ML19079A244

FEMA - After Action Report for Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise, October 3, 2018

ML19079A244
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	02/05/2019
From:	US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML19079A244 (50)

Text

After Action Report Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Date: October 3, 2018 February 5, 2019

After Action Report Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Date: October 3, 2018 February 5, 2019 FEMA

Radiological Emergency. Preparedness Program

• After Action Report* 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant_

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Radiological Emergency, Pregaredness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Table of Contents Page Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 5 Section 1: Exercise Overview ......................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Exercise Details ............................................................................................................. 7 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership ............................................................................. 7 1.3 Participating Organizations ........................................................................................... 8 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ........................................................................................... 11 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design ....................................................................................... 11 2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives .................................................................. 11 2.3 Exercise Scenario ............................................................................... :......................... 13 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities ............................................................................................... 15 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results ...................................... ;........................... :............... 15 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation .................................................................... 15 3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ............................................. 17 3.3.1 State of Tennessee ........................................................................................... 17 3.3.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center .............................................. 17 3.3 .1.2 Field Coordination Center ............................................................. 19 3.3.1.3 Central Emergency Coordination Center. ...................................... 20 3.3.1.4 Dose Ass*essment ........ :.: ... ::....... ;;.~ ................................................ 21 3.3 .1.5 Radiological Monitoring Coordination Center .............................. 22 3.3.1.6 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams ........................................... 23 3.3.2 Hamilton County ............................................................................................. 24 3.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center .. ;.................................................... 24 3.3.2.2 Hamilton County School District .................................................. 27 3.3.2.3 Reception and Congregate Care Centers ....................................... 28 3.3.3 Bradley County ................................................................................................ 29 3.3.3.1 Emergency Operations Center ....................................................... 29

! 3.3.4 Sequatchie County ........................................................................................... 32 i ' 3.3.4.1 Reception and Congregate Care Center ......................................... 32 3.3.5 Joint Information System/ Center ................................................................... 33 Section 4: Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 35 Appendix A: Exercise Time line ................................................................................................... 37 Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders .................................................................. 39 Appendix C: Exercise Extent of Play Agreement ....................................................................... .41 I

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Radiological Emergency*Preparedness Program .

After Action.Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program*

After Action Report* 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Executive Summary On October 3, 2018, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated a plume-exposure-pathway exercise for the 10-mile emergency planning zone of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The evaluations of out-of-sequence activities conducted June 26-28, 2018, are also included in this report.

The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant is located in Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee, 18 miles north of Chattanooga in Hamilton County. The emergency planning zone encompasses portions of Hamilton and Bradley Counties. The plant is operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in responding to a radiological incident at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. It was conducted in accordance with FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on September 14, 2016. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on June, 1980.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans a,nd procedures and successfully implemented them during the exercise. All jurisdictions met tlieir 1exere:ise obJectives and demonstrated the i I corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report. FEMA did not identify any level 1 or level 2 findings during this exercise.

One highlight of the exercise was Hamilton County's emphasis on monitoring and decontamination of evacuees with access and functional needs as well as companion animals. It was also noted that the coordination and teamwork between state response agencies and the Tennessee Valley Authority was excellent, which contributed to a unified and informed response. These highlights demonstrate the commitment of exercise participants to improve their preparedness.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who planned for and participated in the exercise to make it a success.

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Radiological Emergency Prep~edness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

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Radiological Emergency, Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Section 1: Exercise Overview 1.1 Exercise Details Exercise Name 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Type of Exercise Functional Exercise Exercise Date October 3, 2018 Exercise Off-Scenario/Out-of-Sequence Dates June 26-28, 2018 Locations See the extent-of-play agreements in Appendix C for exercise locations.

Program U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Radiological Emergency Preparedness* Prdgtain * ** * * :

Mission

Response

Scenario Type Full-Participation Plume-Phase Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership John (J.T.) Ackermann Matthew Bradley North Section Chief Emergency Management Specialist FEMA Region IV FEMA Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 Atlanta, Georgia 30341 Tim Holden Kevin Penny

• Program Manager Exercise Officer Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Tennessee Emergency Management Agency 3041 Sidco Drive 3041 Sidco Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204 Nashville, Tennessee 37204

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Scott Schiel Drills and Exercise Program Manager Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37416 ;l L_J 1.3 Participating Organizations Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant exercise.

State Jurisdictions:

State of Tennessee Military Department, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Department of Public Safety Department of Environment and Conserva~ion, Division of Radiological Health; Division of AirPollution .. * ... * * * **

Department of ~ealth a.rid, ~uman Services. ;' .

• Department of Transportation, , - -: ;*, i , , , _:

Department of Agriculture;1Division of Forestry.*,.,, .'.

Tennessee Wildlife Resources.Agency .  : t ./ ~

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Risk Jurisdictions:

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Hamilton County , .,.

Office of Emergency. Management r Chattanooga-Hamilton County Health Department Sheriffs Office Department of Education Public Works City of Chattanooga Chattanooga Police Department Collegedale Police Department Chattanooga Fire Department Tri Community Volunteer Fire Department

• Emergency Medical Services Tax Assessor Disaster Animal Response Team ,

Amateur Radio Tri State Mutual.Aid Erlanger's LIFE FORCE Communications Center University of Tennessee Chattanooga 8

Radiqlogical EmergerieyPreparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Bradley County Emergency Management Agency Sheriffs Department City of Cleveland Police Department Fire and Rescue Emergency Medical Service Department of Education Human Services Health Department Road Department Public Works Cleveland City Schools Auxiliary Communications Services I

Host Jurisdictions , .,. i' _',:** .. ; :\

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". Sequatchie County ' 'I . '

Tennessee Department of Health *, * :, . , *. 1 Sequatchie County Emergency Management Agency Sequatchie County Police :Department **, '*

Dunlap*Police,Department . ' : * , _:

Dunlap Fire Department . * ,,. -'; *.:. ;*.

• Fredonia Volunteer Fire Department Long Oak Volunteer Fire Department Puckett Emergency Medical Service Sequatchie County Health Department Marion County Health Department .

Federal Agencies:

Tennessee Valley Authority U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Private Organizations:

American Red Cross Salvation Army Blue Cross Blue Shield Catholic Health Initiative Memorial Hospital Erlanger Life Force Tenova Healthcare

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 350,351, 352, 353 and 354. 44 CPR 350 codifies sixteen planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for state, tribal, and local governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States nuclear regulatory commission regulations also codify the sixteen planning standards for the licensee. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, tribal, and local government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the REP Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, tribal, and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise, together with review of the radiological emergency response plans, and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, along with supplerrients~ through the 'annual letter *of certification and staff assistance visits, enabled FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that the affected state, tribal, and local plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

Formal submission of the radiological emergency response plans for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV by the State of Tennessee occurred on June 20, 1980. In accordance with 44 CPR 350, formal approval of those procedures was granted on August 7, 1980.

2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items.

Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodology, the exercise objectives meet the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements and encompass the emergency preparedness evaluation areas. The critical tasks to be demonstrated were negotiated with the State of Tennessee and the participating counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

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Radiological, Emergency *Preparedness Pro grant.

After Action Report

• 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Operational Coordination: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the e:xecution of core capabilities, , .;

Situational Assessment: Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information _)

regarding the .µature and. extent of the hazard, any cascading effects,. and the status. of the response.

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Public Information and Warning: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, ,and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible; and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threaLor hazard* and, as appropriate, the actions being taken I and the assistance being made available. I

_,EnvironmentalRespoiis'e/Health:aild: Safety: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure J

the protection ofthe,health and -safet¥'ofthe public and workers, as well as the environment,. fromall'"hazards in support ofrespond_er operations and the affected communities . *.* ., , !:**., '.*..:v* ,.. ',"* ' ... : * :* *

. ' i' On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law*enforcementand.related security and protection operations for people- and communities,located 'within affected areas and also for response personnel

.engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations. * , . * ....

Critical Transportation: Provide transportation (including.infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people *and anima1s, and the delivery of vital response personnel, * ' ..

equipment, and services*info the affected areas.

• Mass Care Services: Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected *.

population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, -evacuee ,- ' l support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.

These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives.

The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

1. Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize response personnel and facilities; provide direction and control, make precautionary and protective action decisions and*implement those decisions.* (Operational Coordination;* On-Scene Security, Protection & Law Enforcement; Critical Transportation)

2. Demonstrate the ability to manage radiological field monitoring teams and *perform plume-phase field me::isurements and analysis. (Situational assessment; Environmental Response/Health & Safety) r '

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report .: 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

• 3: Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt alert and notification system and provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and news media in a timely manner. (Public Information and Warning)

• 4; Demonstrate the ability to receive, monitor, decontaminate, register, and provide for the temporary care of evacuees and emergency workers. (Mass Care) 2.3 Exercise Scenariff .

The following is a brief summary of the scenario developed by the utility to drive

• exercise play. Actual exercise times and*events may,have'differed from those described below.

The exercise begin& at 0800. At 0801, Steaih1Generatoi #3 develops a.tube, leak. By 0804,- the leakage meets the criteria for declaration of an Unusual .Event. The operations crew ,begins, re.actor shutdown procedures .. A~ 0825; there is a steam generator tube.

rupture, which meets the criteria for an Alert based on emergency action level*FAl for loss of the reactor coolant barrier.

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AL0945, Reactor Coolant Pump #2 trips on.a locked rotor.. Parts from the pump enter the

• react01:, causing;fuel damage .. Steam Generator #3 faults;into containment and containment pressure rises. At 0951, the .1 A Containment Spray Pump trips; meeting the criteria for a Site Area Emergency, based on emergency action level FS 1 for potential

• loss of the containment barrier:

At 1015, the containment radiation levels indicate the loss of the fuel dadding barrier, which meets the criteria for a General Emergency based on emergency action level FG 1.

The protective action recommendation is to evacuate two miles around (zones A-1, B-1, C-:1; D-1') and shelter five miles downwind (B-2, -B-5, and C-2). The wind direction is from 328 degrees.

At 103 0, containment will breech into the annulus, with the start of a radiological release.

At 1115, the wind will shift-slightly (from 333 degrees). The protective action recommendation evaluation determines that no additional zones are affected. However, Zone B-2 will no longer be in the downwind sector.

At 1235, the two-mile evacuation time has elapsed, requiring a protective action recommendation evaluation. The updated protective actipn recommendation is to evacuate the affected .downwind zones, at five miles including zones A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, B-5, and C-2 and shelter B-2 (previously in the downwind sector). At 1300, the drill is terminated if ~11 objectives are met., ..

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program AfterAction Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the October 3, 2018, plume-exposure-pathway exercise and out-of-sequence activities of June 26-28, 2018.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of core capabilities and the underlying criteria as delineated in the Federal Emergency Management Agency Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated January 2016. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

• M: Met (no unresolved level 1 or level 2 findings assessed and no unresolved findings from prior exercises)

• 1: Level 1 finding assessed

• 2: Level 2 finding assessed or an unresolved level 2 finding(s) from a prior exercise

• P: Plan issue

• N: Not demonstrated  : i I \ : , , *~ * ( :

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program evaluation methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more critical tasks under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. Core capabilities form the foundation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program evaluations. The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability. Section 3.3 of this report contains each jurisdiction's standalone capability summary.

Operational Coordination: Key leadership personnel from the participating agencies established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure that provided effective and responsive direction and control. The overall decision-making process integrated critical stakeholders, enabling protective actions and subsequent decisions to be made in a sensible manner without undue delay. Some information relevant to decision making, such as the potassium iodide decision and the radiological release, was not clearly communicated to risk counties in a timely manner. This caused confusion for the risk counties, but did not have a significant impact on the response.

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Radiological Emergen.cy_Preparedness Program AfterAction Report .

• 2018 Sequoyah-Nuclear Plant Situational Assessment: State dose assessment personnel *provided decisioJ;]. *makers relevant information regarding radiological and plant conditions. The Radiation Control Officer provided direction to the Division of Radiological Health team members: The 1 team gathered information from changing plant and meteorological conditions to assess the radiological release .. They performed* d0se -projections .and compared their results with utility dose projections and field team readings. This information allowed decision makers to understand the extent of the hazards, their cascading effects, arid to make the

• appropriate protective action decisions. I l, Public Information and Warning: Alert and notification of the public was made using simulated siren activation and Emergency Alert System messages, followed by * :.

supplemental media releases and formal media briefings. Effective coordination among locaLpublic information officers, the state public information group, and the direction and control officer resulted in timelydevelopment;-authorization, and distribution of public inforinatiort, These,processes enabled,a coordinated, prompt, and reliable.information

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• message to be*delivered.tothe publiciand media. ,Some pre-scriptedmessages contained

. outdated emergency instructions.and win require,updating. Route alerting was successfully demonstrated in Hamilton-County~

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Environmental Response/Health and Safety: Field monitoring teams were

• consistently informed of plant status, change in wind direction, and protective action decisions by tlie radiological monitoring *coordination cent~r. *There was excellent cootcl,ination between the Tennessee *Department .of Environment and *Conservatiop personnel.and. the.Tennessee.Valley Authority7Field Monitoring Team Coordinators. All team members were experienced,and worked collectively to ensure'.all tasks,were accomplished.

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement:* Evacuation traffic and access control was discussed with local. law enforcement personnel. They were provided,:

appropriate equipment and instructiorndo effectively implement traffic and access ..,

control. They were knowledgeable of their responsibilities during this. type of in~ident as well as radiological exposure control equipment. .. * * *:

• Critical Transportation: Administrators from Hamilton County Schools validated their I ability to implement protective actions and safeguard students, staff, *and faculty in.the  :

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event of an incident at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant during an out-of-sequence discussion.

School officials were familiar within their plans and. procedures ... Protective actions were

! l well. defined, and there were sufficient transportation assets. available to relocate the J endangered schools.

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'* I Mass Care: Hamilton County and Sequatchie. County demonstrated the ability to provide services and accommodations for evacuees during out-of-sequence activities.

These activities included evacuee reception, radiological-monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees at the Sequatchie County High School, East Lake High School, and the Chattanooga High School Center for Creative Arts reception and 16

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

• congregate care facilities. Capabilities to process contaminated pets and individuals with

, access and functional needs were self-assessed by the response organization to improve

• their ability to serve the communities.

3.3 *Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation 3.3.1* . State of Tennessee.

3.3.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary: '

The Tennessee State pmergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated their ability to manage and coordinate an emergyncy incident involving multiple, state, federal,

• county, .and private stakeholders .. The direction and* control*officer.*established ah*

effective operational structur~ and processes that supported the mission and .objectives.

Staff members were*allo~ed to*prepositiori; however,.a:demonstration was conducted to notify personnel. Staff were observed receiving notifications in atimely'manner. The notification system had the capability to identify those that responded and to continue notifying those that did not. * * *.:. *

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11he.facility had ample space, office equipment~ supplies;,and redundant communications systems to support this type of large-scale emergency Tesponse. A dedicated phone line was the*primarymethod of.communicating with the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant: *.

Conference:bridge lines were used to coordinate with,stakeholders. Multiple backup forms of communications were available if needed.

• The direction. and control officer and the alternate direction and control officer provided multiple briefings to the staff. They,utilized theTennessee Valley Authority liaison during those briefings for technical explanations; and Tetj_uired the individual emergency support function's.leadership to brief their activities. This provided situational awareness to all staff. The direction and control officers utilized a similar method over the coordination conference calls to transfer information to and from the counties, joint information center, field coordination center, and the Tennessee Valley Authority Central Emergency Coordinating Center. .

• The *direction and control officer review~d all emergency classification level changes as they came in. He discussed protective action recommendations with senior and technical staff, and the Tennessee Valley Authority liaison. He then developed a protective action decision and determined what pre-scripted emergency alert system messages would be sent to the public to implement the decisions. He initiated coordination conference calls

• to discuss his decision and requested the risk counties' concurrence. The decision for the general population and emergency workers not to ingest potassium iodide was confusing to focal officials because they did not understand why field teams should take potassium iodide, and not their police officers who may*be in the same area. All other decisions 17

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant were concurred upon, to include timing of siren sounding and the sending of-the Emergency Alert System messages.

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a~l~ 1.c.1, l.d.l, l~e.l, 2.a.l,. 2.b.2.  ;*.. ::

a. . Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not.Demonstrated: *None I

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d. Prior Level 2 Findings c;- Resolved:. :None , *

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• . ,e~. *Prior Level 21Findings -.Unresolved:. None :- *,.*,.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

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• TheTennessee State*Emergehcy Operations Center staff demonstrated the capability to conduct primary alerting and notification' of the .public: Leadership and staff effectively used pre-scripted messages* to coordinate and: distribute state protective action- decisions

• and response action informatio,m-. Emergency Alert System:messages*were coordinated . I by decision line participants and appropriately prepared by the-public information staff in  ! I

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a timely manner. Contact and confirmation with the local primary radio station was simulated. Message transmittals to the radio station and siren system activations were simulated as well.

Tennessee State Emergency'Operations:Center staff demonstrated*the capability to provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. Effective coordination between the state public information group and the direction and control officer: resulted in timely development, authorization, and distribution of accurate public information.

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For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 5.a.l and 5.b.l.

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a. Level 1 Finding: None i i

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b. Level 2 Finding: None

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c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 18

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program AfterAction Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 3.3.1.2 Field Coordination Center.*

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The field coordination center director and his staff successfully demonstrated the, Operational Coordination Core Capability in response to a radiological incident at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant during this exercise. They established and-maintained a unified, coordinated operational structure and process.

The director and his staff were pre-positioned but utilized established plans and procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize key emergency response personnel in order to activate the field coordination center. The director ensured the direction of state resources was in accordance with the standard guidance from the state emergency operation center by communicating with the direction and control officer and coordinating with Hamilton and Bradley Comities.* The staffdemonstrated,knbwledge of procedures and how to implement them.

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The field coordination center was located within the Tennessee Air National Guard facility *and there was sufficient space, equipment~ and supplies to support emergency response operations .. There was.also ample,space:on the grounds to stage requested state and federal resources. There were.redundant1communications available to support

• operations including commercialtelephone,*:cellular phones, internet, incident command software, and ari 800-megahertz radio system., The commercial phones served. as, the primary means of communication with state radio as backup. All communications and conference lines were demonstrated during the exercise, and no failures were observed.

The field coordination center was located inside the emergency planning zone, and the issuance of.dosimetry and potassium iodide to the field coordination staff was simulated.

The extent of play agreement did not call for simulation of dosimetry and *potassium

. iodide issuance: According to procedures, the field cc>'c>rdination center staff should

. receive.dosimetry and potassium iodide before entering the facility ..

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a. l, l.d.1, l.e.l, 3.aJ. *

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 19

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 3.3.1.3 Central Emergency Coordination Center i i Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency and the Division of.Radiological Health of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation provided liaisons to the Tennessee Valley Authority's Central Emergency Control Center in Chattanooga,'

Tennessee. The presence of these liaisons facilitated the essential flow of information

• , *between the Tennessee Valley Authority and the decisions*makers of the respective

' resp*onse organiz~tions operating in the -state emergency operations center. The liaisons followed applicable procedures and performed their respective duties in an efficient and profes_sional manner; this ensured that state and. county decision makers were *kept up to

• .. date with;accurate and timely: information.,. . ,.

The liaisons worked closely with Tennessee Valley Authority personqel to obtain the current plant conditions at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and to provide information on a timely basis to the state emergency operations centet and other emergency response facilities: The -respective liaisons al'so-Jacilitated the:flow *of information to various

. queries* and requests

among the ,utility:and state agencies .. The.Tennessee Emergency Management Agency liaisoll'provided .prompt information to Tennessee Valley Authority

. personnel*regarding roadway conditioris*that might.affect:potential evacuation routes, inchiding the clearing of a notional hazardo'us :materials accident.- The liaison also passed a request from the utility to the state emergency operations center that local faw

• enforcement agencies were to be advised of an imminent evacuation of non-essential site personnel..

The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservationliaison;interacted with utility dose assessment personnel and ensured that-the.timely flow df information ,- I

I including meteorological and *plant conditions, radiological monitoring, and the;results of '

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. dose modeling to the state dose.assessment staff operating at the state emergency operations center. The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation ,liaison also communicated information that allowed state and utility field teams to be effectively coordinated.

The liaisons from both agencies provided timely and substantive information to the state

• emergency operations center.-

For this capability, the following Radiological.Emergency Preparedness criterion was MET: 2.b.l. .

a.. Level 1 Finding: None  : I

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None 20

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After .Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.1.4 Dose Assessment Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

Personnel from the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Radiological Health successfully demonstrated dose,assessment operations at the state

, I emergency operations center in Nashville;* Tennessee. The Division of Radiological Health personnel demonstrated the., ability to provide *staff and assess radiological,.*

meteorological, and plant conditions in response to a radiological incident. The facility and the team had adequate equipment, communications, and supplies to support emergency operations. *. ,: : . ,  :

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The Division of Radiological Health team performed ~ose assessments and made,* .

protective actionrecorrimendations, The;techni'cal advisorand assistant entered meteorological.and*solirce term information:intd the dose.projection software program.

• .The radiation control officer made protectiv.etaction1r~conimendati9ns based on technical informationrecei:ved from*the technical-advisor. The direction and control officer made

. protective action decisions based on information ,supplied from the Division of*

Radiological Health team ..

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• The chief medical officer was responsible for authorizing the ingestion of potassium iodide for emergency workers and the public based on the thyroid committed dose equivalent calculations. The .threshold value for ingestion was not reached in this .

• exercise either by dose projections orby field team results; therefore, there was no

• authorization of potassium iodide ingestion for the g~neral public or emergency workers.

The Division of Radiological Health field teams had a standing order to ingest potassium

• iodide when entering the 10-mile emergency planning zone ..

Throughout the exercise, the Division of Radiological Health team continuously monitored meteorological conditions and plotted the downwind direction and field team locations on the. l 0-mile emergency planning zone map. The Division of Radiological Health team performed dose assessments and compared results to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant dose projections and field team results with acceptable agreement. The Division of Radiological Health team had some difficulty.in* comparing the low state field team plume edge radiation levels and air sampling results with the dose assessment runs. The centerline values reported by the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant field teams were used as validation for the dose assessment runs. The radiation control officer instructed one state field team to obtain a centerline survey and air sample. The survey and sample results were compared with dose projections with acceptable agreement. All dose assessment results calculated during the exercise were less than protective action guidelines.

21

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Repqrt 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant For this capability; the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 2.b:1, 2.b.2. *

a. - Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

.:a. Prior Level .2 ,Findings:...,, Resolved:. None ~-'

' I

' . '1 ....  ; . ** .. "": I

1. )I

e. , Prior Level 2' Findings :- U nresolvecl: .None

' ' l 1 .: *. * -~' * *;: ".! .. '

3~3.1.5 Radiological Monitoring Coordination Center *'

• ! "{

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

'.**i" . .:. ;,j..

' iI The Tennessee Department ofEnvironmerit.and Conservation,Division of Radiological Health successfully demonstrated field team management at the radiological monitoring control center in Chattanooga, Tennessee, in response to the Sequoyah'Nuclear Plant  !

lJ exercise. The radiological monitoring control center was co-located with the field coordination center. The facility had adequate equipment, communications capabilities, and supplies to support emergency operations.  :]

The radiological monitoring control center was located in emergency planning zone  ; 1 sector C-7, and field team management personnel should have been'issued dosimetry and l.J potassium iodide. This equipment was available in the field coordination center and would have been issued in an actual *emergency. It.was noted that the provided direct-reading dosimeters had a range of 0-20 Roentgen and would not accurately measure the lower administrative radiation exposure limit used by the Division of Radiologicah ;1 Health.

' ~ ,: .' . . \

The radiological monitoring coordinator, Division of Radiological Health Coordinator, and the Assistant Division of Radiological Health Coordinator worked as a team to develop a field monitoring strategy and direct the activities of five state *field monitoring teams. The Army National Guard, 45th Civil Support Team had two additional teams available to support field monitoring activities.,* The Division of Radiological Health and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant field team coordination groups worked together to*ensure they could collectively locate the plume, find the plume edges and centerline, and obtain air i l samples for radioactive particulates and iodine.

I I

. )

l u

22 I  :'

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After-Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Throughout the exercise, the field. team management group monitored meteorological conditions and adjusted field team survey strategy based on the changing wind direction.

Field radiation survey measurements were immediately transmitted to the state emergency operations center for use in dose projection calculations and validation of protective actions.

The state field team strategy was to locate plume edges; the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant field teams would traverse the plume and locate the centerlin~.

• In some .cases, combined field team management strategy appeared to be an inefficient use of available resources; three teams were used to locate the close in east edge, west edge and plume centerline. If state teams also traversed the plume, centerline measurements could have been obtained at multiple locations downwind. This strategy*would support more timely and accurate dose projections. In one instance, the ra_diation control officer instructed one state field team to obtain a centerline survey*and air sample,to* allow the state .to accurately compare field measurements with dose projections.

t. * .. f ' * *  !~ . . -~ . . * ,!' *.. '*

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: ;1.a;l, l.d.l;.:1.e:1, 2.a.1,*an:d.4.a.2: . ;,.. , .*., * .. , :

,.,, :__.,: , * ( ~ 'l . . '

y '

a. : Levell.Finding: None* * '":  :*_4,,'*:'. ',;_**

• ' . *: i.  ; I ! :: .

. :* b.* -LeveJ.2.;Finding: None  : \ ;, ,~,

• .. i I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings.- Resolved: None

e.

• PriorLevel:2 Findings - Unresolved:* None 3.3.1.6 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams . *. .

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

The Tennessee Departqient of Environment and Conservation, Division of Radiological

.Health demonstrated the ability to provide guidance and resources for field monitoring teams to obtain appropriate field measurements and samples during a simulated radiological event. Ambient radiation measurements were made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples were collected and properly transferred for analysis.

• The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Radiological Health had effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize radiological field monitoring teams in a timely manner. The field monitoring teams had two communications systems that were successfully used to maintain communications with the radiation monitoring coordinator. Field monitoring team vehicles were equipped with

23. \.

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant installed*radios. One*team's radio was inoperable; however, it had tio impact on.

communications throughout the exercise.

• The field monitoring *teams had adequate equipment, maps~ di~plays; monitoring . 1 - l instruments; dosimetry, potassium iodide, and other supplies. to support emergency. I I

• operations. The Division of Radiological Health issued appropriate dosimetry, potassium

• _J iodide, and procedures, and managed radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically, and at the I

'_J

.end of each i.nission;read their dos.imeters,and recorded the readings on the appropriate

• exposure record. All dosimetry;*survey. instruments, and air samplers were within calibration dates and were. properly checked to verify operation. * * *, . *

.r ',

Ambient radiation measurements were made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate :samples were collected in accordance with procedures. Field

,*: *monitoring teams moved.to an appropriate low backgrciund:locationto determine whether any significant amount ofrndioactivity had been.collected on the sampling media. Each team used appropriate* contamination. controI-proceclures throughout the exercise.

Samples were*packaged,.labeled;and,µandled correctly and delivered to the saniple drop off location at the, end of;the :exercise: i. j . . . ' ' - '.'., . . . . .. ' : '

. '* *I,  :  : . ,,, !,!_i '*

For this capability; the followjng Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were

.~ MET:.- 1.a:1, l.d.1, l.e.1, ~:a~ l; *and*4.a!3.

• 1

• ,~ ,..

I

. I l

a. Level 1 Finding: None* * ,, *,

b. Level 2 Finding: None* **

c. Not Demonstrated: None

• d: Prior Level 2 Findings :.... Resolved:. None

• I I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.2 Hamilton County I

i  !

3.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Hamilton County Office of Emergency Management staff established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that integrated all critical stakeholders. The emergency operations center manager notified and mobilized I  ;

emergency personnel to fully staff the Hamilton County Emergency Operations Center. I  !

1-,

I 24 I I I I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoya,h Nuclear Plant The Hamilton County Emergency Operations Center had multiple means of communications and adequate equipment to support the operation. A dedicated phone line was the primary means of incident notification from the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency. All subsequent notifications were received from the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency liaison located in the emergency .operatim1s,center. A commercial conference line was used for coordination among stakeholders .. Alternate communications included the digital National Warning System, cell phones, commercial phones, email, and 800-MHz radios. No communication failu~es were observed diiring the,exercise. Electronic information boards, maps, and dry erase boards were located throughout the emergency operations.center, making it easy for all personnel .to.maintain situational awareness. The facility had ample space, supplies, and equipment to support 24-hour emergency operations.

• Protective action decisions were provided by theTennessee Emergency Management

• Agency and were concurred upon during* the. ~oordination conference ca!ls by Hamilton County afterconsidering local factors.* Emergency operations center staffimplemented protective actions for emergency workers and the public .. The Harpilton County, ;

radiological officer managed radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with procedures. Radiological equipment such as dosimetry, ,survey meters; .and emergency worker exposure control kits were available for distribution to emergency workers. A radiological safety briefing had been pfepared~to provide a training refresher to all responders. The Hamilton County mass care:emergency support function assessed the evacuation and support needs for individuals with access and functional needs within the county. The Hamilton County access and functional.needs registry database was used to arrange adequate support resources based on the needs of those residents. The Hamilton County Schools representatives took appropriate steps.to safely relocate schoolchildren. Law enforcement representatives coordinated with appropriate agencies to manage traffic and clear impediments to evacuation routes.

All response personnel in the Hamilton County Emergency Operations Center remained aware of incident status and worked together to protect the health and safety of the community.

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.1, l.c.l, l.d.l, l.e.1, 2.a.l, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.l, 3.c.l, 3.c.2, 3.d.l, and 3.d.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: .None.

c. Not Demonstrated: None*

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None 25.

Radiological Emergency Preparedness ~rogram, After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

• e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None*

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: .

Hamilton County emergency management officials successfully demonstrated the ability

• *to furnish prompt, accurate, and reliable information to the public and news media during a simulated radiological event at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. This capability was*

I demonstrated at the Hamilton County Emergency Operations Center. Communications  !

with the public and the media during this exercise was the respo1,1sibility of the 'Hamilton *~ )

County Office of Emergency Management. The emergency operations center manager was assisted in the dissemination of information by the counfy public :information

• representative within the emergency operations center. The county was represented in the joint information center by an additional Hamilton County Public Information i  :

Officer. i J

~ , : . ' :' ( ' ~ *:

Emergency information was distributed from the Hamilton County Emergency , I Operations Center to the public through'the joint information center. . The public I information officer in the emergency operations center coordinated with the public information officer located in the joint information center. News releases were-reviewed . I I and approved by leadership in the emergency operations center prior to being released to I the media. Prior to the establishmet;ttofthe joint:information center,-the Hamilton*

County Public Information Officer developed and issued a local news release to inform

. the public ofa traffic accident-that affected potential-evacuation*routes.* I .J Hamilton County Office of.Emergency Management and Tennessee Emergency I I

I Management Agency personnel effectively demonstrated a simulatedactivatioh1ofthe i siren system for the. 10-mikemergency planning zone.* Activation ofthe*sirens*could be accomplished at the Hamilton County Emergency Communications :center or at the state emergency operations center in Nashville;Tennessee. Hamilton County*also had the capabilityto activatetone-alertradios that had been,placed within certain 'establishµients within the emergency planning .zone; these included schools, licensed day care centers, assisted living facilities, and some major businesses. Activation of the primary notification system during this exercise was performed at the state emergency operations center after coordination on the decision line with Bradley and Hamilton Counties. Siren activations were immediately followed by the release of an Emergency Alert System message that gave clear, concise instructions to the public.

• The Hamilton County Office of Emergency Management, with support from the Hamilton County Sheriffs Office, demonstrated the capability to conduct backup route alerting for residents located in the vicinity of siren # 18 in Hamilton County.

• Personnel from the Hamilton County Office of Emergency Management and the Hamilton County Sheriffs Office were interviewed regarding their responsibilities, duties,: and safety protocols related to back up route alerting. The Hamilton County Radiation Safety 26

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Officer provided radiological and mission safety* briefings to the law enforcement officer which described radiological exposure control and administrative reporting values.

Route alerting was performed using a. police vehicle equipped with a public address system. A pre-scripted message was used to alert the public to tune to media outlets.

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 5.a.l, 5.a.3, and-5.b.l.

a. * *Level 1 Finding: *None b., Level 2 Finding: Non.e.

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

'1 **  : . ',**.::'

e. .Prior Level 2 Findings ., Unresolved: N~ne *: * . .;, .,.: ',', ' -

~ ' ' j' ,* ~

3.3.2.2 Hamilton.County.School District, ~ ' i . , : *J ~I  :* '

.. _;.,.-: .~ .. :;* '*1't " f. -~-~-,.~**:'* ";'

Critical Transportation Capability Summary: , .. * . * ::

,-* :;1. rt,**

Hamilton County Scho0ls staff demonstrated their ability. to implement protective actions for the students and staff of the schools located within the 10-mile emergency planning zone.,. Arn interview was conducted with the district's .manager of safety and compliance

.. :and the transportation supervisor as an out--of-sequence activity on June* 27, 2018 ..

During the.interview, school officials*demonstrated.their knowledge and ability to relocate and safeguard the students. and staff, as .well as notify parents of the 26 schools

. located within the emergency planning zone. School officials were familiar with their

, *plans ,and procedures .. Protective actions were well defined, and.there were sufficient transportation assets available to relocate the -endangered schools.

• .: r For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was MET: 3.c.2. *

a. Level 1 Finding: None ; .

b. Level 2 Finding: None * -*

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved:_ None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 27

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program*

After Action,Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 3.3.2.3 Reception and Congregate Care Centers Mass Care Capability Summary:

Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and sheltering of evacuees was demonstrated out-of-sequence at the Chattanooga High Center for Creative Arts and the East Lake Academy of Pine Arts in Hamilton County, TN. Both reception and congregate care centers were set up with appropriate staff and resources to safely accommodate evacuees.

Chattanooga Fire Department personnel demonstrated the ability to perform radiological monitoring of vehicles and described decontamination procedures if contamination was present. The Hamilton County Health Department established administrative: and

• operational monitoring stations outside the facilities and decontamination areas inside the facilities for evacuees. The American Red Cross of Southeast Tennessee; th~ Hamilton'. ;*

County Department of Human Services, and other local agencies demonstrated their ability to conduct evacuee registration and to establish and maintain a shelter to meet the congregate care needs of evacuees. Personnel from the Hamilton County Office of

.Emergency Management.provided .oversight for both facilities. *.They:also provided all staffwith,refresher training and radiological safety briefings. * . , , '. .* . * . * *

,, .* ,If* *,** . '*. ~ ; ' : : ~. '

• All participants were knowledgeabl~ of their duties and performed the~ in. accordance with *procedures .. Personnel. wore' apprnpriate dosimetry, and were familiar with ,

dosimetry reading and recording requirements. Monitoring .personnel- were. proficient in the use of radiological survey instruments and contamination levels were properly documented. .Personnel demonstrated a good understanding of contamination action levels and .decontamination procedures .. Decontamination supplies wer~ on hand to remove contamination, dispose: of and document contaminated it~ms,' and provide

, temporary garments to evacuees. The sites. were sufficiently sized and had appropriate facilities to accommodate monitoring and decontamination.activities. *Evacuees were processed in a.timely fashion and were provided appropriate information and instructions.

Hamilton County took the exercise a step further to*process contaminated*evayuees with access and functional needs individuals and pets. American Sign Language interpreters were on hand to assist deaf evacuees. The Hamilton County Disaster Animal Response Team volunteers monitored, .decontaminated; and housed pets during the demonstration.

This was a fantastic demonstration .and an excellent example of how to use these exercises to improve capabilities ..

Mass care services were set up in accordance*with county and American Red Cross i I

shelter procedures. The facilities had ample space and reasonable accommodations for the expected evacuee population. The staff and, volunteers were knowledgeable of their duties and displayed a commendable dedication to the health and welfare of the public.

For this capability, the,following,Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were

l 28

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Afte'r Action Report'

• 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant MET: l.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.l, 6.a.l, and 6.c.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: . None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

• d.* Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

• e. . Prior Level 2 Fmdings - Unresolved: None 3.3.3 Bradley County I. :**

3.3.3.1.Emergency Operations'Center *

• I ', 1

Operational Coordination,Capability Summary:

J ~ * ~. .* : * ' } J'.l * ',, I The Cleyeland/Bradley County Emergericy ManagementAgenc:Y staff demonstrated the capability to ensure the safety and health of emergency workers and the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Staffing rosters

• ,.identified key personnel from supporting*county*agencies, and the director demonstrated procedures to alert and mobilize them fo activl:).t_e the emergency operations center in a

• .

• timely manner using an automated calling system~ .,

Communication systems, equipment; and .supplies were sufficient to support operations.

The primary notification system was dedicated phone line from the Tennessee Emergency 'Management Agency. Coordination with other stakeholders was

• :aGcomplished using the coordination conferenc*e calls. Other communications systems 1included the: digital National Warning System, commercial telephones, cell' phones,

. email, 800-megahertz radio systems, and the Tennessee Radio Amateur Communications Service. Electronic displays, maps, and dry erase boards were located throughout the emergency operations centermaking it easy for all personnel to maintain situational awareness.

• The Bradley County Radiological*Officervalidated, through interview and discussion, the ability to manage radiological .exposure to emergency workers in accordance with established plans and procedures. Radiological equipment such as dosimetry, monitors, and emergency worker kits would be issued from the emergency operations center, where emergency worker oriefings*would be conducted to reiterate the process for recording emergency workers radiation exposure levels .. The briefings would also coyer instructions for issuance and ingestion of potassium iodide as directed.

Agency representatives were knowledgeable of appropriate dosimetry, potassium iodide, and procedures to ensure safe radiological exposure of emergency workers. C01:mty 29

Radiological Emergency Preparedness ,Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant health department representative*s were prepared to make potassium iodide available to the public as required. The staff performed effective planning to evacuate persons identified with access or functional needs, and to evacuate schoolchildren 'and staff to safety. Law enforcement representatives provided details on traffic control points, clearing impediments, and the procedures for managing traffic control points.- All agency representatives on the emergency operations center staff were knowledgeable, and effectively used checklists from county plans to ensure the safety of the public* and emergency workers. II

'_j For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I j MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.l, 2.a.l, 2.b.2,-2.c.1, 3.a.l, 3.b.l~ 3.c.l, 3.c.2, 3.d.l, and ;J 3.d.2.

... . ~.

I

a. Level 1 Finding: None j I

• 1 **

• .1,

.b. Level 2 Finding:. None.' .*  :. \ ..

I {"1 ' '"' . ' . '. ~

• , 1 .:* * * , ; '*, '

c. N9t, Demonstrated: *None * , ;* ii , '. .. ',*. . ' ** * . ,i

• ,' . * * ~ 1  !" .:* . ,,) .*.

d.

• Prior.. Level,2 Findings - Resolved:.; None * *: * '.' \ *.*

• ,, '.** *.. . *.  ;:I

,j t ::

e. Prior Level 2 Findings:. U.nresolved:. None

• Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Cleveland/Bradley ,County .Emergency Management Agency staff, through a coordinated effort with the*state and Hamilton County, assisted in alerting anc:l notifying .the public of an incident at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant in a timely manner, relaying the elements required by current guidance. :All*messaging was consistent with the protective action*decisions.

The Cleveland/Bradley County Public Information Officer ensured accurate information was disseminated in the form of news releases and press briefings by coordinating with other public information officers at thejoint .information center. No official coordination or approval was observed at the emergency operations* center; the staff relied upon the county public information officer to represent the county within the joint information :l center. Emergency management staff simulated using social media and an automated emergency messaging system to alert citizens of local actions. The Cleveland/Bradley 'I I

I County Emergency Management Director was responsible for approval of those . ' _I messages prior to their release.

'I Two deputies from the Bradley County Sheriffs Department discussed procedures for backup route alerting and notification. *The deputies validated their ability to manage the I l mission by explaining the entire process in accordance with plans and procedures.

. _)I 30

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action.Report . 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

• For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a.1, 5.a.3, and 5.b.l

)

• . a., Level 1 Finding: None b; Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated:* None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

• . e... . Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: .None On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

The ability to implement traffic and access control, along with the clearance of impediments, was discussed with a Bradley County Sheriffs Department deputy ... The deputy described the process for notification, issuance of exposure control equipment and its use, and duties associated with the mission. The deputy received a thorough radiological emergency safety briefing by the county radiological officer as part of the demonstration. Three forms of communication were available i:ncluding,ail 800-megahertz handheld radio, a vehicle-mounted 800-megahertz radio, and a cell phone.

Each patrol car was equipped with appropriate,emergency equipment to support the m1ss10n.

Officer assignments included specific instructions for each traffic control point and the

. route to the:reception center for the general population*evacuating from that area. The assigned ,personnel would clear impediments to evacuation immediately. If impediment

. removal was outside of their ability, assistance would be requested and coordinated*

.through the county. Organizations available to.assist with impediment removal included contractual wrecker services, public works, and the Tennessee Department of

.Transportation.

For this capability, the following Radiological:Emergen:cy Preparedness criteria were MET:. l.d.l, l.e.l, 3.a.l, 3.d.l, 3.d.2.

a. Level 1 Finding:. None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None

Radiological Emergency.: Preparedness Program*

After ActionReport 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

, I 3.3.4 Sequatchie County 3.3.4.1 Reception and Congregate Care Center Mass Care Capability Summary: ,*

• Staff from the Tennessee Department of Health, as:well as Sequatchie County staff and.*.

volunteers, demonstrated their ability to establish and maintain a reception and congregate care center to provide monitoring, decontamination, and sheltering-for , uI evacuees. The reception and congregate care center had ample space, equipment, and  : *1

.trained personpel to perform the mission. Emergency*workers wore personal protective ' i I

. J equipment and were aware of admiiristrativ_e, limits *in .the* function of ~heir responsibilities.,,.

I I

.J The volunteer firefighters Tesponsible for monitoring and decontaminating vehicles were not available during the. demonstration due t0 real world events. Although the processing of vehicles was demonstrated with .orrhand' personnel, it was unqrganized and not in

• .accordance with :plans.

• Response' plans'.ree::i.uire more.detail of the ,processing of vehicles forcontinuityofoperations: . : .' :* :_,*,, . ,. , ::: ~ .,.

,* - ; ; " . J '; ' : "*

'I , ' I ,*;*

Tennessee Health Department staffmonjtored and decontaminated evacuees.,:Records were created and gathered for each evacuee-arriving at the receptioncentet; .Evacuees were then monitored for contamination using appropriate survey techniques and directed to the correctlocation .. One evacuee was fully decontaminated by taking a shower, which

. is normally.a*simulated activity. The Tennessee Health Department elected .to fully decontaminate the*evacuee in order,to*self-assess their procedures and make*.

improvements where possible: Their commitment to preparedness was .evid~rit during the entire exercise. .

• i I Members of the _American Red Cross of Southeast Tennessee, with the support ofthe Tennessee Department of Human Services and other agencies; demonstrated the , **

registration and care of evacuees at the Sequatchie County High School congregate care center. The facility was*setup in accordance with local-procedures and agreements, and it had ample space and reasonable accommodations for its assigned purpose. Staff were well-trained and versed in their responsibilities in operating the facility. The processes demonstrated were logical.and effective.* The staff and volunteers were knowledgeable in their duties and displayed a commendable dedication to the physical and mental health of the public.

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.e.l, 3.a.l, 3.b.l, 6.a.l, and 6.c.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None ,.. -~,

I

I 32

Radiological Emergency: Preparedness Program After Action Report

• 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None *

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.5 Joint Information System / Center

. \ : . *!

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

t .-

The State of Tennessee.-and the risk counties of.Hamilton and Bradley demonstrated the capability to provide coordinated, prompt; reliable, and actionable emergency information to the public and media in support of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

The joint.information center was activated in a.timely manner'in'accordance*with: .

procedures. Its activation was a.collaborative andjoint .decision between the State of Tennessee and th.e utility. Upon activation~.thejointinformation .center served as the central point of contact for the release and distributioll'"of information to the public 'and media. The facility provided ample space and communication resources to support emergency operations. Primary and backup communications systems were fully

• functional, with:no *failures observed .. Equipment; maps, displays,* and other supplies were

. suffidentto,:support.emergency operations. . . 1 *,, *. :

• The;ability to provide accurate and tiniely emergency information and instructions for the public and the media was successfully. demonstrated; Coordinated news releases were prepared, reviewed, approved, and released .in accordance with plans. Two joint media

,:briefings were conducted*during the exercise. Prior to each media briefing, spokespersons coordinated their messages and determined the order of speakers to prioritize critical emergency information. The spokespersons answered all questions

• asked, of them by mock media and .were able to fully discuss what precautionary and protective actions had been taken by their organizations. Rumor control was a joint operation between the utility and* state. State and utility spokespersons were made aware of the calls received to address trends and rumors during the media briefings if needed.

Media monitoring .was.performed by the utility,at this facility.

For this capability, the.following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was MET: 5..b.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None 33

Radiological Emergency Preparedness .Program*

After Action Report 2018 SequoyahNuclear Plant.

c. Not Demonstrated: None

. d. Prior Level ~ Findings - Resolv~d:, None '**I e.,. _Prio~ Leyel 2 Findings - Unresolved: None  ! j

' I

\ __ J i]

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• I i I I

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34 _J rl

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Aftet Action Report . 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Section 4: Conclusion Overall, the exercise was a success. Officials and representatives from the *state o'fTeimessee, the risk counties of Hamilton and Bradley, Tennessee Valley Authority, and numerous other organizations participated in the exercise. State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. The Federal Emergency Management Agency wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made this exercise a success.

I ,

I 35

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ' I J

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Appendix A: Exercise Timeline

. Emergency *: .;:r:ime :, Tinie Tha't.Notification Was*:Received or A"cticm Was Takeir ...

Classification . ,Utility Hamilton Bradley Joint Level or Event Declared. SEOC Dose FCC RMCC

.. County Countv Information*

Notice of Unusual Event 0814 0816 0824 0828 0825 0823 0825 Alert 0833 0837 0841 0841 0841 0843 0843 Site Area Emergency 0954 0957 1003 1002 1004 1003 1003 1002 General Emergency 1021 1028 1026 1035 1028 1035 1034 1025 Simulated Rad. Release Started 1034 1139 1031 1210 1101 1210 1210 1202 Simulated Rad. Release Ended Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing  :'

Facility Declared Operational 0916 0916 0926 0926 0900 0954 1007 Exercise Terminated 13iO 1315 1314 1314 1302 1304 1312 *"

Declaration of State of Emergency Local

---..-*--*-----... 0841 1055 None -

State 0901

- - 0903*

.*. 1017 0959 Precautionary Actions:

Relocate schools, stop river traffic, restrict air space 1017 .. 1015 1017 1017 1045*

1017 1017 1st Protective Action Decision 1020 1020 1020 1020 1020 Stay tuned, Sound sirens, release EAS messages #7 & #5 1st Siren Activation 1025 1025 1025 1025 1025 1st EAS Message: #7 & #5 1030 1030 1030 1030 1030 2nd Protective Action Decision:

1049 1051 1048 1051 1051 1059*

Evacuate: Al, Bl, Cl, DI; Shelter in place: B2, B5, C2 2nd Siren Activation 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055 2nd EAS Message: #46 Modified & # 103 Modified 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055 Kl Decision I 052 (Field team '

1215 ingested/standing 1215 1228 1216 1216 1215 Field Monitoring Teams Only

.................................... ........... ______________ ..,_,...._ order 0925)

General Public NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA

• Time press release was distributed 37

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program**

After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I

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Radiological Emergertc~. Preparedness Program After Action Report-

• 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders RAC Chair: Randy Hecht Exercise Support: Erin McCarty Section Chief: JT Ackermann Technical Lead: Joe Harworth Regional Coordinator: Jill Leatherman Public Information Lead: Glenda Bryson Site Specialist: Matt Bradley

• Loc~ti_on l Venue . Evalu.ation Team *.

• Core Capability(ies)

State. Qf Tennessee: *Directpr -= Patrick Sheehan .. .. .. .*,, ,,,.

.. . .,*. ~ "-

Walt Cushman*, Lorenzo Operational Coordination, SEOC Lewis, Quintin Ivy Public Information and Warning PJ Nied (ICF)

FCC Robert Nash Operational Coordination CECC John Pelchat (NRC) Situational Assessment Dose Assessment Jill Leatherman Situational Assessment RMCC Marcy Campbell (ICF) Environmental Response/Health & Safety John Wills (ICF), Bart Ray Field Teams (2) Environmental Response/Health & Safety (ICF)

Joint Information Glenda Bryson*, Tom Hegele Public Information and Warning System (ICF) ICF Hamilton County: bi.rector- Chris*i\dains -

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Andrew Seward *, DeShun Operational Coordination, EOC Lowery, Mark Dalton (ICF) Public Information and Warning Route Alerting (OOS) Lorenzo Lewis Public Information and Warning Bradley, Lewis, Lowery, Environmental Response/Health & Safety RCCC (OOS)

Nash, Dolder Mass Care Schools (OOS) DeShun Lowery Critical Transportation

. Bra.d,ley :.County: Dir~ctor..,:. TroY Spence .. . :. *. ** ... *;.. '

Operational Coordination Michael Dolder*, Gerald EOC Public Information and Warning McLemore, Elisabeth Adkins On-Scene Security, Protection and LE Matthew Bradley, Lorenzo Environmental Response/Health and Safety RCCC (OOS) Lewis, DeShun Lowery, Robert Mass Care Nash, Michael Dolder Sequatchie County:

Matthew Bradley, Lorenzo Environmental Response/Health & Safety RCCC (OOS) Lewis, DeShun Lowery, Robert Nash, Michael Dolder Mass Care 39

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant J

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Radiological Emergency'. Preparedness Program*

After Action Report .

• 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Appendix C: Exercise Extent of Play Agreement Exercise Evaluation Criteria Capability: Operational Coordination Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

This capability will be demonstrated at the SEOC, FCC, CECC, Hamilton County and Bradley County EOCs.

Target: Emergency Operations Management Critical Task: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (Criterion l .a. l ).

Participants will be prepositioned in proximity to their assigned response location(s).

Notification ofresponders will be demonstrated in accordance with plans and procedures.

All notifications to acijacentstbies; 'Federal gd~ern'ment agencies and railroads will be simulated and verbalized to evaluators.

Critical Task: Key personnel with leadership roles for the Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654 A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion l .c. l ).

In accordance with plans and procedures.

Critical Task: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (Criterion l .d. l ).

In accordance with plans and procedures.

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion l .e. l).

In accordance with plans and procedures. County SA Vs were completed May J5th 2018.

Target: Protective Action Decision Making 41

Radio.logical Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant *factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure thafan exposure control system, including the use of KI (if appropriate), is in place for EWs including provisions to authorize radiation

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• exposure in excess* of administrative limits or PAGs (Criterion 2.a. l ).

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In accordance with plans and procedures. .J I

. Critical Task: A decision-making process involving consideration ofappropriatefactors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the J recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) (Criterion 2.b.2).

In accordance with plans and procedures at the SEOC and risk counties.

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• . ,Critical Task: Protective* action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons

, * * . with disabilities and 'access/functional *needs *(Criterion 2.c. l ).

_j This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs in accordance with plans

'andpto'cedures. f .:. I,~;,' ',\  ; .. '.',.!~,,; * *~., ;* '

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Critical Task:. OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedutes,;and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.* OROsmaintainappropriate,record-keeping-ofthe administration of KI to EWs (Criterion 3.a.l).

In accordance with plans and procedures from a managemen_t perspectiye., Jssu.anc_e of

• Kl to emergency workers will be explained and completed during out ofsequence activities. * *, * *;.

Critical Task: Kl and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of KI is made*. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained (Criterion 3.b.l).

If applicable this critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from. the management perspective and in accordance with plans and procedures. The issuance of Kl will be simulated Critical Task: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions (Criterion 3 .c. l).

I This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the management  !

perspective and in accordance with plans and procedures by discussion with evaluator as 42 J

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report.

• 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant appropriate. Personal information relative to access .andfunctional needs individuals will not be copied or removed from the EOC by the FEMA evaluation team.

• Critical Task: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools (Criterion*

3.c.2).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the management perspective and in accordance with plans and procedures by discussidn with evaluator as appropriate. **

Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control 'personnel., (Criterion 3.d.l) ..

This.critical task will be demonstrated at.the risk county EOCs from the management perspective and in accordance with plans andprocedures by discussion with evaluator as appropriate.

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Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved {NUREG-0654 J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2). An inject creating an impediment will be created and provided, I '

remaining in place during the evacuation-long,enough that re-routing oftrafficis required and will also result in decision making and coordination of public messaging to communicate alternate. routes of evacuation as, applicable.

This critical task wilZ.be demonstrated at'the risk county EOCs.frotn the management perspective. and in accordance with plans and procedures .by discussion with evaluator as appropriate.

Capability: Situational Assessment Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

This capability will be demonstrated at the SEOC by Dose Assessment.

Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate* coordination; to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of

.. KI, is in place for EWs including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs (Criterion 2.a.l).

In accordance with_ plans and procedures.

Critical Task: Appropriate PARs are based on available information on plant condition, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of

• onsite and offsite environmental conditions{Criterion 2.b:l).

43

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report . 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant In accordance with plans and procedures.

Critical Task: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make P ADs for the general public (including. the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) (Criterion 2.b.2). I 1

_J In accordance with plans and procedures.

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Capability: Public Information and Warning ..

Deliver coordinated, prompt, .reliable, and actionable .information to the whole community through the use of dear; consistent, accessible, and culturally ,and linguistically appropriate methods to effectivel:Y relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken*.and the.assistance being made available. : * , * ,

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This capability*.will be,demonstrated*atthe SEOC, Hamilton County and*Bradley County EOCs \

and Joint Information Center. * ,. -- .:,"** .** I I

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• f - 2 .. ~ i Target: Emergency Notification Critical Task: Activities associ,a,t.~d -~v:i!h :p_t'.imary.**~lerting ~d,J:!ot~fi~.~tion.,of th~.pl;!bliq are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.. The initial .

. instructional message to the public must include, as a minimum, the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance (Timely: The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense

• . *of urgency and without undue delay) (Criterion 5.a.l).,

• Exceptions regarding the activation I sounding of the sirens and EAS messages: Sirens will not be sounded as part of this .exercise; the process and procedures ofsu,ch will be demonstrated up to the point ofactivation. Procedures for EAS messages will be followed but the EAS message will not be released or transmittedfrorri,lby the.SWP.

Exercise EAS messages will not be broadcasted to the public.

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1 i Critical Task: Backup alert.notification of the public is completed within a reasonable I  !

time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system (Criterion 5.a.3).

Backup route alerting will be demonstrated out:of sequence by Hamilton Co. June 27, 2mg *

• Hamilton County and Bradley County participants will discuss backup route *alerting with evaluators during the exercise.

Target: Public Information 44

Radiological Emergency Ereparedness *Program After Action Report. 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Critical Task: Ensure OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner (The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to.disseminate the appropriate , *,

• information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay){Criterion 5.b.l).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the SEOC, risk County EOCs, and Joint Information Center. . .,,__

The Joint Information Center (JIC) personnel, State/locatandTVA; can be pre- * ,

positioned in area. Using a virtual joint information system, public information * ,

management will be demonstrated and provide_,the necessary public messaging-until the

• JIC is activated and made opercltional in accorfiance .with establishedproced1-fres. , .

Locally available State P!Os may be utilized in the JIC to supplement TEMA PIOs.

There will be a minimum*oftwopress conferences that offsite response ,organizations will participate in, providing accurate and pertinent protective action *.information to. the public in accordance to the exercise response and in accordance with plans and procedures. , .. : ** '

• Capability: Environmental,Response/Healthand. Safety*** _. ** . ,

Ensure the availability of guidance ancLresources-to ,address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support' of the respo,nder operations and the affected communities.*

This capability will be demonstrated at the RMCC, by the radiological field monitoring teams and Hamilton County as applicable.

The following tasks will be demonstrated by DRH RMCC:

Critical Task: Field teams (two or more) are managed to obtain sufficient-information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.(Criterion 4.a.2).

' This.critical task-will be*demonstrated at the RMCC*in accordance with plans and procedures. .

• Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, Kl, and other supplies are sufficient to support.emergency operations (Criterion l.e.l).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and Ki may be used.

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, Kl, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically 45

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Radi9logical Emergency Preparedness Program I I After Action Report .

• 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  : I I

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arid at the end of *each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the.*

appropriate exposure record or chart. UROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the :i

• administration of KI to EWs (Criterion 3.a:l). ,

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and Ki may be used Critical Task:* Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate  : I I

,_J locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low-background locatiomto determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling I

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media (Criterion .4.a.3).

• In accordance with plans and procedures. I J

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and I

• * * *. other supplies-are su:fficientto support.emergency operations (Griterion l.e. l ); . :I t_~/

,;_ ! -, :. 'l .'j In accordance with plans and procedures;* A prop for permanent reeorddosimetry and .

KI may be used I[*' ' ~' :_,: : *. :_ ' :, I Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage

, I radiologicalexposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures'. EWs periodically I and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration ofKito EWs (Criterion 3.a.l}. . , ,. , i .\

In accordance with plans and procedures: A prop for. permanent record dosimetry and KI may be used Critical Task: The reception: center facility-has appr9priat~' sp~ce~. acly,quate r~so_ui"c_esr, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees (Criterion 6.a.l). ...

• Radiological monitoring, decontamination and registration facilities for evacuees will be set up in accordance with plans and procedures. The set up and operational checks of radiological monitoring instruments is an evqluative component and will 'be completed with an evaluator. Counties will have one-third ofthe resources available at the facility for this demonstration as necessary to monitor 20% of the population within a 12-hour period

• The remaining two~. thirds of the necessary resources will be demonstrated by the I

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counties providing valid documentation reflecting how/wher.e the equipment and staffwill be procured/stored/respond from.

A *minimum of six evacuees, of which at least one being a female and two ofwhich will be

, , contaminated (simulated) .including the female, be available for monitoring, registration 46

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Radi(?logical Emergency Preparedness Program*

After Action Report . 2018 Sequoyah.Nuclear Plant and decontamination as applicable. A minimum for two evacuee vehicles, one of which will be contaminated (simulated) will be available for monitoring, registration and decontamination as applicable. Simulated contamination will be given*by controller inject.

Physical decontamination of evacuees and vehicles may be simulated and in accordance with plans and procedures. Sequatchie County will physically decontaminate evacuees found to be contaminated;" same in accordance with plans and procedures. , ... ,

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• PPE will be availabfe,and will.be used atthe* controller/evaluator's-discretion., ,

I Hamilton County, Bradley County and Sequatchie County Bradley County-demonstration is for training only.

Capability: Critical Transportation

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I Provide transportation (including infrastructure*.access aµd accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response *personnel, equipment, and seryices into: the affected areas: ,

This core capability will be demonstrated out of sequence on June 27, 2018 by Hamilton County.

'. Critical Task:. OROs/School officials implement protecti:ve*actions_ for schools (Criterion 3..ci2). .,\ ,.

In accordance with plans and procedures by discussion with applicable representatives of the Hamilton County School District out of sequence on June 27, 2018. Location:

Hamilton County Department ofEducation Service. Center, 2501 Dodds Avenue, Chattanooga, TN Capability: . On"'-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in- lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to' support emergency operations (Criterion l .e.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and KI may be used This critical task will be demonstrated on exercise day at the Bradley CountyEOC.

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically 47

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and,record the readings;on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record..,keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (Criterion 3.a.l).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and 1

KI may be used. ' . *:..

• Critical Task: Appropriate traffic.and.access control is established. Accurate 1

instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel (Criterion 3.d.l).

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., .. In,accordance with plans and procedures. *.

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. ;. Critical Task: .Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (Criterion 3.d.2).

!_J In accordance with plans and procedures.

Capability,Mass Care. * * * ,., ; * ,. * * *: . \.,

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Provide life-sustaining .services to .the affe'cted population with a focus on hydration, feeding and sheltering to those who have*the most need as*well *as support for reunifying families. * * ,

Hamilton County, Bradley County and Sequatchie County Bradley County demonstration is for training only.

This core capability will be demonstrated out of sequence by Bradley, Hamilton and Sequatchie Counties. At 5PM CT on Tuesday, June 26th Sequatchie County will demonstrate at Sequatchie County HS and will run water. Bradley County will demonstrate (for training purposes only) at 9AM on Wednesday, June 27th at Ocoee MS. Also at 9AM on June 27th Hamilton County will demonstrate at East Lake Academy; they will not run water. At 9AM on Thursday, June 28th Hamilton County will demonstrate at Chattanooga High School for Creative Arts and will not run water. -,I Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion l.e.l).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and KI may be used.

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage ,-,

radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically I

and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the '_J appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (Criterion 3.a.l).

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report

• 2018 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant In accordance with plans and procedures: A prop for permanent record dosimetry and KI may be used.

Critical Task: KI and appropriate instructions are made available in case a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate*record keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained (Criterion 3.b.l).

In accordance with plans and procedures: *Kl will not be distributed but procedures for distribution will be discussed.

Critical Task: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers,.have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with planning guidelines.

Managers demonstrate the procedures to 'assure that evacuees have been monitored for 1

contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities (Criterion 6.c.l). . .. ,. * , *: ~, . , * *. 1 In accordance with plans and procedures. Each shelter is Red Crossrcertified an,d*a. .:J.: . .'

limited demonstration ofservices will be provided. A valid and current LOA or MOU

• between the county andAmericanRed Cross.,will-be.provi'dedto the evaluation team either prior to the .demonstration or, at the time ofthe demonstration.. 1

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