ML20207K928
| ML20207K928 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 12/12/1986 |
| From: | Jape F, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207K879 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-86-89, NUDOCS 8701090563 | |
| Download: ML20207K928 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1986089
Text
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g jo, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Report No.: 50-400/86-89
Licensee: Carolina power and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
' Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-53
Facility Name: Harris
Inspection onducted: November 17-21, 1986
Inspector: .[. h & n
J. 2. Mathis' _
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Oats Signed
Approved by: NI hkN. v ' h ~
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F. ' Jap'e,' Section Chief DatW Sfgnaid
Engineering Branch' ,
Division of Reactor Safety
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SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, una'nnounced inspection was in the~ areas of initial fuel
loading witnessing. -
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Results: One violation was identified - Inadequate housekeeping controls around
the reactor vessel during initial fuel loading.
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REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. Ha ness, CP&L Asstistant Plant General Manager
- R. A. Watson, Vice President Harris iuclear Project
- R. B. Van Meter, CP&L Manager Technical Support
- D. Tibbitts, Regulatory Compliance
- J. L. Dority, Start-Up Supervisor
- C S. Hinnant, Manager Start-Up
- M. G. Wallace, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- H. W. Bowles, CP&L Director-Onsite Nuclear Safety
- C. H. Moseley, Jr. , Manager-0PNS QA/QC
- G. L. Forehand, Director QA/QC
R. Colthorpe, Power Ascension Lead Test Engineer
R. Duncan, Power Ascension Lead Test Engineer
D. Casada, Shift Test Coordinator
C. S. Olexik, Shift Test Coordinator
H. Carter, Shift Foreman
C. S. Matthews, Shift Foreman
T. D. Ward, Jr. , Power Ascension Technician
Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
operators, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organization
F. Baskerville, Westinghouse Adv.
R. Kirk, Westingh.use
R. Nodvik, Westinghouse
A. Sabol, Westinghouse
NRC Resident Inspector
- P. E. Fredrickson, NRC, Section Chief
- G. F. Maxwell, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2. Exit Interview
lhe inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 21, 1986, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee. One new item was
identified during this inspection as follows:
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Violation 50-400/86-89-01, Inadequate Housekeeping Controls Around the
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Reactor Vessel During Initial Fuel Loading (paragraph 5).
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4. Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5. Initial Fuel Loading Witnessing (72524)
Initial fuel loading for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)
Unit 1, started on November 17, 1986, at approximately 5:06 p.m. The
sequence of fuel loading was in accordance with data sheet 10.d of procedure
9101-S-01, Initial Fuel Loading. Prior to the first bundle going into the
< reactor vessel, the inspector verified that the prerequisites and initial
conditions which ensure the following were satisfied: (a) Readiness of
equipment and associated systems required for a safe core loading (b) Veri- i
fication of equipment status and plant condition during core loading to
ensure planned conditions are maintained (c) compliance with the require-
ments which pertain to core loading that are identified in the Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR) and Technical Specifications (TSs).
i The initial core consists of 157 fuel assemblies. Each fuel assembly
- contains a 17 x 17 rod array composed of 264 fuel rods, 24 rod cluster
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control (RCC) guide thimbles and an incore instrumentation thimble. The
fuel loading pattern for Cycle 1 contains three regions of 53, 52, 52
assemblies, each with a different U-235 enrichment. The first two regions,
consisting of the two lower enrichments, are arranged in a checker board
e pattern toward the center of the core. Region 3, which contains the highest
enrichment, is arranged around the periphery of the core. Enrichments for
Cycle 1 are 2.1 w/o, 2.6 w/o, and 3.1 w/o in Regions 1, 2, and 3, respec-
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tively.
. The inspector witnessed initial fuel loading from the control room,
refueling floor and spent fuel pool to verify the following:
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a. A proper version of the procedure was in use and was being followed.
b. Inverse multiplication plots were being maintained in accordance with
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procedural requirements.
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c. Boron concentration was verified by proper sampling and analysis, at
the required frequency. ,
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. d. Shift turnover was performed in conformance with administrative
procedures.
e. Personnel access to refueling floor was controlled.
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f. Deficiencies or difficulties encountered were recorded in the control
room log. Adequacy of corrective action, and the review and approval
of that action was verified.
On November 18, 1986, while witnessing initial fuel loading in the reactor
containment building, the inspector observed that control of personnel,
material and tools was not being recorded at the entry and exit point of the
access controlled area. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II and the
accepted Quality Assurance Program (Final Safety Analysis Report, Section
17.2.2) collectively require that activities affecting quality shall be
accomplished under suitably controlled conditions.
Controlled conditions include the use of appropriate equipment and suitable
environmental conditions for accomplishing the activity, such as adequate
cleanliness. The SHNPP FSAR Section 1.8 commits to Regulatory Guide 1.39
(Rev. 2), September 1977, " Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled
Nuclear Power Plants," which endorses ANSI N45.2.3-1973, " Housekeeping
During the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants." ANSI N45.2.3
requires that for zones I, II and III a written record of the entry and exit
of all personnel and material shall be established and maintained. Failure
to maintain a record of the entry and exit of all personnel and material for
a Class B area, which is the designated cleanliness area around the reactor
vessel with the head off, is in violation of the above requirements. This
item is identified as violation 50-400/86-89-01, Inadequate housekeeping
controls around the reactor vessel during initial fuel loading.
In addition to the above incident at approximately 1:45 a.m., on November 18,
i 1986, the Lead Test Engineer in the Reactor Containment Building, overlooked
the requirement to perform the statistical reliability check of the
temporary nuclear instrument A and the source range instrument N31 as
required by step 6.7.2 of procedure 9101-S-01. The engineer did perform the
required baselining check on these nuclear instruments. The fact that the
data were missing was discovered by the lead test engineer on the day shift
and reported to the Shift Test Coordinator (STC) in the control room at
approximately 5:00 p.m. on November 18, 1986. Fuel movement was stopped and
an investigation started by the STC and the Shift Foreman. The lead test
engineer performed a statistical reliability check (chi square test) on the
detector using the baseline data taken in step 6.7.2 of procedure 9101-S-01.
The detectors failed the Chi Square Test meaning that the detectors were
inoperable due to excessive electronic noise. Technical Specification 6.8.1
requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and
maintained that meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of
Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33. The failure to implement a statistical
reliability check per step 6.7.2 of procedure 9101-S-01 is a violation
against Technical Specification requirement 6.8.1.
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Evaluation of the conditions involved in this incident in accordance with
the NRC enforcement policy indicates that this is a licensee identified and
corrected violation. Therefore, a Notice of Violation was not issued by the
NRC.
Fuel loading was completed at 1:46 on November 21, 1986. Soon after initial
fuel loading was completed the licensee video taped the core to verify the
loading pattern is in accordance with the initial core loading procedure.