05000327/FIN-2005011-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Unprotected Power Cables to Vital Inverters in Unit 1 480V Board Room 1B |
| Description | The team identified an URI associated with unprotected alternating current (AC) power cables to Unit 1 vital inverter 1-II and Unit 2 vital inverter 2-II. The cables were routed through the north end of the Unit 1 480V Board Room 1B (Fire Area FAA- 095) without protection or separation from fire damage (as required by Appendix R,Section III.G.2). The licensees SSA for SSD of Unit 1 and Unit 2 relied on the cables not being damaged by a severe fire in that area. To compensate for the unprotected cables, licensee personnel added a local manual operator action to the fire response procedures. This issue is unresolved pending further NRC review of the licensing basis. The licensees SSA for FAA-095 divided the fire area into three fire zones identified by column lines A3-A4, A4-A6, and A6-A8. Based on these fire zone descriptions the licensee analyzed what electrical equipment would be impacted by a fire in the affected zone. The licensees electric circuit analysis for a fire occurring between column lines A3 and A4 in FAA-095 (the north end of the room) concluded that vital inverters 1-II and 2-II, which were located in the south end of the room, would be available to support SSD. The analysis concluded that only vital inverters 1-I and 2-I, which were located in the north end of the room, would be lost for a fire in this zone. However, the 480V AC power cables to vital inverters 1-II and 2-II were routed through the north end of the Unit 1 480V Board Room 1B without protection or separation from fire damage (as required by Appendix R,Section III.G.2). The cables were approximately 11 feet from the 120V AC vital inverter 1-I and there were intervening 480V MCCs and cable trays in that 11 feet. Consequently, a fire in the north end of fire area FAA-095, between column lines A3 and A4, could result in loss of the 480V AC normal power supply cables to the 120V AC vital inverters 1-II and 2-II. Loss of the 480V AC power supply cable from fire damage would cause the vital inverters 1-II and 2-II to use their direct current (DC) power supply. Because the load of the inverters on the DC power supply would exceed the capacity of the battery charger, it could result in the complete discharge of the 125V DC battery and cause the inverters and other loads on the DC bus to be lost. The licensees analysis of record indicated that the battery charger and battery could maintain power to the 125V DC Vital Battery Board II and 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-II and 2-II loads for least four hours without the 480V AC power to the inverters. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program in Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 91841. In addition, the licensee took prompt corrective action to revise the fire procedure to add local manual operator actions to energize the spare Inverter 0-II, transfer the 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-II to its alternate supply, and de-energize inverter 1-II, all within four hours. The licensee stated that walkdown data showed that the actual loading on the battery/charger combination would be low enough such that the loads could be maintained for more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The team reviewed Design Change Notice (DCN) D-20071, Rev. a, which installed new vital inverters 1-II and 2-II and associated AC power cables (1PL4915B and 2PL4910A) in 2001. The DCN involved the installation of eight new inverters on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 vital power systems. The DCN was approved for implementation on September 2, 1999, and the plant modifications were completed in 2001. The new inverters were physically located in the same rooms as the old inverters. The Nuclear Safety Assessment for Fire Protection in the DCN stated that the new and existing cables routed (or rerouted) for this modification have been evaluated and found to be acceptable in accordance with the SQN Fire Hazards Analysis, see Mini-Calculation SQN-26-D054EPMABBIMPFHA6. It also stated the following: A fire in some areas along the route requires manual actions as a result of new 480V feeders to the replacement 120V AC vital inverters. In each case, the spare inverter is to be energized, the 120V AC vital distribution panel is to be transferred to its alternate supply (spare inverter) and the Unit 1 inverter deenergized. The actions are to be completed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Based on the above, the team concluded that the original design change had concluded that failure of the cable between columns A3 and A4 in FAA-095 was likely due to fire damage and that local manual operator actions would be necessary to mitigate the cable failure. However, after the modifications were completed, the required operator actions had not been added to the post-fire SSD procedure. The team also had a concern that the design change was not consistent with the licensing basis for the plant (i.e.,10 CFR 50, Appendix R ,Section III.G.2) in that local manual operator actions were being used in lieu of separation or protection of the cables. The use of manual actions in lieu of separation or protection may require NRC approval prior to implementation if it affects SSD. The design change analysis referenced NRC approved Deviation #11 to Section III.G.2.b of Appendix R to support acceptability of the DCN. Deviation #11 allowed intervening combustibles in the form of open ladder type cable trays, with sprinklers, to be installed between redundant cables which were separated by more than 20 feet. However, Deviation #11 did not allow redundant cables to be separated by only 11 feet, with intervening 480V MCCs and cable trays. This issue is considered an unresolved item pending further NRC review of the licensing basis and is identified as URI 05000327,328/2005011-02, Unprotected Power Cables to Vital Inverters in Unit 1 480V Board Room 1B. |
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
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| Report | IR 05000327/2005011 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2005 (2005Q4) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Speck M Widmann R Moore R Schin S Rose B Miller C Smith C Stancil D Mas Penaranda E Michel F Ehrhardt G Laska J Baptist J Diaz Velezl Laken Merriweatherb Melly R Schin D Payne J Quinones-Navarrom Widmannr Moore S Rose B Miller C Smith C Stancil D Mas Penaranda E Michel F Ehrhardt G Laska J Baptist J Diaz Velezl Lake M Speck |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Sequoyah - IR 05000327/2005011 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Sequoyah) @ 2005Q4
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