Audit was conducted by Comstock site personnel.

This audit did not satisfy the requirements of Section 3.1.5.

of the L. K. Comstock Quality Assurance Manual in that the audit was performed by site employees rather than corporate personnel.

A third audit was performed during July 1981. Three cut of the eight audit members whoe performed the audit were from the Perry QA/QC staff. Activities related to document control, welder qualification and weld control, indoctrina-tion and training, cable handling, storage and warehouse, and design control were audited. Several audit findings were identified. The records indicated corrective action had been taken and subsequently was verified by the Comstock QA/QC Engineer at the Perry site.

l The fourth audit was conducted on December 17, 1981, covering document control. During February 1982, the corrective actions were completed.

l l

- 66 1

..-._.y. . , - . . - -

. )

In March 1982, the L. K. Comstock Corporate QA Manager performed an audit of Comstock activities at the Perry site and identified 62 findings.

6.4.2 CEI's site QA organization performed an audit of L. K. Comstock on October 6, 7, 8, and 9, 1981. The audit identified that Comstock Corporate audits were not being closed in a timely manner and that some audits were still open after ten months.

Examples identified were: Audit Finding Report No. 80-11-5-1 was still open with the reply due date being December 15, 1980. Audit Finding Report No. 80-11-5-3 required a pro-cedure change; however, no corrective action had been accomplished at the time of the audit. The above were documented in CEI's Action Request No. 0004.

The RIII inspectors stated and the licensee agreed that more indepth audits should be performed to assure the timely close-out of L. K. Comstock Corporate Audit Findings to measure the effectiveness of the L. K. Comstock QA Program.

This matter is considered unresolved. (440/81-19-09; 441/81-19-09).

6.5 Observations of Installed Equipment 6.5.1 The following observations were made by RIII personnel during frequent tours of the Perry facilities throughout the period of this investigation:

6.5.1.1 The covers protecting the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) instrument panels installed in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building were torn. The tears in the protective coverings had caused the overall condition of the panels to deteriorate. The inspectors informed CEI of the unacceptable.

storage condition. (Paragraph 1.2.3. of CEI Construction Quality Assurance Procedure No. 2-1301, states in part, Monitor housekeeping on a continual basis while performing storage and maintenance inspections.") The CEI Quality Assurance Organization documented this matter in a Surveillance Report and requested the L. K. Comstock Company to clean the area.

6.5.1.2. On December 4, 1981, a potential fire hazard was noted by RIII personnel. The hazard consisted of quantities of newspapers and rags on the scaf-folding above and below the electrical penetration annulus tube assemblies. The scaffolding was at the 649' elevation of the Unit 1 annulus space.

(Paragraph 2:16-1 of CEI Specification I No. SP-33-4549 states, in part, "The contractor 1

67

• 4 shall keep the premises clean at all times during the progress of the work and remove dirt and rubbish as directed by the site organization").

The RIII personnel appraised CEI of this condition on December 4th, 1981. CEI informed the inspectors the area was to be cleaned by December 7, 1981.

On December 10, 1981, RIII personnel in the company of CEI personnel noted the rags and newspapers in the annulus space had burned since their discovery i on December 4th. Interviews revealed that the licensee did not know when the fire had started or when it was extinguished.

Subsequently, CEI wrote an Action Request to document the situation. The licensee inspected ,

the annulus tube asseeblies for damage and non-conforming conditions due to fire. On December 21, 1981, the CEI Manager of Nuclear Quality Assurance advised the penetrations were inspected, and none of the safety-related equipment sustained any damage.

6.5.1.3 The conditions cited in Paragraphs 6.5.1.1 and

6.5.1.2 are considered to be items of noncom-pliance contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII. (440/81-19-10; 441/81-19-10) 6.5.2 The following observations were made concerning the failure to properly identify nonconforming conditions related to cenduit separation and equipment single failure criteria:

6.5.2.1 The inspectors observed several instances where installed conduits did .not meet the following

! minimum separation requirements:

(1) Paragraph 5:08.10.1.h.4 of CEI Specifica-

{ tien SP-33-4549-00, Electrical Installations, states in part, "The minimum separation may be reduced to one inch for conduits of re-dundant divisions when routed through wall and floor penetrations."

(2) Paragraph 5:08.1.1.1.1.4 of CEI Specifica-tion SP-33-4549-00 states in part, " Minimum separation between conduits containing Class 1E circuits and conduits containing Non-Class 1E circuits shall be one inch, i

measured from the nearest edge to nearest edge."

i ,

l 68 ,

)

The following conduits did not meet the separation critiera:

6.5.2.1.1 Division 1 Conduit 1R33C1098A was separated by 3/4" from Division 3 Conduit 1R33R334C through a floor penetration at elevation 606' in Room No.1, of the Auxiliary Building.

6.5.2.1.2 Class 1E Conduit 1R33R516A was separated by 1/2" from Non-Class 1E Conduit 1R52W91X located at elevation 568' in the Auxiliary Building above the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Instrument Panel No. 1H22-P017.

6.5.2.1.3 Class 1E Conduit 1R331024A, above the RCIC Instrument Panel was not separated from Non-Class IE Conduit, ID2136X.

This condition was not marked with the

" Hold Tag" described in Attachment 7 of L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.11 .1, Nonconforming Items and Corrective Action.

6.5.2.2 The inspectors observed that in the following instances the installed conduits do not meet the minimum separation requirements of Cleveland

• Electric Illuminating Specification SP-33-4549-00, Paragraphs 5:08.10.1.h and j, which specifies that conduits of different divisions in general plant areas and cable spreading rooms shall maintain a minimum horizontal and vertical separation of six inctes measured edge to edge.

6.5.2.2.1 Division 3 conduit 1R33A129C was separated oy 3 1/2" from Division 2 Conduits 1R33R919B and IC11B3B located at elevation 638' in the Control Complex, cable spreading room.

6.5.2.2.2 Division 2 Conduits 1R33R788B, 1R33R786B, and 1R33R926B were separated by 1-1/2" to 3-1/2" from Division 3 Conduits 1R33C2809C and 1R33R2071C located at elevation 638' in the cable spreading room. This separation violation was marked by a long ribbon with no means of traceable identification.

4 69

6.5.2.2.3 Division 2 Conduits 1R33R920B and 1R33C3033B were separated by 3-1/2" from Division 3 Conduits 1R33R2071C, 1R33C2809C, 1R33C2914C, and 1R33A129C located at elevation 638' in the cable spreading room.

6.5.2.2.4 Division 2 Conduit 1R33T329B was separated by 1-1/2" from Division 3 Conduit 1R33T330C located at elevation 638' in the cable spreading room.

6.5.2.2.5 Division 2 Conduit 1R33T329B was separated by 2-1/4" from Division 3 Conduit 1R33C291C located at evaluation 638' in the cable spreading room.

6.5.2.3 The failure to identify the above non-conforming conditions was considered to be an example of an item of noncompliance contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV.

(440/81-19-11; 441/81-19-11) 6.5.2.4 The inspectors observed several instances where conduits of different divisions were supported on a common hanger. The instances observed were:

6.5.2.4.1 At elevation 599' in the Auxiliary Building, Division 1 Conduit 1R33C1031A, Division 2 Conduit 1R33C1032B, Division 3 Conduit 1R33C1033C, and Non-Class 1E Conduits 1R33C1030X and 1R52W79X were supported on a common hanger.

6.5.2.4.2 At elevation 654' to 671' in the Intermediate Building, Division 2 Conduit 2D17R143B, and Division 4 Conduit 2D17R145D were supported on common hangers at various locations.

6.5.2.4.3 At elevation 654' in the Intermediate Building, Division 2 Conduits 1D17R143B, l

and 1D17R142B and Division 3 Conduit ID17R144C were supported on a common hanger.

6.5.2.4.4 At elevation 620' in the Unit 1 Turbine Power Complex, Division 1 Conduit 1R33R981A, Division 2 Conduits 1R33R988B and 1R33R983B, Division 3 Conduit 1R33R969C, and Division 4 Conduit 1R33R986D were supported on a common hanger.

70

I 6.5.2.4.5 At elevation 620' in the Unit 1 Turbine Power Complex, Division 1 Conduit 1R33R1054A, Divisica 3 Conduit 1R33R1051C and Division 4 Conduit 1R33R1048D were supported on a common hanger.

6.5.2.4.6 It was observed that Class 1E conduits contain divisional Engineering Safety Feature cables, the four reactor Pro-tection System Channel cables, and cables for equipment fed'directly from divisional buses. The inspectors expressed the concern that even though the basic separation criteria had been met in the above installations, the single failure criteria may not have been met. The single failure criteria

~

may not have been met in that a single credible event, involving any of the above hanger installations, could result in multiple equipment failures.

6.5.2.5 Pending further review, these matters are con-sidered unresolved. (440/81-19-12; 441/81-19-12).

6.6 Functional or Program Areas Inspected 6.6.1 Review of Corrective Action The inspectors verified the implementation of the

" Confirmation of Action Letter," issued to CEI by RIII on November 18, 1981 (Exhibit I).

6.6.1.1 The CEI Electrical QA issued Corrective Action Request (CAR) No. 81-08, dated November .16, 1981, to L. K. Comstock informing Comstock that I Comstock's QA program was not being effectively controlled. The CAR was based on several adverse observations during a cable pull in the Emergency Service Water Pump House.

i 6.6.1.2 CEI Issued Stop Work Order No. 81-02 to Comstock to terminate all cable pulling activities related to Class 1E cables covered in CEI Specification SP-33-4549-00.

6.6.1.3 L. K. Comstock QC issued "Stop Work" No. SWN1, dated November 17, 1982, to the field personnel terminating all Class 1E cable pulling activities.

71

6.6.1.4 On January 5, 1982, the NRC inspectors discussed the requirements of the latest revision of Comstock Cable Pulling Procedure, No. 4.3.3, with the licensee's engineers. As a result of the dis-cussions the licensee issued Addendum PA 4.3.3.,

dated January 5, 1982, to the procedure to clarify some requirements. The NRC inspectors reviewed the smendment and determined it was acceptable.

6.6.1.5 The inspectors reviewed the available documenta-tion of L. K. Comstock training, held subsequent to the " Step Work" order issued on November 16, ~

1981. LKC personnel were trained in the following areas:

(1) Cable Pulling Procsdure No. 4.3.3.

(2) Cable Tray and Conduit Identification Procedure No. 4.3.2.

(3) The requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and 10 CFR 21.

The RIII inspectors determined as of January 5, 1982, seventeen training sessions were conducted with approximately thirty hours of instruction presented by L. K. Comstock's Project Manager, Quality Control Manager, and Level II Quality Control Inspectors. The various training sessions were attended by the L. K. Comstock Quality Control Inspectors and craft workers.

Comstock administered examinations to their Quality Control Inspectors. Two inspectors failed the examination and their certifications were withdrawn.

CEI personnel were assigned to monitor the Comstock indoctrination and training program, and their findings were documented in Surveillance Inspection Reports.

I l 6.6.1.6 The licensee reviewed the Nonconformance Reports initiated by LKC relative to cable pulling ,

activities and prepared a list of open reports. '

Recommended corrective action was being expedited.

6.6.1.7 The licensee proposed to perform surveillance /

inspections according to Construction Quality Assurance Procedure 2-1001, Surveillance / Inspection Activities to verify Comstock's compliance to field quality contract requirements until confidence in LKC's performance has been achieved. The licensee 72

. o will perform Type "A" inspections as defined in the above procedure, which requires actual inspec-tions by CEI Quality Control Inspectors for compliance to applicable drawings, specifications and procedures.

6.6.2 Based on the above results, the NRC inspectors conc.urred with the licensee that LKC could restart safety-related cable pulling activities. On January 7, 1982, RIII personnel observed Comstock employees preparing to pull three cables identified as 1E31T64, 1E31T71A, and 1E31T63 at elevation 620' in the Control Complex from Power Generation Control Center terminal cabinet BHY to Junction Box JB-TB-24 at elevation 574' in the Auxiliary Building.

The Comstock QC inspectors walked down the cable route, which included Cable Tray Nos. 3818, 1683, 1678, 1682, 1681, 1660, 1690, 1652 1698, 1699, and conduits 1R33R1021A, JBI-2023, and 1R33T131A. The inspection identified that the marker identifying cable tray 1698 was missing and a Comstock employee was preparing to mark the cable tray before the cable pulling commenced.

6.7 Review of Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Items 6.7.1 CEI's final report to the NRC, under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e), for the torquing of electrical cable tray splice plate bolts was reviewed. The contents of CEI's letter, dated January 15, 1982, were discussed with the CEI and Gilbert Associates engineers at the Perry site.

6.7.2 At the RIII Inspectors' request cable trays and splice plates were set up and filled with SAE J429 Grade 5, 3/8" diameter, ribbed neck carriage bolts with serrated flange nuts. At least two bolts were tightened with each impact wrench which had been used to tighten the cable tray splices previously installed in the Perry Plant. The maximum possible torque developed by each impact wrench (IW) was measured by immediately applying a calibrated torque wrench. The results of these TGMs were:

IW Identification Torque Measured in ft.-lbs.

LKC 11-223 55, 55 E/C 10-190 55, 55 E/C 10-188 Not Tested; Wrench does not run LKC 11-180 Not Tested; Wrench does not run 5-81 Not Tested; Wrench does not run 5-77 Not Tested; Wrench does not run E/C 10-175 55, 55 LKC 11-227 25, 55 E/C 10-314 65, 65 10-593 60, 55 73

. a 11-229 60, 45 LKC 10-309 32, 40 LKC 11-226 55, 40 E/C 10-174 55, 50 E/C 10-184 75, 75 LKC 10-392 55, 50 LKC 10-464 70, 65 E/C 10-302 72, 68 LKC 10-462 60, 65 E/C 10-179 50,55

E/C 10-170 50, .5 5 Based on the above measured torque values, the NRC

• Inspectors established that bolts could not have been initially torqued above 75 ft.-lbs.

1 6.7.3 The RIII Inspectors reviewed the cable tray installation records and determined that some of the trays were installed as early as 1979. As such, if the carriage bolt seats in the cable tray and the serrated flange nut " bites" into the splice plate, after an elasped period a torque larger than the initial torque is necessary to turn the nut, especially due to rust formation. This is perhaps the reason that during a surveillance inspection some bolts needed 100 ft.-lbs. to turn the nut.

6.7.4 The RIII Inspectors reinspected cable trays for which inspection records indicated the bolts exhibited torque as low as 2 ft.-lbs. The inspectors observed that the carriage bolts were not seated on these cable tray sections. This is considered an important attribute for adequate torquing.

Based on the above observations the inspectors requested the licensee develop an inspection program with a checklist to verify the following attributes:

Proper seating of the carriage bolts in the cable tray.

Bolt heads were not ground off.

A minimum projection of the bolt from the serrated washer to indicate the minimum torque had been applied.

(

' On March 19, 1982, CEI and L. K. Comstock management per-sonnel assured the RIII Inspectors a 100% reinspection of installed cable tray splices would be conducted and corrective action would be taken wherever necessary. A preliminary draft of the inspection checklist was shown to the NRC inspectors prior to the conclusion of the inspection of the cable tray splices. The NRC Inspectors will review the results of this inspection prior to closing the 10 CFR 50.55(e) report on cable tray splices.

74

• D 6.8 Observations of Installed Cable Travs 6.8.1 The inspectors observed several cable trays, located at 620' in the Intermediate Building, which did not meet the minimum separation requirements. CEI Specification No. SP33-4549-00, Electrical Installations, Paragraphs 5:08.9.2. and 5:08.10.1.a. specify 14" between cable trays of the same division or between Class LE and Non-Class 1E cable trays. Examples of this condition observed were:

6.8.1.1 Division 1 Cable Tray A4079 separated from Division 1 Cable Tray A3008 by five inches.

6.8.1.2 Division 1 Cable Tray A4053 separated from Division 1 Cable Tray A3088 by five inches.

6.8.1.3 Non-Class 1E Cable Tray X2964 separated from Class 1E Cable Tray A3003 by 7-1/2 inches.

6.8.1.4 Non-Class 1E Cable Tray X3669 separated from Class 1E Cable Tray A4053 by 7-1/2 inches.

6.8.1.5 Cable Tray B1817 was vertically separated from Cable Tray B1324 by 9 5/8".

The inspectors informed the licensee of the above condi-tions. In response the licensee stated this installation would be analyzed. The matter is considered unresolved.

(440/81-19-13; 441/81-19-13).

6.8.2 While in the cable spreading room on the 638' elevation of the Control Complex the inspectors observed several Non-Class 1E cable trays filled with cables above the side rails. The inspectors informed the licenses that the theoretical 50% tray fill for control and low voltage power cable and 60% fill for instrumentation cable, as specified by the requirements of CEI Specification SP-33-4549-00, Paragraph 5:08.13.6, was not documented by actual field conditions. The ideal tray fill calcula-tions do not take into account any non-uniformity on which the cables are trained in the tray. The intent of the separation requirements was compromised if the cables were l above the side rail of the cable tray. The licensee agreed that this concern should be addressed in relevant specifi-cations and procedures to preclude overfill condition in safety-related trays. The matter is considered unresolved.

(440/81-19-14; 441/81-19-14).

6.8.3 The inspectors selectively verified whether the installed cable trays, prior to cables being pulled, met the require-ments of CEI Specification SP-33-4549-00 and Comstock's Procedure No. 4.3.3, Cable Pulling. Paragraph 5:08.17.2.e.

of Specification SP-33, states in part " Raceways shall be l

75 l

l

thoroughly inspected and cleaned prior to installing cable.

Abrasions or sharp edges which might cause cabla damage during installation shall be removed..." Paragraph 3.1.10.

of the L. K. Comstock cable pulling procedure requires that as a pre-requisite to cable pulling the " Raceway is clean and free from abrasions and sharp edges which might cause cable damage during installation."

The RIII Inspectors observed the following conditions contrary to the above requirements:

6.8.3.1 Cable Tray B1313, located at elevation 604' in -

Rocm No. 2 of the Auxiliary Building, contained j one sharp edge and one burr.

6.8.3.2 Cable Tray B1303, located at elevation 574' in the Control Complex, contained one sharp burr and one abrasion. The one cable which had been installed in the tray was observed to be hanging partially over the side rail of the tray.

6.8.3.3 Cable Tray B1324, located at elevation 620' in a cable chase in the Control Complex, contained one sharp edge and one abrasive burr. Cables had been installed in this cable tray and neither the sharp edge nor the burr had been previously identified. This indicates that inefficient cable prepull inspections were performed.

i 6.8.3.4 Cable tray A3201 contained one sharp edge /

l abrasion. Inspection Records were reviewed and indicated this cable tray was inspected and no adverse findings identified.

The above instances are additional examples of failure to perform adequate inspections, and are items of non-compliance contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Critetion X. (440/81-19-03; 441/81-19-03).

6.8.4 The RIII Inspectors observed several instances where cable tray splice bolts had not been properly seated in their i respective cable tray splice plate joints. This condition is contrary to the requirements of L. K. Comstock's Cable '

! Tray Installation Inspection Checklist, Form No. 17, Item 1.6 which requires, " bolts tight on splice joints."

Examples of cable trays with improper seating condition were:

6.8.4.1 Cable Tray A1699 located at column Line D-11 at elevation 599' in the Auxiliary Building. Three of eight splice bolts were not properly seated.

Cables had been placed in Tray A1699.

76

6.8.4.2 Cable Tray 1E21H1A located at column Line F-8 at elevation 579' in Room No. 2 of the Auxiliary Building. Two of eight splice bolts were not properly seated.

These were considered to be additional examples of failing to perform adequate inspections, an item of noncompliance contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X. (440/81-19-03; 441/81-19-03).

6.8.5 At the NRC Inspector's request, the LKC craft personnel demonstrated the tightness of the splice plate bolts of Cable Tray Sections B1324 and B1817. The Inspectors were unable to determine the torque value of the bolts because the torque wrench did not click at the set value of 50 ft.-lbs. The test was abandoned since a torque wrench with higher values was not available.

The Inspectors reviewed L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.3.1,

" Conduit and Cable Tray Installations, and determined torque value requirements had not been specified in Comstock ,

Procedure 4.3.1.

The inspectors were shown a L. K. Comstock memorandum addressed to " Field Personnel," dated September 21, 1981, which states in part " Effective September 21, 1981, all cable tray splice plate bolts shall be torqued to following requirements. . .using the small torque wrenches being used for this purpose will be returned to the warehouse." The inspectors reviewed the following documentation relative to this subject:

(1) Letter from the manufacturer, B-Line Systems of Highland, Illinois, dated December 20,197*, suggesting a maximum allowable torque of 45 ft.-lbs. to tighten the 3/8" - 16 x 3/4" rib neck carriage bolts tupplied for the cable tray splices.

(2) Five pages of Daily Surveillance Inspection Reports, dated August 25, 1981. Page 2 of 5 of this report identified " interface with QE lead, QE, GAI Lead, and LKC QA Manager-LKC is not working to specification.

l Torque Value is required on s,plice plate bolts."

(3) Surveillance Inspection Report SE-689 dated September 10, 1981, identified that based on the inspection of 20 randomly selected cable tray splices, Comstock had failed to meet the 45 ft.-lb.

torque requirements during the installation of the cable trays. CEI Deviation Analysis Report No. 068, dated September 11, 1981, was written indicating that L. K. Comstock installed cable trays throughout the plant without adhering to the requirements of 77

Drawing 213-008, Sheet 1 of 6, and the contents of B-Line System's letter of December 20, 1978. Noncon-formance Report No.2344 was also written.

(4) Telephone and conference memorandum dated, September 18, 1981, documented a telephone call to RIII reporting that the improper cable tray installation practice was being evaluated for a potential 10 CFR 50.55(e) deficiency.

i Neither CEI's 10 CFR 50.55(e) Report nor Noncomformance Report No. 2344 identified that L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.3.1, Cable Tray Installations, was deficient in that it did not specify the cable tray splice plate bolt torque.

The RIII Inspectors informed CEI that L. K. Comstock Procedure 4.3.1., Cable Tray Installations, did not specify the torque to be applied to the cable tray splice bolts; thereby failing to translate the manufacturer's requirements, set forth in a letter of December 1978. This is another l

example of an item of noncompliance, contrary to the re-quirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

(440/81-19-01; 441/81-19-01).

6.9 Installed 4.16KV Switchgear Unit 1 6.9.1 The 4.16KV switchgear, supplied by Gould, Inc., was installed at the locations specified in Drawing E-001-033, Revision 14, titled, Plant Layout Control Room Complex 620'6. Various sections of the switchgear have been turned over to the Start-Up Section on an interim basis and are currently under the administrative control of that section.

From conversations with plant personnel the RIII Inspectors  ;

learned the seismic Category 1 equipment hold down welds had not been inspected. The NRC Inspectors discussed the  ;

start-up procedural requirements with the licensee's repre-sentatives on January 3,1982, and determined the current j " interim-turn-over" arrangements were deficient in that they do not recognize the present status of construction. l I

In the case cf the 4.16KV switchgear the status of the hold down welds was indeterminate, and a Hold Tag" to indicate the inceeplete installation was not affixed to the energized 4.16KV switchgear.

CEI Corporate Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Quality Assurance Program 1500, Project Administration Pro-cedure 1504, Contractor Initiated Nonconformance Reports, Paragraph 1.2.2.2, states, " Hold tags...shall identify specifically the nonconforming condition of the item 1

, l 78 . l

affected by the NR and shall be placed in a conspiciuous location..."

L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.11, Ncnconforming Items and Corrective Action, Paragraph 5.5, states, "unless otherwise author'ized by CQE (in writing), nonconforming items are either segregated, marked, or identified with a hold tag...

to indicate their status and prevent inadvertent use or installation."

Contrary to the above requirements, a hold tag was not affixed to energized 4.16KV switchgear to indicate the indeterminate status of the switchgear's hold down welds. -

This is considered to be an item of noncompliance to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

(440/31-19-11, 441-81/19-11).

6.9.2 The RIII Inspectors conducted an in-depth review of the circumstances under which the 4.16KV switchgear was in-stalled and later turned over on an interim basis to the i Start-up Section. The switchgear was energized by the start-up section. The switchgear hold down welds were installed in 1980. The welds had not been inspected because acceptance / rejection criteria had not been developed. A Nonconformance Report had not been written to document that all requirements had been satisfied to consider the equipment installation complete.

The inspectors reviewed the procedures applicable to the switchgear and determined they either did not complement each other or that they were not completely implemented

~

for an orderly transition from construction sectus to preoperationsi status or start-up. The procedure re-

viewed were

6.9.2.1 Paragraph 1.2 of Corporate Nuclear Quality Assurance Program 1100, Revision 1, dated November 5, 1979, for Test Control requires

! control measures be established for test pro-grams which include equipment or system defi-ciencies identifiad during the course of testing programs. The deficiencies shall be documented by Nonconformance Reports and/or approved test deficiency reporting procedures. The RIII In-spectots informed the licensee that information contained in the " Field Question" and " Problem Sheets" which had been used to record deficiencies, rather than Nonconformance Reports are not entered in the Nonconformance or Deficiency Reporting Systems. As such the current deficiency reporting system relative to the 4.16KV switchgear may not be adequate.

79

6.9.2.2 Project Administration Procedure 1103, Revision 1, dated January 12, 1981, addressed the imp 1'menta-e tion of the above procedure. This procedure pro-vides an overview of the equipment turnover process and outlines the administrative responsibilities-and requirements necessary to facilitate the transition of completed work from contractors to the Nuclear Construction Section (NCS), from NCS to the Nuclear Test Section (NTS), from NTS t'o the Perry Plant Department (PPD), and from NCS to PPD. Paragraph 1.2.2. of this procedure re-quires that checks be made by the contractor on the installed equipment to verify that the equip--

ment has been installed per the installation specifications and drawings prior to interim release to the Nuclear Test Section. EIt also references Construction Quality Assurance Pro-cedure 2-1101. The inspectors informed the licenses that the above procedure appeared to i have been apparently inadequately implemented relative to the 4.16KV installation.

6.9.2.3 The Procedure 2-1101, titled " Construction Quality

- Section Interface for Turnover," Revision 0, effective date September 8, 1980, provides direc-tion to the various elements of the~ Construction

- Quality Section relative to system turnover, interim release and turnback. Section 1.2. of this procedures requires the review of open deficiencies (Deficiency Reports and Nonconform-f ance Reports) and items on conditional release.

6.9.2.4 CEI Program Quality Assurance Procedure 1-1101, Revision 0, effective September 18, 1980, titled

" Program Quality Section Procedure for Turnover" delineates the responsibilities and procedures for the interim release of given equipment from the Nuclear Construction Section to the Nuclear Test Section. One of the requirements of this procedure is that hardware problems identified l

during the Interim Release are to be documented ,

• in accordance with Construction Quality Assurance Procedure 2-1501, Nonconformances.

6.9.2.5 The inspectors stated that in instances where

" Field Questions" or " Problem Questions" were written to obtain clarifications, instead of ,-

"Nonconformance Reports" as required in CEI Procedure 2-1501, then these instances were not entered into the syster alerting the " start-up" personnel that outstanding deficiencies exist. ,

80 e

p ,- ---- p. p y y .eq

6.9.2.6 Nuclear Test Section Procedure 6-1401, Revision 1, dated August 1, 1980, " Construction Followup.

and Walkdown," relates to the construction follow-up activities, including walkdown, which shall precede the turnover of systems from construction to the Nuclear Test Section. The' inspection '

determined that construction followup on 4.16KV installation was not performed prior to turnover of 4.16KV switchgear.

The licensee agreeded with the NRC inspectors that*the various procedures did not complement each other and -

stated that they would review the matter. This matter

, was considered unresolved. (440/81-19-15; 441/81-19-15).

6.9.3 The inspectors reviewed the Insta11aton Requirements on manufacturer's drawings for Indoor Metalclad Switchgear.

The reviewed drawings were Gould, Inc. Nos. E-35-51-958-E231 and E-35-51-958-E233, both Revision 4 and both dated

. April 2, 1979. These drawings were approved by Gilbert

~

Associates, Inc. on October 9,.1981. Note 5 on the drawings states, " Seismic shock requirements: All eight (8) holes shown must be used for welding each cubicle to channel base.

Welds must not be ground." The drawing requires plug welds on 7/16" diameter holes.

~

CEI Specification SP-33, Electrical Installations was reviewed and required all welding to be performed to AWS D1.1. Paragraph 2.8.2 of the AWS D1.1 did not permit plug welds if the diameter of .the hole for a plug weld was greater than 2 - 1/4 times the thickness of the weld.

The thickness of the 4.16KV. cubicle. sheet steel was 1/16".

Therefore, plus welds should not have been used. The inspectors informed the licensee that Gilbert Associates, Inc. (the Architect-Engineer) failed to adequately review

-the Gould, Inc. drawings and-identify that welding instructions on these drawings did not comply with the l

requirements of AWS D1.1.

There were two concerns: (1) inadequacies in the design review process; (2) the as-built condition gust be evaluated and appropriate corrective action taken. This is an item of noncompliance, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III.- (440/81-19-16; 441/81-19-16).

6.9.5 Installed 4.16KV Switchaear. Unit 2 L .

The 4.16KV switchgear was installed in locations specified in Drawing E-001-033, Revision 14, titled " Plant Layout Control Room Complex 620'6"." The Unit 2 switchgear was not energized, and at the inspectors' request the front l

81

e 3

'and rear panels were removed to observe the welds. The inspectors observed gapsLbetween the switchgear and the

' embeds. Hold down welds were made according to ECNs 4245-33-636 and 4384-33-665. Some welds did not meet the_ requirements of AWS D1.1 and were unacceptable.

However, L. K. Comstock had not performed final weld inspections. Prior to_ the conciscion of the RIII inspec-tion, the L. K. Comstock welding QC inspector. inspected the welds and documented the findings in a Nonconformance Report.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

6.9.6 Review of 4.16KV Switchaear Installation Records; Units 1 and 2

The RIII Inspectors reviewed the documentation related to the installation of the 4.16 KV switchgear and determined the following

6.9.6.1 Various " Problem Sheets" and " Field Questions" I were written in early 1980 explaining that the gaps between the switchgear and the embedded steel exceeded the requirements of CEI Specifica-tion SP-33, Electrical Installations. Engineering Change Notices (ECNs) 4245-33-636 and 4384-33-665 were written and provided alternate methods to weld.

6.9.6.2 The L. K. Comstock "Decumentation Packages" for the installed 4.16KV switchgear were reviewed.

No records existed to indicate that fit-up was inspected prior to welding, the sizes of the shims used, or of the welding process specified in the AWS D1.1. had been verified. L. K. Comstock

~

Quality Control did not'have any in process weld inspection records. CEI Specification SP-33, Electrical Installations, required all welding to be performed to AWS D1.1.

6.9.6.3 The Comstock,'s " Document Packages" for the 4.16KV switchgear did not have any records to indicate that the various sections of the 4.16KV switchgear were bolted together and torqued to the manufacturer's recommendations. There were no records to indicate that Connock QC had verified the bolts connecting the various sections were torqued to 35-40 ft.-lbs., as specified by the manufacturer.

l r

82

a 6.9.6.4 L. K. Comstock Form No. 32 listed the various inspection attributes required before the 4.16KV switchgear installations was considered accept-able. The Forms 32 were incomplete.

The inspectors informed the licenses that requirements to perform necessary inspections of the 4.16KV switchgear had

' not been established, and therefore the inspections were not performed and documented to. assure the installation of safety-related 4.16KV switchgest was adequate. The failure to develop quality assurance inspection requirements was another example of an item of noncompliance contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X.

(440/81-19-03; 441/81-19-03).

6.9.7 Review of Proposed Corrective Action on 4.16KV Switchaear Installations The RIII inspectors reviewed the procedures developed by CEI to correct the inadequacies in the installation and inspection of the 4.16KV switchgear installations.

The Procedura SPP-001, Revision 1, dated March 18, 1982, developed specifically for this purpose outlines the following:

a. The 4.16KV switchgear was de-energized on March 5,1981.

b. L. K. Comstock and CEI Nuclear Test Section (NTS) personnel inspected the switchgear to the latest Gould/GAI drawings. Nonconformance Report No. OQC-101, dated February 9,1982, was prepared and identified a secondary contact block with a stripped terminal connection.

c. NTS' reviewed all previously identified Nonconformance - .

Reports and the results of the maintenance program.

l

d. Construction Quality Section (CQS)'to review Comstock's documentation packages.

e. Project Quality Section to review the Nuclear Test Services' documentation.

f. The switchgear manufacturer was to be contacted for additional information on welding, bolting and plumness.

4

' g. Prepare a current list of all open Nonconformance Reports on the switchgear.

i

h. Disposition all identified Nonconformance Reports and implement the fixes.

4 83 i

.m . ...,- ,-, -+ ~ ,., .m,w,,,n-- .-,..n~..,m,w,--,.----.--

i. ' Resolve the problems-behind CEI's "Stop Work" on L. K. Comstock welding. Rescind the Stop Work so that L. K. Comstock completes the welds on the switchgear.

J. Implement approved corrective action to roweld the switchgear.

k. Re-energize the 4.16KV switchgear.

Inspections performed'for this_ corrective action will be documented. ' CEI proposed to develop similar procedures to correct inadequacies in the installation of 480 volt unit substations and 480 volt Motor Control centers.

6.10 480 Volt Unit Transformer Substations. Units 1 and 2 The RIII personnel examined unit transformer substations 1R23S010 and 2R23S015 installed in the Control Room Complex.

Field Variation Authorization (FVA) 2072-33-253 was initiated to identify that_the internal configuration of these transformers did not allow adequate space to weld. In a letter dated June 12, 1980, the manufacturer (Gould Brown Boveri) provided an alternate welding method which was subsequently implemented. Four 1/4" x 4" welds were specified. The sequence of the assembly of the various sections of the switchgear compartments was not reviewed in depth during this V. inspection. However, the RIII Inspector determined from discussions with L. K. Comstock personnel that a checklist, indicating the correct sequence to be followed during installation, the dates of in-process inspections, and the status of completed installations,_

had not been developed and implemented. For example, there were no documents to indicate that Quality Control Inspectors verified the torquing of the bolts attaching two sections of tho'switchgear or that the Quality Control Inspectors examined the welds during' the installation. Documented installation procedures vers not .

available.

This condition is another example of an item of noncompliance contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X.

(440/81-19-03; 441/81-19-03)

I 6.11 480 Volt Motor Control Centers. Units 1 and 2 The RIII Inspectors observed carbon steel shim plates of various, thickness had been used to maintain the level' between the installed 480 Volt Motor Control Center (MCC), supplied by Cutler and Hammer, and the embedded steel. Slots were punched in the shim plates and slot welds attached the shim plates to the embeds. These slot welds cannot be inspected now. The MCCs vere welded to the shim plates with 1/4" x 3" welds at the corners and one 1/4" x 1" weld where two cubicles meet.

84

. _ _ _  :,_____. __ _ . m me . . . _ , _

The RIII Inspectors reviewed the L. K. Comstock weld inspection.

records. The Comstock records do not specifcally indicate that the slot welds had been inspect led and accepted. There were no welding'

'in-process inspection records to indicate that fit-up was verified.-

i There were no records to indicate that various sections of the MCCs were bolted together and torqued to the specified value.- A checklist had not been developed and implemented to indicate the correct sequence of installation, the dates of in process inspections, and the status of completion of installation. Inadequate development' of inspection requirements is another example of an item of non-compliance contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X. (440/81-19-03; 441/81-19-03). -

6.12 Examination of Installed DC Distribution Panels i

The RIII personnel examined Direct Current (DC) Distribution Panels i No. 1R425012 and No. 1R42S013, manufactured by Powell Electric Manu-facturing Company. These DC distribution panels were installed in Control Building, Elevation 638'; per Drawing GAI 4549-GI-025-2.

Four 1/4" X 4" welds were used to hold down the equipment. The weld inspection report, dated May 8, 1981, was reviewd. This inspection

[ report indicated the welds were acceptable. -The NRC inspectors i independently inspected the welds and concurred with the previous inspection findings. An inspection Report, dated December 31, 1981, identified the switches in the panels were not uniquely identified as required by Paragraph 7, Item-1:05.7 of Specification SP-33-45-49-80 4:09 The RIII Inspectors could not readily. determine how corrective action would be taken. This is an unresolved item. (440/81-19-17; 441/81-19-17) 6.13 Flammable Components in Installed Switchaear 6.13.1 The RIII Inspectors observed that flammable grommets were used in safety-related Motor Control Centers. These gros-mets are used to protect cables from sharp edges in the holes where cables enter the Motor Control Centers. At the NRC inspectors' request, the licensee authorized a QC inspector and a test engineer to reinspect the 4.16KV switchgear, 480 volt switchgear, 480 volt Motor Control Centers and D.C. switchgear to identify and report any l

flammable materials. The licensee's inspection disclosed flammable terminal block covers and plastic spirals to bundle wires together were used in the switchgear. At the NRC inspectors' request, the licensee reviewed the purchase specifications and determined that only IEEE Standard 323 (Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations) was referenced.

The foreword of IEEE Standard 323 references IEEE Standard 383-1974, Guide for Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. IEEE Standard 383 requires l

85 ,

l

- . - - - - _ - - - _ _ - _ _ .2_.

I tests to demonstrate that cables are' fire-retardant.

Conformance to IEEE Standard 420-1973 " Trial-Use Guide for Class 1E Control Switch Boards for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, has not been required in the purchase orders.

The NRC inspectors reviewed the Perry Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), determined that conformance to IEEE Standard 383 was required on FSAR Page 8.1-6. .IEEE Standard 420 was not referenced in the FSAR. The licensee

- agreed to discuss this matter with Gilbert' Associates, Incorporated, their Architect-Engineer. Pending review of the results, this matter is considered unresolved.

(440/81-19-18; 441/81-19-18).

6.13.2. The RIII Inspectors observed mounting bases installed in-Class 1E motor control centers to support and train cable bundles. From discussions with cognizant personnel the inspectors determined that there were three different types of cable tie mounting bases being used in the switchgear.

All three types were manufactured by the Thomas and Betts Corporation (T&B) and were approved by Gilbert Associates .

for use in Class 1E and Non-Class 1E applications,~as follows:

(1) T&B catalog No. TC345A which has an adhesive mounting base.

(2) T&B-catalog No. TC345 which is mounted with epoxy.

(3) T&B catalog No. TC5344A which also has an adhesive mounting base.

The onsite Gilbert Engineers in the letter PY-K&H/LKC-54, dated October 12, 1981, approved the use of mounting bases

' T345A and TC-345 with Class 1E cables. Mounting TC-5344A,

was approved for use with, Non-Class 1E cables. .

L. K. Comstock ordered 4000 type TC-345A and 2000 type TC-345 mounting bases on October 20, 1981, in their Turchase Order 5121001-1098. Comstock Purchase Order 5121001-1098 referenced the nonsafety-related Specification 34; therefore, the material was ordered as nonsafety-related material, and was signed by their QA/QC supervisor. The Purchase Order was not corrected to remove the reference to the non-safety related material specification.

The RIII inspectors toured the L. K. Comstock storage areas and determined that safety-related material was inadequately controlled.- Hardware (i.e. , bolts , nuts, mounting bases) intended for safety-related installations was stored in bins. Newly purchesed material was mixed with the stock on 86

_n-, , w,n---~n n e ~-,-mm e -- .n w. n ,- s em -,e--o---,~,---- , - - - , , - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4 hand. As such any defective hardware could not be retrieved to assure the defective hardware was not used in safety-related installations.

The RIII inspectors informed the licensee that L. K. Comstock had failed to adequately control' purchased material.

L. K. Comstock had purchased safety-related material, as nonsafety-related material, when they referened the non-safety-related Specification 34 instead of the safety-related Specification 33. Also, L. K. Comstock had not

- - established adequate measures in their stockroom to con-trol purchased material intended for safety-related in-

• stallations. This is an item of noncompliance, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII. (440/81-19-19; 441/81-19-19) 6.14 Separation Walls The RIII Inspectors observed that the separation wall between redundant safety-related switchgear at elevation 620' in the Control Complex consisted of sheet steel and drywall. The inspectors re-

' viewed the design basis for the partition walls separating the redundant switchgear trains and determined the following:

The commitment in FSAR Paragraph 3.5.3. states, in part, "The exposed walls and roofs of Seismic Category 1 structures have a minimum concrete thickness of 24 inches and are reinforced each way on each face with a minimum of No.- 8 bars at 12 inch center i to center for walls and No. 9 bars at 12 inch center-to-center

, for elabs... Interior structural elements used as barriers to

! contain internally generated missiles are also of reinforced

concrete of the same thickness and minimum reinforcement as exterior walls and roofs."

The commitment in FSAR Paragraph 8.3.1.4.1.1. is, in part, ,

" Electrical equipment and wiring for Class 1E electrical systems are segregated into separate divisions,.. . , such that no single credible event is capable of disabling sufficient equipment to prevent reactor shutdown, removal of decay heat from the core, and isolation of containment in the event of an incident. Division separation requirements apply to equipment and wiring concerned.

Switchgear, batteries, and similar electrical equipment for each division are housed in separate rooms within the control complex and are completely separated from redundant division equipment."

This matter is considered unresolved pending additional review as to whether the separation wall between redundant safety-related switchgear on the 620' elevation of the Control Complex meets the above criteria. (440/81-19-20; 441/81-19/20) 87

d 6.15 Electrical Hanner Installations 6.15.1 The RIII Inspectors examined selected hangers which' support electrical cable trays. These hangers were fabricated and installed by L. K. Comstock. The observ- -

ations focused on the shop welds and field welds. The

.results are as follows:

6.15.1.1 Hanger ICC1-T-72 installed at approximate floor

}, . elevation 574' in the Control Complex meets the

! requirements of Drawing SS-213-111, Sheet T-72, Revision A, and the connections meet detail Types A, 1S, and C. -

6.15.1.2 Hanger 1CCl-T-73 installed at approximate floor elevation 574' in the Control Complex meets the requirements of Drawing SS-213-111, Sheet T-73, Revision A, and connections meet detail Types A, 15, 45, SS, and Hl.

6.15.1.3 Hanger 1AX2-T24 installed at approximate floor elevation 599' in the Auxiliary Building meetings the requirements of Drawing SS-213-222-T24, Revision A, and connections meet detail Types A and IC.

6.15.1.4 Hanger 1AX2-T25 installed at approximate floor elevation 599' in the Auxiliary Building meets

! the requirements of Drawings SS-213-222-T25, i

Revision A, and connections meet detail Types B, 1C and'3C. XX 6.15.1.5 _ Hanger 1AX2-T29 installed at approximate floor elevation 599' in the Auxiliary Building meets

• l the requirements of Drawing SS-213-222-T29'and I connections meet detail Types 1C, F7, F4, and A.

6.15.1.6 Haager 1CC-T111 installed in the Switchgear Room at elevation 620' of the Control Complex meets the requirements of Drawing 55-213-131, Sheet Till, Revision A, and the connections meet details Types A, 15, and 25. Construction Quality Assurance Report dated May 1, 1979, and Noncon-formance Report LKC-389, Revision 1, dated October 1, 1980, identified undercut, slag, weld spatter, and are strikes on some of these welds. Audit Finding Report No. 92 identified that corrective action was verified and determined acceptable. 1 6.15.1.7 Hanger 1CC3-T110 installed in the switchgear room at elevation 620' of the Control Complex meets the  !

88

. . . _ - . - _ - _ - . ~ , - , - - _ , . - _ . . - _ . - ._ -. .. - _.. - _ -

requirements of Drawing SS-213-131, Sheet T110,

< Revision A, and the connections meet detail Types A, 15 and 2S. Audit Finding Report No. 72, dated June 19, 1979,' identified undercut, weld spatter and are strikes. Audit Finding Report No. 92 dated August 21, 1979, verified that the above unacceptable conditions were corrected and l

determined acceptable.

6.15.2 The RIII Inspectors did not review the material certi-fications on the angle-iron and gusset plates used to fabricate the hangers.

The licensee and contractor personnel stated that material certification on the angle-iron used were available, but the traceability on the gusset plates cannot be established.

The Gusset Plate heat numbers were not transferred when the purchased plate 'was cut into smaller pieces. Pending review of this matter further, this is considered unresolved.

(440/81-19-21; 441/81-19-21).

6.16 Instrumentation Hanner Installations Johnson Controls, Inc. (JCI) fabricated and installed the instrument and instrument tube supports. The RIII Inspectors examined several of the instrument tube installations,

)

j 6.16.1 The inspectors observed installed instrument Rack i

No. H22-P018 for the Residual Heat Removal System (RKR)

Rack No. H22-P018 was installed at elevation 599' of the Auxiliary Building outside Room No. 3. JCI Drawings No.1H51-P1202-R, Sheet 1 of 2 and 2 of 2, were prepared based on Architect-Engineer's Drawing GAI B-809-495. The installation, including the welds, was acceptable. JCI Quality Control Inspectors.had not performed the final inspections.

6.16.2 The inspectors reviewed the following records:

F.leid Material Requisitions listing all the hardware material required for the installation.

Installation Fabrication Planner with provisions to document the inspections and test results, the owner (CEI) and the Authorized Inspectors (AI) reviews.

Sequence of Installation Planner with provisions for signoffs on hold points, in-process inspections, AI and CEI inspections.

89

. - _ _ - . . . , _ _ _ . . . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ - . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ - - - . - _ _

. o Weld Data Report identified the weld numbers, the sandatory hold points for fitup and other inspections.

The JCI visual inspection Procedure, QA-QAS-1001-PNPP, Revision II, dated June 30, 1981, in Paragraph I.4.

requires the tube to be retracted _1/16" from a socket prior to fit-up and welding. This aspect is verified during the " fit-up and alignment" holdpoint.

No adverse findings.were identified in the documentation package.

6.16.3 The RIII Inspectors observed Hanger No. H12 installed at i elevation 590' in the Control Complex. This hanger i

supports the control complex chiller instrumentation tubing. JCI craft installed this hanger to detail Drawing OH31-PO193, Sheet 3 of 3. JCI QC inspectors inspected the hanger and determined the installation was acceptable. The NRC inspectors visually inspected the hanger and questioned the installation.

At the NRC inspector's request the hanger was reinspected.

' It was determined that the angle between two of the three i

members was out-of-tolerance as specified in Appendix H-15 of Design Report No. 1937 attached to Specification No. SP-90-044549-00. As a result CEI initiated Audit Report (AR) 417 prior to the conclusion of the RIII inspection. The AR identified the installation drawing 4

did not contain adequate information for proper instal-

' lation and inspection. Recommended corrective action was to provide train ug to JCI engineering personnel and to correct the drawing, as the installation angle violates the 14' tolerance specified in Appendix H-15 of Design Report No. 1937. Appendix H-15 of Design Report No. 1937 related to the seismic support spacing criteria for tubing. Also, Recommended for corrective action was to sc' rap the existing hanger, fabricate a new hanger and rework the installation.

Pending review of the corrective action taken, this is considered unresolved. (440/81-19-22; 441/81-19-22) 6.17 Drawinz Control Verification 6.17.1 The RIII personnel located and reviewed various Gilbert Associates, Inc. (GAI) electrical installation drawings, located at work stations in the Control Complex, Inter-mediate Building, and Auxiliary Building. The GAI Drawings reviewed were:

04-454955-213-221, Sheet T9, Revision A 04-4349S5-213-221, Sheet T35, 90 ,

i

, . - - - ,-_ - - . - . , , - . . . J 'J '. .--,-L,----.------ - - . . _ . _ - -

04-4549SS-213-221, Sheet T57, 04-4549SS-213-221, Sheet T58, 04-4549D-215-161-501, Revision C 04-4549D-214-004, Revision H

. 04-4549D-215-002, Revision G 04-4549D-214-471, Revision J

04-4549D-215-451, Revision G 04-4549D-201-132, Revision E 04-4549D-201-145, Revision A 04-4549D-213-612, Revision B 04-4549D-215-614, Revision G 04-4549D-215-432, Revision F 04-4549D-215-651, Revision H -

04-4549D-209-206, Revision A 04-4549D-015-056,' Revision 3 04-4549D-414-207, Revision F 04-4549-61-007-5, Revision 5 04-4549-58-140-2, Revision 2 04-4549-70A-001-0, 04-4549-64-028-3, 04-4549D-201-120, Revision B 04-4549-64-098-0,

, The RIII Inspectors then verified that the above drawings were the most current version issued. No items of non-compliance with NRC requirements were identified.

6.17.2 On February 23, 1982, the inspectors reviewed drawings pertaining to the 4.16KV switchgear at the L. K. Comstock i foreman's work area on the 620' elevation of the Control Complex. These drawings were prepared by Gould, Inc.,

Switchgear Division, and were titled, " General Arrangement Drawings; Indoor Metal Clad Switchgear." Each drawing had i both Gould and Gilbert identification numbers. The drawings

. are. identified in Table 3.

91 4

s I

• i l

i i

i Table 3 l

! Review of Gould/ Gilbert Drawings, entitled, " General Arrangement Drawings; i Indoor Metal Clad Switchgear."

l Gould Gilbert Associates j Drawing Revision Revision Drawing Revision Date or

, leo . 10 0 . Dete ago. IIe . AnoroveI l 33-51956-E-227 1 12/2/77 gal-4549-58-027 2 4/8/78 j 33-51958-E-228 1 12/2/77 gal-4549-58-028 2 4/8/78 i 33-51958-E-230 1 12/2/77 GAI-4549-58-030 2 4/8/78 i 33-51958-E-231 1 12/2/77 cal-4549-58-031 2 4/8/78 33-51958-E-232 1 12/2/77 cal-4549-58-032 2 4/8/78

! 33-41958-E-233 1 12/2/77 gal-4549-58-033 2 4/8/78 i

i i

}

l I

}

l i

1 5

.During a previous inspection, on February 2, 1982, two of the drawings, namely, GAI-4549-58-031~ and GAI-4549-58-033, were observed in the L. K. Comstock General Fereman's shack on the 620' elevation of the Control Complex. ~ The General-Foreman was in possession of Revision 4 of both drawings.

Review of records at the site's Document Control Center indicated Revision 4 was the most recent revision of these drawings. Gould's Revision 4 was dated April 2, 1979, and was approved by Gilbert Associates on October 9, 1981.

. Available installation records for the 4.16KV switchgear .

i -

were reviewed and disclosed the switchgear was installed during August 1980. A review of the revisions to the Gould drawing indicated the information contained in the drawing revisions did not have any effect on the actual installation. Rather, the drawing revisions dealt with' modifications to the components within the switchgear.

L. K. Comstock Procedure No. 4.2.1., Drawing and Specification Document Control, states in part, "3.5.4. Returning void drawings, the recipient shall

! sign the field drawing transmittal (Form 52-A - void issue return line) and return it with the void drawings-to the Documer.t Control Coordinator..."

(

i. "3.6. Void drawings will be returned by receipients or from the field by the General Foreman within two'(2) i working days of the issuance date noted on the field drawing transmittal fora..." ,

The inspectors informed the licensee that, L. K. Comstock i Company had failed to control the revisions of six " General l Arrangement. Drawings" for the 4.16KV switchgear (Table 3).

This condition is considered an item of noncompliance and is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI. (440/81-19-23; 441/81-19-23)

Prior to the conclusion of the inspection, the L. K. Comstock Document Control staff retrieved the six outdated drawings from the foreman's work area on the 620' elevation of the Control Complex. On February 24, 1982, RIII personnel confirmed the six drawings had been removed from the foreman's area.

7. Review of Timeliness of Corrective Actions The responsiveness of L. K. Comstock to CEI's audit findings was examined.

A review of CEI's Open Action Audit Reports disclosed thirteen findings identified during seven separate audits (from November 29, 1978 through December 1981) remained open. Nine of the thirteen findings had been open 92

for more than one year (November 29, 1978 - October 21, 1980). The,four i

remaining open findings had been reported during-October 1981.-

CEI's Open Observation Audit Reports were reviewed and indicated twenty- ,

eight observation audits, written during 1981, had not been answered by L. K. Comstock. Fifteen of the open observation audits were written during December 1981. None of the remaining open observation findings pre-dated March 2, 1981.

On February 24, 1982, the total number of Open Observation Audit Reports for all contractors / organizations at the Perry Site was:

Organization Year Audited: 1982 1981 1980 1979 -

I 1

Pullman Power Products 5 7 0 0 Newport News Industrial Corp. 0 0 2 1 L. K. Comstock Company 1 28 0 0 Johnsen Controls, Inc. 2 0 0 0 i Metalweld, Inc. 2 3 0 0 National Engineering 4 2 0 0 Robert Irsay Company 1 1 0 0 Nuclear Design Section 0 1 0 0 Pittsburgh Bridge 8 Iron 0 2 0 0 Construction Quality Control 0 1 0 0 Nuclear Engineering 0 1 0 0

. U.S. Testing 0 1 0 0 0 4 General Electric 0 0 i (TOTALS) 15 51 2 1 I

l

- CEI's lead electrical quality engineer was interviewed to determine the reason (s) for what appeared to be L. K. Coastock's poor performance in  !

closing out CEI audit findings. The Quality Engineer advised that two

! reasons existed for this trend. One was the former L. K. Comstock l Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC) Supervisor'(holding that position from April through January 1982) attempted to answer all the audit findings by himself, and since the QA/QC Supervisor had other responsibilities this caused a slow-down in audit responses. The Quality Engineer felt this problem was remedied on February 1, 1982, when the former QA/QC Supervisor became the fulltime QC Supervisor and L. K. Comstock hired a separate QA Manager. The second reason for the trend was the number of personnel (three quality control inspectors and i one quality engineer) available to the Electrical Quality Engineering Section to verify the implementation of the L. K. Comstock answers to the audit findings. All were tasked with overseeing L. K. Coastock's daily activities and seldom had sufficient time away from their daily assignments to verify past audit finding implementation.

The lack of responsiveness of L. K. Comstock in answering CEI's Open Action Audit and Observation Audit Reports was considered to be an integral part of the problems discussed in the following paragraph.

l

93 <

1

_ a.: . == :w-  : - 2

. 8. Review of The Licensee's Overview Program The inspectors reviewed in detail the licensee's overview program insti-

~tuted subsequent to the NRC's Immediate Action Letter of February 1978.

~

That letter had identified inadequacies.in their QA program implementation.

A part of the overview program was to assess the effectiveness of the various contrn. tors' QA programs. The NRC inspectors reviewed the li-~

consee's assessments of L. K. Comstock documented in CEI's Assessment Reports of Quality Assurance Program Effectiveness (AROQAPE) covering the period January 1981 through February 1982. The NRC inspectors also reviewed the quality control rating in the " Contractor Perfe mance Report" (CPR) during the s'ame period. The following are the highlights:

Period AROQAPE CPR January 1981 Belcw Standard Below Standard ,.

February 1981 Shown some improvement but .Shown improvement but remains below standard remains unsatisfactory March 1981 Shows improvement and Showed improvement; now rated satisfactory rated standard i

April 1981 Satisfactory Satisfactory May 1981 Satisfactory Satisfactory June 1981 Satisfactory Satisfactory July 1981 Satisfactory Satisfactory l

August 1981 Satisfactory Standard i September 1981 Satisfactory Standard October 1981 Unsatisfactory Below Standard November 1981 Unsatisfactory Below Standard December 1981 Below Standard Below Standard January, 1982 Satisfactory Unavailable February, 1982 Satisfactory Unavailable j Satisfactory" is defined in the AROQAPE as "The program Management

! spproach is adequate; however, deficiencies in one or more aspects may, if not corrected, result in adverse effects on the desired quality or in achieving project goals."

94

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y ~ -. . _ . . .

. . o The NRC inspectors informed the licenses that the licensee had failed to l'

assure that L. K. Comstock had adequately implemented the Quality Assurance Program at the Perry Site by not conducting in-depth reviews to investigate the unsatisfactory and below standard performance rating identified in the AROQPE's and CPR's during 1981. Further, CEI had failed to identify the

findings of this investigation independent of the NRC.

CEI informed the inspectors that CEI was in the process of an assessment of

, all contractors at the Perry site. Pending review this matter is considered unresolved pending the receipt of the results of CEI's investigation (440/81-19-24;-441/81-19-24).

i 9. Unresolved Items i Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to determine whether they are acceptable, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during this investigation are dis-cussed in Paragraphs 3.3.7.4, 3.4.3.2, 3.4.4.2, 3.4.5.6, 3.4.6.2, 6.4.2, 6.5.2.4, 6.8.1, 6.9.2.6.

10. Meetinas with CEI Manatement On February 10, 1982, a meeting was held in the RIII Office, Glen Ell'yn, Illinois, with the CEI Management personnel indicated in Paragraph 1.1 of l this report. CEI made certain committaents to the RIII staff during the l meeting and by~1etter, dated February 18, 1982 (Exhibit XIV).

On March 19, 1982, the results of this investigation were discussed with Mr. M. R. Edelman, CEI's Manager of Nuclear Engineering and others as ,

indicated in Paragraph 1.1 of this report. The scope and' findings of the investigation were summarized and the licenses acknowledged the information.

On June 18, 1982, an enforcement meeting was held in the RIII Office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois, with the CEI management personnel indicated in Paragraph 1.1 of this report. The RIII staff discussed the findings of this report and notified the licenses that a decision on escalated enforcement would be made in the near future.

Exhibits:

I. RIII Confirmation of Action 7stter, dtd 11/18/81 II. Typed Transcript of Individual B's statement, d+.d 12/3/81 III. Typed Transcript of Romano's statement, dtd 12/3/81 IV. Typed Transcript of Individual B's statement, dtd 12/3/81 V. Typed Transcript of Hart's statement, dtd 12/2/81 VI. Typed Transcript of Hart's statement, dtd 12/3/81 VII. Typed Transcript of Halpin's statement VIII. Statement of Stuart P. Tulk, dtd 1/14/81 IX. Statement of William J. Kacer X. Memorandum.dtd 6/19/80, P. L. Gibson to W. J. Kacer XI. Statement of Stuart P. Tulk, dtd 3/19/82 XII. Statement of Vendel Gilbert, dtd 3/18/82 XIII. Memorandum, 3/3/82, R. L. Farrell to All Construction Quality Personnel XIV. Ltr. 2/18/81, Davidson (CEI) to Keppler (RIII) ,

95

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t%IilC *sTION UI' ACTIO;; 17.11ER '

g[ 7f

. 9"o

~ In4TED tTATES 8 .*'

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111

/

g 799 floOSEVELT ROAD

' #g. . . . . /[ GLEN ELLYN. BLLINols So137 NOV 1 8 1981 Docket No. 50-440 * ~

Docket No. 50-441 '- -

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating

• Company ATTN: Dalwyn R. Davidson .

Vice President - System Engineering and Construction - -

Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 Gentlemen: -

l This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. K. Naidu of this office at the Perry site during the week of November 16, 1981 and to the telephone discussion of the inspection findings by Mr. F. Hawkins of our staff with Mr. M. R. Edelman and others of your staff on November 17, 1981.

Based on the results of .the above discussion, we understand that you have taken or will take the following actions: ,

1. Discontinue all safety related cable pulling activities by your electrical contractor, L. K. Comstock, until the following corrective actions have been taken: .

l a., Augment and revise 'Comstock cable pulling procedures and check-lists, as necessary, to assure proper control and inspection of cable pulling activities. - i -

i

b. Conduct comprehensive indoctrination and training of Comstock l craft and quality control personnel; with emphasis on quality

. control stop work authority. -

c. Verify that previously pulled Class 1E cables meet tne specified requirements and control all identified nonconformances in accordance with your approved QA Program. -

2. Obtain NRC Region III concurrence prior to restarting safety related cable pulling activities.

3. Concurrent with restart of cable pulling activities, implement an appropriate QC overview of L. K. Comstock activities until confioence in Comstock's performance is a'chieved.

i

. Exhibit I 50-440/81-19; .

50-441/81-19.

,.,__.,_._-.-,.---,,..m,,.___-.--,-,--~----.e---.,-w--- m -.--,. .,-

---~e. .___ _---_._-___-__----m.-- - . . . , , - - - - . . , ,

. _ . . . . . . ~ ,

, CONFIRMATION 07 ACTION 1.ETTER The Cleveland Electric -

2- NOV I S 1981 Illuminating Company We acknowledge that you have taken prompt corrective actions in regard to this matter, including the immediate imposition of a stop-work order on Comstock. .

Please inform us immediately if your understanding differs from that stated above.

Sincerely, w.

g

/T James G. Keppler Regional Administrator cc: DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)

Resident Inspector, RIII.

Harold W. Kohn, Power Siting Commission .

Daniel D. Wilt, Attorney Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio f

i l

t I

k l

C0hTIMLATION OF ACTION I.E1TER l

! ms of pr.r:!cs :n.! c :".aln ethr.r identifytp:

detcils hev.2 besn rc:a:;.md in order to prevent a clearly unwarre.nted invasion of ths persona privccy of the Individuals involved.

Madison, Ohio .

December 3, 1981 I, Individual B, hereby make the following ::tatement to Charles H. Weil, who has identified himself to me as an Investigator of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I make this statement freely with no threats or promises of reward having been made to me.

N

reviewed the signatures on the Unit No. I checklist for penetrations IR735011, 5017, 5027, and IR725028 Item No. 6 and do not believe these to be my signature. I did in fact verify the work required by Step 6 for those penetrations but did not sign the checklist. I have no idea who did sign the checklist.

I have read the foregoing statement consisting of 2 pages. I have made This any necessary corrections, and I have initialed those corrections. I declare statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 3,1981 at 18:45.

/s/

Individual B i

Individual B's Home Address WITNESS: Charles H. Weil /s/

Craig D. Braund /s/ ,

1 P

!ars of pertis.: cnd .r :In ott.sr identifying Ex bt I 6etails havs 1::ar. re.=.:d la order to prevent a clearly unustrent.ed invatI:n or the personal 50-440/81-19; 50-441/81-19 privacy of the Individucts involved.

___ . _ _~... _ _

4 .

datalls hsva hun rem:ved in or

-

• o cis.crly unwarranted inv:sfon of the perso privscy of the Individuals Involved.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant Decenber 3,1981 I, Phillip A. Romano, hereby make the following statement to Charles H. Weil, who has identified himself to me as an Investigator of the United States

- Regulatory Consission. I make this statement fmely with no threats or promises of reward having been made to me. ,

I've been employed by L. K. Comstock from 5 January 1981.

Since ny employment I assistanted Individual B with inspecting of the l

electrical penetrations.

F i

l I reviewed the penetration check-off list and seen 5 form 116, Penetra-tion Installation. .

The signature for item number 5 of the checklist for penetration number 1R725003 does not appear to be the signature of Individual B. .

The signature for item number 6 of the checklist for penetration number 1R725011 does not appear to be the signature of Individual B.

The signature for item number 6 of the checklist for penetration number 1R755017 does not appear to be the signatum of Individual B. ,

The signature for item number 6 does not appear to be the signature of Individual B on checklist for penetration IR725027.

The signature for item number 6 does not appear to be the signature of Individual B for penetration checklist 1R725028.

Page1of2pages t'ames of parties end certafn other identifyint 0-4 0 81-19; 50 441/81-19 dotalls hava heen rereved in order to prevent- - - - - -

1 h a cn e .-

• er idIntifyrt

- ne acicarlyunwarrentedit,ve-;c7ofthto prav:nt privacy of the Individuals involved.

Phillip A. Romano statement ,-2 December 3,1981 I do not know who wrote the name Individual B.' I did not write the mane of Individual B on those forms or any other inspection mcords'. I've never used any other persons name on any records beside sqr own.

I have read the foregoing statement consisting of 2 pages. I have made any necessary corrections, and I have initialed those corrections. This state-ment is the truth to the best of my knowledge and belief. I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 3, 1981 at 1:57 p.m.

/s/ Philip Romano Romano's Home Address WITNESS: /s/

Charles H. Weil t

i l

M:mes of parties and certain other ident1fyInt Page 2 of 2 pages details have been receved in crder to provent Exhibit III o cIcarly unwarrented Invaston of the personal 50-440/81-19; 50-441/81-19 privacy of the Individuals involved.

- . _ ~ ~ . m_._- -

!! cess of part):: cnd e.e-::!n other identifyInt det lls hm 1:::n rm:r..! in ordar to provsnt a cicarly umarrant:d txic:fon of the personal privacy of ths Indtviduals Involved. .

Madison, Ohio December 3,1981 I. Individual B. hereby make the fb11owing statement to Charles H.'Weil, who has identified himself to me as an Investigator of the United States Regularoty Comission. I make this statement freely with no threats or ,

promises of reward having been made to me.

From October of 1980 to October of 1981 during this time I was a level II One electrical inspecter employed by L. K. Comstock Engineering Company.

of g jobs was the electrical penetrations penetration 19724017 was not properly installed. The annaulus tube assy was jamed into the containment wall nozzle. 040" of play should have existed. -I started to write an N.R. but was stopped by g supervisor C. W. Hart. He told me to have P/0 -

Engineer J. Dzugan look at the problem and go from there. Dzugan looked at the installation and said there was no problem to forget it. When I asked for papemork (FVA or ECN) to that effect Ezugan told me FQf12249 was all I.needed. This field question did not address the problem of no play. When I tried to parsue the matter further I was told to drop it or loose w job. I was told by Mr. Hart to sign off the items or loose g job. As mquired to keep g job I signed off steps 4 & 5 of the penetra-tion checklist regardless of accuracy of the completion. However I did I continued to try to not sign off as totally complete any penetration.

e'ffect change to the problems until I was terminated at which time I contacted the N.R.C.

I have read the foregoing statement consisting of 2 pages. I have made This any necessary corrections, and I have initialed those corrections. I declare statement is the truth to the best of g knowledge and belief.

ur. der the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and cormet.

Executed on December 3.1981 at 10:35 a.m.

Exhibit IV, Page I of 2 50-440/81-19; 50-441/81-19

?!: mas of partf as and cert:In other Identifyins details have bacn remv:d in order to prevento clearly unustrcn nr2flsm1 of the Individuals involved.

.*- Names cf parties cnd c .rtain other identifyln '

d2 tells hava been reeved in ordar to pravant

. . a clearly unwarrcnted invaalen of the personai privacy of the Individuals involved.

December 3,1981 Individual B's statement

/s/ Individual'B Individual B's Home Address WITNESS: /s/ Charles H. Weil

/s/ Craig D. Braund

~ -

l l

Exhibit IV Page 2 of 2 pages 50-440/81-19; 50-441/81-19 j

N::r.as of pcrtiss end certrin other identifying details have been rer. .ved in order to prevent a clearly umvarranted Irvs:fon of tha ;:ers,.rr*

7rivacy of the Ind! rt'.nic Ir.vcive'.

~' .. __. .

.=

NImes of parties cnd cartnin ethar id:ntifyins f d2 tails hnv2 been razysd in ordar to prsvant a clesrly unwarranted invcsion of the personal

.'.. privacy of the individuals involved.

Perry Site December 2,1981 I, Clarence W. Hart, hereby make the following statement to Charles H. Weil, who has identified himself to me as an Investigator of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Consission. I make this statement freely with no threats or promises of reward having been made to me.

To the best of g knowledge I have never told Individual B to sign off documents for the installation of penetrations if the work was not complete.

Individual B has been thoroughly trained and fully aware of the basic mquirements and 10 CFR 21. Because he was aware of these requirements he should know of the requimments of signing documents without perfoming a complete inspection in accordance with the Approved Procedums.

Prior to 4/1/81 I was assigned the responsibility of QA Engineer. After 4/1/81 I was assigned the position of QA/QC manager and had the authority to instruct personnel on their inspections. As the QA Engineer I would clarify procedure and inspection requirements.

I do not recall any questions on the .04 tolerance for the installation of penetrations. If this was addressed, I would have instructed him to l

l issue a field question or write an NR for clarification or disposition.

Since this is a violation of a procedure I would not have instructed him or anyone else to sign off a document including an inspection checklist.

I have read the foregoing statement consisting of 2 pages. I have made This any necessary corrections, and I have initialed those corrections. I declare statemant is the truth to the best of g knowledge and belief.

under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 2,1981 at 4:15.

Exhibit V Page 1 of 2 pages Names of parties and certain other identifyins 50-440/81-19; 50-441/81-19 details have been remcved in order to prevent a cicarty unwarranted investon of the personal

_ Privacy of the individuals involtado_ _ .____ -.~ .-- - - - - - - -- -

~~

... . . . . ~ . ~ . . . . . - - . . . . ~ . ~ . - - . . . . .

N:mes of parties cnd c3rtain othar idintifyint-datsils hive b sn renov:d in ordar to prevant a ciserly unw:rrentsd Invasion of the personal privacy of the Individuals involved.

December 2,1981 Clarence W. Hart statement f_s/ClarenceW. Hart Hart's home address WITNESS: /s/ Charles H. Weil

/s/ Craid D. Braund .

i I

Exhibit V N:mes of parties and certain other identifyint Page 2 of 2 pages dat lls have been remved In order to prevent 50-440/81-19; 50-441/81-19 o cicarly unwarranted Invasion of the personal priv cy of the Individuals involved.

• ' tit .es of pert!:.s and cer*nin other identify 1ns deteils hava b:an ro ; . . ' in ord:r to prsvant a cicarly uwarrr.ntsd br.ccion of the personal privacy of the Individuals Involved.

~

Perry Site December 3,1981 I, Clarence W. Hart, hereby make the following statement to Charles H. Weil, who has identified himself to me as an Investigator of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission. I make this statement freely with no threats or promises of reward having been made to me.

In addition to w statement on December 2,1981 I cannot recall having a conversation with Individual B concerning the .04 shim requirement on elec. penetrations.

(

I have reviewed field question No.12249 with the NRC concerning Installa-tion of Penetrations. Penetration No.17'was questioned. The field question concerned the alighnment of the penetration and not the .04 shim requirement. If Individual B and I would have discussed the .04 shim req.

I would have asked him to re-address this problem on another field question for clarification for disposition by an FVA or ECN. I wish to address again that I do not recall the .04 shim requirement being brought to w attention.

I would also like to state again that I hage never told Individual B or anyone else to sign off a document or checklist unless he has inspected it i

himself and the installation was completed and acceptable to him.

I have never threaten Individual B or anyone else with their job for not signing a document or checklist wh'en the inspection was incomplete I or acceptable to the inspechr.

l

• l

~

Exhibit VI

Page 1 of 2 pages Names of parties and certain other Identifying 50-440/81-19; 50-441/81-19 details hevs been remvad in ordar to prevent he personal

l Mrmes of psrties and certeln other idIntifyin:

.- datsils havs been rc:.sv:d in crder to tr: vent a clearly unwarrented lavesten of the par::cact privacy of the individuals involved.

December 3,1981 Clarence W. Hart I have read the foregoing statement consisting of 2 pages. I have made any i necessary corrections, and I have initialed those corrections.: This state-I ment is the truth to the best of my knowledge and belief. I declare under l' the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed

) on December 3,1981 at 4:10.

i

/s/ Clarence W. Hart Hart's Home address WITNESS: /s/ Charles H. Weil

/s/ Craio P. Braund .

l Hamas of parties and certe!n other identifyint details have t.c:n rc-em! In ord:r to prevent Exhibit VI a clearly unustrcnt:d Ir..csic.) of the persor.al Page 2 of 2 pages privacy of the Individuals Involved. 50-440/81-19; 59-441/81-19

3-~_=-.. - .- - = = _ _ .

names of partfos end certain other Identifyins deti:lls have been rem.~ d in crdar to prevent a clearly unwarranted Ir.ve:lon of the personal privacy of the Individuals involved.

Perry Nuclear. Power Plant' January 14, 1982 q

1 I, Stephen H. Halpin, hereby make the following statement to Charles H. Weil, i who has identified himself to me as en Investigator of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I make this statement freely with no threats or promises of reward having been made to me. t I have been employed at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant approximately 2 years and 1010 months with Kaiser Engineers. I supervised and directed inspection l

activities of Individual C. Individual D and Individual' E for almost all of their employement period at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

I never told any of the three (above) or anyone else not to write nonconform-ances.

It was e understanding of the site policy the contractor was given the first opportunity to identify nonconformances. If the contractor did not (refused) to i.dentify the nonconformance one of the three above inspectors would identify the nonconformance on a action request and in some cases a nonconformance depdending on the status of the element inspected. I feel l

the three above inspectors having only first line inspection experience caused them to misunderstand second line inspection policy stated above.

I have read the foregoing statement consisting of 2 pages. I have made any necessary corrections, and I have initialed those corrections. This state-t

' ment is the truth to the best of g knowledge and belief. I declare under -

the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and corrwet. Executed s

on January 14, 1982 at 11

55 a.m. ,

l

/s/ Stephen H. Halpin _

j -

Halpin's 'h'ome addrtss N mes of parties and certcIn other Identifyins Exhibit VII I d2 tails have hacn re:reved in order to prevent Page ~1.of 2 pages l o clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal , 50-440/81-19; 50-441/81-19 l privacy of the Individuals involved. ,

~ . -

!!1m*.s of parties and certain cthar id:ntifying dstalls h;ve been raneved in order to prevent a clearly unwarranted investon of the personal privacy of the Individuals involved.

Stephen H. Halpin's Statement January 14. 1982 s

.j ~

i Subscribed and sworn to before me

~

this 14th day of January, 1982, at Perry Nuclear Power Plant Charles H. Weil /s/

,  ?

l Names of partfes and cartain other Identifying ,'

details have been removed in order to prevent Exhibit V11

~

a clearly unwarranted Invasion of the personal Pa 2 of 2 privacy of the Individuals involved. 50 440/81-19; 50-441/81-19

l l

I Perry Nuclear Power Plant

. (LOCATION)

January 14. 1982

' (DATE) 1 I, Stuart P. Tulk , hereby make th'e following

.j s'tatement to Charles H. Weil . , who has identified himself

. to me as an Investigator of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

4 -I make this statement freely with no threats or promises of reward having i

been made to me. [

This is the statement of Stuart P. Tulk, the lead electrical Quality Engineer- ,

employed by the Cleveland Electric Illdminating Co. This statement is in re-gard to an allegation made to the effect that Steve Halpin and I told Con-struction Quality Control (CQC) inspectors working under Mr. Halpin's direction "NOT TO WRITE NONCONTORMANCE REPORTS (NRs)" on items found in noncompliance at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP). This, as'I understand it took place in early to mid 1980.

• Mr. Halpin and I did have several conversations about that j

subject at about that period of time. The conversations were about project Th procedural requirements in dealing with CONTROL OF NONCONFORMING IT s

The following paragraph is from 2-1001 Rev.1 (in effect from 1/12/79 to 8/1/80.

5.3 DOCUMENTATION OF NONCOMPLIANCE ITEMS .

5.3.1 Each noncompliance item noted shall be discussed with the contractor's QC/QA personnel and efforts shall be made to have the contractor's QA/QC personnel document the nonconfoming item and a take the appropriate action in accordance the contractor's QA/QC program. This should be noted

' on the daily surveillance / inspection report.

( The intent of this paragraph is to have the contractor provide the documentation

!~

l as part of his contractual obligations under his QA/QC program. THis require-ment ar.d philosophy is still in effect in the current revision of 2-1001 (Rev. 4).

~

The purpose of the conversations was to have the QC inspectors comply with the above requirements and not do the contractor's work for him. At no time did g Mr. Halpin and I order CQC Inspectors not to write nonconfomance reports _

+

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"J.,., ' age 1 of 2 pages, Na .a.s a t p..ri;i.:s ci;c G; m

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EXHIBIT VIII datalis have been rcrov..d in order to prevent 50-440/81-19; a clearly urr.varrante.d Irvssion of the personal 50-441/81-19.

.... . a n . Individesls involved.

U; M It should be noted that this procedure (Rev.1) addresses wnat the CQC inspector should do if the contractor refuses to issue a Nonconfomance Report. In the current revision (Rev. 4) the words are slightly .

l . different but the intents are the same. i.e. ...If the contractor won't write it up then CQs will.-

~

l

/ .

I have read the foregoing statement consisting of 2 pages.

I have made any necessary corrections, and I have initialed those corrections. This statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge and belief. erjury that the foregoing is true and correct.I declareExecuted under the onpenalty///of

Mdress.

19 42 at Beeny A,a4 h&'

[- d". 1[ '!c.' E of prcir en' e. ' C.: e" c r ident! Tyic; c:.tclis here he. rc .:. ..! in ord-r to prevent a clearly vir.arrs.te: Ir.v2.cion of the pc scr.al rivacy of the India *dtric Involved.

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.l 3./v/@//; /, $$,1.s r eby r.ske t he f oli t. i ng ve i en t ury e t t.ti : . nt t e J .E . in* :e r ,

who has identified himself to me as an investigat ion Specialist wi t h t h:; l' .r . ** . - : - - - -

Regulatory Commirsion. I make this statement f reely with no threats or prorr.ises of reward having been made to me. Mr. Tester is writing this statement for me with my concurrence. .

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Q pm MI have read the foregoing state entASA f"*

consisting of / pages.

I have made any necessary corrections, and I have initialed those l corrections. This statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge and belief. I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing f ? 4' f a. as, at is true and correct. Executed on /- /2 - /J (Da te) (Time) h YAfflj .

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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22 day og ,f g ffjf '

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Exhibit II 50-440/81-19; 50-441/81-19.

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o- _ .. . -. -, _ o l fitLD CONSTauCUON MANAGLMENT onGANERA?aON THE CLEVELAND ~ ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY ANO EAlS$ A (NGIN([R$. SNC. P4acwo. 1 of 1 MEMORANDUM, _

.. June 19, 1980 oArt monwW115 runw P. L. Gibson k to W. J. Kacer PMoNt 232 monu TRO1 i

l susJtcv ALLEGATIONS OF QA PROGRAM DEFICIINCIIS

\-

ces M. R. Ede2 man ,

' D. A. Pitzpatrick E. V. Knox d lC I received a certified letter, Attachment 1, frem Indivi ua nn June 17, 1980, allegina certain deficiencies in our QA Program and its implementa-12/10/7 was an Inspector in the CQC Electrical group frca tion. Individual C l

to6/13/80.

Please note that the alle-The allegations and my responses are listed below. Individual 8's concerns. In most l'

gations as listed are my interpretation ofcases, he is not spec Rteve Halnin CQC Lead Electrical Inspector, instructed Allegation 1: Individual g to bypass CQC procedures because of verbal

" agreements" between Mr. Halpin; Mr. Stuart Tulk, CEI Lead Electrical GE; and Mr. R. Love,)QC Manager - L.K. -

Cemstock (PNPP electrical contractor .

Individual a did not understand Response 1: I can only conclude that To' the organizational relationship between CQC and CQE.

have an effective, coordinated QA Program on this project requires close emMcation and a close working relation-T ship between CRC and CQE. Ea::h of these are responsi-level of the Lead CQC and CQE. It ble for implementation of portions of our QA Pro

, It is also impera-a uniform approach to the contractor.

tive that they work with and coordinate with the contrac tor's QA/QC management.

ments" the project.

were made which jeopardized the quality (Construction quality Assurance Procedures' Volume 2) w l

disregarded.

• l Allegation 2:

Mr. Halpin directed Individual E to consult Mr. Tulk prior to issuance of " paperwork".

I believe lladividual E is referring toBecause CQE AR'sconsultation are p Response 2: to issumpce of .CQC Action Requests (AR's).

used to identify software / programmatic 2 responsibility of CQE (Reference CQS Procedures Volu l

0101,0$0+,0701,1001,1603), intent to consult with

_ cerning these areas.

Manes of parties cr.d certctn ether Id-ntifyIn:

Exhibit I cl stalls havs been rs::=vcd in order to prevent 50 44Q'81-19 '

a clearly mamated beskn of da perma' 50-441/81-19* -

- privacy of the Individucts involved. _ .-

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, , . Ptnev NUCLEA2 P0wth PLA8tf P431ECT

, flELD CONSTRUCTION 84ANAGEMENT ORGANEATION THE. CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY ,

, ANO RA1StR INGINEIR$. INc.

MEMORANDUM mac uo. 2 o:

vs Room FR OM DAvr-PHONE RDeM

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sumatov b  :

Response 2: This again is an effort to maintain a coordinated uniform (CONT) approach to the contractor. Similarly, hardware noncon-formances identified by CQE are normally brought to the attention of CQC for action. This consultation does not, and has not prevented CQC from issuing AR's where appropri-ate. In fact, CQC Electrical group has issued 35 AR's againstL.K.Comstockfrcun7/27/78through6/12/80. The latestwasissuedon6/6/80.

Allegation 3: " Paperwork" was not issued because it " cost too much money".

i Response 3: In no case has CQC failed to issue " paperwork" because it

" costs too much money". CQC has attempted to eliminate unnecessary or duplicate paperwork where possible. It has i been, and is, our philcsophy that problems be resolved by mutual agreement between CQC, CQE and the contractor when the contractor agrees to correct problems in a timely man-ner or to identify (i.e. document) the problem per his ap-proved program, it is generally not necessary for CQC or CSE to duplicate that documentation. Exceptions are made for serious or repetitive problems when CQC believes it neces-sary to identify noncompliances per our program. This

. philosophy, too, is consistent with our procedures (Refer-ence CQS Procedure 2-1001, paragraph 5 3.1).

Allegation 4: Individual g does not consider Mr. Halpin qualified to be a Lead Electrical Inspector.

Response 4: In the first place, it is not, nor was it, Individual C function to judge Mr. Halpin's qualifications. That right is reserved to me as CQC Supervisor and KEI Project QC Mana-ger. Mr. Halpin has 27 years of varied experience, most of which is in the field of electrical and electronic manufac-

! turing and installation, including inspection, testing and -

trouble-shooting. While Mr. Balpin did not ccane to Perry with ,

previous nuclear plant construction experience, he did have extensive experience (9 years) in aerospace electronics working within a formal QA/QC program comparable to 10CFR50, Appendix 3. In addition he had experience in commercial and residential electrical constructiog which is of benefit in overall job knowledge. Mr. Halpin's qualifications have been reviewed during int.ernal audits, NRC inspections and my own l review. I believe Mr. Halpin is fully qualified for his po-sition.

I Names of parties and cartcIn other identifyin;

' ' details have been rem ved in crder to prevent

~

j 3 a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal I

• privacy of the individuals involved.

l t  ! . -v m .m.~ ~ = u "' "

_ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ - ._ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ ._ ... ~_... -__ ~ - - .

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pe:LD cONStauCTION

,__A_. _ .

• MANAGIMLNT onGAte::ATCN THE. CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY -

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w MEMYNY$Di!M ex o r w o. 3 c:

mooM rnou car va PHONE nooM

,j SUBJECT

v. '

Allegation 5: " Politics" has had a negative effect on QA Progra's imple-

.' mentation.

Response 5: " Politics" is a loaded word fra a semantics standpoint.

To one person it means lying, cheating and backstabbing.

i To another it means doing AhTIHING to avoid a conflict.

' To a third person it means haMHng situations in a dip-.

lematic and professional manner to best achieve a desired goal, i.e. politics is the grease that keeps an organization functioning smoothly. I do not know to what Individual C refers in speaking of " politics". I do know that CQC has not and will not refrain fra identifying quality problems because of any political considerations. I also know that my manage-ment fully shares this position.

l Allegation 6: : Individual g was hired merely to fill a slot whereby his resume would bolster the appearance of the qualification l of CQC personnel. .

Response 6: Individual C was hired because of his background and experience primarily in the areas of conduit installation and cable pul-ling. Because of project delays in these areas there was less work than nMrinally planned during the first six months of this year. Individual a was asked to get involved in ,

other areas such as MCC and switchgear inspection, cable tray installation, and QC program verification. Individual E. ,

approached these duties with a singular lack of enthusissa. .

His initiative was much less than expected. He was verbally notified of his inadequate perfnmance nn a msnber of occasions.

Most recently on June 10, 1980, Individual Kwas told that failure to improve his perfomance would result in his disnis-sal. His response was that he would: "make it easy on me and resign as of June 30, 1980". I was informed Monday, June 16, 1980, that he had teminated the previous Friday. I received the attached letter of resignation on Tuesday, June 17, 1980. ,

Allegation 7: Mr. Halpin is an ineffective supervisor because of excessive tardiness and lack of interest in his job.

Response 7: Mr. Ralpin's attendance and praptness is a matter of super-visory concern and does not impact quality program implemen-tation. While there have been problems, I have addressed those problems within noznal supervisory channels. I do not believe this item to be significant fra quality anegation standpoint.

!!amas of parties and cartcIn other identifying details have baan recoved in erfer to prevent ..

a clearly unwarranted invcsion of the personal -

privacy of the Individuals involved.

. ~ .. m .. . - c . .c. n +. . - < .

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PIELO CONSTauCTION MANAGEMENT 0. gam 2ATIOes

. THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY i

~ ANO KAISt. ENGINlt.S. INC.

m -

MEMORANDUM exar wo.k o i

vn momu raoM oAvr PHONE mooH

. sus.sant Allegation 8: The above items as won as a lack of approved procedures have resulted in " coverup" of quality problems.

i Response 8: I believe the above responses refute Individual t's final '

l anegation'. CQC has not and will not coverup any quality problems. My policy is to implement as effective a Ep program as possible. Where deficiencies in our program cae to my attention, I have instituted corrective measures.

In fact, the entire electrical CQC program was revamped about a year ago because the existing program was considered in-adequate. The number of quality problems identified and satisfactorily corrected over the past year speaks well for our canmitment to and implementation of an effective second-linesurveillance/inspectionprogram. ,

y l

In st:;nmary, I believe that Individual E's allegations'are unfounded. I fur-ther believe that much of his dissatisfaction stemed from two sources:

l

1) His lack of understanding of our second-line function as opposed to first-line inspection; 2) His personal lack of confidence in the leaderthip provided by Mr. Halpin. Neither of these, in my mina, is grounds for the above allegations. I am confident that the CQC program in the electrical area, as well as other areas, can withstand the close scrutiny Individual E's.

letter may generate. .

In closing I would note that at no time during Individual 4's employment' at Perry did he cae to me expressing serious concerns about the quality of the hardware or QA Program implementation. To the best of my knowledge, l he did not approach any other individual in the management of PNPP either.

I If I may provide further information on this matter, please let me know.

1 I

PIf,/sgb -

l Attach.

1 i

ams of p. ries a .d certain other identifying det:lis have been re:oved in ordar to prevent a clearly uniarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the ir.dividuals involved.

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. Ta seien it may Concernt -

Due f.o the working conditions or should 1 say lack of working condit[ ohs.

1 ce terminating wy employsment with Kaiser Engineers.

For the past six smonths. I was under the supervision of Mr. Steve Halpin '

(F. lect T'ien) Ecad Quality Control). On siany occasions. Mr. Halpin instructed see to bypass Procedures because he had made verbal agreements with Mr. Steuert i Tulk (Quality Engineer Electrical. CET) and Mr. Ray Love (quality Control Manager L.K. Coastock). To me, this was in gross disregard of Construction Quality Amenrance Procedures Volveu 2.

I was continually instructed by Mr. Helpin to consult trith Mr. Tulk before generating any type of paperwork. But, the major reason 1 didn't generste paperwork was that Mr. Halpin stated that is most too souch money.

In my epiolon. Mr. Malpin is not qualified to be an Electrical Lead. The eleven yearn that. he apent an a dairy farm prior to being employed here defin-as. ty .t.=.m not egualify him to be in this pcait fon. Furthermore his habitual tardiness and lack of interest in his job further demonstrate this lack of tecdernhlp and ability to perform.

Mr. Italpin stated tlist on many occasions he had run int.o a political wall while trying to back his men. There should be no polities involved in the quality control af a Wuclear Power Flant.

I feel that i t, is my duty as a concerned citisen and proponent of Nuetear swer to notify the Regional Of fice of the Nuclear Regulatory Cosenission to invcatigate the Dumerous problefes that have been identified by Construction t}nality L:nntrui. Due to the lack of approved Procedures and agreements made -

between the aboved mentioned, these problems are being covered upt Raiser Engineering has many gustified and dedicated perronnel in Quality content i f only they were a11 owed to perform their jobs according to procedures.

They should be free from seerative agreements between the . client, Co.ntractor cad Quality Control and also free from political pressures. -

In tint pont few months I have so u to the understanding t, hat 1 was needed caly for wy resume to satis fy a requirement and not. for my electrical experience in the Nuclear Field.

.)

18 la witti deep regret that I tender this resignati~ on. Due to the fact i

1 was nnt able to perform Quality Control survei11snee/ Inspection as it has to be performed in e Nuclear Feuer Flant. . .

Sincerely. ,.

/ Signed /

Individual E - 1

( *.d Names of parties and certain other Identifyins

• 6

'es D. Firt. patrick .

details have been removed in order to prevent E. Knnst a clearly umiarranted invasion of the personal .

privacy of the Individuals involved. _

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• IE ~

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

• (LOCATION)

March 19, 1982 (DATE)

I, Stuart P. Tulk , hereby make the following i statement to Charles H. Weil , who has identified himself to me as an Investigator of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Comrnission.

I make this statement freely with no threats or promi.ses of reward having been made to me.

This is the statement of Stuart P. Tulk, the Lead Electrical quality Engineer ,

employed by the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. This statement is in re-gard to an allegation made to the effect that I ordered Construction Quality Engineering Inspectors working under my direction "NOT TO WRITE NONCONFOR W CE REPORTS (NRs)" on items found in noncompliance at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP). At no time did I order anyone "NOT TO WRITE NONCONFORMANCE REPORTS". .

I have on occasions, discouraged the writing of an NR until such time sufficient information was available to clearly define the nonconforming condition or the acceptance criteria was clearly established . . ie. . Do your homework prior to writing the NR. Another instance where I have discouraged the writing of an NR by any of my inspectors, is when it is clearly the responsibility of a Contractor to write up a nonconforming condition in accordance with his quality program . .

ie . . Don't do the Contractor's job for him. In the first instance I consider that part of doing a thorough job. The second instance is consistent with our quality program and addressed in procedure 2-1001.- -

1 I

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detnlls ha u b nn rem:. .J i,3 grc,tr to prav: rat P, age 1 of f omges.

a clearly unwcrre. .t-d ;nve:ie,n of the personal Exhibit XI 50-440/81-19; i Privacy of the Individuals involved. '

50-441/81-19.

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I have read the foregoing statement consisting of 2 pages.

.I have made any necessary Jorrections, and I have initialed those corrections.. This statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge and belie.f. I declare under the penalty og peyjury that the foretoing i is true and correct. Executed on 7//9ME at 0757 .

(Date') (Time)

.n Subscribed and sworn to before me this //C" day of /AHt?p /fdL , Tulk's home address.

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privacy of the Individa.ls involved.

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(LOCATION) 3 O Kf8Q Pr (DATE)

I, /w M // A , hereby make the following statement to A , who has, identified himself to me as an Investigator of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

I make this statement freely with no threats or promises of reward having been made to me.

h&N Y A.JK nw

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a cicarly ut. war.c;:u..i sav s! a of tha personal privacy of the Individucis involved. Exhibit XII (QfjQg}-jg;

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I have read the foregoing statement consisting of j pages.

I have made any necessary corrections, and I have initialed those corrections. This statement is the truth to the best of my knowledge and belief. I declare under the penalty o( perjury that thef'oregoing is true and correct. Executed on 82/r/fC at 0. /S m .

(Date) (Time)

Y eAlh Y/bj Subscribed' and sworn to before me a I I""*"#*}

this /f'# day of ///AN-# ,

19,_dL a t &ny b.,<.- A! <4//~'# Gilbert's Home Address.

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wts f i s h.r.:. N ..; .. . .. .' : . ,.:r ;e ;.revent a cicarly u..t.:r;;;. a ;. ..w ;.. c.. 'da ;:srscnal privacy of tha individa.ls Ir.volved.

THE CLEVER.AND. EtECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY ,

1 MEMORANDUM  !

• L, . .

,, ALL CONSTRUCTION monM rnow - R. L. Farrell oxyg March 3, 1982 QUALITY PERSONNEL PHONE 306 ROOM S260 sussscT ORIGINATION OF PROJECT ORGANIZATION

-- NON-CONFORMANCE REPORTS

?

Effective March 4,1982, the following instructions will govern the origination of Non-

Conformance Reports for all safety-related work:

1. When a non-conforming condition is identified by Project Organization personnel, l

the employee identifying the condition will immediately originate a Non- ,

i Conformance Report. The origination of this report will take place regardless  !

l - of any effort made to have personnel from the responsible contractors Quality organization write the Non-Conformance Report, unless the individual identifying

' the non-conforming condition can personally assure that the contractor's Quality i personnel vill ic:::ediately issue the required NR.

2. The Non-Conformance Reports originated by Project Organization peisonnel will be logged and processed as required. ,

3. On a timely basis, those NRs originated by the Project Organization will be reconciled with those issued by contractor personnel. Duplicates will not be removed from the system, but the Project Organization Non-Conforming Report will be cross-referenced to the contractor documents.

4. It is the responsibility of the Project Organization employee who originates an NR involving either L. K. Comstock, Metalweld, or PBI, to assure that a copy of that NR is independently and separately transmitted to J. Kline, General Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Construction;'E. Itiley, General Supervisor, Construction Quality Section; and the Manager of Quality Assurance.

Contractors will be added or deleted from this special distribution l'ist as conditions warrant.

! These instructions are consistent with both PAP 1502 und 1504, the governing documents.

i The intent is to assure that no non-conforming condition identified by Project Organiza-i tion personnel goes undetected and to assure that such conditions are tracked and resolved.

In the near future, to assure better control of NRs originated by the Project Organization and to make sure that none of these documents are lost, steps will be taken to serially number blank Project Organization Non-Conformance Report forms. You will be instructed 1 in the use of these new forms at the appropriate time.

I If you have any questions regarding these i$structions, please cal E. Riley on Ext. 271.

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uuad .

6Lzad Romaid L. Farrell, Manager Nuclear Quality Assurance Department cc: 3. L. Barkley, M. R. Edelman, J. A. Kline, J. C. Marjenin, P. P. Martin, E. Riley, R. L. Vondrasek Exhibit XIII 50-440/81-19; 50-441/81-19.

- @. rv THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMIN AT -

V]..p .. sos so

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. c a m a o. c 4iis, . m u.sous a,. .n. . .uu-41 ~o - . ss ,usuc sou .

Serving The Best location in the Nation

, Dalwyn R.Davidson wcs passeawr

sestsu ansas6 eases aeso constnuenom February 18, 1982 .-

1

, =  :

i Mr. James G. Reppler

• Regional Administrator . ,

Nuclear Regulatory Consnission -

Region III 799 Roosevelt Road cien Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Reppler:

On February 10, 1982, a meeting was held at the Nuclear Regulatory Regional Head-quarters in Glen Ellyn, Illinois, to discuss the findings from recent inspections  ;

of work being performed by the L. K. Comstock Corporation at the Perry Plant Construction Site.

During this meeting, concerns were expressed regarding certain management aspects involving the implementation of t'se Quality Assurance Pro 5 ram at Perry. Based on our discussions of these concerns, The Illuminating Company has initiited the following actions:

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1. An evaluation is underway by the Quality Assurance Department of the qua11ty performance of each safety-related contractor presently working on the site. This evaluation will identify areas of the contractor's performance, t

if any, which need increased attention. This evaluation will be in addition to those monthly evaluations of contractors performance routinely being made. This evaluation of all safety-related contractors will be completed

by March 1, 1982. - -

Upon completion, of each revidw by Quality Assurance personnel, the evalua' tion will be reviewed for any management implications by the Manager of Quality Assurance and by the independent overview Quality Assurance Advisory Consnittee.

This overview will be completed by March 31, 1982.

2. -Based on the evaluation of safety-related contractor quality performance and while the management review is underway, a corrective action program will be developed and put in place by the Construction Quality Section for those contractors where areas needing insnediate attention have been identified.

The schedule dates for completion of the steps in each plan will be completed by March 31, 1982. Any additions or changes to these plans made as a result of the subsequent management reviews will be reflected in revised improvement programs for each contractor by April 30, 1982.

r Exhibit XIV .

50-M,0/81-19; 50-441/81-19. FG 22 E

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,Mr. James Keppler February 18, 1982 -

Page Two

1

4 18, 1982.

j 3. A complete review of the nonconformance system ' started on February This review will focus on the use of the Monconformance Report fem, the Field Question form, the Field Variance Authorisation, Audit Action Request and

.l

.: Corrective Action Request. The objective of this review is to assure that

• these documents have clear definitions as to purpose, that Site personnel understand the purpose and the correct use of each document, that each has '

been used correctly in the past and is being dispositioned in a correct and timely manner. This review will be completed and any required corrective ,

action documented by March 31, 1982. *

4. The Site Task Force recently chartered to analyze documentation and records associated with equipment installed by L. K. Comstock will complete its 7

t review to a point sufficient to identify needed changes in this area by i^ March 1, 1982.

' Using the knowledge gained in this effort, similar reviews will be under-taken for all other safety-related contractors in the order of priority determined by the Quality Assurance Manager

5. At the present time 78 systems have been turned over from the contractorThe status o to the Nuclear Test Section for testing.

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are safety-related, or partially safety-related, will be re-evaluated to assure that required Nonconformance Reports are readily available, that needed documentation is present and retrievable, and that any work remaining This evaluation will be completed by March 31, to be done is identified.

1982. - ~

As a further step in our management review, the Quality Assurance Advisory Committee, which provides an independent overview of They quality activities will, based onat this Ferry, will review review, the results of the activities listed above.

determine if there is a need to improve our existing program or the manner in which that program is being implemented." Their assessment will be completed May 1, 1982.

If you have any questions, please call me.

Sincerely,

/

Dal . Davidson Vice President System Engineering and Construction DRD/11p W

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