ML070660166
| ML070660166 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/2007 |
| From: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| To: | NRC/RGN-III |
| References | |
| EA-07-001, IR-06-009 IR-06-009 | |
| Download: ML070660166 (22) | |
Text
Regulatory Conference NRC Region I11 NRC Emergency Preparedness IR 050000331/2006009 March 1,2007
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Position on Apparent Violation FPL Energy agrees that it failed to critique (generate a CAP/AR) an unexpected scenario sequence FPL Energy disagrees that there was a performance weakness associated with a failure to recognize an emergency action level entry condition OR a that there was a performance weakness that led to a delay in classification once conditions for a Site Area Emergency (SAE) were met
- The SAE declaration was correct and timely based on the actual scenario conditions. the indications that existed during the exercise, the plant's EALs, and industry accepted guidance for classification The Apparent Violation and preliminary white finding should be withdrawn
Planned Scenario Up To SAE Due t o failure of Reactor Protection System (RPS) t o initiate an automatic scram with a subsequent successful manual scram, an Alert w a s declared Fuel failure due t o power and pressure transient Stuck open Safety Relief Valve (SRV) with a cracked Ta it pipe Containment pressure increases Radiation levels in containment increases Failure of containment isolation valves - Planned T-0
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Actual Scenario Sequence A t 1050, a bag of tools fell from scaffolding and impacted components of t w o valves on piping between Torus and Reactor Building Control Room valve indications were as follows:
- CV4304, Torus Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve, changes from closed to intermediate (greenlred or open/closed) - no alarm
- V43-169, Torus Vacuum Breaker Check Valve, changes from closed to indeterminate (loss of indication or position not known) - no alarm i
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FPL Energy Conclusion The exercise scenario incorrectly stated that the SAE classification T-0 was 1050
- This was the time that the Torus to Reactor Building vacuum breaker valves change state The scenario T-0 and declaration time were not consistent with FPL Energy EALs, NE1 99-02, or FPL Energy's expectation for correct classification The appropriate EAL entry conditions were available at 1057 and recognized a t 1101
- The Control Room and TSC were aware that a radiological release had begun and that the Loss of Containment EALs required assessment
- There was focused effort to determine containment isolation valve status to support EAL assessment
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FPL Energy Conclusion The correct classification w a s made in accordance with FPL Energy EALs
- The valve indications available to the operators at 1050 did not meet the threshold for a Loss of Containment EAL in that indications were not conclusive to determine that a failure of both valves in one line to close existed
- Due t o relocation risk to the public, classification should not be made on a potential release path The classification w a s timely in accordance with guidance of NE1 99-02 I
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Preliminary Results of Cause Analysis FPL Energy reviewed situation:
- The processes as described by EP procedures do not clearly drive the determination of whether a weakness exists in a Risk Significant Planning Standard
- Scenario development guidance does not ensure a quality, reviewed and approved scenario is used t o conduct drills and exercises FPL
Corrective Actions Entered in Corrective Action Program (CAP 44942) on 10119/06 Revised EPDM 1008, Emergency Response Drill and Exercise Program to:
- Provide direction that a CAP shall be initiated for any deviation in ERO performance from the exercise scenario expectations associated with a RSPS
- Change the exercise critique process to be more complete and thorough critiques of ERO performance
Corrective Actions Revised EPDM 1010, E f Deparfmentferformance indicators lpl'sl, to ensure DEP process is completed prior to declaring success or failure of o p po rtunities
- Any evaluation prior to completion of the process shall be clearly marked as
" p reIimina ry "
Summary
- FPL Energy failed to generate a CAP/AR for an unexpected sequence
- FPL Energy identified weaknesses in the scenario development and validation process
- FPL Energy identified that there is a weakness in h o w scenario differences are identified and entered as a CAP/AR
Summary t The Site Area Emergency declaration was correct and timely, based on the actual conditions during the exercise Indications of a pathway to the environment did not exist until 1057 - declarations should not be made based on potential pathways Failure of the simulator crew to identify the failed valves a t 1050 did not lead to a failure to classify t Control Room crew performed well during the scenario t Emergency Response Organization effectively supported Control Room crew and communicated with State and County representatives to protect the health and safety of the public
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