05000528/FIN-2009006-06
From kanterella
Revision as of 20:38, 20 February 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Failure to Properly Implement Corrective Action Process for Potential Operability Issues with the Safety Related Systems and Systems Important to Safety |
Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of operations personnel to follow the corrective action program to ensure that degraded and nonconforming conditions associated with safety related systems and systems important to safety were properly reviewed for operability. Specifically, between December 21, 2006, and January 30, 2009, operations personnel failed to perform adequate operability determinations of Palo Verde Action Requests associated with the component design basis review project and other site projects, resulting in 97 Palo Verde Action Requests that either needed an immediate operability determination or a functional assessment, or needed more information to provide reasonable assurance of operability. Of the 97examples 20 occurred following implementation of corrective actions associated with the Confirmatory Action Letter to improve this process and therefore are reflective of current performance. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request 3281099.The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have a very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because 9 of the 20 examples, reflective of current performance, were not thoroughly evaluated such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary, including properly evaluating for operability conditions adverse to quality (P.1c |
Site: | Palo Verde |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000528/2009006 Section 4OA5 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | N Taylor D Dumbacher R Rodriguez E Knutson R Walton D Proulx D Bollock M Catts E Ruesch A Vegel H Freeman |
CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
INPO aspect | PI.2 |
' | |
Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2009006 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2009Q1
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||