ML20155C513
| ML20155C513 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/22/1988 |
| From: | Scaletti D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Fukushima A JAPAN |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8810100080 | |
| Download: ML20155C513 (5) | |
Text
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- September 22, 1988
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Mr. Akira Fukushima Deputy Director Nuclear Power Safety Examination Division Agency of Natural Resources and Energy Ministry of International Trade and Industry 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyodaku Tokyo,100, Japan
Dear Mr. Fukushima:
l This letter is to inform you of our plans to visit Tokyo October 10-14, 1988. !
We would like to meet with you and other representatives of MITI on October 11, ;
) 1988 to discuss the ABWR licensing issues and review status. We plan to be at !
your offices in the taorning following a brief meeting at the US Embassy. '
Presently, our plans for the rest of the week call for us to visit Hitachi Works to observe some of the ABWR component tests, visit one of the Fukushima !
sites and meet with Tokyo Electric Co, Toshiba and Hitachi to discuss the ABWR t licensing and other issues of mutual interest.
l l The members of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff who will be visiting Japan are Mr. Lester Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Region IV Reactors and Special Projects, Dr. Charles Miller, Director, Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate, Dr. Laurence Kopp, Senior Reactor Engineer, Mr. George Thomas, Senior Reactor Engineer and myself. In order to l facilitate our discussions, we have enclosed a list of discussion topics for your cunsideration. We look forward to meedng you in Tokyo and to very inforrnative discussions with MITI and the other participants in the Japanese ABWR design and licensing process. -
Sincerely, '
original signed by Dino C. Scaletti, Project Manager i 8810100000 880922 Standardization and Non-Power l 1 PDR ORG NRRB Reactor Project Directorate j PNU Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, j Y and Special Projects i Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i Enclosure As Stated '
cc: Dr. Yoshinori Tatsuta ;
! Mr. Shogo Hara j
! Mr. Akira Omoto ;
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Mr. Akira Fukushima Deputy Director Nuclear Power Safety Examination Division Agency of Natural Resources and Energy Ministry of International Trade and Industry 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyodaku Tokyo,100, Japan
Dear Mr. Fukushima:
This letter is to inform you of our plans to visit Tokyo October 10-14, 1988.
We would like to meet with you and other representatives of MITI on October 11, 1988 to discuss the ABWR licensing issues and review status. We plan to be at your offices in the morning following a brief meeting at the US Embassy.
Presently, our plans for the rest of the week call for us to visit Hitachi Works to observe some of the ABWR component tests, visit one of the Fukushima sites and meet with Tokyo Electric Co Toshiba and Hitachi to discuss the ABWR licensing and other issues of mutual interest.
The members of the US Nuclear Regulatory Coninission Staff who will be visiting Japan are Mr. Lester Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Region IV Reactors and Special Projects, Dr. Charles Miller, Director, Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate, Dr. Laurence Kopp Senior Reactor Engineer, Mr. George Thomas, Senior Reactor Engineer and inyself. In order to facilitate our discussions, we have enclosed a list of discussion topics for your consideration. We look forward to meeting you in Tokyo and to very informative discussions with MITI and the other participants in the Japanese ABWR design and licensing process.
Sincerely.
M b.
Dino C. Scaletti, Project Manager Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects !!!, IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As Stated cc: Dr. Yoshinori Tatsuta Mr. Shogo Hara Mr. Ajira Omoto
ENCLOSURE QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION TOPICS FOR JAPAN VISIT
- 1. Please discuss the status of the MITI review of the ABWR,
- 2. Will any of the questions asked GE on the U.S. ABWR review be asked of TEPCO? If yes, please provide the U.S. NRC copies of the answers when MITI receives them.
- 3. Please discuss the plans for on-line surveillance testing for the ABWR, Are these plans different from that existing on the present generation of operating reactors?
- 4. Has the control room design for the ABWR been finalized? If not when do you expect the design to be completed?
- 5. Are there architectural design criteria (policies, goals, objectives, standards or guidelines) being used during the planning, design and construction processes for the ABWR?
- 6. What is the role and responsibility of the architect in the ABWR design process? (Ref. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section III, Design Control; see also 10 CFR role participatory 50.35,)NUREG-0700, and SRP Section 18.0 for the architect's
- 7. The NRC fuel failure thresholds for control rod drop accidents are 280 cal /gm to avoid prompt fuel element rupture and 170 cal /gm for clad failure for UO fuel. How do these limits compare to what is used in Japan? WhatikmitswillbeplacedontheABWRfuel. What is the status of the Japanese reactivity initiated accident (RIA) fuel failure research? I
- 8. Presently, where and how is fresh fuel and irradiated fuel stored? Wnat I criteria are used for the design of fuel storage facilities to prevent l accidental criticality? Please relate the to the ABWR design. J J
- 9. How are reload reviews conducted between refueling? What accidents are )
reevaluated? Who does the calculations? Who does the safety I evaluations? l
- 10. Are Technical Specifications standardized or do they vary from plant to plant? How do they compare with U.S. Technical Specifications?
- 11. How are computer codes quality assured for licensing use? How are calculated results verified and validated for accuracy?
- 12. What procedures and operating limitations are in place to provide for the prevention or detection and suppression of high flux oscillations?
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- 13. Please describe any changes made to your operating procedures, Technical Specifications, instrumentation, or operator training as a result of the LaSalle Unit 2 power oscillation event. Are any future actions or studies being planned?
- 14. It was recently discovered that at least one BWR in the U.S. allowed fuel loading while control rods were withdrawn from the core. GE has previously notified all BWR owners about the possibility of an open vessel reactivity initiated accident during refueling if all control rods are not fully inserted. Please describe the ABWR refueling basis with regard to this item.
- 15. Both Hitachi and Toshiba have completed reactor internal pumps (RIP) test programs to verify their performance. What was the test objective?
Discuss the test results.
- 16. Hitachi and Toshiba have developed handling equipment for the RIP. How does this equipment reduce radiation exposure to plant personnel.
Describe the features of the handling equipment used for pump removal / replacement.
- 17. We understand that a fine motion control rod drive test is in progren in the LaSalle Unit 2 in the U.S. Have similar tests been performed in Japan? If so, describe the test results.
- 18. Hitachi and Toshiba have performed wear, fretting and seismic tests of low delta-P spacers used in the core. Discuss the results of these tests.
- 19. Core spray distribution tests by Hitachi confirmed spray distribution.
Please explain the Japanese position related to the use of a core flooder ring in place of the traditional core spray sparger in the ABWR design?
- 20. Toshiba was primarily responsible for the flow induced vibration test of the 1/5 scale reactor model. We understand that there is no looie parts monitoring system planned for the reactor internals in the ABWR design.
What is the philosophy behind the decision of not having a loose parts monitoring system?
- 21. In current BWRs, RCIC steam isolation valves are not tested to verify that they will close as designed during a pipe break with pressure and temperature at rated condit' ions. Is any Japanese organization planning to perform the necessary tests to verify RCIC steam isolation valves closing?
- 22. Who is responsible fo the development of emergency procedure guidelines (EPG) in .lapan? f.re there any significant deviations between the Japanese and the U.S. BWR Owners Group EPGs?
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- 23. What is the believed cause of the high flux scrams at Fukushima during the April 1987 earthquake?
- 24. How did the magnitude of the earthquake compare with the design basis earthquake?
- 25. Why did Units 4 and 6 show no evidence of abnormal APRM readings?
- 26. How much of an instantaneous reactivity increase would be necessary to reach the 118% high flux trip? How much of a decrease in core average void fraction would give this amount of reactivity?
- 27. How much would the core and internals be expected to move due to the observed vertical seismic wave?
- 28. Why did core performance parameters show no variation during the event?
Was the time duration (100msee to 180 msec) too short to show any?
- 29. Please discuss the procedures used following an event at a nuclear power plant, such as the high flux trip experienced at Fukushima, prior to restarting the reactor. What other follow up action would be undertaken? '
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