05000416/FIN-2008003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Ineffective Corrective Actions in Response to Plant Transients Resulting from Animal Intrusions |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing Green finding involving ineffective corrective actions that resulted in an unplanned down power caused by an animal intrusion. The plant experienced a loss of the balance of plant Transformer 23 with a loss of power to the plant service water pumps. Operators reduced reactor power to 47 percent. The control room dispatched operators to the river via a boat due to high river level and discovered a dead raccoon in the vicinity of the transformer. The inspectors noted that two previous reactor scrams had been caused by raccoons, and an injured raccoon had previously been found at the base of Transformer 23. The inspectors concluded that the flooding conditions which have been routinely experienced at the site and the occurrence of raccoon events at the site could have been used to anticipate and mitigate the unplanned down power. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2008-02089. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the initiating events cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors concluded that a Phase 2 evaluation was required because the finding impacted both the Initiating Event and Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix A Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, of Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, and the Phase 2 Worksheets for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The inspectors determined there was an increase in likelihood of a transient without the power conversion system but there was no reduction in remaining capability. Because the exposure time of the finding was less than 30 days, the result of the Phase 2 analysis was that the finding had very low safety significance (Green). The cause of this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with operating experience in that the licensee failed to implement proper corrective actions to prevent animals from causing a plant transient P.2(b) |
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
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| Report | IR 05000416/2008003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2008 (2008Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N O'Keefe P Elkmann R Smith A Barrett D Bollock G Guerra I Anchondo |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2008003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2008Q2
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
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