ML20127N948
| ML20127N948 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/14/1985 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-PINV, TASK-SE SECY-85-213, NUDOCS 8507020255 | |
| Download: ML20127N948 (54) | |
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POLICY ISSUE June 14, 1985 SECY-85-213 (Notation Vote)
For: The Commissioners From: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations l
Subject:
ACTION ON PROPOSED RULE TO LIMIT THE USE OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) IN RESEARCH AND TEST REACTORS
Purpose:
To obtain approval for a plan of action to implement l Commission policy on reducing, to the " maximum extent I
possible", the use of HEU in research and test recctors.
Category: This paper covers a major policy matter. Category 1 resource estimate.
Issue: Implementation of Commission policy on limiting the .use of HEU in foreign and domestic research reactors. '.
Decision Criteria: 1. Are the actions recommended compatible with U.S.
domestic and international non-proliferation inter-ests?
- 2. Are the actions supported by the value/ impact appraisal?
- 3. Has proper weight been given to the Commission's desire to reduce, to the " maximum extent possible",
the use of HEU in domestic and foreign research reactors?
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Contact:
F. P. Gillespie, RES 44-37936 l
8507020255 SECY 850614 PDR PDR e5-213 l
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t The Commissioners 2 Alternatives: 1. The Commission may direct staff to proceed with finalrulemakingwhichwouldlimittgeuseofHEUin domestic research and test reactors
- 2. The Comission may approve, based on the customary value/ impact analyses, a revised plan to implement its policy on this subject which would include with-drawal of the proposed rule and provision of incen-tives for voluntary conversion to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels by non-pnwer licensees.
- 3. The Comission may desire to reduce a residual risk to essentially zero based on national policy consid-erations and may, therefore, approve suspension of further action on the proposed rule pending the results of legislative action which could be recom-mended by the Comission.
Sumary: This paper presents recommendations for Comission action relative to the use of HEU in domestic and foreign research reactors. These recommendations are based on the following findings related to the stated decision criteria: (1) the State Department has expressed the view that the international implications of the proposed conversion rule are marginal; (2) the proposed rule can-not be supported by the value/ impact appraisal inherent to the rulemaking process; and (3) any effort to further reduce a residual risk to essentially zero through an NRC regulation should be based on national policy consid-erations.
The staff fully supports the goal of the Commission policy to reduce to the " maximum extent possible," the use of HEU in research and test reactors. In response -to this Comission policy, the staff developed a proposed rule requiring licensees to convert from HEU fuel to LEU fuel except when the HEU fuel has a unique purpose. Applying the cost / benefit approach to rulemaking (see pages 8-11),
1 The proposed rule to limit the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in domestic research and test reactors was directed at 31 licensees using HEU fuel (including 25 university or state related facilities, 5 commercial facilities and 1 Federal facility.)
The Commissioners 3 staff believes the proposed conversion rule does not pass the value/ impact test for ~ final rulemaking. The basis for this staff judgment is explained on pages 7-10 and in Enclosure B. The principal elements that form this staff opinion are two. First, the State Department has expressed the view that the international implications of the rule are marginal. If, in fact, only marginal international benefits accrue, the anticipated value of the rule is severely diminished. Second, the cost to university research and training non-power reactors in terms of actual conversion costs and uncertainties of extended litigation from adjudicatory hearings are such as to raise questions, at least in some instances, of continued operation of non-power reactors. The Commission may desire to direct the staff to proceed with the current rulemaking activity in spite of these considerations (Alternative 1). However, the staff believes that this direction would result in a high degree of licensee resistence.
Recognizing that the staff believes that the proposed rule is not warranted under the cost / benefit approach to rulemaking other considerations may warrant taking a different approach (Alternative 2 or 3). In the case of university research and training reactors, the staff believes that use of HEU, at least to some degree, was encouraged by the Federal government in the past and, if the government now desires to encourage conversion to LEU, it may not be unreasonable for the Federal government to bear the costs. In fact, Federal assumption of at least some conversion costs is underway in certain DOE programs and the Commission has already stated that it will support continued DOE efforts.
A different approach is further supported by Section 104c of the Atomic Enr.rgy Act, which directs the Commission to impose only such minimum amount of regulation of nuclear research facilities, including research and test reac-tors, as the Commission finds will permit it to fulfill its obligations under the Act.
The continued operation of non-power reactors for training and research may be considered a national resource and the interruption or loss of that resource could have significant consequences. Hence, over and above the reasoning of traditional rulemaking, the Commission should be sensitive to regulatory acticr.s which may erode this resource.
s The Commissioners 4 If the Commission could accept a program of voluntary conversion by some portion of the non-power reactor licensed community (Alternative 2), then the staff would recommend the following actions:
- 1. Issue no construction permits for a new non-power reactor that would use HEU fuel unless the applicant demonstrates that the proposed facility has a uniqug purpose which cannot be met without the use of HEU.
- 2. Encourage DOE to continue its conversion-related activities directed at medium and higher power research and test reactors (i.e., DOE intends to supply LEU fuel to university facilities when LEU fuel acceptable from a licensing, functional capability, and economic standpoint is developed by DOE's Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor [RERTR] or other fuel development programs).
- 3. Encourage voluntary conversion of low power and other
" lifetime core" facilities by supporting appropriate Congressional action to provide funding to DOE to assist those non-power reactors considering conver-sion.
- 4. Continue ongoing NRC efforts to facilitate conver- .
sion safety reviews. 1
- 5. Continue the ongoing NRC activities aimed at reducing the inventories of unirradiated HEU fuel at licensed domestic non-power reactors to the minimum necessary for operations.
This alternative, voluntary conversion, would include the withdrawal of the proposed rule, " Limit-ing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Domestic Research and Test Reactors," published on July 6, 1984 (49 FR 27769). Although staff has identified on page 12, situations which it believes will pro-vide more concrete incentives, the effectiveness of 2
0nique purpose would be defined as in the proposed rule with modifications as indicated in Enclosure A.
.O The Commissioners 5 attempting to achieve the Commission's policy by voluntary action cannot be predicted. Also, the staff analysis of the proposed rule did not use as a standard the reduction of diversion risks to essentially zero.
Legislation which provides Federal funding and which exempts licensees from adjudicatory hearings (Alternative
- 3) would provide an opportunity for such reductions with what some would consider reasonable costs, particularly if most or all funding was assumed by the Federal Government.
On balance, the staff believes that the Commission should consider recommending legislation which, as appropriate, would provide Federal funding for conversion and would exempt licensees from adjudicated hearings, for fuel con-version only, providing the conversion does not signifi-cantly decrease margins of safety.
Background:
In August 1982, the Commission issued a on the use of HEU in research reactors.folicy Statement It was pointed out in the statement that "...NRC has licensing responsi-bility for domestic use and for export abroad of Special Nuclear Material, including HEU, and is interested in reducing, to the maximum extent possible, the use of HEU in domestic and foreign research reactors." The Policy Statement briefly discussed early U.S. policy on the use and supply of HEU abroad, the increases in proliferation concerns which took place in the mid-1970's and the response taken to allay concerns of proliferation risks.
Specifically, DOE's RERTR program was described and Com-mission support for the program's objective (to develop and demonstrate fuels which would allow substitution of LEU for HEU) was reaffirmed. The Commission stated that it was "... prepared to act expeditiously to review the use of the new [ LEU] fuel in domestic research and test reactors licensed by NRC" and "as part of a policy to strongly encourage conversion by foreign operators
[would] take steps to encourage similar action by U.S.
research reactor operators."
3 47 FR 37007,"Use of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) in Research Reactors; Policy Statement," August 24, 1982.
s The Comissioners 6 The 1982 Policy Statement was coordinated with the Department of Statg on behalf of the Executive Branch, prior to issuance. State advised NRC, at that time, that the statement would be very useful in implementing the procedures under which U.S.-supplied inventories of HEU could be eliminated to the maximum degree possible.
State also supported the view that there should be a coherent policy respecting the use of HEU fuels in both foreign and domestic research reactors. (Note that this view did not imply Executive Branch support of the proposed conversion rule which was subsequently devel-oped.) The underlying reason for issuing the Policy Statement in 1982 was the Comission's concern regarding the significant international traffic in HEU with the attendant risk of diversion or theft of this material.
During Comission meetings on December 19, 1983, January 27, and February 6,1984, the impacts of poten-tial theft or diversion of HEU were discussed. At that time, the staff had noted that recent acts by terrorists in foreign countries had shown that a significant adver-sary capability can materialize without sufficient warn-ing from the intelligence comunity. Furthermore, it was brought out that these acts had shown a significant increase in sophistication, coordination and willingness to comit violence. Although those conclusions resulted from foreign activities and no known credible threat against domestic non-power reactors has been identified, the staff's recomendation was that it might be prudent to consider additional domestic security measures to increase the conservatism associated with the protection provided for HEU fuel at licensed non-p9er reactors.
This position was reflected in SECY-84-216 Throughout this period, the staff was treating the issue of HEU to LEU fuel conversion separately from the issue of whether non-power reactor security needed improvement.
One reason was the proposed rules were in different stages of development. However, the major reason for the fRefer(toSECY82-294,"HEUPolicyStatement," July 12, 1982.
SECY-84-216, Security Measures at Non-power Reactors, May 25, 1984.
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The Comissioners 7 separation of issues was that conversion was believed to be driven by international policy considerations while the non-power reactor security issue was driven by the Comission's desire to consider added levels of conser-vatism in safeguards measures at licensed non-power reac-tors. Therefore, the issues were addressed in two sepa-rate SECY papers. It was recognized, however, that any residual risk of HEU diversion or theft could be reduced to zero if facilities converted to the use of LEU fuel and that licensees who converted to LEU fuel would not be subject to Category II security requirements currently applicable to these facilities.
Discussion: THE PROPOSED RULE On July 6,1984 (49 FR 27769), the Comission published a proposed rule which would limit the use of highly enriched uranium in domestic research and test reactors.
Over 150 coment letters were received from Congressional representatives, public interest groups, members of the research and test reactor comunity, special interest groups, the Departments of Energy and State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and individual members of the public. In addition, two Congressional Subcomittees held joint hearings on the proposed conversion issue.
These coments and the proposed NRC staff responses to applicable comments are enclosed as Enclosure B. Com-ments were segregated into nine categories. These are (1) International Significance of NRC Mandated Con-versions; (2) Value/ Impacts of Proposed Conversion; (3) Technical Feasibility and Safety Issues; (4) Real or Perceived Licensing Issues Attendant to Conversion; (5) Funding for Proposed Conversions; (6) Magnitude of Risk of Theft or Diversion of HEU Fuel; (7) Evaluation of the Threat of HEU Thef t or Diversion--Adequacy of Security; (8) Implementation Options and Alternatives; and (9) Mis-cellaneous Coments. Of these categories, three are con-sidered to be most "elevant to the staff's recommendation to consider alternatives to publishing a Final rule at this time. These are (a) Category 1--International Sig-nificance of NRC Mandated Conversions and, to a lesser extent, (b) Value/ Impact of Proposed Conversion, and (c) Category 6--Magnitude of Risk of Theft or Diversion of HEU Fuel. The staff's position on the topics addressed in these three categories of comments are summarized as follows.
The Commissioners 8 International Significance of NRC Mandated Conversions The Commission's view regarding the international signif-icance of the proposed domestic conversions was reflected in the Policy Statement of August 1982. In this state-ment, the Commission stated its interest in reducing, to the maximum extent possible, the use of HEU in domestic and foreign research reactors. To accomplish this policy goal, the Commission made two commitments. The first commitment was to provide full support for DOE's RERTR program--a program whose objective was, and still is, to develop and demonstrate research and test reactor fuels which will allow substitution of LEU for HEU in foreign reactors. The development of LEU fuels within the RERTR program, if successful, was considered to be the techno-logical development which could lead to a significant reduction of HEU inventories both abroad and in the U.S.
The second commitment made in the 1982 Policy Statement was that the Commission, as part of a policy to strongly encourage conversion by foreign operators, would take steps to encourage similar action by U.S. research reac-tor operators. Subsequently, a proposed rule to limit the use of HEU fuel in domestic (licensed) research reac-tors was considered by the Commission.
Based on comments received from the State Department6 and 0
With regard to the international implications of the proposed rule, the State Department has stated that it could have some " marginal effect" on future negotiations with foreign reactor operators on the need and timing for converting their own reactors. The State Department has also advised NRC concerning the criterion in the proposed rule for converting reactors which were built before current concerns about HEU use, suggesting an exemption from conversion, if such action would impose an undue technical or economic penalty. Such an exemption would bring the domestic conversion program criteria in line with those [ Executive Branch criteria] for foreign research reactors. Specifically, this exemption would apply to reactors requiring fuel reloads. The State Department also expressed the view that there are no significant non-proliferation benefits associated with conversion of lifetime core reactors since they do not add to HEU commerce.
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O The Commissioners 9 others, the staff now believes that the proposed rule cannot be strongly supported by international policy con-siderations. The staff believes that development and demonstration of acceptable LEU replacement fuel and the conversion of larger DOE facilities would have the most influence on foreign operators. Furthermore, the 4 proposed rule implied that HEU at licensed non-power reactors, whether in a facility's inventory or in tran-sit, has equivalent proliferation significance. The State Department view is that no significant non-proliferation benefits are associated with conversion of " lifetime core" reactors. Twenty of the 31 licensed facilities potentially impacted by the proposed rule can be characterized as having " lifetime cores." If the current views of the State Department are correct, the anticipated value of the rule is severely diminished.
The benefit of the proposed rule, as representing a mean-ingful example for foreign conversion, was also chal-lenged on more quantitative grounds. An argument was made that if the overriding concern is with inventories and traffic in strategic special nuclear material (spe-cifically, HEU and plutonium), then all sources of this material should be considered for retrieval or replace-ment and, specifically, all quantities of HEU related to foreign and domestic research reactors. Section 1 of Enclosure B discusses this relative risk issue in greater detail.
Magnitude of Risk of Theft or Diversion of HEU Fuel The proposed rule to limit the use of HEU in research and test reactors, although principally based on international policy considerations, did result in a re-examination of the " values" and " impacts" associated with further reductions in the risk of theft or diversion of HEU fuel from NRC licensed non-power reactors. In assessing the "value" of conversions in terms of " residual risk" reduction, the conservatisms in the current operating assumption which affect the likelihood of clanc fission explosive construction must be considered.)estine 7
Memorandum from L. V. Gossick to C. Smith, et al., " Operating Assumption on Clandestine Fission Explosives," August 8, 1977.
The Commissioners 10 Specifically, it is necessary to consider not only the level of security provided, but also: (1) the threat; (2) the ability of the intelligence community to give advance warning of a developing event or a planned malevolent act in sufficient time to implement additional countermeasures; (3) the deterrent value of irradiated fuel;(4) the length of time it would take to remove fresh or irradiated fuel from a facility (irradiated fuel would normally take longer); (5) the likelihood that an adver-sary would successfully process either fresh or irradi-ated fuel to obtain material which potentially could be used to construct a nuclear explosive device, and the time and resources required (processing of irradiated fuel is significantly more difficult); (6) the ability to find and retrieve nuclear material, if stolen (irradiated fuel would be easier to find); (7) the conservatism built into the 5 kilogram formula quantity for U-235 (the pres-ence of fission products would increase the conservatism of this number); and (8) the likelihood that, possessing the material, an adversary could successfully construct a nuclear explosive device (the presence of fission prod-ucts would make this more difficult). All of these fac-tors have an impact on the assessment of the likelihood that an adversary could construct a clandestine fission explosive.
When taken as a whole, the conclusion reached from the assessment remains the same as that indicated in the background section to the proposed rule; namely, that licensed non-power reactors using HEU fuel are currently operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. In other words, an acceptable level of risk to public health and safety can continue to be achieved
- through an appropriate level of safeguards requirements.
Value/ Impact of Proposed Conversion The staff n tes that as stated in Policy and Planning Guidance,8 any requirements imposed by NRC should make a positive contribution to safety; however, those proposed 0"U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Policy and Planning Guidance 1985,"
NUREG-0885, Issue 4, February 1985.
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The Commissioners 11 to achieve incremental reductions in risk should be eval-uated on a cost-benefit basis, insofar as practicable.
This guidance also indicated that NRC would pursue efforts to convert foreign and domestic research reactors away from the use of HEU fuel (consistent with the 1982 Policy of the Statement) while recog(nizing research community in theirtheservice legitimate to needs the nation's general welfare). Therefore, the proposed rule was not based on a " worst case" assessment but on value/ impact or cost / benefit consideration in which the impact on global reduction in the use of HEU in research and test reactors played a major role.
As discussed previously, the Department of State comments on the proposed rule indicate that, with regard to the international implications of the proposed rule, it could have some marginal effect on future negotiations with foreign reactor operators on the need and timing for con-verting these foreign reactors. If, in fact, only mar-ginal international benefits accrue, the anticipated value of the rule is severely diminished.
Quantified costs of conversion for all affected licensees are currently estimated as 12-16 million dollars. The costs of DOE's RERTR and other fuel development and dem-onstration programs are not included in this estimate.
Non-quantifiable costs include any licensing costs asso-ciated with potential hearings and potential losses in functional capabilities. The cost to university research and training non-power reactors in terms of actual con-version and uncertainties of adjudicatory hearings are such as to raise questions, at least in some instances, of continued operation of non-power reactors.
The staff has concluded 'that the value/ impact is highly subjective and that the cost to licensees which would actually occur is highly uncertain. Staff has concluded that the value/ impact analysis does not support a final rule at this time. This conclusion is based primarily on the uncertainty of the costs and on the State Depart-ment's contention that the value of the proposed rule, in setting an example to encourage conversion by foreign operators, is marginal. Furthermore, although licensee l
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The Comissioners 12 conversions would reduce the small residual risk of theft or diversion of HEU fuel, the benefit of this risk reduction was not considered sufficient to justify the uncertain costs of conversion.
STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS The staff continues to fully support the goal of the Comission to reduce to the maximum extent possible, the use of HEU in research and test reactors.
The staff has concluded that the Commission policy to reduce, to the maximum extent possible,the use of HEU in both domestic and foreign research reactors remains rea-sonable and prudent. There are several reasons for this which, for foreign facilities, include (1) the magnitude of the inventories and traffic in HEU are relatively large (i.e. , it far exceeds the inventory and traffic associated with non-power reactor licensees [ refer to Enclosure B]); (2) the HEU in worldwide traffic (specif-ically, U.S. export traffic) can be in physical forms other than fuel plates or rods; and (3) the worldwide threat assessment may differ from the domestic assess-ment.
Even if the policy is considered from the perspective of licensed non-power reactors, it romains reasonable and prudent for two principal reasons: (1) although, at pre-sent, no credible threat against domestic licensees has been specifically identified, this assessment is subject to change dependent on outside forces (adversary actions) beyond Commission control, and (2) the consequences (im-pacts) created by the potential diversion or theft of any quantity of HEU sufficient to support a nuisance threat to national peace-of-mind are highly speculative and could be of sufficient magnitude to support this policy.
Alternative 1 The Commission may desire to direct the staff to proceed with the current rulemaking in spite of the consid-erations discussed in this paper.
The Comissioners 13 Different Approaches Recognizing that the staff believes that the proposed rule is not warranted under the cost / benefit aproach to rulemaking other considerations may warrant taking a different approach (Alternative 2 or 3). In the case of university research and training reactors, the staff believes that the use of HEU, at least to some degree, was encouraged in the past by the Federal government and, if the government now desires to encourage conversion to LEU, it may not be unreasonable for the Federal government to bear the costs. In fact, Federal assumption of at least some conversion costs is underway in certain DOE programs and the Commission has already stated that it will support continued DOE efforts.
A different approach is further supported by Section 104c of the Atomic Energy Act, which directs the Commission to impose only such minimum amount of regulation of nuclear research facilities, including research and test reactors, as the Commission finds will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations under the Act.
The continued operation of non-power reactors for training and research may be considered a national resource and the interruption or loss of that resource could have significant consequences. Hence, over and above the reasoning of traditional rulemaking, the Commission should be sensitive to regulatory actions which may erode this resource.
Alternative 2 This alternative would involve withdrawal of the proposed rule and rely, instead, on voluntary conversion by some portion of the non-power reactor licensed community.
This alternative includes the following major actions:
- 1. Issue no construction permit for a new non-power reactor that would use HEU fuel unless the applicant demonstratesthattheproposedfacilityhasauniqug purpose which cannot be met without the use of HEU.
- 2. Encourage DOE to continue its conversion-related activities diiccted at medium and higher power 9
To incorporate this feature of the recommended plan, an amendment to Part 50 would eventually be required. Unique purpose would be defined as in the proposed rule with modifications as indicated in Enclosure A.
The Commissioners 14 research and test reactors (i.e., DOE intends to supply LEU fuel to university facilities when LEU fuel acceptable from a licensing, functional capability and economic standpoint is developed by DOE's Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reac-tor [RERTR] or other fuel development programs).
- 3. Encourage voluntary conversion of low power and other
" lifetime core" facilities by supporting appropriate Congressional actions to provide funding to DOE to assist those non-power reactors considering conver-sion.
- 4. Continue ongoing NRC efforts to facilitate conver- i sion safety reviews.
- 5. Continue the ongoing NRC activities aimed at reduc-ing the inventories of unirradiated HEU fuel at licensed domestic non-power reactors to the minimum necessary for operations.
The first action item represents an implementation fea-ture which was included in the proposed rule. The second action item relates to ongoing DOE activities which pro-vide fuel to university and state operated non-power reactors requiring refueling on a regular basis. DOE currently is working with these licensees to supply their needs with LEU fuel acceptable from a licgsing, func-tional capability, and economic standpoint The third action item specifically relates to low power
" lifetime core" non-power reactors. Several of these, specifically at universities, have indicated interest in converting to LEU fuel providing that all costs would be covered. The universities' motivations for converting to 10 For example, the LEU fuel used in the conversion at the University of Michigan or relatively low density LEU silicide fuel may meet the require-ments of two to three medium power facilities. Advanced LEU and HEU fuels, being developed in the RERTR and other programs, can be expected to meet similar requirements at higher power research and test reactors.
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The Commissioners 15 LEU fuel could include: (1) facility upgrade or improvement, (2) reduction of safeguards costs, (3) the "public relations" benefit of removing HEU fuel from a university campus, and (4) the realization that future regulatory action could be subject to " adversary events" beyond their control or the control of NRC. Congressional appropriations to fund conversion of all low-power facil-ities could result in proposals for voluntary conversions beyond the two currently under consideration. NRC should support appropriate Congressional action to provide this necessary financial support.
The fourth action item involves a continuation of NRC efforts to investigate methods by which safety reviews of any actions directed solely at conversion from HEU to LEU fuel can be facilitated. Activities are ongoing to:
(1) define the licensin g needs for various classes of non-power reactors, (2)review the foreign and domestic data available through the RERTR and other fuel develop-ment and demonstration programs, (3) assess the feasi-bility of generic Safety Evaluation Reports or Safety Analysis Reports, and (4) participate in IAEA efforts to publish an IAEA technical document which addresses safety and licensing questions.
The fifth action item, to reduce the inventories of unir-radiated HEU fuel at licensed non-power reactors to the minimum necessary for operations is self-explanatory.
This action could be considered in the separate rulemaking proceeding, to determine what safeguards improvements, if any, should be considered for added conservatism in safeguards at non-power reactors.
These actions could result in a reduction in the traffic and inventories of HEU fuel at licensed non-power reactor facilities by the mid to late 1990's. These conversion actions are generally consistent with the plans for those foreign conversions which are relying on the development and danonstration of acceptable LEU fuel under DOE's RERTR and other programs. These recommended actions do not appear to be inconsistent with policies at DOE and DOS, as expressed in comment letters on the proposed rule. These actions would also resolve uncertainties in the licensed non-power reactor community regarding NRC's
The Commissioners 16 position on the continued use of HEU fuel. Although +.he revised implementation actions assume only a limited relationship between licensed non-power reactor conversions and the conversion of non-licensed research and test reactors, both domestic and overseas, the policy to limit the use of HEU fuel, to the maximum extent possible, is consistent with U.S. international goals.
However, the effectiveness of attempting to achieve the Cennission's policy by voluntary action cannot be pre-dicted at this time.
Alternative 3 Within the narrow context of the rulemaking process, the staff did not give any specific weighting to potentially broader reasons for promulgating a conversion rule.
Because the existing risk level from HEU fuel is believed to be acceptable, any effort requiring NRC regulatory action which would further reduce the res'idual risk to essentially zero should be on a broader basis, such as national policy considerations. Alternative 3 is for NRC to sponsor legislation to provide for federal funding for the conversion (which the Commission already has stated it will support) and, in addition, to exempt by non-power reactor licensees using HEU from adjudicatory hearings, for fuel conversion only, providing the conversion does not significantly decrease margins of safety. Such legislation could effectively remove most or all of the cost of conversion to the licensees and remove many of the uncertainties in the value/ impact analysis. If the Commission selects this option, further action on the proposed rule should be suspended pending a successful outcome of this legislative proposal.
On balance, the staff recommends Alternative 3 as the most prudent course of action, including those actions under Alternative 2 to issue no construction permits for HEU except for unique purposes, to continue NRC efforts to facilitate conversion safety reviews, and to reduce inventories of unirradiated HEU fuel at licensed non-power reactors.
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The Commissioners 17 RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS Resources to carry out the recommended implementation provisions will be required but quantitative estimates have not yet been established.
Recommendations: That the Commission:
- 1. Approve staff plans to prepare a final rule which would prohibit construction permits for a new non-power reactor that would use HEU fuel unless the applicant demonstrates that the proposed facility has a unique purpose which cannot be met without tha use of HEU.
- 2. Encourage DOE to continue its conversion-related activities for all types of licensed research and test reactors.
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- 3. Approve continuation of ongoing NRC efforts to
! facilitate conversion safety reviews.
i 4. Approve continuation of staff efforts to work with l licensees and DOE to reduce the inventories of unir-j radiated HEU fuel at licensed domestic non-power l
reactors to the minimum necessary for operations.
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- 5. A) prove Alternative 3, to recommend legislation l w1ich, as appropriate, would provide for Federal l funding for conversion and would exempt licensees conversion from adjudicatory hearings, for fuel only, providing the conversion does not
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significantly decrease margins of safety.
- 6. Direct staff to work with OGC to prepare and submit such legislation.
- 7. Suspend staff action on the proposed rule which l
- would require HEU conversion pending enactment of such legislation.
- 8. Note:
- a. That the appropriate Congressional Committee will be informed of the Commission's intended action.
The Comissioners 18
- b. That a public announcement will be issued.
Scheduling: It is recomended that this paper be considered at an open session and that the paper be placed in the Public Document Room on the day of the Comission meeting.
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Williau J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
A. Definition of Unique Purpose B. Responses to Public Coments This paper is tentatively scheduled for discussion at an Open Meeting on Wednesday, June 19, 1985.
If not voted on at the June 19, 1985 meeting, Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Tuesday, July 2, 1985, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners .
OGC OPE OI OCA OIA OPA REGIONAL OFFICES EDO ELD ACRS ASLBP ASLAP SECY
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LIMITING THE USE OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM IN DOMESTIC RESEARCH AND TEST REACTORS Enclosure A DEFINITION OF UNIQUE PURPOSE
" Unique purpose" means that the project, program, or commercial endeavor cannot reasonably or economically be accomplished without the use of HEU fuel, and may include:
(1) A specific experiment, program, or commercial activity (typically long term) that s.ignificantly serves the national interest and cannot be accomplished without the use of HEU fuel; (11) Reactor physics or reactor development based explicitly on the use of HEU fuel; (iii) Research or commercial projects or programs based on the neutron flux levels or spectra only attainable with HEU fuel; or (iv) A reactor core of special design that could not perform its intended function without using HEU fuel.
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. LIMITING THE USE OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM IN DOMESTIC RESEARCH AND TEST REACTORS Enclosure B RESPONSES TO PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED RULE Over 150 letters were received from Congressional representatives; public interest groups; members of the research and test reactor community; special interest groups; the Departments of Energy and State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and individual members of the public. In addition, two Congressional Subcommittees (Energy Research and Production and Energy Develop-ment and Application of the House of Representatives' Committee on Science and Technology) held joint hearings on the proposed conversion issue. The discus-sion which follows has attempted not only to address comments received during the comment period, but als'o those raised at the Congressional hearing and several submitted for the record following the close of the comment period.
The comments addressed a wide range of issues which were organized into the following categories:
- 1. International Significance of NRC Mandated Conversions.
- 2. Value/ Impacts of Proposed Conversions.
- 3. Technical Feasibility and Safety.
- 4. Real or Perceived Licensing Issues Attendant to Conversion.
- 5. Funding for Proposed Conversion.
- 6. Magnitude of Risk of Theft or Diversion of HEU Fuel.
- 7. Evaluation of the Threat of HEU Theft of Diversion - Adequacy of Security.
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- 8. Implementation Options and Alternatives.
j 9. Miscellaneous.
The information presented under categories 1 and 6 w.s especially pertinent to l
1 the staff's recommendation to withdraw the proposed rule and formulate a revised i plan to implement Commission Policy. Because of the decision to recommend with-drawal of the proposed rule, some comments, especially those pertaining to rule
- implementation options or alternatives were not specifically addressed. Comments on the threat of HEU theft or diversion and the adequacy of security at domestic non power reactors were either addressed in Section 6 or were not addressed since the proposed rule was not promulgated to address the issue of an accept-I able level of conservatism in security at licensed non power reactors. '
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- 1. INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PROPOSED NRC MANDATED CONVERSIONS A number of commenters expressed opinions regarding whether or not reducing enrichment in licensed non power reactors could promote the policy of encourag-ing conversion by foreign non power reactor operators. Many indicated that they believed the proposed action would send a clear message to the world regarding the U.S. commitment to the prevention of the irresponsible use of nuclear weapons.
Several others, both supporters and opponents to the proposed rule, indicated that the foreign reactors of interest are in the same category as high power, non-licensed, U.S. reactors at National Laboratories and that, taken alone, conversion of the smaller licensed facilities covered by the proposed rule would have no impact on foreign operators with large inventories and/or large turn-over of HEU fuel. A foreign reactor operator expressed a similar opinion and other commenters noted that they have been told by their foreign colleagues that they are receiving no pressure to remove HEU fuel. A comment from the aforementioned foreign reactor operator indicated that pressures to convert (exerted through export policy considerations) range from very tough to non-existing, depending on the facility and country involved. Several commenters stated that the " example policy" is a reflection of a failed and naive U.S.
policy which has not worked in the past in the power-reactor, fuel reprocess-ing and isotope separation arenas. The Department of State view was that the domestic conversion program could have some marginal benefit in demonstrating the United States' direct interest in pursuit of the conversion program abroad.
A few commenters pointed out that the conversions, to which the proposed rule is directed, go beyond, and should not be related to, what the Department of State is promoting for foreign reactors. It was noted that conversion of the smaller facilities overseas (equivalent to those affected by the proposed rule) has not been a major goal in U.S. policy. Comments from the Department of State and DOE support this statement. Representing an opposite viewpoint, several commenters noted that the above arguments should be used to support a policy for the conversion of more of the non-licensed U.S. (i.e., DOE) reactors that use large quantities of HEU fuel. Implementation of the proposed rule was stated as being the first tangible commitment directed at low-security environ-ments and could lead to development of valuable licensing and technical infor-mation which could be shared with foreign operators. One commenter, while conceding that moral leadership quite often does not work in foreign policy, 4
stated that being inconsistent by favoring our licensed university reactors with HEU will make the political climate abroad for HEU to low enrichment uranium (LEU) conversions all the more difficult.
The Commission's view regarding the international significance of the proposed domestic conversions is reflected in the Policy Statement of August 1982.5 The 1982 Policy Statement was coordinated with the Department of State, on behalf of the Executive Branch, prior to issuance.2 The Executive Branch advised NRC, at that time, that the statement would be very useful in implementing the procedures under which U.S.-supplied inventories of HEU can be eliminated to the maximum degree possible. The Executive Branch also supported the view that there should be a coherent policy respecting the use of HEU fuels in both foreign and domestic research reactors. In the Policy Statement, the Commission stated its interest in reducing, to the maximum extent possible, the use of HEU in domestic and foreign research reactors. To accomplish this policy goal, the Commission made two commitments. The first commitment included a statement of full support for DOE's Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) program - a program whose objective was, and still is, to develop and demon-strate research and test reactor fuels which will allow substitution in foreign reactors of uranium of low enrichment for HEU. The development of' LEU fuels within the RERTR program, if, successful, was considered the technological development which could lead to a significant reduction of HEU inventories both abroad and in the U.S.
The second commitment made in the 1982 Policy Statement was that the Commission, as part of a policy to strongly encourage conversion by foreign operators,' would take steps to encourage similar action by U.S. research reactor operators.
Although the direct impact of the proposed rule would be to reduce the domestic risk of theft or diversion of HEU fuel used in NRC licensed non power reactors, the reduction in domestic use of HEU fuel was seen as possibly encouraging sim-ilar action by foreign research reactor operators. On the basis of this hope, the proposed rule was issued to implement the second policy commitment.
'"Use of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) in Research Reactors: Policy Statement,"
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 47 FR 37007, August 24, 1982.
8SECY 82-294, "HEU Policy Statement," July 12, 1982.
5
Based on comments received in 1984 from the State Department' and others, it is 'ecognized that the State Department believes that foreign policy considera-tions do not provide the main impetus for the proposed rule regarding domestic
~
reactors. Furthermore, the proposed rule implied that HEU, whether in a facil-ity's inventory or in transit, has relatively equal proliferation significance.
The State Department view is that no significant non proliferation benefits are associated with conversion of " lifetime core" reactors. In conclusion, the international significance of the proposed NRC mandated conversions, when taken alone and considering Executive Branch input, is considered marginal. In fact, as commenters have suggested, the greatest significance internationally could be indirect; namely, the impact, if any, that NRC action could have on future conversion plans for the larger non-licensed, DOE-owned research and test reactor facilities.
The benefit of the proposed rule, in representing a meaningful example for for-
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eign conversions, was also challenged on more quantitative grounds. Several commenters, either directly or by reference to a paper by E. L. Zebroski', stated that significant amounts of HEU (and plutonium) exist in hundreds of locations in a variety of forms. These commenters pointed out that, to the degree that a diversion or theft risk for HEU exists, the contribution to risk from the presence of HEU fuel at small research reactors is insignificant compared to that associated with other sources of fissionable material. One commenter pointed out that the total authorized mass of HEU at domestic non power reactors is 2.7% of the amount under Euratom Safeguards and 1.7% of the amount of HEU
'With regard to the international implications of the proposed rule, the State Department has stated that it could have some " marginal effect" on future negotiations with foreign reactor operators on the need and timing for converting their own reactors. State has also advised NRC that a more reasonable formulation of " Unique purpose" criterion for those existing reactors requiring fuel reloads would be to require the use of LEU unless such use would impose an undue technical or economic penalty on the reactor operators or users. State also noted that there are no significant non-proliferation benefits associated with conversion of " lifetime core" reactors
'Jince theyof Analysis doRisks not ac'd to HEU commerce.
of Diversion of Plutonium or Hichiv Enriched Uranium."
E. L. Zebroski, Ar.nual Meeting of the Society of Risk Analysis, Knoxville, Tennessee, October 1, 1985.
6
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exported through 1982. A number of letters made note of the fact that our national policy of promoting reactor conversions apparently does not apply or is very ambiguous regarding conversion of over 40 smaller foreign reactors (less than 1 Mw) which are the counterparts of the domestic facilities poten-tially impacted by the proposed rule.
In the footnoted reference (Zebroski), the rankings of the following four major categories of diversion exposure were assessed: (1) weapons materials and facilities; (2) large test reactors using HEU abroad; (3) large domestic test i
)
reactors not subject,to NRC licensing; and (4) small research reactors at universities. The result's of this assessment show an estimated HEU exposure risk from small research reactors at universities being three orders of magni-tude (1,000x) less than similar risk from weapons materials and facilities and two orders of magnitude (100x) less than that resulting from HEU at facilities abroad. This ranking ).inges on the assumption that diversion risk exposure per kilogram of material is,not widely different among these sources of HEU (i.e., the level of safeguards protection was assumed to balance the dif-ferences in the amounts of weapons-useable material in a particular category).
The question regarding the relative risk of diversion or theft of HEU from domestic research and test reactors (and more specifically those licensed by the NRC) is recognized as a subject for legit'imate discussion regarding the value/ impact considerations of the proposed rule as considered on a global .
scale. Table 1 presents an elementary appraisal of the fissionable material inventories and annual traffic in HE0 or equivalent material. Given the significant differences in safeguards requirements associated with these cate-gories of material, all comparisons of global diversion and theft risk for HEU require subjective assessments of the impact that these safeguards measures have in reducing the likelihood of diversion or theft of HEU. Comparison of the diversion and theft risks posed by HEU reactor fuel with similar risks associated with weapons also requires a comparative assessment of the " benefits" of two completely different uses of HEU or equivalent fissionable material.
When considering HEU use in research and test reactors, the NRC position has been that the value of the proposed conversion of licensed non power reactors is strongly tied to the extent of future actions to reduce HEU inventories and traffic at all possible foreign and domestic research and test reactors. This 7
TA8LE 1 t.
FISSIONASLE MATERIAL INVENTORIES AND ANNUAL TRAFFIC
- I AVERAGE NUMBER ANNUAL TRAFFIC (KG) 0F LOCATIONS l INVENTORY (KG)
I Weapons Hundreds of Thousands (HEU Equiv.)
Foreign-Research and' Test Reactors ,
500 50 2000-15,000 -
40, Large (>1MW) 4 Few Hundred Small (<1MW) 500 20 Several Thousand DOE-Research and Test Reactor's 40 30 ,
300 NRC Licensed Research and Test .
Reactors Fuel Fabrication Plants 2+
Foreign Several Thousand
2+
Several Thousand Domestic 200 2 Foreign Special Purpose Reactors 200 1 Domestic Power Reactor
- Best estimates to one significant figure.
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9 relationship has been recognized by commenters both in support of and opposition to the proposed rule. In fact, this was the view expressed in the Commission's 1982 Policy Statement.'
To the extent that one focuses solely on the domestic risk situation, the contribution from DOE and potential " unique purpose" licensee facilities, as provided for under the proposed rule, should be compared to risk posed by facilities for which conversion would be mandated by the proposed rule. Such a comparison indicates that adoption of the proposed rule would cause domestic inventories at non power reactor facilities to be reduced by less than 10% and the associated annual traffic to and from reactor facilities to be reduced by less than 2%.
The staff acknowledges that HEU fuel at its licensees represents small, but not insignificant, fractions of the inventories and traffic domestically. However, when the diversion and theft risk of this material is compared to the similar risk from the inventory and traffic associated with DOE research and test reac-tors, consideration should be given, as discussed previously, to risk on a unit mass (kilogram) basis. The assumption made in the footnoted (Zebroski) refer-ence presumes that variations in the level of safeguards protection (e.g., at DOE facilities vs NRC licensees) equalizes the diversion and theft risk on a unit mass basis. The uncertainty in this assumption is high and could change the resulting risk ranking between various classes of research and test reactors, both foreign and domestic.
With regard to inventories overseas, any actions proposed to reduce these inventories could also be subject to appropriate value/ impact appraisals to establish if such actions are reasonable and prudent. Given the large inven-tories of HEU fuel overseas, the magnitude and form' of the HEU traffic involved, and potential differences in credible threats and levels of security, decisions on conversions domestically (and specifically for NRC licensees) may not be the same as decisions made for segments of the foreign non power reactor community.
' August 24, 1982; 47 FR 37007.
' Domestic licensee traffic would typically include HEU in fuel and other forms whereas U.S. traffic overseas would typically be in non-fuel forms (e.g., UF.).
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In conclusion, the staff believes that the merit in the comparison of global HEU inventories, in the light of judging the international significance of the proposed rule, is most pertinent when applied to inventories at foreign and domestic research and test reactors (especially, the " lifetime core" facilities overseas). This comparison supports the previously reached conclusion that the international significance of the proposed NRC mandated conversions is marginal, especially in view of the apparent absence of any national policy directed at promoting the coversion of low power, " lifetime core," foreign non power reactors.
- 2. OTHER VALUE/ IMPACTS OF PROPOSED CONVERSIONS A large number of commenters provided views on the value/ impacts of the proposed conversions ranging from subjective judgements on the entire prop'osal to detailed estimates of a specific impa*ct.
(a) Value/ Impact Judgements Many commenters simply indicated that any conversion costs are well worth the value of reducing the traffic in and inventories of HEU. Several suggested that the potential loss (by decommissioning) of a few marginal facilities pales in comparison to the costs and risks associated with weapons materials. A few addressed the consequences of diversion in terms of potential national destab-ilizations and/or as a precursor to international conflict. In several letters, the statement was made that if universities were required to adequately protect HEU material (with an implied near zero probability of theft or diversion), the financial cost would be greater than those [ costs] considered for conversion.
Reflecting an opposite view, other commenters stated their belief that the cost of conversion (10-20 million dollars), if borne by the Federal Government, would be a waste of taxpayer's money. Others believed the direct costs could be overshadowed by societal costs associated with losses of facilities or capabil-ities. Specifically, a number of commenters expressed the view that the perception, especially by university administrators, of " politically" inspired, burdensome, regulatory costs would lead to facility decommissionings. A few suggested that the money (525 million) already spent on DOE's RERTR program 10
would have been better directed at upgrading U.S. research reactor facilities.
One commenter implied that the proposed rule is an example of NRC making a general judgement based on a single " worst case" scenario. Another pointed out f
that the LEU exercise has been going on for about 5 years and has taken time and effort by the staffs at non power reactors to consider the consequences of lower enrichments, to prepare statements, and to present their argument to NRC and other agencies. It was pointed out that these activities were performed without compensation from the government.
In response, the staff notes that as stated in Policy and Planning Guidance,'
any requirements imposed by NRC should make a positive contribution to safety; however, those proposed to achieve incremental reductions in risk should be evaluated on a cost-benefit basis, in so far as practicable. This guidance also indicated that NRC would pursue efforts to convert foreign and domestic research reactors away from the use of HEU fuel (consistent with the 1982 Policy Statement) while recognizing the legitimate needs of the research community (in their service to the nation's general welfare). Therefore, the proposed rule was not based on a " worst case" assessment regarding malevolent HEU use but on value/ impact or cost / benefit consideration in which the impact on global reduc-tion in the use of HEU in research and test reactors played a major role.
As indicated in the discussion under Section I, the Department of State comments on the proposed rule indicate that, with regard to the international implica-
- tions of the proposed rule, it could have some marginal effect on future nego-tiations with foreign reactor operators on the need and timing for converting these foreign reactors. It is recognized, therefore, that international policy considerations no longer provide the major support for the proposed rule. A complete value/ impact appraisal, however must still (1) consider the specific needs for use of HEU by its licensees; (2) evaluate the incremental risk reduc-J tion, if any, in the substitution of LEU for HEU fuel; and (3) consider all the costs and other impacts imposed by conversion actions. With the modification discussed in the following subsection, and the attempts in this document to E'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Policy and Planning Guidance 1985,"
NUREG-0885, Issue 4, February 1985.
h' 11
characterize the values and impacts which cannot be quantified in monetary terms, the staff believes that the " costs" and " benefits" of the proposed rule have been fairly characterized.
(b) Detailed Value/Imoact Estimates Several commenters, mainly NRC licensees, provided detailed descriptions of the value of their facilities and a few provided conversion cost estimates indicat-ing that in the regulatory analysis supporting the proposed rule, the costs were underestimated. Table 2 presents a listing of the values as indicated by the comment letters. A few commenters referred to studies estimating the need for several thousand trained people for replacement and upgrading of operating staff in U.S. power reactors and implied that the decommissioning of non power reactors would have a serious impact on meeting this need.
Most commenters discussing'the costs of conversion expressed concern about the possibility of unknown licensing costs. Specifically identified were costs related to potential hearings generated by the license amendment or construc-tion permit which conversion would require. The recent experience involving the UCLA facility was raised as a case in point. (This comment is discussed in Section 4.) Only a few commenters addressed the quantified costs of conversion presented in the regulatory analyses which accompanied publication of the proposed rule. These estimates typically included fuel fabrication, licensing support, transportation, and startup costs. Table 3 presents these estimates and compares them with NRC cost estimates contained in the regulatory analysis.
As a further comparison, the U.S. Congress pursuant to H.R.98-755 directed the DOE to submit a report estimating the costs of LEU fuel conversion for university research reactors currently using HEU fuel. Table 3 also presents a comparison of the cost estimates from this study with those estimated in the regulatory analysis which supported the proposed rule. The review of these cost estimates indicates a general agreement, with one exception, on the quantifiable costs of conversion of NRC licensed non power reactors from the use of HEU to LEU fuel.
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TABLE 2 TYPICAL SOCIETAL VALUES OF SPECIFIC RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR FACILITIES AS EXPRESSED BY COMMENTERS Value Expressed Facility Provided competent n'uclear-oriented engineers Worcester Polytechnic to graduate schools and industry for nearly Institute 25 years
>400 nuclear engineering graduates (90% used Iowa State University facility)
Reactor use (61% teaching, 24% maintenance and operator training, 15% research)
Research (e.g., NSF-neutron " noise" generated by moving reactor core components. Neutron activation analysis of high cross-section materials, sensing small concentrations of radioactive gases)
Training and research (e.g., effects of trace University of Missouri amounts of Se on human and animal health; Columbia understanding toxicity of Se; development of radioactive agent for bone cancer treat-ment; measurement of crystal structure of Nd Fe B used in hard magnets (retain a U.S.A.
patent position); boron n capture therapy for treatment of brain cancer Used by 7 laboratories and departments @ MIT, Massachusetts 27 additional universities, hospitals and Institute of Technology other non profit institutions Research n scattering study of wave properties of thermal n; diffraction physics; organic compound molecular dynam-ics; development and testing of materials to enhance irradiation performance; effects of simultaneous fatigue, thermal cycling and irradiation; development of closed loop digital control methods for nuclear reactors; neutron activation of geologic samples and trace elements (nutrition and disease stud-ies); boron n capture therapy for brain cancer; high resolution track etch auto-radiography to determine boron and plutonium distributions at cellular level; Au-198 production for cancer therapy; Dy-165 13 ,
TABLE 2 (continued)
Value Expressed Facility production for arthritis treatment; Cr-37 production for pulmonary research; P-32 production for biology research applications 100 MIT students participate yearly in reac-tor oriented research; 100 additional stu-dents use reactor technology methods; train-ing, research, demonstrations, class visits by 200 students and 28 faculty from 14 other educational institutions; at which >3000 specimens irradiated Research - Neutron Spectroscopy (nuclear and Rhode Island solid state physics)
Reactor use by a number of faculty from various University of Missouri-departments Rolla Training for approximately 120 utility reactor operators (40 in the next 4 mo.)
Neutron transmutation doping of electronic Union Carbide grade Si. Sterling Forest Reactor Radioisotope production fron U-235 fission (Mo'99, Xe-133, I-131, I-125 and others Nuclear medicine - 2.5 x 105 in vivo tests /
year Radioimmunoassay - 60x10' in vitro tests / year Cold neutron research on metals, polymers and National Bureau of l biological materials Standards Trace element production l
Non-destructive testing of materials l
- Chemical catalyst studies Neutron physics Thermionics research General Atomics Initial or requalification training for 150 Westinghouse nuclear power plant operators per year l
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TABLE 2 (continued)
Value Expressed Facility Education (nuclear engineering laboratory, University of Washington nuclear instruments and other specialized courses)
Research (reactor noise, neutron activation analyses (forestry, fisheries, oceanography physics, nephrology, pharmacy, chemistry, metallurgy); thermal column flux measure-ments, two phase flow analysis, reactor flux measurements, dosimetry, age dating 15
TABLE 3
SUMMARY
AND COMPARISON OF VARIOUS LEU CONVERSION COST ESTIMAT
($000)*
9 Reactor or Fuel Source Fabrication Licensing Transport Startup Total Reactor Class 1,968 525 468 10,118 20 University (1) DOE /ANL 7,157 i Reactors 3,000 2,500 250 11,950 27 Licensee (2) NRC 6,200 Reactors 96 70 16 939 Univ. of Wisc. DOE /ANL 757 917 75 80 12 NRC . ~750 Reactor --- ---
631
--- 90 Director ,
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+100 305 2,005 GA Technologies GA 1,395(4) 250 80 12 721 NRC 375
- High (1)
Estimate Used If Range Given.All licensed university reactors with excepti (2) All licensed reactors For with exception of Manhattan College, UCSB, WNTR, facilities with routine refueling schedules, fuel fabri-and GENTR.
' - cation costs were discounted by 50% to reflect the fact that not all HEU fuel value would be lost if conversions were required.
c Does not include $100K support for (3') 'fricludes $305K lost revenue estimate.
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Safety Analysis Report which has been separately identified under licensing.
(4) Includes 50% discount factor to reflect that HEU fuel values would not be expected to be totally lost and does not include uranium cost.
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The exception involves the question of how uranium costs should be included in the cost evaluation. An assumption was made in the regulatory analysis that the conversion from HEU to LEU fuel would not involve a significant loss of uranium. However, achieving this approximate balance would require reprocessing of the existing HEU fuel and this charge should be added to the conversion costs.
Furthermore, although this loss of uranium was not considered significant, the LEU replacement fuel is estimated to require about 15% more uranium than the HEU fuel. Taken together these costs could add $1-2 million to the conversion
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cost estimate.
Table 3 also indicates a significant difference in the estimates between NRC and GA Technologies (GA). Part of the difference involves the consideration of the aforementioned uranium costs. Another factor involves the 50% discount factor which the NRC analysis applied to all HEU fuels in facilities which experience routine refueling. This discounting was an attempt to reflect the fact that not all of the HEU fuel value would be lost in conversions. Finally, as estimated by GA, the cost per element and number of elements requiring replacement are somewhat higher than values used in the generic assessment made by NRC. Based on the review of these costs, an additional fuel cost of about 5200,000 should be added to the NRC conversion cost estimate.
A few commenters suggested that substitution of LEU fuel for HEU fuel could severely affect attainment of the goals of their facilities. Most of these comments apply to the 6-8 medium and high power facilities whose operations or research activities are dependent on neutron flux magnitudes or energy spectrums.
The Commission believes that case-by-case studies of these facilities, using advanced LEU fuels developed by DOE's RERTR or other programs, could lead to conversions which have limited or no impact on a facility's goals. For those remaining facilities, the proposed rule provided the possibility of exemptions from conversion based on defined unique purpose provisions.
In conclusion, the staff believes that the quantified conversior, costs were properly characterized. The identified, but unquantified, costs of most significance relate to (1) losses in functional capabilities or decommission-ing of facilities brought about solely because of the proposed conversion rule, and (2) legal (licensing) costs attendant to the license amendments or new 17
construction permits required to implement conversion. The first of these cost items can only be subjectively assessed through the preceding discussion of comments. (It should be noted, however, that since the time that the proposed rule has taken its final form, four university facilities have decided or have given strong indication that they will request " possession only" licenses for a variety of reasons.) About another half-dozen have indicated that decommis-sioning is a real possibility if conversion results in any significant economic impacts to their universities. The second cost item is discussed in more detail in Section 4.
- 3. TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY AND SAFETY Many comments on technical feasibility and safety pertained to licensing issues
, and these are discussed in Section 4. Most commenters recognized that DOE's RERTR' and other programs are developing and demonstrating high density LEU and HEU foals which conceivably could be used to replace HEU fuel with little or no functional penalty. One commenter indicated that if LEU fuel was available in plate form of the same dimensions as present fuel with approximate equal reactivity worth per plate and which would not alter reactivity coefficients, no operating difficulties were foreseen. Others expressed differing opinions --
some believing that replacement LEU fuel could improve functional capability while others claimed that their specific needs would suffer due principally to neutron flux level, neutron spectrum, and fuel lifetime differences between LEU and HEU fuel. One commenter pointed out that the spectroscopy group at his facility has recently spent 2 years designing and building new beam port plugs I which through special techniques increase flux by 10%. LEU fuel was seen as a i step backward in terms of utilization. Several commenters stated that informa-tion on the availability of acceptable (and reliable) new fuel must be obtained l
before a meaningful conversion plan can be developed and submitted to NRC detailing a proposed conversion schedule. Two commenters pointed to the proven reliability of low density, HEU fuels over 30 years of operation in numerous reactors and under accident conditions as demonstrated in the SPERT and BORAX l
'"RERTR Program Activities Related to the Development and Application of New LEU Fuels," A. Trave 111, October 1983.
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tests. Three others specifically addressed fuel acceptability and availability questions with regard to replacement of TRIGA FLIP fuel with currently avail-able LEU TRIGA fuel. Pulsing capabilities and fuel lifetime were highlighted.
A few commenters expressed the opinion that the safety benefits in converting to LEU fuel have been understated citing increases in Doppler coefficients with LEU plate fuel and the strong prompt negative temperature coefficient associated with TRIGA fuel.
The staff judgement is that all available information continues to indicate that conversion of several low power licensed non power reactors is technically feasible and is not expected to involve any significant hazards considerations.'
The University of Michigan has been converted to val, LEU fuel with a U density of 1.79/cm* and operations to date have been successful. There is no known reason that this type of fuel could not be used to replace HEU fuel at several low power licensed non power reactors. Information from DOE indicates that silicide fuel, with uranium densities significantly below the upper bound values needed and being tested for the conversion of high power facilities overseas, could be used in almost all licensed non power reactors. Specifically, the report prepared by Argonne National Laboratory for DOE pursuant to H.R. 98-7551' asserts that an LEU U Siz- Al fuel with a uranium density of less than 3.8g/cm' could be used to convert 14 of the 16 " plate-type" university reactors. This report also expresses the opinion that TRIGA LEU fuel has been developed by GA Technologies as a standard replacement for its HEU FLIP fuel. The conclusion reached is that conversion of all but two university licensees is or, in the near future, will be technically feasible. The NRC licensing staff has not reviewed and evaluated these fuels except for the University of Michigan.
With regard to operational safety, the staff knows of no reason that LEU fuels cannot be developed and demonstrated which will perform safely. The
'" Assessment of the Implications of Conversion of University Research and Training Reactors to Low Enrichment Uraniun Fuel," NUREG/CR-3666, February 1984.
2'" Cost Estimate for LEU Conversion and Standardization of University Research and Test Reactor Fuels," Office of Energy Research, Department of Energy, (to be published).
19
safety reviews undertaken on any conversion action would have to conclude that LEU fuel can be operated in a manner which properly protects public health and safety.
- 4. REAL OR PERCEIVED LICENSING ISSUES ATTENDANT TO CONVERSION In the supplementary information section of the proposed rule, the statement was made that the NRC is considering the development of generic envelopes of safety limits for several types of non power reactors. The development of these generic envelopes could facilitate safety reviews attendant to the HEU/
LEU fuel conversion process. Comments were invited on this approach and many were received from both supporters and opponents of the proposed rule. These comments could be divided into two general classes. The first class presented the belief that conversion, in almost all cases, would require either a reactor
" relicensing" [i.e., new construction permit] or a license amendment. The possibility of implementing conversion without amendment under 10 CFR 50.59 was generally considered by these commenters to be unrealistic. Concerns were expressed that this " relicensing" or license amendment process could lead to extensive licensing hearings brought about by potential intervenor groups and that costs related to such hearings could exceed the hardware costs of con-version. Some of these letters cited the recent shutdown of the UCLA reactor as a pertinent example. Many commenters, including several involved with the operation of non power reactors at universities, indicated that the universities could not afford to carry out litigation against determined opponents and that even the perception of or uncertainties regarding such litigation could influence decisions regarding continued facility operation. Following along this line, a few commenters recommended that the NRC undertake a rulemaking proceeding on l
this question and that any changeover be contingent on a finding that safe operations are not significantly affected. It was also suggested that the requirement in the proposed rule regarding the acquisition (or fabrication) of additional HEU fuel should be contingent on completion of the license changes necessary to accommodate use of LEU fuel. The potential need for the rule to provide, in any conversion process, for stepwise refueling to keep the facility within present 10 CFR 73 requirements was also identified.
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The second class of comments presented an opposite viewpoint, stating that, even if conversion requires a license amendment, challengers can only raise questions on the narrowest of matters relevant to the subject of the amendment.
Further, many comments in this class opposed the idea of generic envelopes'of safety limits for several types of non power reactors although some of these
- recognized the need for generic safety analysis of fuels. These commenters l believed that if there are any questions regarding the safety of reactors due to conversion, the public should be allowed to address these safety questions in a public hearing. Others emphasized that safety margins should increase or remain equal to those currently approved by the NRC and that a license amendment should be required if margins are reduced.
Several of these commenters indicated their concern that reactor operators might attempt to raise power levels or reactivity limits at the time they convert. A strong opinion was also expressed that the suggestion that poten-tial conversion was a factor in the recent shutdown of the UCLA reactor is incorrect and, in fact, it was security issues relating to HEU which brought about the security contentions. Failure to follow through with the removal of " weapons materials" from campuses, several commenters stated, will likely result in precisely the kind of opposition to non power reactor facilities (i.e., risk of interventions and lengthy litigation) that the operators state they cannot afford.
The staff has reviewed existing licenses and agrees that the possibility of implementing conversion in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 would have been limited to only a few licensees. However, other approaches to address the licensing questions associated w-ith conversion are under consideration. One involves the development by NRC of generic envelopes of safety limits for each of several types of non power reactors so that conversion would not significantly decrease existing safety margins. These generic envelopes could form the basis of an NRC rulemaking action which, in accordance with the usual provision for public input and comment, could codify acceptable regulatory bases for conversion actions. NRC has initiated efforts to examine if and how the approach can be implemented. A second approach would involve documenting the results of the c University of Michigan fuel conversion experience in a form which a licensee 1
could adapt as an appendix to appropriate current licensee SARs. To the extent 21
that the staff could rely on the Michigan fuel data to support a "no significant hazard consideration" in a specific facility conversion, the burden on individ-ual licensees could be minimized and the licensing amendment process could be expedited for all concerned. The staff believes that both approaches have merit for achieving a licensing review process which would be focused on any real safety issues associated with conversion from HEU to LEU fuel.
With regard to both the likelihood of licensing interventions (if conversion actions are undertaken) and the relevancy of the UCLA experience, the staff notes that usually license amendments for non power reactors are accomplished without intervention. Interventions and public hearings on licensing actions for non power reactors would be limited to the matters addressed in the amend-ment.
The UCLA case, on the other hand, involved a facility license renewal action which led to intervention and a public hearing process on a number of conten-tions. The staff does not believe that the " licensing costs" experienced by UCLA should be considered representative of similar costs which could be experienced by facilities submitting applications for license amendments for converting from HEU to LEU fuel.
- 5. FUNDING FOR PROPOSED CONVERSIONS In publishing the proposed rule for public comment, the Commission indicated in the supplementary information section that the "NRC shares the licensees' expressed view that conversion costs should largely or entirely be financed by the Federal Government." A number of commenters stated that this statement did not constitute a firm commitment for funding expensive fuel changes nor did it specify what costs would or would not be covered. Transportation (both of new and old fuel), differential fuel cycle, insurance, disposal, licensing support and potential litigation costs were specifically identified by commenters.
It was also pointed out that the proposed rule does not establish the vital link between Federal funding and implementation; that is, would implementation be delayed if Federal funding does not materialize. One comment letter contained discussion on the apparently conflicting views of NRC and DOE regarding conver-sion funding, especially for " lifetime cores," and questioned Congressional 22
willingness to provide funding. Resolution of the funding question was consid-ered necessary before issuance of a final rule. Another commenter stated that his facility was currently under review for deactivation (decommissioning) due to a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the requirements of the proposed rule specifically related to conversion costs. Other commenters detailed specific costs which they believed were not considered in promulgating the pro-posed rule. The possibility was mentioned that implementation (the process of removing the HEU) could lead to the need for Category I safeguards requirements (i.e., becadse of fuel falling below self protecting levels). Another commenter suggested that since the proposed rule has the overriding effect of discouraging all new non power reactor development in the United States, the Federal Govern-ment should have a concomitant program of encouraging non power reactor develop-ment and construction. This program, it was stated, should include a guarantee that, if the reactor is maintained and operated as specified in the license, it can continue to be operated for its intended purpose with no unreimbursed financial burdens imposed by the Commission.
Many commenters supporting the proposed rule emphasized their belief that conversion costs are petty cash compared to the societal benefits of conversion and several implied that economics should not be used as a reason to avoid the changeover. Comments from two members of Congress indicated their belief that Congress would continue to provide funding for development of reduced enrichment fuels and would defray the cost of its use in university research reactors.
Others also stated their belief that funding for conversion would be provided by Congress. Several members of the public stated that NRC should not be preoccupied by this consideration, but should implement a consistent nuclear policy even if it is in the face of reluctance by those who might be inconven-ienced. A few stated that conversion schedules should not be affected by Federal funding. A number also emphasized their belief that the Federal Government should not pay for any increased security costs for any facilities which do not convert.
The staff, after review of these comments, maintains the view that conversion costs of all reactors forced to convert should largely or entirely be financed by the Federal Government. The rationale for this view involves the fact that the Commission believes that the non power reactors presently licensed to use 23 m - n -
HEU fuel are operated without undue risk to public health and safety. The -
conversion actions proposed by the Commission were based on the possibility that the residual risks of theft or diversion of HEU could be further reduced in a cost-effective manner and that conversion of licensed domestic facilities was considered consistent with the policy of setting an example to encourage conversion by foreign users of HEU. On these bases, Federal Government funding was considered appropriate for an action supporting national policy.
As noted in the background material accompanying publication of the proposed rule, DOE historically and by statute has provided significant support to research and test reactor programs. In fact, fuel for university reactors is currently supplied and paid for by the DOE (U.S. taxpayers) and " loaned" to the universities. It is anticipated that the funding necessary for conversion activities could be provided through DOE or another Federal Agency. Overall fuel replacement costs (including, but not limited to, transportation, and reasonable lost fuel values' for any licensees who own the HEU fuel being replaced), support for safety analyses, and reasonable " lost revenues" caused solely by the conversion requirement are examples of such costs. Costs which would not be covered by the Federal Government include facility security costs and costs associated with litigations on required license amendments.
- 6. MAGNITUDE OF RISK OF THEFT OR DIVERSION OF HEU FUEL Almost all commenters expressed some opinion regarding the risk associated with the highly enriched uranium fuel used at research and test reactors.
Approximately two-thirds of these comments were subjective statements, most noting that HEU is uniquely attractive to would-be terrorists since the mate-rial can be used in a nuclear weapon. Therefore, its use in research and test reactors was stated as being a significant and unnecessary risk which should be eliminated. A few qualified this opinion by indicating that if the risk can be reasonably set at zero, it should be done and the use of HEU avoided. Others, in opposition to this position believed that the risk of diversion of HEU from-non power reactors had not been sufficiently evaluated and that emotional, rather than technical, arguments are prevailing in the current discussions. A potential reason proposed for this suggested state-of-affairs was the attempt to reduce an already small risk to zero. A few commenters stated that by 24
R 1 giving credence to the possibi4ity of creating instant bombs from insufficient material, that the proposed rule unintentionally or indirectly contributes to an incorrect public image and a real increase in public risk of another type because of panics which could result from any future theft or diversion attempt.
Another stated that the sudden surplus of HEU from research reactors which undergo conversion would produce a " glut on the market" of bomb-making material which will tempt organized crime and dangerous foreign governments. It was also pointed out that it would be important to dovetail fuel removal and acqui-sition since failure to do so gould provide more attractive targets for diver-
- sion or theft scenarios. Finally, a few commenters believed that the implica-tions of theft or diversion of kilogram quantities of HEU would create signifi-cant political consequences to warrant the proposed conversion action.
1 About one-third of the commenters argued in much more quantitative terms--
discussing subjects such as: the amounts of HEU needed to constitute a legit-imate threat (i.e., a clandestine weapon), the physical and chemical processes necessary to construct a weapon, the attractiveness or unattractiveness of
,. research and test reactor fuel as a target material relative to other global inventories of HEU, the current and future likelihood of terrorist diversion of fuel from non power reactors, the clandestine nature of the entire hypothesized construction process necessary to produce a nuclear detonation, and the possibil-ity of recovery of any stolen or diverted material. One commenter noted that achieving zero risk is unattainable since, he asserted, even 20% enriched LEU material could theoretically be used to achieve fast criticality. He implied that fast criticality was both necessary and sufficient to produce a nuclear
- detonation.
i The staff believes that an assessment of the risk of diversion or theft of HEU
+
from licensed non power reactors must begin with an understanding of what inven-tories of HEU are present at these facilities. Although the inventories of HEU will vary with facility operations, Table 4 presents an approximate breakdown of the HEU inventories in terms of enrichment level, irradiation level, and number of facilities involved. It must also be emphasized that no licensee currently possesses more than 5 kg of HEU in either unitradiated form or 25
TABLE 4 ESTIMATED HEU INVENTORIES AT NRC LICENSEES I*. ESTIMATED TOTAL INVENTORY NO. OF FACILITIES NOMINAL HEU FUEL DESCRIPTION
$20 kg 15 93% Enriched Unirradiated 570 kg 17 93% Enriched Slightly Irradiated .
(*80% in-core) 7
- 160 kg 93% Heavily Irradiated
- 4
$4 kg -
70% Enriched Unirradiated .
+3 kg 4 70% Enriched Slightly Irradiated 5
70% Heavily Irradiated * $60 kg 91
$300 kg Total (sum has been rounded to indicate approximate
- nature of tabulated values)
Heavily irradiated
- Much of this fuel would exist at lower than the initial enrichment due to burnup.
is defined as fuel having a radiation level greater than 100 r/hr at 3ft.
t in fuel causing a radiation level of less than 100 rem /hr at three feet. The distinction between the 70% enriched-TRIGA FLIP fuel (used in 5 facilities) and I
the 93% enriched plate fuel is made because of the impact of differences in enrichment level on the hypothesized objectives of a potential adversary.
- In assessing the potential for design and fabrication of a clandestine fission explosive (CFE) from the HEU in licensed non power reactor fuel, the NRC,'under
] the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, relies on DOE for technical information. Detailed technical information specifically applicable to the design and fabrication of a CFE might assist an individual or a group with interest inimical to the public health and safety in either constructing a CFE or perpetrating a credible hoax; therefore,.this information is classified and subject to strict need-to-know considerations. It can be noted that the NRC
-recognizes the need for conservative safeguards operating assumptions in this
- area. These include the assumption that a small subnational group of people could design and build a crude nuclear explosive device which would produce a significant nuclear yield, that is, a yield much greater than the yield of an equal mass of high explosive. To accomplish this, they would need an amount of special nuclear material which is at least equal to the 5-kilogram formula quantity (in this case, 5 kg of U-235), and they would have to possess the appropriate technical capabilities, a
l The operating assumption considers two different aspects of the fabrication of
! a CFE--the amount of HEU required and the technical capability of a group of j . people attempting the task. The conservatism of each aspect of the assumption is addressed below.
- Based upon information supplied by DOE, more than one theft of less than five ,
kilograms each would be required to construct a CFE. Furthermore, for HEU in research and test reactor fuel, more HEU than the 5-kilogram amount would be
- required to construct a CFE since metallurgical or chemical processing would be required. In assessing the adequacy and degree of conservatism of protec-tion at non power reactors, it is necessary not only to consider the level i of security provided but also (1) the threat; (2) the ability of the intelli-gence community to give advance warning of a developing event or a planned l,
malevolent act in sufficient time to implement additional countermeasures; 27
(3) the deterrent value any fraction of HEU fuel which is heavily irradiated; (4) the length of time it would take to remove fresh or lightly irradiated fuel from a facility (from storage, or from the reactor core); (5) the likelihood that an adversary could successfully process a limited amount of HEU fuel to obtain uranium in a form which potentially could be used for a nuclear explosive device, and the time and resources required; (6) the ability to find and retrieve nuclear material, if stolen; (7) the conservatism built into the 5-kilogram quantity for U-235 (this conservatism increases as enrich-ment level decreases); and (8) the likelihood that an adversary, given suffi-cient material, could successfully construct a nuclear explosive device.
Of the factors listed above, safeguards requirements for the currently licensed non power reactors using HEU fuel include direct consideration only for the level of irradiation of the f,uel and the length of time it would take to remove the fuel from a facility (i.e., as time relates to detection features, adversary detection, and response). Conservatism in the effectiveness of security require-ments results from the fact that the Commission has no knowledge or information of a specific credible threat aimed at a domestic nuclear facility and current requirements do not take credit for possible advance warning from the intelli-gence community. Further, the staff does not rely on any conservatism built into the 5-kilogram formula quantity for U-235, nor on any likelihood that an adversary would be incapable of either separating weapons useable material from non power reactor fuel or successfully constructing a nuclear explosive device without detection and recovery of the material.
To complete this discussion of risk, the consequences of successful diversion or theft must be considered. Diversion of less than formula quantity (5 kg) amounts of HEU in fuel form from a domestically licensed non power reactor l
could lead to a wide range of impacts and responses which would be dependent on a number of factors including the amount of material stolen or diverted and the assessment of or knowledge about the motivation and intent of the adversary.
As the occasion warrants, various law enforcement agencies and the Nuclear Emergency Search Team could be notified and activated, respectively. Impacts on licensees could range from undesired public relations impacts to the immediate .
need to improve security in response to the weaknesses identified by the hypothesized successful diversion scenario.
i l 28 i
The likelihood of diversion or theft of greater than a formula quantity of unirradiated or slightly irradiated HEU (the HEU typically contained in more than thirty 93% enriched fuel elements) is far smaller than the likelihood of diversion of lesser amounts if only because the diversion would be required at more than one facility. Such a diversion would be considered extremely serious.
A variety of response actions similar to those described previously would most likely be taken. Additional actions to prohibit loss of any further material could be considered. Long term impacts could conceivably include the require-ment to convert from use of HEU fuel, as by the proposed rule, but in a much more immediate time frame.
The conclusion reached from the above discussion remains the same as that indicated in background section to the proposed rule; namely, that currently licensed non power reactors using HEU fuel are currently operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The overall intent of the proposed action was to reexamine the values and impacts associated with further reduction of the risk of theft or diversion of HEU and HEU fuel used globally in non power reactors. The discussion in this section has addressed the "value" of the pro-posed rule in terms of the reduction of inventory and traffic in HEU fuel asso-ciated with NRC licensed non power reactor facilities. Another "value" is the potentially positive example that domestic conversions could have in encouraging similar actions by foreign research reactor operators and, thereby, support the national policy to reduce the amount of HEU fuel in international use. The evaluation of this postulated global value was discussed in Section 1.
- 7. EVALUATION OF THE THREAT OF HEU THEFT OR DIVERSION--ADEQUACY OF SECURITY A substantial number of conment letters included opinions regarding security matters. These security-related comments can be separated into three subcat-egories: (a) Threat Evaluation, (b) Adequacy of Existing Security, and (c) Self-Protecting Radiation Levels. Responses to some of these comments were provided in Section 6. The remaining comments are not addressed since the proposed rule was not promulgated to address the issue of an acceptable level of conservatism in security at licensed non power reactors.
29
- 8. RULE IMPLEMENTATION The comments and responses in this section have been limited to those which conceivably could have some bearing on the recommendations to withdraw the proposed rule and to revise the implementation of Commission Policy on the use of HEU in licensed non power reactors.
A large fraction of comment letters expressed one or more views regarding the implementation features of the proposed rule. The views most widely held by commenters supporting the proposed rule were that (1) the conversion actions should be initiated as soon as possible; (2) exemption, under the proposed rule's unique purpose provisions, should be eliminated or tightened; and (3) the con-versions must be mandated. Some holders of the first viewpoint suggested that a date should be established by which conversions should be completed (e.g.,
within 2 to 5 years or within 1 year to 18 months of the date that LEU fuel becomes available) and that'the current 12-month period allowed for the licensee to submit a proposed conversion schedule was too long (e.g., 6 months was sug-gested). Several holders of the second view believed that exemptions should only be granted if the reactor's function is both unique and of vital signifi-cance to national security and one suggested that any unique purpose request should also be accompanied by a conversion schedule. The more detailed comments focused on the " overly general" description associated with the first of the proposed rule's unique purpose definitions. Under this provision, it was stated that a unique purpose exemption could be requested on the basis of a specific experiment or program which could not reasonably be accomplished without the use of HEU fuel. It was stated that isolated experiments could be carried out at National Laboratories and, in any event, a licensee should have to demon-strate not only the need but the value of the proposed research. A few stated that since acceptable fuel exists (e.g., TRIGA and " Michigan type" plate fuel),
conversion should not be tied to continued success of the RERTR program.
Several believed that shipping cask availability and reactor usage also should not be considered in establishing the ccnversion schedule. Finally, it was proposed in one letter than any exemptions granted for unique purpose be accom-plished through a vote of the Commission and not by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
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4 Holding views opposite to those stated above, commenters stated that uncertain-ties attendant to, (1) the acceptability of replacement LEU fuel; (2) the physical availability of shipping casks (i.e., in some cases, the small number of shipping casks available for spent fuel removal has led to storage of irradiated fuel at a few reactor sites); (3) funding; and (4) licensing should be resolved before any final rule is issued. Regarding fuel acceptability, it was suggested that the RERTR program should be completed and evaluated before conversions are mandated. A few, including the DOE and DOS submittals, suggested that economic feasibility should be considered in judging the convertibility of existing facilities and proposed that any required conversions should exclude facilities which do not require routine refueling. Suggestions were also made that TRIGA reactors using 70% enriched uranium-zirconium hydride fuel with erbium burnable poison should be considered for exemption since this specific fuel is no more attractive to the hypothetical thief than 20% enriched MTR fuel. Others suggested that further options should have been considered such as (1) minimizing the'HEU inventories on-site, (2) giving consideration to extended life HEU fuels, or (3) encouraging voluntary conversion to suit the needs of the reactor operator. A few stated that a more systematic review of the risk / benefits of conversion of specific facilities should be performed. On specific details of the proposed rule, it was stated that the proposed require-ment, (under proposed S 50.64(c)(2)(i)), " Acquire no additional HEU fuel if fuel acceptable to the Commission for that reactor is available at the time of the proposed acquisition of the HEU by the licensee," should be rephrased to state that, "No additional fuel should be started in fabrication...the licensee." A few commenters also suggested the definition of HEU as fuel with enrichment greater or equal to 20% could more reasonably be set at 50%.
The Commission, as stated in the background section of the proposed rule and referred to in response to comments in Section 6, believes that the non power reactors presently licensed to use HEU fuel are operated without undue risk to public health and safety. The proposed rule addressed the potential reduction of the residual risk posed by the use of HEU at non power reactors but was primarily intended to encourage foreign operators to convert to the use of LEU fuel by setting an example consistent with National policy. Therefore, the Comission never considered that establishing a deadline for conversion actions 31
by domestic licensees (as opposed to schedule submissions required by the proposed rule) was justified.
Furthermore, the exemptions which could be granted under the unique purpose provisions of the proposed rule are also considered to be justified. However, the general definition of unique purpose under S 50.64(b)(3)(i) did need to more precisely define the nature and purpose of the experiment or program necessita-ting the use of HEU fuel. However, the Atomic Energy Act of the 1954 and 10 CFR 50.40 and 50.41 limit NRC's role in the use to which non power reactor facil-ities are put. The revision to the unique purpose definition as indicated in Appendix A is considered to achieve both objectives.
The proposed rule indicated that a licensee's conversion schedule could consid-er availability of replacement fuel acceptable to the Commission for that reac-tor. In the background discussion, the Commission strongly implied that the licensee may consider, at the licensee's discretion, a conversion schedule in which acceptable replacement fuel must be based on reactor physics parameters
- but may be defined as fuel of similar geometry (i.e., only minor changes in physical dimensions) to currently used HEU fuel. A non power reactor using plate type fuel was expected to continue to use plate-type fuel and would not have to convert to rod-type or vice-versa, because such a change would involve major changes in the reactor. The Commission also believes that it is reasonable to allow for the consideration of other factors in the establishment of conver-sion schedules. " Reactor usage" and " availability of shipping casks" are two
! such factors: " reactor usage" to prevent an undue impact on an ongoing long-term experiment or education program requiring continued availability of the reactor; " availability of shipping cask" to permit conversion with minimum build-up or unnecessary ex-core inventories of HEU fuel and because the current
! very small number of licensed shipping casks even now requires scheduling many months in advance. With regard to the designation of the NRC authority charged
- to make determinations with regard to unique purpose, the Commission reaffirms l its position that the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the responsible licensing official for NRC licensed non power reactors, would have been a proper designee.
32 l
l
The suggestion for exemption of TRIGA reactors using 70% enriched HEU fuel was considered to have a significant degree of technical merit. As discussed, in Section 6, it is believed that more than two times the amount of 70% enriched uranium would be needed to achieve the same(adversary) goal as 93% enriched material. The required (adversary) processing of this material is also considered to be more difficult than similar processes with aluminide fuels. However, the staff does not believe that these differences are suificiently large to have justified any specific exemption or specific treatment in the context of the proposed conversion, rule. Extended life HEU fuels, on the other hand, would have received con' sideration as a potential option for any non power reactors applying for unique purpose exemptions.
With regard to suggestions on voluntary conversions or conversion to enrichments higher than 20%, the staff notes that a voluntary conversion policy has been in effect since the issuance of the 1982 Policy Statement. During that time, one facility converted volu'ntarily as soon as acceptable fuel became available.
Other facilities are also considering voluntary conversion as the RERTR program continues to reach fuel development and demonstration goals. The proposed rule was issued to reemphasize the Commission's continuing desire to reduce, to the maximum extent possible, the use of HEU-in domestic and foreign research reactors.
Conversion to enrichments higher than,20% is not considered a viable alternative for most licensed non power reactors, because it is understood that DOE does not plan to make such fuel available, and, more importantly, the 20% enriched fuels under development in DOE's RERTR program are or are expected to be acceptable for use in almost all licensee facilities by about 1990.22
- 9. MISCELLANEOUS Again, the comments and responses in this section have been limited to those which conceivably could have some bearing on the recommendations to withdraw the proposed rule and to revise the implementation of Commission Policy on the use of HEU in non power reactors.
"RERTR Program Activities Related to the Development and Application of New LEU Fuels," A. Travelli, October 1983.
33
A number of comments addressed issues which did not fall within one of the preceding eight specific category headings. A few commenters stated that the initial comment period was too limited in time. The Commission agreed and extended the comment period an additional 60 days (for a total of 120 days).
In fact, several letters received after this extended period are included in this response to public comments. Some commenters questioned why the proposed rule was published without regard to formal prepublication comments made by ANS, EpRI, ACRS, NEDHO, TRTR, G.A. Technologies and Union Carbide. The Commis-sion decision to develop a proposed rule and solicit public comment was made in late February 1984. Several of the formally identified concerns of the above organizations, made prior to that time, were discussed in the preamble to the proposed rule. Other letters received prior to the publication date of the proposed rule (July 6, 1984) were adaed to the public comment record and are addressed in this response to public comments.
A few commenters expressed' concerns regarding the timing of the rule -- suggest-ing that reactor facilities should not be expected to provide timetables in the absence of firm specific data on fuel, spent fuel shipping casks, and funding.
The Commission understands these concerns but believes that the initiation of schedule development required by the proposed rule would have been a first step in developing a reasonable schedule for conversions. In fact, all mitigating factors could have been proposed by the licensee for consideration by the NRC in developing the final schedule.
One commenter suggested that a systematic risk evaluation of potential diversion from small research reactors by a neutral, but well-informed, panel appears to be a necessary prelude to any rulemaking. The staff believes that studies pro-
- viding information on diversion potential and target attractiveness have been j performed and that the comments and responses brought about by this rulemaking proceeding provide the necessary basis for the subjective assessment of risk I
called for by this commenter. The staff does not believe that a totally quanti-tative and meaningful risk assessment on diversion and theft of HEU fuel from research and test reactors can be accomplished.
l t
34 i
One commenter stated that the issues of (1) swift handling of future export licenses, (2) reprocessing of LEU fue1 elements, (3) the cost of reprocessing and the residual fissile material credits, and (4) the guaranteed civil use by the U.S. of the returned material from overseas should be addressed. The staff recognizes the legitimacy of these questions but does not believe that policy decisions in these areas need to be tied to this rulemaking activity.
l '
h
^*
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