05000327/FIN-2012002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Implement Procedures for Tornado Watch/Warning |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Units 1 & 2 Technical Specification of 6.8.1.a for the licensees failure to adequately implement procedure AOP-N.02, Tornado Watch/Warning, Revision 28. On March 2, 2012, the licensee entered AOP-N.02 due to a tornado watch/warning and failed to secure or remove loose material in the Switchyard/Transformer Yard as required by the procedure. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 515684. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to secure or remove potential missile hazards from the Switchyards/Transformer Yard increased the likelihood of a Unit trip and/or loss of offsite power event. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. The finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area since the licensee failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance, and personnel failed to follow procedures. |
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000327/2012002 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Thomas C Young M Speck B Collins A Vargas P Braxton A Alen W Deschaine S Shaeffer |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Sequoyah - IR 05000327/2012002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Sequoyah) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Sequoyah)
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