ML20137P714

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Forwards Human Performance Info for Use in Preparing Briefings for January 1996 Senior Mgt Meeting
ML20137P714
Person / Time
Issue date: 09/20/1995
From: Boger B
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Cooper R, Roe J, Varga S
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
Shared Package
ML20137P228 List:
References
FOIA-96-485 NUDOCS 9704090304
Download: ML20137P714 (28)
v • d • e


Text

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION "S 8 3 wasumoTow,o.c. -

..... September 20, 1995

[

+[1 +4 l MEMORANDUM TO: Steven A. Varga, Director Division of Reactor Projects, I/II,3115t,J

_. '*[y i"^[ i Jack W. Roe, Director Division of Reactor Projects, III/IV, NRR 0 hb 1

l Richard W. Cooper, Director .

j Division of Reactor Projects, RI l Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects, RII l 4

William L. Axelson, Director Division of Reactor Projects, RIII James E. Dyer, Director l

Division of Reactor Projects, RIV i I

i FROM: Bruce A. Boger, Director - ,

"g Division of Reactor Controls M. b./^w.ud

. j

- and Human Factors, NRR

SUBJECT:

HUMAN PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FOR SM PREBRIEFINGS By memorandum dated March 21, 1995, I provided you with human performance

information developed by the Human. Factors Assessment Branch (HHFB) using their Human Factors Information System (HFIS) for your use in preparing for the prebriefings for the June 1995 Senior Management Meeting. Based on the i

, favorable responses I received from that information, I am providing in )

Attachment I similar information for your use in preparing for the
prebriefings for the January 1996 Senior Management Meeting.

I LER and inspection report data are provided for all the plants in each region i for the most recent 12-month periods for which data are available. The data, numbers of LERs involving human performance and numbers of human performance items in inspection reports, are compared to values of twice the national average. HHFB's analyses of the data are provided for plants that exceed that threshold. In addition, available data for previous years are provided in tabular form for use in trending.

, It is important to remember that the information provided is somewhat i subjective in nature and should only be used for insights or to validate l

, information from other sources. To assist you in interpreting the analyses, 1 Attachments 2 and 3 provide additional details on the types of information i

entered into HFIS for LERs and inspection reports, respectively.

If you need any additional information concerning the attached information, j please contact Cecil Thomas, Chief, HHFB, at 415-2160. j cc. A. Thadani~  !

R. Zimmerman h

Attachment:

As stated 9704090304 970407 (s i

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PDR FOIA BINDER 96-485 PDR ,

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ATTACHMENT 1 .

LER and Inspection Report Summaries h

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  • REGION I PLANT 5 Wrrn AT TRAST TWICE THE NATIONAL AVERAcE OF tsgg Haddam Neck - 15 I.ERS The major groups of personnel involved in these events were licensed operator personnel (274), engineering personnel (204), and mechanical personnel (204). Major contributing factors were management and planning (734), written communications (274), and Task behaviors were knowledge-based inadeguate procedures (20%). Work types were primarily operations (9 M) and rule-based (40%).

2 (33%), engineering (274), testing (13%), procedure development (13%), and modification (134). Cognitive errors contributing to the events included misinterpretation of information (534), false

?

e assumptions about conditions (274), attention deficit (134), and poor judgment (7%) . Action errors were primarily those of omission (834).

Hope Creek - 13 LERS

]

The major groups of personnel involved in theseMajor events were I&C contributing '

personnel (54%), and licensed operators (23%). >

factors were procedures not followed (62%), management and planning (39%), inadequate training (314), inadequate procedures Task(234), behaviors work schedule (15%), and written communications (154). Work l

j were knowledge-based (54%) and rule-based ((46%). and types procedure were primarily testing (54%), operations (244),

i i development maintenance (24%) . Cognitive errors contributing to

' the events included poor judgment (38%), attention deficit (31%),

' misinterpretation of information (23%), and false assumptions about conditions (23%). Action errors were primarily those of wrong

) j action (54%) and omission (38%).

i 1

Indian Point 3 - 13 LERS The major groups of personnel involved in these events were other l

(4 6%) , engineering personnel (31%), I&C personnel (234) and

electrical personnel (23%). Major contributing factors were management and planning (77%), inadequate procedures (38%), . written Task training (314).

communications (38%), and inadequate Work behaviors e te knowledge-based (77%) and rule-based (23%).

types were primarily operations (46%), engineering (234), and testing (23%). Cognitive errors contributing to the events i

' included falso assumption about conditions (54%), misinterpretation of information (38%), and attention deficit (23%). Action errors were primarily those of omission (69%) and wrong action (23%).

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Millstone 2 - 32 LERS i

The major groups of personnel involved in these events were engineering personnel (25%), other personnel (which includes l

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j management and supervision) (25%), mechanical maintenance (224),

  • electrical maintenance (13%), licensed operators (9.4%), and Isc i personnel (9.4%). Major contributing factors were management and planning (69%) and procedures not followed (224) . Work Task behaviors

, were rule-based (47%) and knowledge-based (47%). types were primarily testing (28%), operations (25%), and engineering (164) .

Cognitive errors contributing to the events included false assumption about conditions (474), misinterpretation of information (25%) and poor judgment (164). Action errors were primarily those.

' of omission (53%) and wrong action (47%) .

Vermont Yankee - 14 LERS The major groups of personnel involved in these events were engineering personnel (19%) and mechanical personnel (21%). Major

> contributing factors were management and planning (50%), inadequate ,

training (36%), and procedures inadequate (36%). Task behaviors were rule-based (50%) and knowledge-based (43%). Work types were primarily operations (57%), testing (144), and engineeringincluded (14%).

Cognitive errors contributing to the events misinterpretation of information (57%) and falso assumption'about conditions (36%). Action errors were primarily those of omission  !

(57%) and wrong action (36%). ,

REGION I SITES WITH AT TMAST TWICE THE NATIONAL AVEFAGE OF 1 INSPECTION ITEMS l

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Millstone - 95 Items The major categories contributing to these items were procedures (59%) and management and supervision (25%). In these categories, the departments contributing the most were operations (38%) and mechanical (17%). The primary issues in the procedure category were failure to follow procedures (554) and inadequate procedures 1 (21%). The primary issues in the management and supervision l J

category were work control (50%), corrective actions (25%), and attention and oversight (21%).

QJHER COMMENTS l The overall number of human performance-related LERs for Region I plants has shown a significant decrease notwithstanding Millstone 2.

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[. REGION II PLANTE WITH AT T. WAST TWICE THE NATIONAL AVEnAGE OF T.wns crystal River 3 - 19 LERS The major groups of - personnel involved in these events were t mechanical personnel (23%) and engineering personnel'(234). Major contributing factors were inadequate procedures (29%), management Task behaviors and planning (20%), and inadequate training (17%). Work types were were rule-based (53%) and knowledge-based (474).

primarily operation (30%) and procedure development (304).

4 Osgnitivs' errors contributing to the events included-misinterpretation of information (50%) and false assumption about conditions (35%). Action' errors were primarily those of caission i (444) and wrong. action (44%).

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'f REGION II SITES WITH AT Y.WAET TWICE THE NATIONAL AVERAGE OF INSPECTION ITEMS I

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QTHER COMMENTS

! The number of hurtan performance-related LERs for Region II plants '

j has shown a significant downward trend over the last three years.

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REGION III PLANTS WifH AT TJAST TWICE THE NATIONAL AVERAGE OF TRRS'

! ' Dresden 2 - 12 12RS The major groups of personnel involved in these events were a

licensed operator personnel (23%), engineering ~ Major personnel (234), and contributing radiological protection personnel (234).

factors were management and planning (354) and procedures not followed (204) . Task behaviors were knowledge-based (584) and Work types were primarily operations (424),

rule-based ((42%).

testing (17%), procedura development (174), and modification (174) .

to the events included

. Cognitive errors contributing 1

misinterpretation of information (41%), pour judgement (35%), and ]

false assumptions about conditions (24%). Action errors were l

primarily those of wrong action (834).

i Dresden 3 - 15 12RS The major groups of personnel involved in these events were engineering personnel (28%), licensed operators (17%), non-licensed Major operators (174), and mechanical personnel (17%).

contributing factors were management and planning (30%),and procedures verbal not followed (17%), inadequate training (134),

communications (13%) . Task behaviors were knowledge-based (674) and rule-based ((33%) . Work types were primarily operations Cognitive (294),

errors troubleshooting (14%), and maintenance (14%).

j contributing to the events included misinterpretation of

' information (374), false assumptions about conditions (32%), and poor judgement (26%). Action errors were primarily those'of wrong

, action (69%) and omission (31%).

LaSalle 2 - 12 LERS .

The major groups of personnel involved in these events wereMajor I&C personnel (25%) and engineering personnel (194).

l contributing factors were procedures not followed (24%), inadequate Task behaviors training (20%), and management and planning (20%) . Work types were were rule-based (53%) and knowledge-based (47%) .

Cognitive errors primarily operations (33%) and testing (27%).

contributing to the events included falso assumption about conditions (44%), attention deficit (25%), and misinterpretation of information (25%). Action errors were primarily those of wrong l-action (75%) and omission (25%) .

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Prairic Island 1 - 12 LERS

' The major groups of personnel involved in these events wereMajor I&C personnel (39%) and engineering personnel (21%).

and a contributing factors were management and planning (40%)

procedures inadequate (30%). Task behaviors were rule-based (674) i L

a i' and knowledge-based (33%) . Work types were primarily maintenance (274), operations (18%), and testing (18%). Cognitive errors l

contributing to the events included misinterpretation of l

, information (42%) and false assumption about conditions (42%).

Action errors were primarily those of omission (674) and wrong action (25%).

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Prairie Island 2 - 12 LERS

,The ma j or groups of personnel involved in these events were I&C Major personnel (39%) and engineering personnel. (214') .

1 contributing factors were management and planning (40%) and procedures anadequate (304). Task behaviors were rule-based (674)

' and knowledge-based (33%). Work types were primarily maintenance

. Cognitive errors

(234), operations contributing to (15%),

the events and testing (15%)isinterpretation included m of information (42%) and false assumption about conditions (42%).

i Action errors were primarily those of omission (674) and wrong

) action (25%).

Zion 1 - 14 LERS.

i The major groups of personnel involved in these events were engineering personnel (31%) and electrical personnel (25%). Major contributing factors were management and planning (524) and procedures inadequate (24%).. Task behaviors were rule-based (50%)

and knowledge-based (50%). Work types were primarily maintenance t operations (29%), testing (29%), and engineering (214). Cognitive

' errors contributing to the events included false assumption about conditions (44%) and misinterpretation of information (384).

Action errors were primarily .those of omission (50%) and wrong action (434).

Zion 2 - 14 LERS The major groups of personnel involved in these events were Major engineering personnel (33%) and electrical personnel (27%). and 3

contributing factors were management and planning (524) s procedures inadequate (17%), and inadequate training (17%). Work Task i

j behaviors were knowledge-based (57%) and rule-based (43%).

i types were primarily maintenance operations (29%), testing (29%),

and engineering (21%) . Cognitive errors contributing to and the events included misinterpretation of information Action (47%)

errors were primarily false assumption about conditions (33%).

those of omission (50%) and wrong action (434).

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    • EION IV PLANTS WITH AT T RAST MfICE THE NATIONAL AVERAcE OF T2D_8 cooper Station - 24 LERS
The major groups of personnel involved in these events were I&c personnel (22%), mechanical personnel (234), engineering personnel (234), and electrical personnel (15%). Major contributing factors were management and planning (45%),. inadequate procedures (23%),' i and inadequate training (20%). Task behaviors were knowledge-based l (544) and rule-based (46%). Work types were primarily engineering i (274), operation (19%), and testing (154). cognitive ' errors l 1 contributing to the events included misinterpretation of j infcrmation (50%) and falso assumption about conditions (464).

Action errors were those of omission (544) and wrong action (464). ,

1 l

River Band 1 - 13 LERS j i The major groups of personnel involved in these events and other were mechanical personnel (25%), I&c personnel (19%),

personnel (19%) . Major contributing factors were procedures not 4

followed (29%) and inadequate training (21%). Task behaviors were l 4

! rule-based (624) and knowledge-based (38%). Work types were l i primarily operation (31%) and testing (31%). Cognitive errors of contributing to the events included misinterpretation ,

information (36%), false assumption about conditions (29%), and ,

poor judgement (21%). Action errors were those of wrong action

(54%) and omission (46%).

1 i

REGION IV SITES WITH AT LEAST TWICE THE NATIONAL AVERAGE OF 1 INSPECTION ITEMS i

! Arkansas - 81 Items The major categories contributing to these items were procedures (43%) and management and supervision (26%). In these categories, departments contributing the most were operations (354),

! enginee' ring (11%), and mechanical (10%). The primary issues in the procedure category were inadequate procedures (63%) and failure to follow procedures (37%) . The primary issues in the management and supervision category were work control (52%), attention and oversight (29%), and corrective actions (19%).

Cooper Station - 7s Items The major categories contributing to these items were management and supervision (454) and procedures (35%). In these categories, departments contributing the most were operations (38%) and I

1 mechanical (114). The primary issues in the management and supervision category were work control (37%), corrective actions

-(31%), and attention and oversight (23%). The primary issues in 3

- - - - - _ - . . - . . . _ ., _ . . - . , , . - ~ . - _ _ . , - -

~_ . _ _ _ _ _ .____ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ . . __. . ___ _ _ _

the procedure category waro failuro to follow procIdurso (48%) cnd inadequate procedures (374). <

Palo Verde - 89 Items l The major categories contributing to these items were management l and supervision (37%) and procedures (37%). In these categories, l departments contributing the most were operations (38%) and r mechanical (18%). The primary issues in the management and )

supervision. category were work control (334), corrective actions  :

(27%), and attar, ion and oversight (244). The primary issues in l

the procedure category were failure to follow procedures (574) and

' inadequate procedures (334).

River Bend - 96 Items The major categories contributing to these items were procedures (44%), management and supervision (32%), and communications (19%) .

In these categories, departments contributing the most were operations (44%) and engineering (31%). The primary issues in the procedure category were inadequate procedures (55%) and failure to follow procedures (40%). The primary issues in the management and supervision category were corrective actions (35%), work control (26%), self-evaluation (23%), and attention and oversight (16%).

The primary issues in the communication category were communication less than adequate (66%), and misunderstood information (284) .

WNP 75 Items The major' categories contributing to these items were procedures

. (33%), communications (28%), and management and supervision (24%).

In these categories, the department contributing the most was operations (57%). The primary issues in the procedure category were inadequate procedures (56%) and failure to follow procedures (36%). The primary issues in the communication category were (71%), and misunderstood communication less than adequate information (24%). The primary issues in the management and supervision category were attention and oversight (33%), self-evaluation (28%), corrective actions (22%), and work control (174) .

OTHER COMMENTS None.

l l

LER DATA ENTRY SHEET

, Plant same: (as marked as LER and seleased free Centnheting heess:

. nuns pinklist) istematies meeva!!am

  • '- t ;-- training Docket sember: (as surked on LER) isnproper training I so training  !

Event dem:(as marked as LER) procedwe not followed l Procedure leadequese j uR s ber:<a marked es uR) het erproseden prosedes wsess '

I

svest nime
homeseyenssneerne.

i work environment lesse dois:0seve bleak) verbal --h i wrinen sommunication 4

Power level: work sobedels <

work lead I Micro fiche:(leeve blank) management and plemalag l shiR surnover i i

Syssem involved:(leeve blank)

Plant identified raos sense:

1 Personnel etegory: (as marked on LER by seder) licensed operator  ;

l non licensed operator Alternative root cause: (coder must specify hers.)

instrurnent and coesrol electrical anschanical

, engineer l radiological protection l ehemistry security Corrective Actions:

i ether (as marked by moder)

Work rype: Type of event:

operating (leave blank) testing l calibration Cognitive error:

troubleshooting attention deficit ,

misinterpreting information maintenance enginuring forgetting procedure development false assurydion refueling poorjudgement ,

snodification boredom other . enbar Task behavior: . Personnel effect code:

ekill (leave bleek) rule ,

know': ?se Reportat'.ay sodes:

(as marked on MR)

Action enor:

unevaria m Personnel activity sodes:

entisely action (leave blank) emission out of sequeene wrong action .

    • ""**"'*d**

Attachment 2 w _ --m

j MEAR2EE I seinenar age MI&l&E f?Om... .

0 Instrisunt 4 centret t,trainins a salti:t a continutes/repet et me tralalg et laselswete trefning l C Electrieel C sJT 85 frotnig prosess

, 9 Asshantent 9 SteJteter prebtem 8 I themistry 04 Took quellfisetlen F tedletten protestien

4 Engineerig s a sentraster I fretnig J SA/et a prese h ee a sernet es se prese h e F eff nonent 86 Inadsgdete pressere 8 Energency ST Pelture to fettau 8 SurvietIanse prese6are and test 48 pressere devotepsont/

1 Asteintstrative precoe re saintenense J Speelet program LTA

- C orpenisettenet E staffins Of inadeguete staffing

! Issues 10 peer task ettesetlen i

& Sverties 11 Inedew ete sentrolo 12 facessive nusher of hours merked 13 Frequent use of overtlee I

& Management eral N Attentlen and 14 No s e ervislen s eervisten oversight 15 Inede w ete supervielen

N Werk Centret 16 Scheduling and planning i 17 Worker Selection 4

( m tified worker) l 18 Tag outs l 19 pre brief g etity j 20 Work pockepe speellty O Corrective actions 21 Indivialuet actlens LTA 22 Astlen not yet started 23 No actlen ptervied 24 Corrective action program LTA P Self evoluetten 25' aset seuse L1A l .- . - _ _ ............,

j' E Communisetten e Verbst 26 Misundersteed Informatten l A Written IF Canuunisetten not timely 28 Connunication L1A

( 29 he sammunisetlen j ... .. ... ..... .......

! F aumen a system 8 Equipment

  • If, Labels LTA i Interface 31 Centrets LTA 32 Alertness LTA i

T Instrumentatten 33 Instrument / displays LTA andsentre(s '

34 Centrets LTA

  • 35 Mirror lasse 5

36 Lack of senelstency

! with other like itses 37 men foult tolerant system of sentret l U Work Environment 38 Tenper ture 39 Light 40 Nelse 41 Redletten At Creaped w ertere

! Attachment 3 i

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  • _ . .= . . -. - -. -- - - . - - . - - . . . -

mt-

.i COMMISSION BRIEFING PAPER 1

VISITING.0FFICIAL: Thomas F. Plunkett, President, Nuclear Division Florida Power and Light Company

DATE OF VISIT: November 21, 1996 1

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 PLANTS:

ENCLOSURES: 1. Mr. Plunkett's Biography

2. Corporate Organization Chart also showing plant management f .

i S.gckaround Information for St. Lucie

~

The St. Lucie Nuclear plant is 1ocated on an 1110 acre site on Hutchinson Island, which is a natural barrier island. . The plant is comprised of two

.nearly identical units designed by Combustion Engineering. -The non-nuclear, or steam plants, were designed by Ebasco Services. Each unit is capable of generating approximately 900 megawatts of electric power. Cooling is provided by seawater, drawn from and returned to the Atlantic Ocean.

4

. Unit I was placed in commercial operation in December 1976, and Unit 2 began  ;

commercial operation in August 1983. The reactors are refueled at ap)roximately eighteen month intervals. The next refueling (Unit 2) is j scleduled for April 1997.

St. Lucie Unit I currently has a lifetime capacity factor of 75%. Over the

} years, the unit has achieved many world and U.S. records associated with plant ,

availability and capacity factor. In 1992, Unit 1 set a world record for i pressurized water reactors for consecutive days on line. The unit had

, - operated 502 days non-stop before being removed from service for refueling.

St. Lucie Unit 2 also had an outstanding performance record. In 1987-1988, Unit 2 set a FPL record for continuous operation of 427 days and had the 1

~

number one capacity factor of any nuclear plant in the world. However, l declining perfomance at the St. Lucie Plants was noted in the last SALP period which ended January 6,1996, particularly.in the areas of Operations .

. and Maintenance. The reason for this decline is discussed below under i

" Current Concerns". j There'have been a large number of mananment changes at St. Lucie in the last year. Since December 1,1995, 8Jnanagm have been changed (Services Manager, Licensing Manager, Outage Manager, Training Manager,Tu'c' lear Material .

Management Superintendent, Steam Generator Replacement Project Manager, n Operations Manager, and System & Component Engineering Manager), and in  ;

addition a new site vice president, Art Stall, reported in.May of this year. i

' f

, orma!,3f3 jp .

l m acccidance wlgff.ed ns gay y f=hnemptions *dm ofInformatin h, z,,'} \

4

, , . ,, - . . . - , - m 1

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SALP Ratinos .

Functional Area .Ratina This Period Ratina tast Period Operations 2 1

, Maintenance' 2 1 Engineering 1 1 Plant. Support ~ l 1 CURRENT STATUS Both St. Lucie Units are currently operating at 100% of rated power.

CURRENT CONCERNS Since July 1995, there have been a series of events that lead to questions

about the plant's overall performance. These events and several other recent deficiencies involving weak procedures, a general lack of procedural goneliance, equipment failur_gs, a,.4ersonnel erron clearly Indicated that

- the plant's past nign level of perf6rmance has declined. These deficiencies highlighted weak management involvement in day to day operation of the plant; weak operat5Fperrormahce uuriny runine evonitT6nsT procedure inadequacies; weak corrective actions; lack of attention to detail; decline in equipment performance; and poor maintenance. As a result of this declining performance,

.the NRC has held bi-monthly meetings with FPL management to review the status of the licensee's performance improvement initiatives. The licensee undertook

- a number of efforts to reverse this declining performance. A number of c management changes were also made in response to the declining performance.

, . The NRC continues to clos'ely monitor the plant's performance to determine the effect of these corrective activities.

There has been a significant increase in the number of allegations at St.

Lucie. There were a total of 43 allegations in FY96, compared to 16 in FY95.

This increase could be related to the FPL downsizing (13% in the last year), -

although there has not been a corresponding increase at Turkey Point. A significant allegation was made recently relating to the St. Lucie Emergency

. Preparedness program. The alleger-also provided a copy of his concerns to the licensee and to the local press. The NRC performed a special inspection in response to this allegation. Violations of NRC requirements identified during 4 this inspection will be discussed at an Enforcement Conference currently scheduled for December 10, 1996.

There has also been a 1arae an=ha of vielations at St. Lucie, with three Level III violations since August-1995 involvTng; inoperabie Po'wer Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) due to inadequate Post Naintenance Testing (8/4/95);

B y Overdilution Event (1/22/96); and Inadequate 50.59 Evaluation (7/12/96). '

Due'to a large number of steam generator tubes being removed from service as a~

. result of tube degradation, the licensee is scheduled to replace the Unit 1 -

_----_--__.-_Y____..---__.___.._____---__-_.--_----

3 steam generators beginning in October 1997. The replacement SGs are already completed and are due to arrive on site in June 1997. The SGs were built by Babcock &'Wilcox Industries. Unit 2 SGs have not experienced the same level

. of degradation as Unit 1 and there'are currently no plans to replace these SGs. A 2.206 Petition from Mr. Thomas Saporito was submitted on June 12, 1996, as a result of the large number of plugged tubes in St. Lucie Unit _1.

The Petition requested, among other actions, that St. Lucie Unit 1 be restricted to 50% power. The Director's Decision is scheduled to be issued by November 29, 1996. As currently drafted, the Petitioner's request would be denied. i

l

' On two occasions. in ~ July and August, the licensee discovered instances of 1

tampering. The tampering consisted of placing a glue-like substances in a number of padlocks, .doorlocks, and keylock switches. No safety systems were

- disabled as a result of the tampering, but the equipment'was located inside vital areas of the plant. The licensee implemented augmented security -

measures and conducted an intense investigation, but was unable to identify

. the individual (s) responsible. The NRC-dispatched a special inspection team to the site to review the licensee's actions. The team determined that the i licensee's actions were appropriate, although some deficiencies were noted.

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e:

ECLEAR DIVISION PRESIDENT "

1 m

T' MEETLVG WITH USNRC '

c.

1

@i e,. ,

AGENDA -

e M

e Introduction - About Florida Power & Light F w

e Turkey Point Performance -

e St. Lucie Performance jl E,

o Economics E L

e Issues E

o Future w.

1 ,,

~ '~

l . - - - - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - .

Y Biographical information ,

- \

s

.n

. Thomas F. Plunkett -1 President, Nuclear Division k l Tom Plunkett is President, Nuclear Division at Florida Power & Light Company. In this )

function, Mr. Plunkett oversees the operation of FPL's four nuclear units, two at Turkey Point ~

i in south Dade County and two at St. Lucie on Hutchinson Island in St. Lucie County as well as the technical support activities at corporate headquarters in Juno Beach.

$ Mr. Plunkett joined Florida Power and Light Company in 1990 as Vice President,

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. Prior to that he worked for Gulf States Utilities Company as i General Manager of the River Bend Nuclear Plant and for lilinois Power Company as General Manager of the Clinton Nuclear Plant. Earlier he was Technical Manager at the D. C. Cook l Nuclear Station for the Indiana Michigan Power Company. Mr. Plunkett began his career with the Douglas Aircraft as a nuclear engineer.

Mr. Plunkett holds both a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering and a Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Wisconsin.

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