ML20078D544

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Evaluation of Util Response to Suppl 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01:FitzPatrick, Technical Evaluation Rept
ML20078D544
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/30/1994
From: Udy A
EG&G IDAHO, INC.
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20078D546 List:
References
CON-FIN-L-1695 EGG-DNSP-11509, IEB-90-001, IEB-90-1, NUDOCS 9411040274
Download: ML20078D544 (21)
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Text

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EGG DNSP 11509 September 1994

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, idaho EVALUATION OF UTILITY RESPONSE TO National SUPPLEMENT 1 TO NRC BULLETIN 90 01:

Engineering FITZPATRICK Laboratory Managed by the U.S.

Department ofEnergy Alan C. Udy i

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94 EGrGw Wort performed under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76tD01570 i

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EGG-DNSP-11509 l

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT Evaluation of Utility Response to Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01: FitzPatrick l

Docket No. 50-333 '

I Alan C. Udy Published September 1994 l

EG&G Idaho, Inc.  !

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 l

Prepared for the  ;

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  !

Washington, D.C. 20555 l Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 l FIN No. Ll695, Task No. lla l TAC No. M85389 I l

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SUMMARY

This report documents the EG&G Idaho, Inc., review of the New York Power Authority submittal that responds to Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01 for

the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. This NRC Bulletin provides information regarding the loss of fill-oil in certain pressure and differential pressure transmitters manufactured by Rosemount, Inc. This report finds the licensee conforms to the requested actions and the reporting requirements of the Supplement.

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l FIN No. L1695, Task No. 11a B&R No. 320-19-15-05-0 Docket No. 50-333 TAC No. M85389 ii  ;

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s PREFACE This report is supplied as part of the " Technical Assistance in Support of the Instrumentation and Controls Systems Branch." It is being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Reactor Controls and Human Factors, by EG&G Idaho, Inc., DOE /NRC Support Programs Unit.

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CONTENTS

SUMMARY

.............................................................. ij PREFACE .............................................................. ijj

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................... I
2. NRC SPECIFIED REQUESTED ACTIONS ................................. 4
3. EVALUATION ...................................................... 7 3.1 Evaluation of Licensee Response to Reporting Requirements . 7 3.2 Evaluation of Licensee Response to Requested Actions ...... 8
4. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 13
5. REFERENCES ...................................................... 14 i

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l Evaluation of Utility Response to Supolement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01: FitzPatrick

1. INTRODUCTION The NRC issued Bulletin 90-01 on March 9, 1990 (Reference '.). That Bulletin discussed certain Rosemount pressure and differential pressure transmitter models identified by the manufacturer as prone to fill-oil leakage. The bulletin requested licensees to identify whether these transmitters were or may later be installed in safety-related systems.

Actions were detailed for licensee implementation for identified transmitters installed in a safety-related system. These same actions apply to identified transmitters presently held in inventory for later installation in a safety-related system.

With the cradual leakage of fill-oil, the transmitter would not have the long term accuracy, time response, and reliability needed for its intended safety function. Further, this condition could go undetected over a long period. Redundant instrument channels are subject to the same degradation mechanism. This increases the potential for a common mode failure. Thus, this potential failure mechanism raised concern for the reliability of reactor protection systems (RPS), engineered safety features (ESF) actuation systems, and anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) mitigating systems. To achieve high functional reliability, there must be a low probability of component failure while operating, with any failures readily detectable.

Supplement I to NRC Bulletin 90-01 (Reference 2) was issued on December 22, 1992. The Supplement informed licensees of NRC staff activities regarding the subject transmitters, and noted continuing reports of transmitter failures. The NRC requested licensee action to resolve the issue.

The Supplement also updated the information contained in the original bulletin. The licensee was requested to review the information and determine if it was applicable at their facility. Further, the licensee was requested to modify their actions and enhanced surveillance monitoring programs to conform with the direction given. Finally, the licensee was instructed to 1

respond to the NRC. The Reauested Actions in Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01 supersede the original NRC Bulletin 90-01 Reauested Actions.

In responding to Supplem.1t I to NRC Bulletin 90-01, the licensee is directed to address three itenc.

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1. A statement either committing the licensee to take the NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, Reauested Actions or taking exception to those actions. I 1
2. Addressing the actions committed to in the above statement, provide:
a. a list of the specific actions, including any justifications, to be taken to complete the commitment,
b. a schedule for completion, and
c. after completion, a statement confirming the actions committed to are complete.
3. A statement identifying the NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, Reauested Actions not taken, along with an evaluation providing the basis for exemption.

In implementing the replacement option of the NRC Reauested Actions, plant shutdown exclusively for replacing the transmitters is not required.

This allowance infers that replacements can be scheduled. With replacement in a timely m..nner, enhanced surveillance monitoring for interim operation is not required.

The New York Power Authority, the licensee for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, responded to Supplement i of NRC Bulletin 90-01 with a letter dated March 5, 1993 (Reference 3). The licensee provided additional information on July 22,1994 (Reference 4). This technical evaluation report evaluates the completeness of those submittals. It also determines whether proposed surveillance methods are adequate to determine fill-oil loss-caused 2

i degradation of the transmitter. Finally, this report addresses the interval

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of surveillance proposed by the licensee for any transmitters included in the enhanced surveillance monitoring program.

Many Rosemount transmitter failures have been attributed to the use of stainless steel "0"-rings between the sensing module and the process flanges. l l

Rosemount improved the manufacturing process for transmitters manufactured l after July 11, 1989. Those improvements included a limit of the. torque applied to the flange bolts. This limits the stress caused in the sensing l module by the "0"-ring. Post-production screening, including pressure testing of the sensing module for this potential . latent defect, was also implemented  !

at that time. Therefore, as described in Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01, those Rosemount transmitters manufactured after July 11, 1989, are not subject -

to this review.

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2. NRC SPECIFIED REQUESTED ACTIONS The NRC staff specified the following Requested Actions of licensees of operating reactors.
1. Review plant records and identify the following Rosemount transmitters (if manufactured before July 11,1989) that either are used in or may be used in either safety-related or ATWS mitigating systems.
  • Rosemount Model 1153, Series B
  • Rosemount Model 1153, Series D
  • Rosemount Model 1154 Following identification, the licensee is to establish the following:
a. For those identified transmitters having a normal operating pressure greater than 1500 psi, and are installed as part of reactor protection trip systems, ESF actuation systems, or ATWS mitigating systems, either replace the transmitter in an expedited manner, or monitor monthly, for the life of the transmitter, using an enhanced surveillance program.

If the identified transmitter exceeds the 60,000 psi-month or the 130,000 psi-month criterion (depending on the range code of the transmitter) established by Rosemount, enhanced surveillance on a refueling (not exceeding 24 months) basis is acceptable. Under this option, justification must be based on the service record and the specific safety function of the transmitter. That justification can be based on high functional relitbility provided by redundancy or diversity,

b. For those identified transmitters having a normal operating pressure greater than 1500 psi, and are installed as part of a safety-related system other than reactor protection trip systems, ESF actuation, or ATWS mitigating systems, either replace the transmitter or monitor quarterly, for the life of the transmitter, using an enhanced surveillance program.

If the identified transmitter exceeds the 60,000 psi-month or the l 130,000 psi-month criterion (depending on the range code of the transmitter) established by Rosemount, enhanced surveillance on a refueling (not exceeding 24 months) basis is acceptable. Under l this option, justification must be based on the service record and ,

the specific safety function of the transmitter. That i 4

justification can be based on high functional reliability provided by redundancy or diversity.

c. For boiling water reactors (BWR)--

For those identified transmitters having a normal operating pressure greater than 500 psi and less than or equal to 1500 psi, and are installed as part of reactor protection trip systems, ESF actuation systems, or ATWS mitigating systems, either replace the transmitter, or monitor monthly with an enhanced surveillance monitoring program, until the transmitter reaches the designated (by Rosemount) psi-month criterion (60,000 psi-month or 130,000 psi-month, depending on the transmitter range code).

For transmitters that provide signals to the RPS or ATWS trips for high pressure or low water level, the enhanced surveillance must be monthly. For other transmitters in this classification, enhanced surveillance on a refueling (not exceeding 24 months) basis is acceptable. Under this option, justification must be based on the service record and the specific safety function of the transmitter. That justification can be based on high functional reliability provided by redundancy or diversity.

For pressurized water reactors (PWR)--

For those identified transmitters having a normal operating pressure greater than 500 psi and less than or equal to 1500 psi, and are installed as part of reactor protection trip systems, ESF actuation systems, or ATWS mitigating systems, either replace the transmitter, or monitor with an enhanced surveillance monitoring program, until the transmitter reaches the designated (by Rosemount) psi-month criterion (60,000 psi-month or 130,000 psi-month, depending  ;

on the transmitter range code) on a refueling (not exceeding  ;

24 months) basis,

d. For those identified transmitters having a normal operating  !

pressure greater than 500 psi and less than or equal to 1500 psi, and are installed as part of a safety-related system other than reactor protection trip systems, ESF actuation, or ATWS mitigating systems, either replace the transmitter or monitor with an enhanced surveillance monitoring program, until the transmitter reaches the designated (by Rosemount) psi-month criterion (60,000  ;

psi-month or 130,000 psi-month, depending on the transmitter range l code) on a refueling (not exceeding 24 months) basis. )

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e. Those transmitters having a normal operating pressure greater than 500 psi and less than or equal to 1500 psi, and have accumulated sufficient psi-month operating history to exceed the criterion established by Rosemount, may be excluded from the enhanced i surveillance monitoring program at the discretion of the licensee. l However, the licensee should retain a high level of confidence '

that a high level of reliability is maintained and that transmitter failure due to loss of fill-oil is detectable.  !

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f. Those transmitters having a normal operating pressure less than or l equal to 500 psi may be excluded from the enhanced surveillance monitoring program at the discretion of the licensee. However, l the licensee should retain a high level of confidence that a high  ;

level of reliability is maintained and that transmitter failure l due to loss of fill-oil is detectable.

2. Evaluate the enhanced surveillance monitoring program. The evaluation is to en;ure the measurement data has an accuracy commensurate with the accuracy needed to compare the data to the manufacturers drift data criteria. It is this comparison that determines the degradation threshold for loss of fill-oil failures of the subject transmitters.

The Supplement also states the NRC may conduct audits or inspections in the future to verify compliance with the established requirements.

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3. EVALUATION 4

The licensee provided a response to Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01 on March 5, 1993. i The licensee provided additional information and commitments on July 22, 1994.

In this report, those responses are compared to the Bulletin Reportino Recuirements and Reauested Actions as described below.

The licensee listed 110 installed Rosemount transmitters. Of these, 97 transmitters are subject to the Beauested Actions of the Supplement. The other 1153, Series 13 Rosemount P, transmitters.transmitters include 8 Model 1151 transmitters and 5 Those 13 transmitters are not subject to the Reauested Actions of the Supplement.

Plant is a BWR. The James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power 3.1 Lvaluation of Licensee Response to Reportino Reauirements The licensee states they will take the Reauested Actions detailed in Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01.

Included with that statement is clarification, interpretation, and the limits placed on that commitment. The licensee described the specific actions taken to implement the Reauested Actions.

The description included the elements of their enhanced surveillance monitoring program.

The Reference 3 submittal infers the Reauested Actions are complete.

Attachment 2 of that submittal states the enhanced surveillance monitoring program is in effect.

The licensee did not schedule transmitter replacement or refurbishment.

References 3 and 4 evaluate and support the adequacy of the enhanced surveillance monitoring program.

The licensee submittal conforms to the Reportino Reauirements of Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01.

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I 3.2 Evaluation of Licensee Response to Reauested Actions Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01 requested licensee action to resolve In this Technical I

the issue of fill-oil leakage in Rosemount transmitters.

Evaluation Report, the Reauested Actions and associated transmitter criteria The licensee identified a total of 97 are summarized in Section 2.

The licensee has no Rosemount model transmitters in the scope of this review. The licensee 1154 transmitters or model 1153, series D, transmitters.

response is discussed in the following sections.

3.2.1 Licensee Response to Reouested Action 1.a The licensee states there are no Rosemount transmitters subject to the Reauested Actions of this transmitter classification at the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

3.2.2 Licensee Response to Reouested Action 1.b The licensee states there are no Rosemount transmitters subject to the f tion at the James A.

_Reauested Actions of this transmitter classi ica FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

3.2.3 _ Licensee Resoonse to Reauested Action 1.c The licensee states there are 23 Rosemount transmitters subject to the Reauested Actions of this transmitter classification at the James A.

The licensee includes these 23 transmitters FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. That program is discussed in their enhanced surveillance monitoring program.

in Section 3.2.7 of this report.

Of interest here is the interval of the enhanced surveillance monitoring program.

The Supplement is clear that the enhanced surveillance monitoring 8

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3. EVALUATION The licensee provided a response to Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01 on March 5, 1993. The licensee provided additional information and commitments on July 22, 1994. In this report, those responses are compared to the Bulletin Reportina Reauirements and Reauested Actions as described below.

The licensee listed 110 installed Rosemount transmitters. Of these, 97 transmitters are subject to the Reauested Actions of the Supplement. The other 13 Rosemount transmitters include 8 Model 1151 transmitters and 5 Model 1153, Series P, transmitters. Those 13 transmitters are not subject to the Reauested Actions of the Supplement. The James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power  !

Plant is a BWR.

3.1 Evaluation of Licensee Response to Reportina Reauirements The licensee states they will take the Reauested Actions detailed in Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01. Included with that statement is clarification, interpretation, and the limits placed on that commitment. The licensee described the specific actions taken to implement the Reauested l

Actions. The description included the elements of their enhanced surveillance l monitoring program.

The Reference 3 submittal infers the Reauested Actions are complete.

Attachment 2 of that submittal states the enhanced surveillance monitoring program is in effect. The licensee did not schedule transmitter replacement or refurbishment. References 3 and 4 evaluate and support the adequacy of the enhanced surveillance monitoring program.

The licensee submittal conforms to the Reportina Reauirements of Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01. l I

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3.2 Evaluation of Licensee Response to Reauested Actions Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01 requested licensee action to resolve the issue of fill-oil leakage in Rosemount transmitters. In this Technical Evaluation Report, the Reauested Actions and associated transmitter criteria are summarized in Section 2. The licensee identified a total of 97 transmitters in the scope of this review. The licensee has no Rosemount model 1154 transmitters or model 1153, series D, transmitters. The licensee response is discussed in the following sections.

3.2.1 Licensee Response to Reauested Action 1.a The licensee states there are no Rosemount transmitters subject to the Reauested Actions of this transmitter classification at the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

3.2.2 Licensee Response to Reauested Action 1.b The licensee states there are no Rosemount transmitters subject to the Reauested Actions of this transmitter classification at the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

3.2.3 Licensee Response to Reauested Action 1.c The licensee states there are 23 Rosemount transmitters subject to the Reauested Actions of this transmitter classification at the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The licensee includes these 23 transmitters in their enhanced surveillance monitoring program. That program is discussed in Section 3.2.7 of this report.

Of interest here is the interval of the enhanced surveillance monitoring program. The Supplement is clear that the enhanced surveillance monitoring 8

program for a BWR must be monthly for RPS or ATWS mitigation system transmitters that provide signals for high reactor coolant system pressure or low reactor vessel water level trips. Monitoring other transmitters from this transmitter classification on a refueling basis is permissible. That exception requires the licensee to justify the surveillance interval based on the service record and the specific safety function of the transmitter.

Redundancy and diversity of the safety-related signals also impact the allowance for the justification.

The licensee submittal included justification for using a refueling interval for the enhanced surveillance monitoring program for each of the 23 transmitters in this clsssification. None of the transmitters provide RPS or -

ATWS mitigation system trips for high reactor coolant system pressure or low  :

reactor vessel water level. The justification described the redundancy, diversity, and safety function of each transmitter.

Based on the justification provided by the licensee, we find the refueling interval for calibration zero and span drift analysis acceptable.

3.2.4 Licensee Response to Reauested Action 1.d ,

The licensee states there are no Rosemount transmitters-subject to the Reauested Actions of this transmitter classification at the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

3.2.5 Licensee Response to Reauested Action 1.e The licensee states there are 22 Rosemount transmitters subject to the Reauested Actions of this transmitter classification at the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. These 22 Rosemount transmitters meet the classification requirements for Reauested Action 1.c., and exceed the psi-month criterion. The licensee did not include these 22 transmitters in the enhanced surveillance monitoring program. These 22 transmitters are separate 9

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i from the transmitters discussed in Section 3.2.3, above. Participation of transmitters in transmitter classification 1.c in the enhanced surveillance monitoring program will be discontinued after reaching their respective psi-month maturity threshold or after replacement. The Supplement permits this discretionary action.

The Supplement requires the licensee to maintain a high degree of confidence that these transmitters remain highly reliable. The licensee states they will continue to trend the calibration drift data (as-found to as-left) for these transmitters once per operating cycle. The licensee states this monitoring will continue for at least two operating cycles.

Concurrently, the licensee screens for loss of fill-oil via a computer comparison of redundant transmitter operational output data once per week.

Should a transmitter output deviate from the mean output of the redundant transmitters by more than two standard deviations, the licensee investigates the transmitter further. This computer comparison will continue for transmitters in this transmitter classification. This maintains the licensees confidence in these transmitters.

3.2.6 Licensee Response to Reauested Action 1.f The licensee states there are 22 Rosemount transmitters subject to the Reauested Actions of this Supplement classification at the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. These 22 Rosemount transmitters meet the classification requirements for Reauested Action 1.f. At the discretion of the licensee, these 22 transmitters are not part of an enhanced surveillance monitoring program. The Supplement permits this discretionary action.

The Supplement requires the licensee to maintain a high degree of confidence that these transmitters remain highly reliable. The licensee states they will continue to trend the calibration drift data (zero shift and l span shift) for these transmitters once per operating cycle and process operational data of redundant transmitters weekly, as described above. The licensee states the monitoring of the drift data and the operational data will 10 l

continue until transmitter replacement or demonstration that failures are not time dependent. As long as the licensee observes transmitters in this manner, the licensee is confident these transmitters will remain highly reliable.

The licensee states that their monitoring for transmitters in transmitter classification 1.f will be discontinued once they demonstrate that the loss of fill-oil in these transmitters is not time dependent. The failure itself is the leakage of fill-oil past a glass-to-metal seal inside the sensor at a very slow rate. Any rate is a function of time. One of the interacting factors that leads to the loss of fill-oil failure of one of these transmitters, as discussed in the Supplement, is "the amount of time that the transmitter has been in service." According to the Supplement, the NRC confirmed a relationship, previously reported by Rosemount and NUMARC, between

" operating pressure, time in service, and failure rate." While a high operating pressure is the "most dominate factor leading to a loss of fill-oil," time in service remains the second factor that leads to a loss of fill-oil failure.

As time-dependency will always be a factor with Rosemount transmitters, the licensee will, of necessity, take actions to maintain their confidence that these transmitters remain highly reliable and that any failures are readily detectable.

3.2.7 Enhanced Surveillance Monitorina Proaram The enhanced surveillance monitoring program consists of the following elements.

1. A daily operational instrument check -

This has the operator read the information display daily. The operator records the displayed information. The reading is compared to previous readings and to the readings of redundant channels to identify anomalies. The Operations Department reviews any abnormal reading.

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2. A weekly operational verification check This is a signal comparison between redundant channels performed by the plant computer. If the output of a transmitter deviates from the mean signal value (the average signal of the redundant  ;

channels) by two standard deviations or more, the licensee investigates the transmitter further. This can identify adverse trends.

3. Response time checks This portion of the enhanced surveillance monitoring program observes the transmitter output signal response to a step change in the input pressure (or differential pressure). This confirms whether transmitter degradation has occurred.
4. Calibration zero and span drift trend analysis.

This portion of the enhanced surveillance monitoring program monitors the transmitter zero and span shift over the calibration (refueling) interval. The as-left to as-found drift of both the zero signal and the span (full scale) is compared to accepted drift limits.

The licensee states the enhanced surveillance monitoring program is consistent with the recommendations of Rosemount Technical Bulletin No. 4.

l The licensee states their calibration data is accurate to three decimal places. This allows comparison to the Rosemount fill-oil loss degradation threshold limits. Thus, the licensees enhanced surveillance monitoring program is acceptable.

The licensee notes that should they replace any transmitter with a l transmitter manufactured after July 11, 1989, the enhanced surveillance l monitoring program will not include the replacement transmitter. That clarification is acceptable. _

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4. CONCLUSIONS Based on our review, we find the licensee has completed the reporting requirements of Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01. Further, the licensee conforms to the requested actions of Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01.

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5. REFERENCES
l. NRC Bulletin No. 90-01: " Loss of Fill-oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount," March 9, 1990, ORB No. 3150-0011.
2. NRC Bulletin No. 90-01, Supplement 1: " Loss of Fill-oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount," December 22, 1992, ORB No. 3150-0011.
3. Letter, New York Power Authority (R. E. Beadle) to NRC, " Response to NRC Bulletin No. 90-01, Supplement 1, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount," March 5, 1993, JAN-93-010.
4. Letter, New York Power Authority (W. A. Josiger) to NRC, " Response to Request for Additional Information, NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1,

' Loss of Fill-011 in Rosemount Transmitters'," July 22, 1994, JAN-94-035.

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i 336 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATC2Y COPtil5SION 1. PORT g R NRCH 1102.

3201. 3202 o BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET EGG-DNSP-11509 l (see instructions m t w reverse)

2. TITLE AND $UBTITLE 3. DATE REPORT PUBLISTD Evaluation of Utility Response to Supplement 1 to MONTH YEAR NRC Bulletin 90-01: FitzPatrick September 1994
4. FIN OR GRANT NtNBER L1695
6. AUTHOR (S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT Alan C. Udy Technical Evaluation
7. PER100 COVERED
8. PERFORMING ORGAN!ZAT10N - NAME AND ADORESS , e n, ar . u n , ,c_ . . ,. ,, , ., .

DOE /NRC Support Programs EG&G Idaho, Inc.

P.O. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3870 l

9. SPON50 RING ORGANIZATION - NANE AND ADDRESS wi c. . -e co ar . n ,c - .

Division of Reactor Controls and Human Factors Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

10. SUPPLEMLNTARY NOTES
11. ABSTRACT ac .-

This report documents the EG&G Id'aho, Inc., review of the New York Power Authority submittals that respond to Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01 for the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. This NRC bulletin provides information regarding the loss of fill-oil in certain pressure and differential pressure transmitters manufactured by Rosemount, Incorporated. This report finds the licensee conforms to the requested actions and the reporting requirements of the Supplement.

12. KE Y WRDS/0ESCRIFTOR5 u .----. -. i 13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Rosemount Transmitters Unlimited Distribution Loss of Fill-0il 14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1

~,

Unclassified Unclassified

15. NtNBER OF PMES
16. PRICE w r a,+ w u - o n
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