ML20081K767

Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervenor Contentions, Listed in Encl App I.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20081K767
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	11/07/1983
From:	Potter R, Remis S NEW JERSEY, STATE OF
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20081K747	List: ML20081K745 ML20081K767
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8311100263
Download: ML20081K767 (56)

Text

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D00(ETED USi1RC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - .. ._

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I' 1:D; Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of Docket No. 50-354 OL PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF GAS CO., et al.,  : INTERVENOR'S CONTENTIONS (Hope Creek Generating Station,  :

Unit 1),  :

1 Enclosed in Appendix I are the party-intervenor's contentions relating to the operating license proceeding for the Ebpe Creek Generating Station. As the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board " Board" is well aware, the admissibil-ity of contentions in operating license proceedings is gov-erned by 10 C.R.R. 52.714 which, in relevant part, requires a petitioner to:

file a supplement to his petition to inter-vene which must include a list of the con-

, tentions which petitioner seeks to have

! litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity.

10 C.R.R. 5 2. 714 (b) (emphasis supplied).

Section 2.714 (b) requires every contention to in-clude a reasonably specific articulation of its rationale, f E.g., In the Matter of Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear l

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6 Station Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-16, 15 NRC 566, 570 (1982).

This specificity requirement enables the Board to determine whether contentions are admissible and puts the applicant on notice of the facts which an intervenor seeks to liti-gate. Id., In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Co. (Dres-den Nuclear Power Station Unit 1) pp. 82-52, 16 NRC 183, 188 (1982); In the Matter of Illinois Power Company (Clin-ton Power Station, Unit D), BP-91-61, 14 NRC 1735, 1737 (1981).

In applying the specificity requirement, the Board has directed that intervenors demonstrate an understanding of the Applicants' filed materials and indicate that a hear-ing is likely to add to the preexisting NRC process. In the Matter of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175, 182 (1981). The Board has employed the following criteria in determining whether an intervenor states the basis for 4

a contention with reasonable specificity:

(1) Have intervenors shown how the contention re-lates to specific sections of the FSAR or En-vironmental Report cited in the brief filed by Applicants or Staff?

(2) Is the contention sufficiently specific so that Applicant has general notice of issues on which it may bear the burden of proof at a hearing?

(3) Is there either a reasonable explanation or plausible authority for factual assertions?

(4) If a contention has been thoroughly litigated in the construction permit proceeding and has

i been challenged on that ground, is intervenor's allegation significantly different from the construction permit issue or has it shown sufficiently changed circumstances or policies to permit relitigation?

(5) If all the facts alleged in the contention were proved,.would those facts require imposition of a licensing condition or the denial of an operating license?

(6) Has intervenor indicated enough familiarity with the subject of its contention so that its contribution to the proceeding may be expected to be helpful and.so that minor shortcomings should be overlooked?

In the Matter of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175, 182 (1981).

In the instant case, the Public Advocate examined with care the available documents pertaining to the Hope Creek facility and made every effort to specify his conten-tions and bases with sufficient particularity. In most instances, the enclosed contentions meet each of the above criterion. Unfortunately, the applicants have not yet supplied the Public Advocate with all the factual informa-tion necessary for specificity. For example, PSE&G has not yet complied with the' Advocate's request for a copy of the Applicants' final safety analysis report. Furthermore, this office first received a copy of the Applicants' environmen-tal report merely two working days before contentions were due. A number of other important documents are not yet available or remain to be completed for the Public Advocate's G

inspection, most notably the Staff's Safety Evaluation Repo rt', the report-of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and the Applicants' Security and Emergency Plans.

• While- the' lack of these documents has handicapped the Public Advocate's ability on short notice to prepare con- I tentions, the Public Advocate has had access to several technical materials which have been used in the prepara-tion of the contentions which are attached. These include the _ various NRC reports, NUREG's, issues of Nuclear Safety and other documents (the Staff's requests for additional information have also been most helpful) referenced in the contentions. Additionally,"the Public Advocate's history of participation in nuclear licensing proceedings and public utility regulation have enabled him to call upon the assistance of several recognized experts in the field. These include Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C.

Minor of MHB Technical Associates, San Jose, California, who doubtlessly are known to this Board. Together they have many years of experience in the design, construction, and operation of General Electric BWR's. (The Advocate is not at liberty at this point, however, to identify the other experts who have assisted in the preparation of these contentions and who will be available to testify at forthcoming hearings.)

Among the prior NRC proceedings where the Public Ad-

-vocate has appeared and represented parties are the follow-ing: In the Matter of Public Service Electric & Gas Co.

(Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1), NRC Docket No.

50-272; In the Matter of Public Service Electric & Gas Co.

and Atlantic City Electric Co. (Hope Creek Generating Sta-tion Units 1 and 2), NRC Docket Nos. 50-354, 50-355; In the Matter of Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), NRC Docket No. STN 50-437; and In the Matter of Public Service Service Electric & Gas Co.

( Atlantic Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-47.7, to-478.

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However, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has repeatedly recognized the difficulties an intervenor faces when key documents are either unaccessible or not yet pre-pared. The Board has responded to this situation by' con-sistently applying a less stringent standard of specificity for the contentions and their bases at the early stages of an operating license proceeding. For example, In the Matter of Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station), LBP-82-50, 15 NRC 1746, 1752-53 (1982); In the Matter of Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2),

LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1488 (1982); In the Matter of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175, 182 (1981).

When the applicant such as PSE&G fails to fully provide information in its application documents, a con-tention is reasonably specific if the intervenor provides a good reason for raising the contention. In the Matter of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 and 2), LBP-81-24,114 NRC 175, 182 (1981).

A review of the Public. Advocate's contentions reveals that each is supported by significant reasons concerning the health, safety, and environmental interests of New Jersey citizens, especially those in close vicinity to the Hope Creek _ facility.

If the intervenor's reasons support his contention, and'if those reasons provide a logical basis for believing that discovery is appropriate, the Board has admitted even vague contentions, subject to later specifications through discovery.or has deferred ruling on.some contentions until the necessary documentation is available. E.g., In the Matter of Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-16, 15 NRC 566, 572 (1982); In the Matter of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-124, 14 NRC 175, 182 (1981). The Appeal Board's decision in Tennessee Valley Authority -(Browns Ferry Nuclear Pla.it) , ALAB-664, 15 NRC 16 (1982) confirms that licensing boards have discretion to defer rulings where a document is needed in order to assess a-contention. Moreover, the rule prescribing a final pre-hearing conference at the close of discovery explicity authorizes parties to amend their pleadings and clarify their issues. 10 C.F.R. 52.752.

In light of . the above precedent and the fact that many-key documents are yet unavailable, the Public Advocate requests .that the admissionof contentions be followed by an extended period of discovery during whicF, ti e the Pub-lic Advocate can learn additional factua*  :<n:r s4 about their areas of concern. The Public Advocate will review the relevant documents promptly after the material becomes n - - ,

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available and either abandon or revise any vague conten-tion's to meet the specificity requirement of 10 C.F.R.

-S2.714 (b). This practice has been followed by numerous licensing boards. See e.g., In the Matter of Duke Power Co.'(Catawba ~ Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-16, ASLBP-81-463-01-OL, 15 NRC 566, 575 (1982); In the Matter of Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Operating Station' Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423 (1982);

In the Matter of Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1), ,LBP-81-32, 14 NRC 381, 395 (1981).

The Public Advocate also requests that this Licen-sing Board exercise extreme reluctance in rejecting any contentions which-address important health, safety, and environmental concerns. 'See, In the Matter of Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-19B, 15 NRC 627, 631 (1982); In the Matter of Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-16, 15 NRC 566, 576 (1982). Contentions which concern the actual safety of the Econstruction and operation of a nuclear plant are at the-core of responsibility for an operating license board, and

, great care should be taken before rejecting a potentially important' contention that is poorly framed. In the Matter of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power' Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-24, 14 NRC 175,183

-(1981).

• l Of course,-if the applicant, NRC staff, or Board have 'a ~ particular objection to any of the enclosed con-tentions, the:Public Advocate requests the opportunity to respond to the. objection to either refute or cor, rect any.

alleged deficiencies in our pleadings. Licensing boards have viewed.this opportunity to respond as essential before rejecting any contentions. In the Matter of Wis-consin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-45, 14 NRC 8 53, 856 (1981); In the Matter of Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-18, 14 NRC 71, 73 (1981).

On many occasions, the Board has rephrased a par-ticular issue and admitted the contention in its reformu-lated form. E.g., In the Matter of Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-45, 14 NRC 853, 854 (1981); In the Matter of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units l'and 2), LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175, 189 (1981). The Public Advocate requests that the Board extend this sort of assistance if necessary to admit our contentions in a pro-

.per form.

The Public Advocate offers these contentions with the sincere hope that their resolution will significantly correct potential safety, health, and environmental prob-lems associated with the Hope Creek facility. As the Atomic

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v' safety and Licensing. Board stated in In the Matter of Cincinnati Gas ~ & Electric Co. , (Zimner Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1),.LBP-82-54, 16 NRC 210 (1982) , "we believe that a full 1public~ airing lof this matter will not only contri-bute to public confidence,.but will also strengthen the safety of.the Applicants' plant. Subjecting _[these issues addressed byEthe intervenor's contentions) can only centri-bute, not detract, to reasonable-assurance that the pub-lic health and safety will be protected." Id. at 215.

.u-L CONCLUSION For the reasons presented above and in the con-tentions which follow'(Appendix I), the Public Advocate of the State of New Jersey requests admission.into issue

' of the Contentions I through X, infra.

Respectfully submitted, JOSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ.

PUBLIC ADVOCATE

.=s 2 By: )

• R. William Potter, Esq.

Assistant Public Advocate

-"L Susan C. Remis, Esq.

Staff Attorney DATED: November 7, 1983

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-0 APPENDIX I - CONTENTIONS

. Contention Page I. Pipe. Cracks......................... 1-3

. II . Pipe Cracks and the Mark I Containment........... .......... 4-5 III. The Mark'I Containment and Equipment Degradation............ 6

'IV . Flooding........................... '7-8 V. Management Competence to Safely Operate Hope Creek........ 9-11 VI. Environmental Qualification........ 12-16 VII. -Effects of Radiological Releases........................ 17-23 VIII. Final Cost Benefit Analysis....... 24-30 XI. Decommissioning................... 31-34 (Attachment)

X. Cooling Tower Operation.......... 35-37

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' CONTENTIONS I. Pipe Cracks

Background

As a standard General Electric Boiling Water Reactor ( "BWR") ,

Hope' Creek is vulnerable to the potentially dangerous phenonenon Jknown as "Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking" ("IGSCC") .

Such cracking has been found at an increasing number of BWR's in Ethe United States and around the world.1 If undetected and not repaired in time, cracks in the piping which carry cooling water into the reactor core could lead to " rupture" and thereby cause a " loss of coolant accident" ("LOCA") and a severe safety hazard.

10 C.F.R. Part 50'(p. 447).

Statement of Contention I The recirculation piping installed at Hope Creek utilizes American Iron and Steel. Institute Type SS-304, which is highly susceptible to IGSCC. The applicants have given inadequate consider-ation to the prevention and mitigation of IGSCC. Accordingly, the applicants should not be allowed to commence operation until they have demonstrated that:

1. Danko and Stahlkopf, 23 Nuclear Safety 653. As of 1982 the authors had tabulated some 272 incidents of IGSCC for type SS-304 piping'in BWR's since 1974. In 1983 IGSCC incidents convinced the NRC to order a shut-down of 5 BRW's, although the Commission later

. granted the affected companies more time to review the. problem. (See Nucleonics Week, Oct. 13, 1983 - " Hasty Shutdowns for Select BWR's Seen").

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1. All critical piping has been identified and tested for susceptibility to IGSCC, and where such susceptibility is found, the piping is replaced with corrosion-resistant piping; or

2. Where replacement is found not to be feasible, then

.all possible preventive measures have been taken prior to start-up, including, but not necessarily limited to, the use of solution heat treatment ("SHT") in shop welds, field application of corrosion-resistant cladding (" CRC"), and the use of the Inductive Heating Stress Improvement ("IHSI") process; and

3. Af ter start-up, PSE&G can and will implement a continuing system for the identification and replacement of piping susceptible

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to IGSCC. To be acceptable, such system must provide for regular and' verifiable inspection techniques which.do not rely upon manual ultrasonic testing ("UT").

Basis for Pine Cracks Contention

1. The letter of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards of August 9, 1983 (" Subject" ACRS REPORT ON FLAW EVALUATION PRO-CEDURES FOR BWR PIPE CRACKS") See Attachment No. 1 (In the letter the ACRS concludes that it is a " delusion" to rely upon "' measure-ments' of crack depth obtained by conventional ultrasonic probe motion techniques." The Committee warned that "the present approach

[to crack detection) in effect, may accept a much higher probability of a LOCA than has been considered acceptable.")

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2. STATUS REPORT ON OBSERVATION OF PIPE CRACKING AT BWR'S (SECY 267) July 1, 1983. See also, SECY 267A, July 11,

2. Danko and Stahlkopf, at 658, 659.

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1983; SECY 350 August 19, 1983.

3.. Danko and Stahikopf " Status of Research on Pipe Cracking in BWRs" 23 NUCLEAR SAFETY, 653-664 (November-December 1982).

4. Regulatorv Guide 8.8, Revision 3,.1978 "Information re-levant to ensuring that occupational radiation exposures at nuclear power stations will be as low as is reasonably achievable" (E.g.,

"A~ major portion of the radiation exposure of station personnel is-received during maintenance . . . inservice inspection, . . .

and nonroutine operations. . . . Adequate space for ease of main-tenance and other operations can permit the tasks to be completed more-quickly, thereby reducing the length of expvsures." Reg.

Guide 8.8-2 and-3.)

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'4 II . - . Pipe Cracks-and the Mark I Containment

Background

Hope. Cree < employs the'now outdated Mark I containment.

This-containment creates an exceptionally _ cramped and confusing environment within the drywell. (Harold Denton, NRC's Director.of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has referred to the.drywell as a

" jungle of pipes. ") 3 .

This factor underscores the importance of preventing IGSCC before operation. commences and devising automated systems.for inspection and deterction of piping afflicted with IGSCC and located-within the drywel1 area.

If.UT methods'are employed, individual workers will find-cit tit:1 cult, it.nct impc citic, to cccomplish thc criticci tesk

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of' safely checking pipes for. cracks and repairs or replacing cracked pipes. High' radiation levels will greatly threaten Lworker's health and further complicate the process, yielding re-

.sults which may be-irratic-and undependable.

Unless the drywell isLredesigned and absent the installa-tion of: automated-detection systems, the operation of Hope Creek under Lthese conditions threatens to violate the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part~20, notably the applicants' duty to " maintain ra-diation exposures (to levels) as low as is reasonably achievable."

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10 C.F.R. 20.1 (c). (This is known as the "ALARA standard. ")

3 24 Nucleonics Week #13 (Oct. 13, 1983)

Statement of' Contention II

.Thefapplicants have not demonstrated that they will be ableito perform the inspection, detection and repair which~will be necessary to assure the integrity of safety-related piping-located withinf the drywell of the Unit I containment.

Basis

1. The Public Advocate relies on the same published materials as described'in Contention I.

2. NRC staff information requests reveal a lack of applicant-supplied Linformation in. the FSAR o'n this topic. See,-e.g., Nos.

au ,_ .100.1 (re: Sec . l . 3. 2 of the FSAR) , and 100.2 (Sec. 1.5.1.5).

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III. The Mark I Containment and Equipment Degradation

Background

Given the location of critical recirculation piping within the containment drywell, the drywell may not be properly designed and' constructed so as to' permit necessary inspection and repairs without violating ALARA. Moreover, adequate assurance of the long-term qualification of safety-related systems and components, especially_ electrical cables, is uncertain due to the high temperature environment which can induce rapid deterioration of such safety-related systems as electrici cables.

Statement of Contention III The applicants have given inadequate consideration to the degradation of electrical cables and other safety related systems due.to the heat and radiation within the drywell.

Basis ,

1. The Public Advocate relies upon the same sources as cited in Contentions I and II.

2. See also the discussion and basis relied upon in the con-tention regarding environmental qualification of safety-related systems and equipment (contention VI ).

IV. Flooding

Background

Hope Creek is located at or near mean sea level- ("MSL") on a small man-made peninsula -- called Artificial Island -- constructed fromidredge fill'and silt. Artificial Island extends partway into the Delaware River and lies a short distance from the New Jersey-Delaware boundary. This estuarine location is subject to a combination of potentially severe enfironmental forces from river flooding and ocean forces, notably tides, currents and storms.

The vulnerability of the site is likely to be further aggravated by the now-documented worldwide warming trend caused by the atmospheric build-up of carbon dioxide. This trend will lead'to'a warmer climate world-wide that_may cause radical changes in climate and rainfall. Ocean levels are expected to begin rising, thereby flooding unprotected coastal areas. (This is the

- so-called "Greehouse ef fect. ") Unless Hope Creek is adequately protected from this synergism of forces over the life of operation, serious safety problems will emerge.

Statement of Contentions The applicants have giv2n inadequate consideration to the potentially extreme environmental forces associated with (1) flooding within the Delaware watershed and estuary, (2) flooding associated with tidal fluctuations and ocean storms and (3) flooding due to ocean waters rising above historical levels as a result of the Greenhouse effect.

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BASIS

-1. Applicant's' Environmental' Report-Operating License Stage

'( "ER" ) ~, S ec . 2.4.1.1 (" Physiography") ; Sec. 2.4-2 ("Phsio-Chemical Description") ; Sec. 2.4-3 (" Flood History"); Sec. 2.4-4 ("Bathymetry").

2. Staff's FSAR information requests 2 4 0.1. ( 2. 4. 3. 6) - through

' 2 4 0. 4 -( 2. 4'.11. 6) ; 410.1 (3.4.1.1.).

3.. Various staff ER informational requests (Enclosure 3),

pp. 3-1 through 3-3 (E.g., at 3-1: " Description of. flood plains, as requested by Executive Order 11988, Floodplain-Management, have

not been provided . . . {And] parts of the waterfront area of the site-are within the 100 year floodplain. Other requests call upon PSE6G'to "[i]dentify,-locate on_a. map and describe all plant structures and topographic alternations (sic) in the floodplains

. . . ' " - Also the staff has' directed PSE&G to "[d]iscuss the' hydro-logic _ effects of all items [above,) tha_ potential for altered flood-flows and levels, offsite (and] . . . the effects on offsite areas of. debris generated.from the site during flood events . . .

[together with);the details of your analysis used in response to

-(the] above.")

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4. Can We Delay a-Greenhouse Warning? Federal Environmental Protection Agency.(EPA doc. no. ) Sept.,-1983.

5.- Changing Climate,_ National Academy of Science (doc. no.

3 42 5-0 ) , October 21, 1983.

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]LL. Management Competence to Safely Operate Hope Creek

Background

The deficiencies in applicant's management (specifically

~PSE&G's)_.were[ demonstrated in'the multiple safety failures at salem Unit 1, which is also' operated by PSE&G. Specifically, the

' failures of the reactor protection systems at Salem on February

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-22.and 25', 1983 made evident serious shortcomings-in the adminis-tration,' procurement, maintenance and quality assurance ("QA")

programs at the. Salem station,.all of which-are under the direct responsibility of PSE&G.

As a-result of these failures, the' unit

was required by: the NRC to remain shut-down while a program of

. investigation and rectification was' developed, and the short-term casks of the-program were accomplished.

In addition to- the specific inadequacies which were required to be~ rectified, the NRC identified a serious concern with the overall: management of the Salem reactors. A civil penalty of S850,000fwas: assessed by the NRC and paid by PSE&G'for violations of. regulations and license conditions that caused the safety sys-tem' failures. AnLindependent review of PSE&G' management was also mandated by the NRC.

The same corporate management whose failures were demonstra-ted by_the February, 1983 incidents is in charge of the construction and operation of-Hope-Creek. Although the NRC required the recti-

~fication of certain specific program deficiencies prior to restart 1

of Salem, a corresponding reform of corporate policies, procedures and personnel responsible for these deficiencies has not been undertaken. Therefore, the evident lack of ability of PSE&G to manage the safe operation of a nuclear facility renders the company technically unqualified to assure the safe operation

, of the Hope Creek reactor in violation of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Sec. 50.56 and 50.57 (a) (4) (which requires a finding that the OL applicant is " technically and financially qualified to engage in the activities authorized by the operating license in accordance with the regulations in this chapter.")

Statement of Contention Prior to operation, PSE&G must demonstrate that it has fully resolved the management implications of the Salem events, and that it has taken all steps necessary to achieve and maintain the technical qualification required for the safe operation of Hope Creek.

Basis

1. The Public Advocate requests that the Board take official notice of the many NRC orders, notices, investigation reports, transcripts and summaries of meetings, and other factual information produced by the NRC staff and PSE&G during the inten-sive review of the Salem incident. See, e.g., In the Matter of PSE&G (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),

docket nos. 50-272, 50-311, " Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalties" (Sept. 29, 1983). 10 C.F.R. 2. 718 (c) and 2. 743 (i) .

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2. . Various NRC staff. requests for information related to the Hope. Creek'FSAR,'e.g., nos. 630.1 and .2, 260,1 See also staff. letters on this topic requesting evidence of PSE&G's " ability to concurrently support a licensing effort on the Hope Creek

- application and still give adequate attention to the safe operation of the Salem facility." Letter of June 23, 1983; Darrell G.

Eisenhut,-Director, Division of Licensing to R.L. Mittel, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance & Regulation, PSE&G. And please see letter.of August 4, 1983, A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 to Mr. Mittle, noting that "the FSAR must also be updated to reflect changes in overall PSE&G management capability and performance [PSE&G has] made or plan [s] to make in response to the NEC Order dated May 6, 1983."

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VI. Environmental Qualification

Background

i Few questions are.more important.to the safe operation of a nuclear power plant than the environmental qualifi-cation of certain safety-related equipment "that is needed to mitigate an accident or to shut down a reactor following an' accident." Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Reg.

Com'n, 711 F.2d 370, 371 (C.A.D.C., 1983) Just as a truck's i

brake-pads must operate in the full range of heat and friction likely to. be present when the o.perator presses the brake peddle, the: reactor- sy.v.o.ms critical to staving off a LOCN or other-accident scenario must be able to withstand the heat, water and radiation that will be present in an emergency. In short, these systems -- and all of their

' inter-related subsystems and components -- must be qualified for operation in the harsh conditions of an unfolding accident.

Unfortunately, the NRC has had a most difficult time 7

gaining the cooperation of the electric utility industry in verifying the' environmental qualification ("EQ") of

< key safety systems at currently operating reactors. UCS v.-NRC, supra, at 372-373 ("The Commission spent the next two years attempting, with scant success, to obtain

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' documentation of [EQ] from licenseos," Id. at 373). See also, e.g., 10 C .F . R. 50.49, 50.55a and App. A, General DesignLCriteria 1, 2 and 4 (" Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to accom-modatelthe effects of and to be compatible with the environ-mental conditions associated with normal operation . . .

and postulated accidents, including loss-of-coolant accidents." G.D.C.4)

An EQ matter of the gravest concern is the inability of many vital electrical connectors, terminal blocks and other electrical equipment to withstand the punishing heat, dampness and radiation -- which may_ fluctuate wildly --

found during_ normal and, of course, accident conditions.

UCS v. NRC, supra, at 372 (citing a Sandia Laboratory study) .

Dr. Clough of Sandia has described one example.of this apparent failure to account for the impacts of radiation in assessing EQ: "The present testing methods underestimate the long-term effects of radiation exposures on polymers by (ignoring] dose rate effects and synergisms that display themselves only in a. longer test." Industrial Research and. Development (June, ,982) at 55-56. These polymers are of the type used in the cable insulation and jackets, seals, rings, and gaskets at Hope Creek. Typical testing

t methods have relied upon short bursts of high radiation levels -- rather than the real world environment of con-tinuous, long-term bombardment and subject to the extremes of an accident situation. See NUREG/CR-2157, " Occurrence and Implications of Radiation Dose-Rate Effects for Material Aging Studies," (June 18, 1981).

Synergisms -- the simultaneous or sequential presence of heat and radiation -- create the greatest potential for equipment to degrade. This, of course, is the likely scenario in an evolving accident, where safety systems must function immediately. See NUREG/CR-2156, " Radiation-Thermal Degradation of PE and PUC: Mechanism of Synergism and Dose Rate Effects," June, 1981. The Applicants have not as yet performed EQ testing which incorporates the findings and implications of these studies. In sum, it is unlikely that the applicants will be able to meet the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.70 and 1.89 (or an accept-able alternative) and IE Bulletin 79-OlB.

Statement of Contention The applicants have not demonstrated that safety-related electrical and mechanical equipment, components and sub-components will be. environmentally qualified at the start of operation and throughout the life of operation, so as to assure compliance with G.D.C. 1, 2 and 4 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A.

Basis

1. See the references discussed and cited in the above

" Background" discussion.

2. The applicants' FSAR Table 3.11-2 and Sec. 3.11.3, Qualification Test Results: " Environmental Qualification documentation for safety-related electrical equipment will be on file at PSE&G and will be available for NRC audit."

3. IE Information Notice 83-72: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFI-CATI.ON TESTING . EXPERIENCE- (Oct. 28, 1983) and Attachment I

4. Staff letter of Aug. 10, 1983, A. Schwencer to R.L.

Mittl, PSE&G,-Enclosure 1. Mr. Schwencer states that, regarding the EQ information submitted by the applicants,

"[o]ther~new information is required . . . and is defined in this guidance," For example, PSE&G is directed to provide:

a list of all'nonsafety-related electrical equipment, located in a harsh environment,

-whose failure under postulated environ-mental conditions could prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions by the safety-related equipment.

A-description of the method used to identify this equipment must also be included. The nonsafety-related equipment identified must be included in the environmental qualifi-cation program, and identification of safety-related mechanical equipment located in harsh environment areas, included required operating time.

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(Mr. Schwencer added that the staff will then perform an

" audit-review" of the above and prepare a supplement to the regular staff. Safety Evaluation Reoort, which, pre-

'sumably will contain the staff's recommendations as to the applicants eventual compliance with 10 C.F.R. 50.49 and

' App. B, 10 C.F.R.)

4 16-E

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VII. Effects of Radiological ~ Releases

Background

~

LApplicants are required to quantify to the fullest extent' practicable, the factors considered in calculating the environmental effects of operating Hope Creek. C.F.R.

5551.20 and;51.21. These. factors must then be revealed and weighed'against the expected benefits of operation as.

part of the final cost-benefit analysis required by the Commission's' regulations'and the National Environmental 321.20(b).

~

Policy.Act. 42 U.S.C. 39321, 10 C.F.R.

Although the cumulative effects of low-level radia-tion on-living organisms is'well-known, John Gofman, M.D.,

Radiation and Human Health,-San Francisco: Sierra Club Books (1981) at'47,' applicants fail to provide a complete and: accurate analysis of the radiological burden to man, animals, and plant life, from the operation of Hope Creek.

For example, the applicants' Environmental Report-

- Operating License Stage ("ER") categorically states that "[t]he radiological impacts from the routine opera-tion of HCGS have been evaluated; no adverse effects on man'and the environment have been identified." ER at Sec. 5-2. This statement is inconsistent with the fin-

' dings of the National Academy of Sciences, see BEIR

-Kational Academy ~of Sciences, National Research Council,

'The Effects of Populations of-Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, November, 1972, and is neither explained nor. substantiated by the applicants.

The Environmental Report merely outlines the various pathways-that radiation travels and estimates an annual

? radiation dose to persons and animals. ER Sec. 5.2.1 through 5.23, Tables 5.2-2, 5.23. Applicants completely

-. fail.to assess the imoact of such irradiation on human health, animal and plant life. An examination of Sec.

5.2.3 illustrates the incompleteness of applicants' analysis. In this section, applicants state that "the evidence indicates that no other living organisms have been identified as more radiosensitive than man. Thus, no measurable radiological impact on populations of biota is expected from the radiation and radioactivity released to the biosphere as a result of the routine operation of HCGS."' Sec. 5.2.3. By simply stating that man is more radiosensitive than other living organisms, applicants surely do not demonstrate that these other organisms will suffer no radiological impact. Moreover, applicants assume, without offering any proof, that people residing

~

near Hope Creek will not suffer any adverse affects from routine radiological releases from the facility. ER Sec. 5.2. Applicants must correct this oversight by adequately addressing the radiological and health burdens on people residing within the radius of Hope Creek. Dr.

Rosalie Bertell ' states that radiation has an enhancing effect on 4

4 existing health problems and, therefore, that such infor-mation is necessary to correctly determine the impact of a fa'cility's operation. See " Radioactive Effluents:

Pebble Springs Nuclear Plants," Testimony Before the Oregon Energy Facility Siting Council, April 3, 1978. See also, "X-Ray Exposure and Premature Aging," Journal 51 Surgical Oncology (1977) at 379. Without such information, it is obvious that a final cost-benefit analysis cannot be per-formed.

Applicants should also state the projected annual doses of radiation received by workers at Hope Creek.

Occupational exposures from Hope Creek will impact the overall genetic pool and such exposure should be consi-dered in the cost-benefit analysis for the plant. Gofman, suora at 584. Applicants should also up-date the BWR exposure data used in Chapter 12.4. At present, appli-cants exposure estimates do not include plant exposures after 1976. See HRC Staff Request for Additional Informa-tion Relating to Hope Creek FSAR at 2-9.

Additionally, applicants should describe how they intend to accurately' detect airborn radioactivity which may be found in any compartment occupied by Hope Creek employees. Acceptance criterion II-4.b 3 of SRP 12.3-12.

Ventilation monitors should be placed upstream of HEPA

- filters to provide an indication of elevated airborn radiation concentrations in plant areas. However, applicants placed ventilation monitors downstream of the HEPA filters in Hope Creek and do not describe how radiation detection can be provided. See NRC Staff Request for Aditional Information. Relating to Hope Creek FSAR at 2-8.

Applicants also fail to assess the effect of radia-tion releases to ' children in utero. A radiation exposure could have lethal consequences to children in utero, John Gofman, Radiation and Human Health at 26, 48 and 728; and applicants should provide actual and expected populations of in utero children and project radiation doses and ef fects on _ this helpless population.

Nor does the Applicants' Environmental Report dis-cuss the entire scope of artificial radiation taken up and absorbed in the. environment and food chain of the Delaware River and nearby Atlantic Ocean. (The waters nearby are rich in commercial and game fisheries, such as white-perch, weakfish and American shad.) Absent a quantification of these effects, applicants cannot possibly comply with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I.

In addition, Applicants' Environmental Report only discusses radiological impacts from the routine operation of Hope Creek, Environmental Report 55.2, and fails to address with specific reference to all possible pathways, the potential radiological consequences following such accident scenerios as a fuel handling accident and/or a postulated loss of coolant accident.

Statement of Contention Th'e Public Advocate contends that-applicants failito' address properly.the potential releases.and

theTeffects ofiradionuclides from the Hope Creek

-f acility during nonnal, transient,_and accident conditions.

Thus, applicants fail to meet the requirements-

-of 10 C.F.R. SS20.103, 50.34 (a) , 50.36 (a) , and Part 50,-Appendix.I, and further underestimate the human cost:of-the project in the cost-benefit analysis required by 10 C.F.R. SS51.20(b) and (c).

Accordingly, applicants should:

1. Provide a complete analysis of the radiological burden to man, animal and plant life from the operation-of Hope Creek,

2. Address the radiological and health burdens of people residing within the radius of Hope Creek,

3. ' Project annual radiation doses received by Hope Creek employees, both temporary and permanent employees,

4. Update BWR exposure data,

5. Describe the mechanisms and pro-ceedings used to detect and prevent airborn radiation within the facility,

'6. Provide population data on'i l utero population and proj'ect radiation' doses and effects on this population,

7. ' Quantify effects of radiation from Hope Creek on animal and. fish life, and

8. Address, through all pathways, the potential radiological consequences following a fuel handling accident and/or a loss of coolant accident.

Basis

1. -10 C.F.R. SS20.103, 50.34(a), 50.36 (a)

~51.20, 51.21, 51. 23 (c) , and Part 50, Appendix I.

2. John Gofman, M.D. Radiation and Human

. Health, San Francisco, Sierra Club Books (1981),

3. " Radioactive Effluents: Pebble Springs Nuclear Plants," Testimony before the Oregon Energy Facility Siting Council, April 3, 1978.

.~.

~4. "X-Ray' Exposure and~ Premature Aging," Journal of, Surgical Oncology (1977),

.5. NRC Staff. Request for-Additional Information

~

Relating to Hope Creek FSAR at 2-8 and 2-9.

6. Acceptance criterion II 4.b.3 of SRP 12.3-12.4.

7. BEIR National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, The Effects of Populations of Exposure tc Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, November, 1972.

e

e VIII. Final Cost Benefit Analysis

Background

By now it is well-established that a decision on whether to license the operation of a nuclear facility is a " major federal action" significantly I

affecting the environment, which require compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),

42 U.S.C. SS4321 and 4332; Calvert Cliffs Coord. Com.

v. A.E.'C., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.C.A.,

1971), and the Commission's regulations applying NEPA to its licen-sing activities. 42 U.S.C. SS2239 (a) , 10 C.F.R. Part 51, Subpart A.

A central element in the decision-making process on whether and, if so, under what circumstances to issue an OL, is the final statement of the tabulation of the costs and benefits militating for and against the requested federal action. 10 C.F.R.

SS51.20(b) and (c). For example, the applicants ' ER, which present their views of the outcome of the cost-benefit process, a should not be confined to data supporting the proposed action but should include adverse data as well." Id., subsec. (d)(emphasis supplied).

Such data must also be accurate and complete, both t; facilitate the Commission's decision on the application and to further the publ.tc " full disclosure" purposes of NEP;A. Calvert Cliffs v. AEC , supra at 1118-1119, and 1123.

l l

Accordingly, it is imperative that the applicants file an accurate statement of the costs and benefits to be expected.from the operation of Hope Creek. The Public Advocate's Contention VII, has detailed defici-encies in the discussion and consideration of the l

radiological " costs" due to the release of radionu- '

clides into the environment during normal and accident conditiens. This contention focuses on the applicants failure to present an accurate' listing and discussion of the alleged " benefits."

Specifically, the relevant sections of the ER in Chapter 8 describing benefits are grossly misleading in numerous respects which are detailed below. Unless they are corrected, the public may be forced to absorb unduly burdensome levels of " costs" due to the exaggera-tion of purported " benefits." If the careful weighing process dictated by NEPA and the Commission's regulations

- is not to be frustrated, the applicants must rectify their erroneous presentation.

For example, in Section 8.1.1 (" Direct Benefits")

the applicants state that Hope Creek will lead to direct dollar savings of $250 million to $460 million "during the.first five full years of operation." Sec. 8.1-1. No information or calculation to support this claim is described or referenced.(Nor is any statement made regarding operation after 1991). Indeed, sworn t'estimony c

and other information supplied by PSE&G to such regu-latory agencies as the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities ("BPU") indicate that there will be direct cost increases as measured in base rate relif alone of approximately $719 million "over the next few years" associated solely with Hope Creek. In the Matter of the Petition of PSE&G, etc., N.J. BPU Docket No. 836-620, Direct testimony of E.L. Morris, Sr. Vice-President, SPE&G Customer Operations , . al y , 1983), at 77. Mr.

Morris projects fuel savings by 1987 of $350 million, due to Hope Creek operation, leaving net direct costs of $369 million. Assuming the validity of Mr. Morris' recent data, one must increase his calculations by approximately 5% to account for the ownership interest of the other applicant, Atlantic Electric, yielding a total net direct cost of about $387 million over the next few years alone.

Table 8.1-1 of the ER summarizes the applicants' tabulation of net benefits from Hope Creek operation.

The Table reveals extreme optimism that Hope Creek will perform more efficiently than the national average by several percentage points. This is seen in the third column which reveals the projected capacity factor of Hope Creek operation for the years 1987-1991. *(The assessment of benefits is highly sensitive, inter alia, to two key factors: the frequency and durability of

and other information supplied by PSE&G to such regu-latory agencies as the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities ( " BP U ) indicate that there will be direct cost increases as meatared in base rate relif alone of approximately $719 million "over the next few years" associated solely with Hope Creek. In the Matter of the Petition of PSE&G, etc., N.J. BPU Docket No. 836-620, Direct testimony of E.L. Morris, Sr. Vice-President, SPE&G Customer Operations (July, 1983), at 77. Mr.

Morris projects fuel savings by 1987 of $350 million, due to Hope Creek operation, leaving net direct costs of S369 million. Assuming the validity of Mr. Morris' recent data, one must increase his calculations by approximately 5% to account for the ownership interest of the other applicant, Atlantic Electric, yielding a total net direct cost of about $387 million over the next few years alone.

Table 8.1-1 of the ER summarizes the applicants' tabulation of net benefits from Hope Creek operation.

The Table reveals extreme optimism that Hope Creek will perform more efficiently than the national average by several percentage points. This is seen in the third column which reveals the projected capacity factor of Hope Creek operation for the years 1987-1991. '(The assessment of benefits is highly sensitive, inter alia, to two key factors: the frequency and durability of L_

reactor operation, i.~.,

e the " capacity factor", and the cost of purchasing or generating " replacement power" from other sources. ER 8.1-1 and 8.1-2.).

The applicants' estimated capacity factors vary between a low ofL62% in 1989 and a high of 70% in 1990, for a five year average capacity factor of 66%.

The projection of 66% is most optimistic. It exceeds the national average of 55% for similar BWR's by about 11% (66-55=11%) . In the Matter of Atlantic City Electric Co. etc , Phase II, N.J. BPU Docket No.

, 822-116, testimony of Dr. R.J. Timms, Entec. Consulting Inc., witness for the Public Advocate, p.5. If a more conservative statement of capacity factor is used --

i.e., -- 55% -- the applicants' should substantially lower their calculation of benefits. (The above dis-crepancy, at least should impose a burden on the applicants' to reveal how they will achieve their lofty projections').

Additionally, the applicants' have revealed no information'to support their estimates of the cost of replacement power, regardless of the capacity factor of the unit. Table 8.1-2.

1 Besides the above failures in calculating alleged l

" Direct Benefits", the applicants' mischaractdrize many factors as " Indirect Benefits" which, while yielding '

reactor operation, i . 'e . , the " capacity factor", and

'the cost of purchasing or generating " replacement power" from other sources. ER 8.1-1 and 8.1-2.).

The applicants' estimated capacity factors vary between a low of~62% in 1989 and a high of 70% in 1990, for a five year average capacity factor of 66%.

The projection of 66% is most optimistic. It exceeds the national average of 55% for similar BWR's by-about 11% (66-55=11%). In the Matter of Atlantic City-Electric Co. e tc , Phase II, N.J. BPU Docket No.

822-116, testimony of Dr. R.J. Timms, Entec. Consulting Inc., witness for the Public Advocate, p.5. If a more conservative statement of capacity factor is used --

i.e., -- 55% -- the applicants' should substantially lower their calculation of benefits. (The above dis-crepancy, at least should impose a burden on the applicants' to reveal how they will achieve their lofty projections.)

Additionally, the applicants' have revealed no information to support their estimates of the cost of replacement power, regardless of the capacity factor of the unit. Table 8.1-2.

Besides the above failures in calculating alleged

^

" Direct Benefits", _the applicants' mischaracterize many factors as " Indirect Benefits" which, while yielding

economic benefits to a small population, produce net indirect costs to a large population. Indeed, the ER is fundamentally flawed in that the applicants give no weight whatever to the indirect economic impacts.

The relevant section, 8.2.2, for example, does not consider the economic harm to business, industry, employment, and growth to be expected from paying for the direct and indirect " benefits" claimed by the applicants. (Taxes, for example, are counted as

" benefits" but not matched as " costs.")* Yet it is well-settled that if community income is lowered via taxes or higher rates, economic growth can suffer (depending, e.g. on how the funds are " recycled."

Samuelson, Economics, (1981) at .) The appli-cants, however, besides miscalculating " Direct Bene-fits", take no heed of this basic consideration in balancing " Indirect Benefits" and " Indirect Costs."

See-also, testimony of R.J. Timm, supra, at 14.

The discussion of taxes is further flawed in that the applicants' have misrepresented that the payment of Gross Receipts and Franchise taxes of "12.5 percent of revenues produced by the sale of electricity from (Hope Creek [", ER-OL, S11.1.1, at 11.1-1, are paid to the-state government" Id. (emphasis supplied). As the applicants are well aware, these large sums are paid to the state but then transferred to the Town of, Lower Alloways Creek where the unit is located. This amounts to a112.5 percent sales tax while accru'es to the benefit not of the 7.5 million residents of New Jersey but to the few thousand residents of Lower Alloways Creek. See, j N.J.S.A. 54:30A-54, el seg.

In short, the delicate weighing of costs and benefits mandated by the applicable law is imperiled by the one-sided superficial and outdated presentation found in the applicants' Environmental Report.

Statement of Contention The applicants have failed to present an accurate, complete assessment of the direct and indirect costs and benefits associated with the operation of Hope Creek, in violation of the Commission's regulations, the National Environmental Policy Act, and governing case lew. (Citations omitted; see above.) Unless corrected, the Commission will be frustrated in its efforts to carefully weigh the full range of costs and benefits and thereby will not be able to conclude whether an OL should be granted and, if so, under what conditions so as to assure that the benefits of Hope Creek oper'ation will exceed its costs.

Basis

1. The Public Advocate relies on the relevant sections of the ER-OL, documents, reports and sworn testimony recited above, together with his substantial departmental experience as the statutory representative of New Jersey's electric utility ratepayer's and the public interest before the New Jersey BPU. N.J.S.A.

52:27E-1, et sg .

O

2. Nuclear Engineering International, " Nuclear Station Achievement 1981" (August 1982) ; Hellman,"

Competitive Economics of Nuclear and Coal," 1983; Licensed Operating Reactor Status (NUREG-00 2 0 ) , Jan. 1981, Vol. 5, No. 1; Komanoff Energy Associates.

e e

IX. Decommissioning-

Background

The applicants' have failed to reveal that Hope Creek may be unique among all commercial nuclear reactors in that the company's. management .has already accepted a particular decommissioning plan as a condition to the receipt of State land use approval. This violates the intent of the Commission's regulations, which state that the ER "shall include a discussion of the status of com-pliance'of the facility with... applicable zoning and land use regulations...which have been imposed by... State...

agencies having responsibility for environmental protec-tion." 10 C.F.R. S 51. 20 (c) (emphasis supplied) The applicants' must then incorporate the above " discussion" into their Environmental Report, including the cost-benefit analysis. Id.

To be sure, the applicants' have correctly identi-1 fied the relevant State approval as that required by the Costal Area Facility Review Act ("CAFRA"), N.J.S.A. 13:19-1, et seq., CAFRA Permit No.74-014 (September, 1975), ER-OL Table 12.1-2. (The application of CAFRA is discussed at length in Public Interest Research Group v. State DEP, 152 N.J. Super. 191 (App. Div. 1977) ,3 77 A. 2d ,915 (1977).

See also, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Calif. Energy Re s . Comm ' r . , 103 S.Q .1713 (19 8 3 ) . They have not, however, i

D.

I revealed, discussed or incorporated into their NEPA assessment and cost-benefit analysis the particular requirements for decommissioning in the CAFRA

. approval. Specifically, CAFRA Permit No.74-014, Condition No. 21, provides that:

PSE&G shall within six months of the effective date of this per-mit (Feb. 1, 1976] file a plan subject to DEP approval...to physicially dismantle the facility describing what steps will be taken to restore the site to a condition and appearance similar to that be-fore construction of the facility.

CAFRA No.74-018, p. 5 (emphasis supplied) .

The applicants' do not disclose that they are bound by this requirement. Instead, they briefly list and describe a variety of possible decommissioning methods, ER, S5.8.2, one of which is " Prompt Removal / Dismantling" (ER., p. 5.8-2). The discussion of this " alternative" is so cursory that it can be stated in full as follows:

Prompt Removal / Dismantling involves I; the removal from the site of all fuel assemblies, radioactive fluids and wastes, and other materials having activity above accepted un-restricted levels. -The station owner then has unrestricted use of the site with no requirement for a possession-only license. If the station owner so desires, the remainder of the reactor facility may be dismantled and all vestiges removed.

(emphasis supplied). Clearly, the above discussion is insufficient; it,is also in error in that it suggests

! l t

that full dismantling will be the perogative of the utilities -- when the State of New Jersey has stated its preference that PSE&G return the site to its original

" condition and appearance."

In'short,-given this clear policy direction from New' Jersey's highest-ranking environmental official at the time he approved Hope Creek, the applicants' must do more than present a menu of decommissioning choices.

They must focus on the option selected by the State and incorporated in t, heir land use permit, describe the current status of compliance, and their best estimates of the full range of costs to cart away the remains of the reactor "at the end of its useful life." CAFRA Opinion No. 20, 1140, pp. 41-42-(Feb. 1, 1976). The lack of data and information found in this report would be lamentable even without this express State policy; that, 7 years and 9 months later the applicants' attempt to submit so little cannot be i

excused under reasonable reading of the Commission's rules.

Statement of Contention The applicant's have failed to reveal how they will comply with the policy of the State of New Jersey for dismantling the Hope-Creek facility at the end of its useful life and restoring the site to its original condi-tion and appearance. Complying with this State land use

.: }

~/ ,

-requirement-raises serious concern for (1) the achieve -

' ment of ALARA standards decommissioning for (2) 'the methods for safeguarding public health and environ-mont at' disposal. sites, (3) .the economic cost of dismantle-ment and restoration, and (4) the adequacy of the applicants' final cost-benefit analysis, Basis

1. CAFRA permit No.74-014 (copy-attached)

2. . NUREG-0613, E.F. Conti, " Residential Radio-activity Limits for Decommissioning" (1979).

3. Regulatory Guid,e_ - 1.86

4. NUREG/CR-0672 Vol. 1 " Technology Safety and Costs'of Decommissioning a Reference BWR." (See, especi-ally Chapters 4 and 9.)

5. Draft Generic EIS on Decommissioning of Nuclear. Facilities, NUREG-0586.

l e

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• CAFRA PERMIT CA #74-014

^

f' .,

5ASTAL AREA FACILITY PERMIT STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DIVISION OF MARINE SERVICES P. O. BOX 1883 TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08625 Mr. R. L.-Mitti, General Manager - Projects

' Engineering and' Construction Department Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Ne ark, New Jersey 07101 ,

,, , j .RE: . Coastal Area Facility Permit Application t- CA #74-014 I

SIR: The Department of Environmental Protection, Division of i

Marine Services, acting under Title 13,. Chapter 19, Sections 10 and 11 of the. Annotited Statutes of New Jersey, hereby , c

, grants a revocable' Coastal Area Facility Permit to carry out ,

. work in accordance with plans and specifi' cations accompanying <

the permit application and applicable laws and regulations.

l@j. .

This application in general contemplates the following work:

_ Public Service Electric and Ga5206mpany (PSE&G) plans.

to construct and operate a nuclear power plant housing two boiling water reactors and support facilities on Artificial Island within Lower Alloways Creek Township, Salem County.

This facility is to be known as the Hope Creek Generating Station.

The following conditions (referenced to CAFRA Opinion No 20 by, noted paragraph numbers) shall be met before, during and after construction, as appropriate.

1) Within six months of the effective date of this

.- permit, PSE&G will implement, with the approval

- of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) , a compre-hensive load management program, the contents

- and procedures of which shall follow the_ guide-lines and requirements of the State Energy Office (SEO) and PUC. (Paragraph 38) 2)- For those components of the facility for which detailed technical specifications are not yet available, PSE&G will obtain the specific permits needed at the appropriate time as provided by law or regulation in the design and construction pro-cess. (Paragraph 47) e 1

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'Mr. R. L. Mittl CAFRA Permit CA #74-014 ,

6 i (A.- 3) PSE&G shall submit to DEP:

, (a) within six months of the effective date of this permit an analysis of the design and structural possibilities for the retrofitting of technology to further reduce the emissions of radioactive materials into air and water, should such technology be developed during the estimated 40-year lifetimie of the plant.

4 (Paragraph 53a) 4 (b) during- the lifetime of the plant, as the Com-missioner may request, specific analyses of the technical feasibility, with cost-benefit

g. , .

analysis, of installing such improved control technology as it may become available.

(Paragraph 53b) -

, 4) PSE&G shall:, .

(a) continue the Salem tadiation monitoring program (Artificial Island Radiological .

Environmental Monitoring Program for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, 1974 Annual ca; Report, Radiation Management Corporation, tyr March 1975) .or another program approved by DEP for the Hope Creek% generating Station for life of said geneneti-ng station. (Para-graph 60) i

', '(b) institute an immediate radiation reduction or clean up program approved by DEP if any adverse radiological impact occurs as deter-

! mined by DEP. (Paragraph 60)

5) PSE&G shall meet all the requirements of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) permits and licenses

regarding the use, possession, and discharge of radioactive substances. (Paragraph 64) 6)

PSE&G shall notify DEP's Bureau of Radiation Protection at least one week prior to shipments of radioactive material, and shall follow routes within New Jersey approved by the Bureau of Radiation Protection to avoid congested and popu-lated areas wherever possible. (Paragraph 65)

7) PSE&G shall:

-s (a) inform DEP sixty days prior to any refueling operation of the temporary and final dis-position to be made of the sp nt fuel rods to l be removed during such re-fueling. (Para-graph 67) .

e.

)

• . l LMr. R. L. Mitti CAFRA Permit CA #74-014 l MG.

, $' (b) inform DEP if its actually available on-site i storage capacity for spent fuel rods ever falls below that required to hold one full core for each unit and of its program to re-instate that level of storage capacity.

(Paragraph 67)

8) PSE&G shall not use mixed uranium / plutonium oxide fuel rods in the Hope Crcek facility. (Paragraph 71)

9) Where required by DEP,.PSE&G shall sample dis-charges of all liquid waste specified by DEP prior to dilution by the cold bypass water to determine ir- -#- compliance with effluent limitations; sampling locations shall be determined by DEP. (Paragraph ,

72) ,

, 10) If the Salem Station is required to reduce the Salem Water discharge plume by providing closed .

cycle cooling pursuant to EPA requirments, PSE&G shall:

(a) Evaluate the feasibility of relocating the

> dn Hope Creek-Salem discharge structures to

• • minimize the possibility of shock kill during the shutdown of either, station.

(Paragraph l ..

76) -e - .. .

4 (b) upon the request of DEP, conduct such ad-ditional studies (including monitoring and entrapment studies) and/or implement such -

operation modifications including modifica-tions to the discharge structure. (Para-graphs 76 & 78) l

11) PSE&G shall be limited to the period from Sep-t tember 1 through April 15th for construction

! dredging, and from September 1 through March 31 I for maintenance dredging. (Paragraph 82 as amended i by opinion 20-A, January 22, 1976) -

12) Within six months of the effective date.of this

( permit PSE&G shall design a program to' analyze the effects of entrapment and any alteration of pro-ductivity it may cause within the plume. Upon review of the above monitoring programs, DEP may i.

require PSE&G to implement a program to determine whether mortalities are significant enough to

^ actually depress the population size of any sig-nificant species. (Paragraph 88) ,

e e 0

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,Mr. R. L. Mitti CAFRA Permit CA #74-014 f.3 13) Prior to and after initiation of power operation, v/

PSE&G shall initiate an on-going study of proposed chlorination methods to assure that there will be acceptable chlorine residuals in the station effluent under the full range of conditions anti-cipated during operation of the station and shall submit this study to the Department for approval of these methods as soon as possible but in no case subsequent to the initiation of installation of the methods proposed by PSE&G. The study shall include an evaluation of the effects of variable ammonia and organic nitrogen concentrations, chlorine demand, temperature and pH on.the con-centrations of both free and combined chlorine T- -J' residuals in the treated water. Alternative l l

methods of reducing chlorine residuals shall be investigated. (Paragraph 92)

14) PSE&G shall continue the NRC biocide monitoring program for the Hope Creek installation (construc-tion p'ermit, United Stat,es Atomic Energy Com - ,

misssion, Docket No. 50-354 & 50-355) and use both continuous laboratory and'in situ bio-assay ap-proaches to recore short- and long-term effects on '

the aquatic biota. PSE&G shall obtain DEP ap-

'454 proval for this program, insofar as it deals with

'S discharges from the Hope Creek installation.

(Paragraph 93) ~ .

15) PSE&G shall monitor the ambient water for copper

.\

and other:; heavy metals which may be present in various discharge waters to insure that concen-

• trations in the ambient waters (outside the mixing ,

zone) do not exceed the limits specified as biologically protective for marine species in the National Academy of Scienca publication Water i

Quality criteria - 1972. However, as an alterna- l tive to monitoring ambient water quality, PSE&G may demonstrate by calculations that such con-centrations will not be exceeded; such a demon-stration shall be by methods of analysis specified by DEP's Division of Water Resources. PSE&G shall institute an immediate remedial program if such concentrations are exceeded. In addition PSE&G shall measure the heavy metal content of represen-tative species of shellfish in the facility's vicinity. (Paragraph 94)

16) Within six months of the effective date of this permit PSE&G shall design a pre-operational and 7' operational monitoring program to evaluate the 4

. _., _ _.. _ , ~ . , _ . _ _ . _ _ , . _ _ . _ - _ _ _ - - _ .

,Mr. R. L. Mittl CAFRA Permit CA $74-014 m... effects of salt released from the cooling towers K.: -

on terrestrial life and structures; such program shall be submitted to DEP for approval. If salt deposition during operation causes detrimental effects, PSE&G shall take such remedial steps as DEP requires. (Paragraph 111)

17) PSE&G shall determine mortality of birds due to collision with the cooling towers;. this shall be reported to DEP by species as well as by time and climatic conditions. (Paragraph 112)

18) PSE&G shall not dump spoil material, brush or other debris or pump silt-laden water into any wetlands or other locations unless approval is

-.. . , y. - obtained from DEP or the Natural Resource Council for riparian land and r s11 employ erosion control techniques approved by 2P. (Paragraph 122)

19) PSE&G shall notify DEP prior to any plant shut down'and of'any fish mortality that might be .,

related to plant operation, including any sequence of events leading up to a fish" kill. (Paragraph 120) g3 20) PSE&G shall adhere to the several requirements re-m- lating to transmission corridors and excavation and construction work developed by the NRC as part

_ of its -licensing proceedin~ ge (Paragraphs 138. &.

139)

21) PSE&G shall within six months of the effective

. date of this permit file a plan subject to DEP -

approval outlining the procedure to be utilized to

. physically dismantle the facility,. describing what steps will be taken to restore the site to a condition and appearance similar to-that before construction of the facility. (Paragraph 140)

Additionally, the standard permit conditions set forth in attached Appendix A'shall be met during and after con-struction. .

It is my opinion that all of the conditions imposed on the grant of this permit are within my authority under CAFRA and are essential to promote the public health, safety and welfare. If, however,'any condition is determined to be legally unenforceable, I reserve the right to substitute whatever additional conditions thereby become necessary to protect the public interest.

]  !

Effective Date:

February 1, 1976

)

I'D' avid J . Kardin, Commissioner -

Departm'ent of Environmental

• w a .v v e u w

~'

Standard CAFRA Permit Conditions Department or the Stato shall in no way be responsible or become party to any action for loss of life or property, or for damage.to persons or property which may occur by the carrying out of the work covered by the permit.

(9) A permittee shall notify the Division in writing three (3) days prior to commencement of construction on the site.

(10) A permittee shall allow the authorized representatives of the Department free access to the site at all times

, . . when construction activity is taking place and at other times upon notice to .the permittee and shall provide r* d free of charge all equipment reasonably necessary for inspection of the site.

(11) No change in plans or specifications upon which a permit is issued shall be made except with the written permission of the Department. .

(12) A copy of the permit shall be posted prominently at the site and shall be exhibited upon request to any person.

/.i (13) A permittee shall notify the Division in writing within seven (7) days of the completion of construction at the site. The p t emittee shall,41so notify the Division within 'seven (7) days of commencement of operation of the facility. At this time, the permittee shall also notify the Division that all. conditions of the permit, if any, have been met.

(14) The permittee shall monitor the construction of the facility to determine the accuracy of the environmental assessment prepared and submitted in the application's EIS. The permittee shall submit written, semi-annual progress reports to the Division on the results of this monitoring and upon the completion of construction

. shall within thirty (30) days inform the Division in writing of the final results of the environmental monitoring and the accuracy of the environmental as-sessment contained in the original application. If the permittee's ongoing monitoring reveals a-major or substantial inaccuracy in the environmental assessment or an adverse environmental impact not anticipated in the environmental assessment, such inaccuracy or impact shall be reported to the Division in writing within five (5) days.

e

_ . , , - , ~ ,- - - - - - . , . ,

e i :*

X. Cooling Tower Operation

Background

Hope Creek will employ a so-called " natural draft cooling tower", ER 33.4.4 in order to contain thermal discharges to the Delaware estuary within acceptable levels. The tower itself, however, creates its own range of environmental costs, impacts and uncertainties, even as it may mitigate the harmful consequences of once-through cooling. See, Final Environmental Statement related to the proposed Hope Creek Units 1 and 2 (Feb.,

19 74 ) ("FES") , Chapter 6, Sec. 6.1.1.

For example, at a planned height of about 800 feet

-- almost nine-tenths the size of the Empire State Buil-ding -- the tower will be visible for miles around, considering the flat countryside in southern New Jersey and across the river in Delaware. A white mane or " plume" of mist mixed with salt, water vapor, and sodium hypo-chloride will extend from the top of this giant structure "as far as 20 to 30 miles downwind before dissipating."

CAFRA Opinion No. 20, 1106, pp. 32-33.

In fact, the New Jersey DEP estimated that the plume would be visible "up to 50 miles away." Id.

(emphasis supplied). In other words, the residents of Wilmington, Philadelphia, and Trenton, as well as visitors to the Ocean resort of Cape May and the natural areas of Wharton State Forest in the New Jersey "pinelands" will

y f

.allisee the plume at' times.. (Note that the DEP estimate

= predicted the use of two cooling towers at Hope Creek, Eeach no more than.500' feet high). Id., at 9105, p.32.

Thus, it seems likely that the 50 mile estimate under-states.the impact radius.) What will be the long-term environmental " fallout" from such a'widely visible

' discharge? Since the applicants appear to have grossly understated the size of the plume -- stating that such plumes " persist" for "no more than 1.0 kilometer",

$5.1.4.6 and 5.1.4.9 -- there is no discussion of what effects such a visual " easement" will have on the varied environments within a 50 mile radius. Such failure constitutes yet'another violation of the Commission's rules interpreting NEPA.

The New Jersey bar also_ stated its concern with

.the possible damage to "terrestical life forms (that]...

may result from salt drift from cooling towers." CAFRA

• Opinion No. 20, 1109, p. 33. As-one of the largest salt

~

water cooling towers in the world, moreover, less than optional' operation can be expected. Hence the applicants' conclusory claims that operation will have minimal effects on. salt deposition, cloud enhancement, shadowing, and hazing must'be'taken with the proverbial grain of salt.,

-The-NRC staff has shown that it shares this skep-ticism by requesting substantiation of ER SS.l.V.F.

.1

< s regarding the above factors, e.g. "the potential reduc-tion in solar radiation due to a visible-cooling tower plume. Staff requests E451.4, p. 3-13. Additionally, the staff has noted an apparent inconsistency between the ER assertion that ground fogging and icing will not be triggered by the moist plume. Compare FES, Sec. 5 and ER 5.1.4.1.

Statement of Contention

-The Public Advocate asserts that the applicants ER inadequately describes and analysis the cooling tower plume, its impact radius, the range of impacts depending upon suboptimal operation, and therefore results in an underestimate of the total environmental burdens associ-ated with the normal and abnormal operation of Hope Creek.

Basis The Public Advocate. relies on the information, sources and facts recited above.

4 O

T" 9

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 0 ,\ , y r, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 33 pp/ 9 g.

Public Service Electric and ) ,.s .

Gas Company )

[FFlc:

u0ChUmg gy4 g,3g.!)g'

) Docket No. 5 9- 3 5 4-O[ rat!CH (Hope Creek Generating )

Station) )

SERVICE LIST Marshall E. Miller Atomic Safety and Chairman Licensing Appeal Panel Atomic Safety and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Board Panel Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Peter A. Morris Docketing and Service Atomic Safety and Section Licensing Board Panel Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. James H. Carpenter Lee Scott Dewey, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Office of the Executive Licensing Board Panel Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Theodore C. Granger Richard Fryling, Jr., Esq.

Deputy Public Advocate Associate General Counsel Department of the Public Service Electric Public Advocate and Gas Company Division of Rate Counsel Post Office Box 570 (T5E) 744 Broad Street Newark, New Jersey 07101 30th Floor Newark, New Jersey 07102 Irwin I. Kimmelman Attorney General, State Atomic Safety and of New Jersey Licensing Board Panel Hughes Justice Complex U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Trenton, New Jersey 08625 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Director, Division of Environmental Control Tatnell Building Dover, Delaware 19901 Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.

Conner and Wetterhan 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest Washington, D.C. 20006 9

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