05000346/FIN-2014003-03
From kanterella
Revision as of 23:21, 21 February 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Ensure Auxiliary Feedwater Design Bases Were Correctly Translated into Design Documents and Procedures |
| Description | The inspectors identified two examples representing one finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to ensure the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) design bases were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, and procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the loss of normal feedwater analysis, and AFW cooler assumptions would not be violated during limiting temperature and flow conditions. As part of their corrective actions, the licensee instituted a standing order to ensure the reactor operators had guidance to ensure transferring water from the hotwell to the condensate storage tank (CST) did not exceed the loss of normal feedwater analysis CST limit of 120 degrees Fahrenheit (oF). The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control. Specifically, the inspectors were concerned the AFW system could potentially be operated in a manner which had not been previously evaluated. The finding screened as having very low safety significance because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system, structure, or component (SSC) but the SSC maintained its operability. Specifically, the licensee reviewed the operating history of the CSTs and found no indication the CST water had been above 120 oF in Modes 1 through 3. Also, the licensee reviewed the operating history of the AFW coolers and found no indication the AFW coolers had been inoperable due to excessive cooling water temperature or inadequate flow. The inspectors determined this finding had an associated cross-cutting aspect, avoid complacency, in the human performance cross-cutting area. (H.12) |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2014003 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Rodriguez T Briley A Shaikh D Kimble G O'Dwyer J Cameron J Corujo Sandin J Rutkowski |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2014003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||