05000272/FIN-2011004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | lnadequate IST Program Evaluation of a Pressure Relief Valve |
| Description | The inspectors identified a NCV of Salem Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.4.j, ln Service Testing, that implements the in service testing program for ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 -components in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operations and Maintenance (OM) code. Specifically, PSEG di9.n9t complete an adequate ASME OM code required evaluation following the test of the Unit 2 Boron lnjection Tank (BlT) relief, 2SJ1O, which lifted outside of its acceptance criteria. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. PSEG entered this issue into their CAP as notifications 20523948 and 20518249. Corrective actions at that time included replacing the damaged seat and disk, rebuilding the valve, and performing a post maintenance test of the rebuilt valve. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and it impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, leakage of greater than l0 gpm through the 2SJ10 valve degraded the ability of the charging system to deliver design flow rates to the reactor following a safety injection signal that would unisolate the bit. The inspectors evaluated this finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4\' The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent an actual loss of system safety function, and was not potentially risk significant for external events. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action program, because PSEG did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. Specifically, PSEG\'s evaluation following the 2SJ10 failure in April 2011 did not meet the requirements of PSEG procedure ER-SA-321-1010. The evaluation contained incorrect information regarding valve refurbishment that prevented PSEG from identifying the cause of the 2SJ10 failure. |
| Site: | Salem  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000272/2011004 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Burritt A Turilin C Douglas D Schroeder E Gray J Furia P Mckenna |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Salem - IR 05000272/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Salem) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Salem)
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