05000528/FIN-2009003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Develop an Adequate Procedure to Ensure Operability of the Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchanges |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of operations, chemistry, and engineering personnel to develop a procedure with appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for chloride levels to ensure operability of the essential cooling water system heat exchangers. Specifically, from plant startup until April 28, 2009, chemistry personnels Policy CDP1-14, Chemistry Department Policies, stated, in part, that a Palo Verde Action Request will be generated for entry into any Action Level 1, 2, 3 or 5, and did not give actions for Action Level 4. This resulted in chlorides exceeding Action Level 4 quantitative acceptance criterion in the essential cooling water system Train A without a Palo Verde Action Request being generated, or an operability determination being performed in a timely manner. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request 3347097.The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have a very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision-making because decisions and the basis for decisions were not communicated to personnel who have a need to- 4 Enclosure know the information in order to perform work safely, in a timely manner |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2009003 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Treadway L Carson J Adams J Melfi S Alferink M Young M Hay J Bashore M Catts P Jayroe S Hedger |
| CCA | H.10, Bases for Decisions |
| INPO aspect | CO.2 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2009003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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