ML043640251
| ML043640251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/2004 |
| From: | Mark Miller US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Travers W Region 2 Administrator |
| Schneck, D NSIR/DPR/EPD 415-3079 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML043640251 (60) | |
Text
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Region IV 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, GA 30341
-FEMA Final Exercise Report Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority Exercise Date:
Report Date:
June 23, 2004 September 21, 2004 www.fema.gov
U.S. Department ot lomeland Security Office of National Preparedness 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 t ~FEMA September 21, 2004 Mr. William D. Travers Regional Administrator - Rll Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. Travers:
Enclosed is the final report for the June 23, 2004, Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercise. The report addresses the evaluation of the offsite response plans and preparedness for the State of Tennessee and the affected local governments. The 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) includes Hamilton and Bradley Counties. The Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV staff prepared the final exercise report. Copies of the report will be forwarded to the State of Tennessee and FEMA and NRC Headquarters by my staff.
The State of Tennessee and Bradley and Hamilton Counties activated their emergency response staffs. The emergency response organizations included elected officials, state and county employees and volunteers. Some of the exercise activities were conducted during the weeks of May 17 and May 24, 2004. These evaluated activities included protective actions for schools; evacuee monitoring, decontamination, registration and temporary care; and emergency worker monitoring and decontamination. A medical drill for an off-site patient was conducted on April 22, 2004.
The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency has instituted a "meet-me" conference call system between the State and the counties to improve their communication and coordination during events.
This system was used extensively during the exercise and is a valuable addition.
All agreed upon exercise evaluation area criteria were demonstrated. No Deficiencies and only one Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) were identified during the exercise. The ARCA concerned the failure to activate the sirens after making the second protective action decision. The appropriate EAS message was released. We will work with the State of Tennessee to monitor the correction of the ARCA.
Based on the results of the June 23, 2004, exercise and FEMA's review of Tennessee's 2002 and 2003 Annual Letter of Certification the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Tennessee and the affected local jurisdictions, site-specific to the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant, can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable www.fcmagov
II assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. The Title 44 CFR Part 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Tennessee site-specific to the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant, granted on August 7, 1980, will remain in effect.
Should you have any questions, please contact Robert Perdue at 770/220-5464.
Sincerely, I
fa-I Mary Lynne Miller Acting Regional Director Enclosure cc:
Ms. Vanessa E. Quinn, Chief Department of Homeland Security/FE'MA Headquarters Radiological and Emergency Preparedness Branch - NP-TS-RP 500 C Street, SW, Room 202 Washington, D. C. 20472
&i. Timothy J. McGinty, Chiief Inspection and Communications Section (EPPO-A)
(
Emergency Preparedness Project Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 ii
-I
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Region IV 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta. GA 30341 0,-
I t:
CF -
.4IJi&FEMA 1,- ' I Final Exercise Report Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Licensee:
Exercise Date:
Report Date:
Tennessee Valley'Authority
. i June 23, 2004 S.
2 0 i
,~.
September 21, 2004 I
www.fema.gov
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS i
- 1.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
I II.
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................2 III.
EXERCISE OVERVIEW...............................................................................................4 A.
EPZ Description................................
4 B.
Exercise Participants................................
4 C.
Exercise Timeline...............................
5 IV.
EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS.......
7 A.
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2
.7 L
B.
Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated...............................
9
- 1.
STATEOFTENNESSEE.................................
11 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center......................
1..........
I 1.2 Dose Assessment................................
12 L
1.3 Field Coordination Center................................
12
-~
Idi
~ogical Monitoring Control Center.
............................... 13 1.5 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams................................
13 L
1.6 Central Emergency Control Center................................
14 1.7 Joint Information Center................................
14 L
- 2.
RISK JURISDICTIONS................................
15 2.1 BRADLEYCOUNTY................................
15 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center................................
15 2.1.2 Protective Actions for Schools................................
15 2.1.3 Traffic Control Points................................
16
2.2 HAMILTON COUNTY..............................
16 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center.............................. 16 2.2.2 Protective Actions for Schools..............................
17 2.2.3 Reception and Congregate Care..............................
18 2.2.4 Traffic Control Points..............................
18 2.2.5 Emergency UWorker Decontamination............................. 19 2.2.6 Medical Drill..............................
19
- 3.
SUMMARY
OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION...
20 3.1 2004 ARCAs 20 3.1.1 58-04-I.c.1-A-01 State of Tennessee SEOC.20 List of Appendices L
APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.......................................
22 APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALUATORS.......................................
24 L
APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT........................
............... 27 APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO.......................................
28 List of Tables Table I -
Exercise Ti6eline.6 L
L abIEZ -
summary Results Exercise Evaluation.8 L
ii L.
- 1.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
On June 23, 2004, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region IV, conducted a full participation plume exposure pathway exercise in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was conducted in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures. This report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise.
The most recent evaluated exercise was conducted on October 2, 2002. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted in June 1980.
FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals, including volunteers, who participated in this exercise. The State of Tennessee and Bradley and Hamilton Counties, Risk Counties, participated in the exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an assigned L
responsibility for others. Others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. All exercise participants were L
cooperative and worked well fulfilling their duties as part of the team.
During the weeks of May 17 and May 24, 2004 FEMA evaluated out-of-sequence activities in Bradley and Hamilton Counties. The evaluated activities included: protective L.
action for schools; reception and congregate care and emergency worker decontamination.
A medical drill was conducted on April 22, 2004.
L..
The meet-me conference system improved the communication and coordination between the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) and Bradley and Hamilton Counties.
State and local organizations, except where noted, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. No Deficiencies and only one Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) were identified. The ARCA concerned the failure to activate the Sequoyah siren system after the decision to evacuate the "Near Plant Area" and Quadrant B and to shelter-in-place Quadrant C.
1
II.
INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.
FEMA Title 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local government's radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
L Taking the lead in offshite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures developed by State and local governments; Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments; Responding to requests by the NRC pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No.176, September 14, 1993).
L Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
L Department of Commerce Nuclear Regulatory Commission Environmental Protection Agency L.
Department of Energy Department of Health and Human Services Department of Transportation Department of Agriculture
-Department of the Interior, and L-Food and Drug Administration Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region IV Regional Assistance L
Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
2
Formal submission of the Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Response Plan (MJRERP) for the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant to FEMA Region IV by the State of Tennessee was made in May of 1980. Formal approval of the MJRERP was granted on August 7, 1980, under 44 CFR 350.
A joint REP exercise was conducted on June 23, 2004, by FEMA Region IV to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their MJRERP and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant. Out-of-sequence activities were evaluated during the weeks of May 17 and May 24, 2004. The activities included:
protective action for schools, reception and congregate care, and emergency worker decontamination. A medical drill was conducted on April 22, 2004 and is included in this report. The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.
The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal Evaluator L
team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region IV RAC Chairperson and Chief Evaluator and approved by the Regional Director.
L The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980; FEMA-REP Interim Program Manual, August, 2002.
Section III, entitled "Exercise Overview" presents basic information and data relevant to L
the exercise. This section contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities evaluated and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
Section IV, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results" presents summary information on L
the demonstration of applicable exercise criterion at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format.
3
III.
EXERCISE OVERVIEW Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the June 23, 2004 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant.
A.
EPZ Description The Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant, operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), is located on the Tennessee River near the town of Soddy-Daisy in Hamilton County, Tennessee. Portions of Bradley and Hamilton Counties lie within the 1 0-mile EPZ. The major highways are Interstate 75 and Tennessee Highways 27 and 58. Land use is a mix of residential, business, and agricultural.
The population of the 1 0-mile EPZ is approximately 89,000.
B.
Exercise Participants The following State agencies, organizations, and County governments participated in the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercise on June 23, 2004.
STATE OF TENNESSEE Bureau of State Parks Department of Agriculture Department of Environment and Conservation Department of General Services Department of Human Services Department of Mental Health Department of Military Department of Safety Department of Solid Waste Management Department of Transportation Division of Forestry Division of Radiological Health Division of Water Pollution Control
'Public Service Commission Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Wildlife Resource Agency RISK JURISDICTIONS Bradley County Hamilton County 4
PRIVATE/VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS American Red Cross (ARC)
AT&T Bell South C.
Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercise on June 23, 2004.
5
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Table 1. Exercise Timeline DATE AND SITE: June 23, 2004 - Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Classification The Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken Level for Event Declared utility I
l SEOC FCC RMCC CECC JIC BRADLEY COUNTY HAMILTON COUNTY Unusual Event Alert 0928 0939 1001 0928 0952 0954 Site Area Emergency 1023 1032 1036 1023 1032 1037 General Emergency 1132 1140 1142 1142 1132 1136 1151 1148 Simulated Rad. Release Started 1140 1140 1136 1136 1142 1140 1136 1134 Simulated Rad. Release Terminated Facility Declared Operational 1033 1035 1008 1017 1039 0900 0932 Declaration of A local State of Emergency 1100 Exercise Terminated 1409 1410 1415 1410 1440 1411 1412 Early Precautionary Actions:
School relocation 1004 1011 1000 River closing 1009 1010 1011 TARS activated for day cares I
1011 1021 1st Protective Action Decision Activate public notification system I
1015 1015 1015 1st Siren Activation I
1030 1030 1030 1st EAS Message
- 4 - School relocation, notification for buses, stay-tuned message 1030 1030 1031 2nd Protective ActIon Decision:
Evacuate near plant: Al, B1, C1, Di and remainder of Quadrant B 1054 1054 1054 Shelter In place: Quadrant C 2nd Siren Activation 2nd EAS Message
- 58 1100 1100 1101 3rd Protective Action Decision:
Evacuate: Near Plant Area and Quadrants B and C 1159 1151 1151 Shelter in place: Quadrants A and D 3rd Siren Activation 1210 1210 1210 3rd EAS Message
- 72 1210 1210 1211 Ki Administration Decision:
Field Teams take KI 1028 Emergency workers take KI 1040 1051 Public in Quadrants B and C take KI 1141 1151 1151
IV.
EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the June 23, 2004 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the I 0-mile EPZ around the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant.
Each jurisdiction or functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in exercise criteria contained in the Interim REP Manual, dated August 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.
A.
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 The matrix presented in Table 2 presents the status of all exercise criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are identified by number. The demonstration status ofthose criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:
M Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved Deficiency or ARCAs remain from prior exercises)
D Deficiency assessed A
ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)
N Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B) 7
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F1 1.7 Table 2. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: June 23, 2004 - Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant ELEMENT/Sub-Ekement SEOC DOSE CECC RMCC FCC JIC FIELD BRADLEY HAMILTON
.S N T
___ASSM T.
TEAM S COUNTY COUNTY 1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT iSSMT_
TEAMS COUNTY COUNTY I.al. Mobilization M
M M M M
M M M
M I.b.l. Facilities l el t. Direction and Control A
M M M N
M M
M M
I.d.l. Communications Equipment M
M M
.I M M M
M I.e.. Equipment&SuppliestoSupportOperations M
M M
M M
MI N
N
- 2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING 2.a.
- 1.
Ememency Worker Exposure Control M
M M
M 2.b.
- 1.
Rad Aesssment
& PARs & PADs Based on Available Info M
M 2.b.2. Red Assessment and PARs and PADs for the General Public M
M
=
M M
2.c.
- 1.
Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations M
M M
2.d.l. Rad Assessment & Decision Making fo r Ingestion Exposure 2.e.
- 1.
Rod Assessment & Decision Making for Relocation, Re-entry & Retum
- 3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency WorkrControl M
M M
M 3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions M
M M
M 3.e
.1.
Implementation of PADs for Special Populations M
=
=
M M
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools M
M 3.d.I. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control M
M 3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control i NM M
3.e.
- 1.
Implementation of Ingestion Decisions Using Adequate Info I 3.e.2. Implementation of IP Decisions Showing Strategies and Intnructional Materials 3.£1. Implementation of Relocation. Re-enny and Return Decisionsl
- 4. FIELD MEASUREMENT and ANALYSIS 4.a.l. PlumePhaseFieldMeasureent&AnalysisEq uipment I
M 4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management i
M M
4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures M
4.b. 1. Post Plume Field Measurement & Analysis 4.b.2. Laboratory Operations
- 5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFO 5.a.. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification M
=
=_
M M
5.a.2. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification 15-Minute (Fast Breaker)
S.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification M
5.b. 1. Emergency Info and Insttions for the Public and the Media, M
M M
M
- 6. SUPPORT OPERATIONS/FACILITIES I
6.a.1.
Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of Evacuees
=
M 6.b. 1. Monitoring and Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment I
M 6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees M
6.d. 1. Transport and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals M
LG N:M MtD
= Deficiency A = ARCA LEGEND:
M -
Met D =-Dericiency i
A = ARCA
B.
Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction finctional entity, in a jurisdictional results based format. Presented below are the and definitions of terms used in this subsection relative to criterion demonstration status.
Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criterion under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.
Deficiency -Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed durng this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.
Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criterion under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that remain unresolved. Included is a description ofthe ARCA assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise criterion, which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.
Prior ARCAs-Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises which were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.
Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior
--exercises which were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise. The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues which may be discussed in this report.
A Deficiency is defined in FEMA REP Interim Manual as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offiite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."
An ARCA is defined in FEMA REP Interim Manual as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itselW to adversely impact public health and safety."
9
I FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also L
used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.
The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).
Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.
Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.
I Evaluation Area Criterion - A number, letter and number corresponding to the criterion in the FEMA REP Interim Manual.
I Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.
Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.
10
.'L 1
....L
.1 I
II 10
- 1.
STATE OF TENNESSEE-1.1 State Emergency Operations Center State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) personnel fully demonstrated the capability to conduct emergency operations. The SEOC received the emergency notification from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), verified the information, and proceeded to quickly contact, alert, and mobilize personnel to coordinate and complete necessary actions in a L
timely manner. The SEOC Directot periodically announced significant developments and kept the EOC staff informed of events to properly coordinate actions throughout the exercise. Their positive attitude was apparent as the staff worked as a well-trained team L
to provide effective direction and control. Particularly worthy of note was the continuous distribution of messages, press releases, weather reports and other information, as well as the display of the SEOC log to keep EOC personnel fully informed.
- a.
MET: Criteria I.a.1, l.d.l, I.e.l, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.1 and L
5.b. I
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: I.c.l IssueNo: 58-04-I.c.l-A-01 Condition: At 1054 after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency (SAE) and after being informed that plant conditions were degrading, the SEOC Director in coordination with Hamilton and Bradley Counties reached a decision to evacuate the Near Plant Area and Quadrant B and shelter-in-place Quadrant C. The SEOC L
Director told the counties that sirens would be activated at 1100 and the appropriate EAS message (#58) would be broadcasted.-The sirens were not activated. The EAS message was released.
L Possible Cause: SEOC staff did not follow the MJREP. The decision to activate dthe sirens was not communicated to the Operations Officer charged with physically activating the siren system.
Reference:
Evaluation Area l.c.1; NUREG-0654 E.6; MJREP Annex B.I.B.l.c and H.V.B.2 I
Effect: Some members of the public may have missed the emergency instruction to evacuate or shelter-in-place because the sirens were not activated prior to the broadcast of the EAS message concerning the protective action decision (PAD).
Recommendation: Review and revise as necessary implementing procedures to ensure that an individual (position) is assigned the responsibility to communicate decisions to appropriate personnel for implementation.
'11
=-
1 Schedule of Corrective Action: The State will defer the corrective action to the TEMA training section (FNF) to change the program of instruction to reflect a checklist that will not only ensure siren activations followed by EAS messages to the public in a timely manner, but that the difference between "silent tests" and "simulated" siren soundings is only in the mechanics, and both will be treated with the same emphasis with respect to confirmation with the Risk Counties, and with immediate log entry. These steps are a matter of Standard Operating Procedure and need not be reflected in the MJRERPs for Watts bar and Sequoyah.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED:
NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.2 Dose Assessment The dose assessment staff, under the direction of the Division of Radiological Health l
(DRH) Radiation Control Officer, was highly competent and independently calculated dose assessments that closely agreed with those of TVA. The staff worked cooperatively and maintained communications 'with the Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC). Field measurements. from TVA and DRH field teams were appropriately applied to verify previously estimated release information. A visual presentation of the l
projected plume footprint was displayed to aid personnel in protective action decision making. Dose assessment efforts were well integrated into the overall DRH activities which were conducted in an exemplary manner.
- a.
MET: Criteria I.a.1, l.c.1, L.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2 and 3.a.1
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE L
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.3 Field Coordination Center J
The Field Coordination Center's (FCC) primary purpose was to coordinate State and Federal resources in support of local government and to serve as a backup to the SEOC.
The FCC Director did an outstanding job in coordinating and performing his direction and control responsibilities. Emergency Services Coordinators (ESCs) established and maintained continuous contact with their counterparts in the SEOC and exchanged S
12
operational information that resulted in a well-coordinated and planned response.
Briefings were conducted, significant activity logs were maintained and maps were posted, which provided everyone within the FCC a full visual of the operational situation. The FCC staff is commended for their professional attitude and demonstrated ability to assume the lead response role from the State.
- a.
MET: Criteria 1.a.l, 1.c.1, l.d.1 and L.e. 1
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE C.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs-UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.4 Radiological Monitoring Control Center The RMCC was co-located with the FCC. Upon activation, the RMCC successfully demonstrated the ability to direct radiological field monitoring teams (FMT), share field team data with the TVA field team' cooidinator, and promptly forward such data to the dose assessment team at the SEOC. All personnel'were kio'wledgeable and professionally performied their duties.
- a.
MET: Criteria I.a.1, I.c.1, 1.e.1 and 4.a.2
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE e
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:
NONE 1.5 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams Four Radiological Field Monitoring Teams (FMT) successfully demonstrated their capabilities during the exercise. Prior to deployment, team members conducted equipment inventories and instrument checks in accordance with their written procedures. After deployment, the FMTs used their equipment and procedures to effectively make appropriate radiation measurements and collect proper samples for analysis. Team members knew their exposure limits and turn-back values, and were properly equipped.
13
L
- a.
MET: Criteria l.a.1, L.d;1, L.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.2 and 4.a.3 L
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
-L
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE
[
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.6 Central Emergency Control Center The TVA's Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the Corporate Offices,
[
Chattanooga, Tennessee, is an excellent facility for effectively managing and conducting emergency operations. Communications, coordination and the flow of technical information between the utility operator and State officials, both at the CECC and the SEOC, were outstanding. State officials dispatched to the CECC were knowledgeable, well trained, and professionally and efficiently carried out their responsibilities.
- a.
MET: Criteria I.a.1, 1.c.1. 14.d1 and 1.e.l1
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE I
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.7 Joint Information Center The Joint Information Center (JIC), staffed with personnel from the State of Tennessee, Bradley and Hamilton Counties, and TVA, was declared operational at 1039. The TVA and State co-directors effectively managed the JIC. The excellent interaction and coordination between government and utility personnel was reflected in the execution of the JIC plans and procedures.
l Two media briefings and one technical briefing were conducted, and State and county news releases were issued. The Public Inquiry/Rumor Control responded accurately and professionally to all calls from the public.
I 14 I
- a.
MET: Criteria l.a.1, l.c.I, I.d.l, i.e.1 and 5.b.1
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs-UNRESOLVED; NONE
- 2.
RISK JURISDICTIONS 2.1 BRADLEY COUNTY 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center The emergency operations center was 'w'ell staffed and organized. The Bradley County Director of Emergency Management "'raintained direction and control throughout the exercise. Frequent briefings were held with round table input from all agencies represented. Communication bktw"een the State and counties was excellent throughout the exercise.
- a.
MET: Criteria l.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, L.e.l, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 5.a.l, 5.a.3 and 5.b.'I
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS-REQUIRING-CORRECTIVE-ACTION -'NONE -
- d.
NOTIDEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs-UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.2 Protective Actions for Schools On May 18, 2004, Prospect Elementary School successfully demonstrated school relocation procedures through an interview at the Bradley County EOC. Participants in the interview included the Principal of Prospect Elementary School, the Director of Bradley County Emergency Management Agency and a TEMA Area Coordinator. The Principal was knowledgeable of the school relocation plan. Faculty and staff are trained annually on the plan and procedures. Schools are equipped with tone alert radios, buses
.15
are equipped with two-way communications, and. escorting law enforcement personnel I
have radio communications. Teachers and the school resource officer are assigned to ride buses to provide accountability of students.
- a.
MET: Criterion 3.c.2
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE I
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE I
- b.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- c.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs-UNRESOLVED: NONE 1
2.1.3 Traffic Control Points Two deputies from the Bradley County Sheriff's Department were interviewed regarding traffic control point (TCP) procedures at the County EOC. The deputies, when directed Aj by their supervisor, would deploy to the assigned TCP with the appropriate dosimetry and equipment required for the establishment of a TCP. The deputies successfully demonstrated their knowledge of radiological exposure control, establishment of a TCP,
]j and procedures to remove impediments to evacuation.
- a.
MET: Criteria 3.a.1, 3.b;1, 3.d.I and 3.d.2
{L
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE.
- c.
-AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE-
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
-Il
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2 HAMILTON COUNTY 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center
-t The Hamilton County EOC is a spacious, technologically advanced operations center.
The EOC staff was very proactive and used the new WebEOC program to keep all participants informed of their agencies' activities. The Emergency Management Director provided excellent direction and control throughout the exercise. Frequent briefings and feedback kept all agencies aware of the current plant status. The decision-making process 16
2 between the State and the County went smoothly. The County agencies' actions were timely and responsive.
- a.
-MET:
Criteria l.a.l,.c.1, I.d.1, I.e.l, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.l, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 5.aA, 5.a.3 and 5.b. I
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE,
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE,'
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:. NONE' 2.2.2 Protective Actions for Schools Protective actions for schools was successfully demonstrated through an interview with school officials on May 24, 2004, at-the Hamnilton County Emergency Services Building.
The following individuals participated: Assistant Superintendent, Hamilton County Schools; the Principals from Daisy, Harrison and McConnell Elementary Schools, Brown Middle School, Ooltewah High School'and Sequoyah-Technology Center; the Brown Middle School Resource Officer' and the Hamilton' County Emergency Services Director.
School staff receive in-service training on an'annual basis. Each school has an emergency operations plan that addresses alert and notification procedures, and responsibilities and actions to take in the event sheltering or evacuation is directed. Teachers ride the buses to manage and keep track of the students. The County plans to have buses arrive at any of the schools within twenty minutes after the drivers are notified.-The buses are equipped with two-way radios. Buses are escorted by the Hamilton County Sheriffs Department.
The County provides relocation assistance, if needed, to' twenty-six day care centers within the EPZ.
- a.
MET: Criterion 3.c.2
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE e
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 17
2.2.3 Reception and Congregate Care L
Harnilton County successfully demonstrated reception and congregate care at Brainerd, Dalewood, and Chattanooga High Schools on May 19, 2004. The Hamilton County Il Health Department surveyed evacuees, sent contaminated evacuees on a designated path to the showers, and after decontamination they were re-monitored. The radiological monitors recorded the readings on a special form that evacuees carried to the American Red Cross (ARC) registration table in the adjacent congregate care center. The Chattanooga/Hamilton County Chapter. of the ARC properly registered evacuees on ARC forms. The ARC provides feeding, mental health counseling, sleeping, and health services to evacuees. All staff were knowledgeable of their duties and effectively set up the evacuee monitoring and congregate care areas were effectively set-up.
l
- a.
MET: Criteria 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 6.a. 1 and 6.c. I
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE I
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE j
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE
- r.
PRIOR ARCAs-UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.4 Traffic Control Points j
The Sheriffs Department successfully demonstrated its ability to establish and maintain TCPs. The Hamilton County Stanidard Operating Procedure (SOP) identifies the staffed at
-and barricaded roadblocks.- The abilityto identify-and-remoove impediments to evacuation-- -
was demonstrated during exercise play. The Sheriff's Department personnel demonstrated their knowledge of dosimetry and radiological exposure control.
IL
- a.
MET: Criteria 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2 iil
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 1L
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE f
PRIOR ARCAs-UNRESOLVED: NONE 18
2.2.5 Emergency Worker Decontamination The Hamilton County Emergency Management Agency, Tennessee Division of Forestry, the Red Bank Fire Department, the Red Bank Police Department, and the Hamilton County Health Department successfully demonstrated the emergency worker and equipment monitoring and decontamination station at the Red Bank High School on May 20, 2004. Personnel, including!volunteers, were very knowledgeable in the set-up and operation of their equipment and facility. Appropriate dosimetry and monitoring equipment were issued and properly worn by the emergency workers. Monitoring, contamination control and decontamination procedures were appropriate. Individuals were knowledgeable of radiological exposure control.
- a.
MET: Criteria L.e.l, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED:
NONE 2.2.6 Medical Drill On April 22, 2004, the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant medical drill was conducted at the Memorial Hospital. The medical drill scenario involved an individual, who had an accident while leaving a contaminated area.. Hamilton County EMS personnel were dispatched to t ihe accident scene and usmg appropniate cont iniatioWico-ntrol techniques treated-and-prepared the patient for transport to the hospital.. After arriving at the Memorial Hospital, the emergency staff successfully monitored and decontaminated the patient.
- a.
MET: Criteria I.e.1, 3.a.1 and 6.d.1
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCA-UNRESOLVED: NONE 19
- 3.
SUMMARY
OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 3.1 2004 ARCAs 3.1.1 58-04-1.c.1-A-01
- State of Tennessee SEOC Condition
- At 1054 after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency (SAE) and after being informed that plant conditions were degrading, the SEOC Director in coordination with Hamilton and Bradley Counties reached a decision to evacuate the Near Plant Area and Quadrant B and shelter-in-place Quadrant C. The SEOC Director told the counties that sirens would be activated at 1100 and the appropriate EAS message (#58) would be broadcasted. The sirens were not activated. The EAS message was released.
Possible Cause: SEOC staff did not follow the MJREP. The decision to activate the sirens was not communicated to the Operations Officer charged with physically activating the siren system.
Reference:
Evaluation Area l.c.l; NUREG-0654 E.6; MJREP Annex B.I.B.L.c and H.V.B.2 Effect: Some members of the public may have miis§edhe emergency instructiiio1fo6 -
evacuate or shelter-in-place because the sirens were not activated prior to the broadcast of the EAS message concerning the protective action decision (PAD).
Recommendation: Review and revise as necessary implementing procedures to ensure that an individual (position) is assigned the responsibility to communicate decisions to appropriate personnel for implementation.
Schedule of Corrective Action: The State will defer the corrective action to the TEMA training section (FNF) to change the program of instruction to reflect a checklist that will not only ensure siren activations 20
.1 followed by EAS messages to the public in a timely manner, but that the difference between "silent tests" and "simulated" siren soundings is only in the mechanics, and both A
will be treated with the same emphasis with respect to confirmation with the Risk Counties, and with immediate log entry.
These steps are a matter of Standard Operating Procedure and need not be reflected in the MJRERPs for Watts bar and Sequoyah.
21L a
aU 3
L
.1 21
APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations, which may have been used in this report.
ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action CECC Central Emergency Control Center CFR Code of Federal Regulations DHS/FEMA Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency Division of Radiological Health DRH EAS EEM EMA EMS EOC EPA EPZ ESC Emergency Alert System Exercise Evaluation Methodology Emergency Management Agency Emergency Medical Services Emergency Operations Center Environmental Protection Agency Emergency Planning Zone Emergency Support Coordinator FCC FMT Field Coordination Center Field Monitoring Team GE---
General Emergency------- -----*-*-
ICF ICF Consulting, Inc.
JIC Joint Information Center KI Potassium Iodide MJRERP Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Response Plan NRC NUREG-0654 Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, November 1980 ORO Offsite Response Organization 22
PAD Protective Action Decision PAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Information Officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RCO Radiation Control Officer REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan RMCC Radiological Monitoring Control Center SAE Site Area Emergency SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SOP Standard Operating Procedures SQN Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant TCP Traffic Control Point TEMA Tennessee Emergency Management Agency TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TVA Tennessee Valley Authority 23
I.I LL L
I L L
L L
L L
L L
L L
APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercise on June 23, 2004. The organization represented by each evaluator is indicated below.
DHS-FEMA - Department of Homeland Security
- Federal Emergency Management Agency EPA
- Environmental Protection Agency ICF
- ICF Consulting Incorporated NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission Thomas E. Reynolds Co-RAC Chairman EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Chief Evaluator Robert Perdue DHS-FEMA STATE OF TENNESSEE SEOC Lawrence Robertson DHS-FEMA Michael Dolder Jim McClannahan Central Emergency Control Center Robert Trojanowski Forward Coordinating Center Stan Copeland RMCC _
Keith Earnshaw Lloyd Gennerette Dose Assessment Charles Phillips Amy Moss Gary Parker FMT #1 James Hickey FMT #2 Carol Herzenberg FMT #3 Marcy Campbell FMT#4 Dave Stuenkel Joint Information Center Daniel Inman Frank Stead 24 DHS-FEMA 1CF NRC DHS-FEMA ICF EPA ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF
BRADLEY COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Helen Wilgus Beth Massey Ernie Boaze DHS-FEMA DHS-FEMA ICF Traffic Control Points Ernie Boaze ICF HAMILTON COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Traffic Control Points Tom Reynolds Candace Burrell DHS-FEMA DHS-FEMA Candace Burrell DHS-FEMA Out of Sequence Activities Schools May 18 1300 - Prospect Elementary Tom Reynolds DHS-FEMA May 24 Daisy Elementary McConnell Elementary Brown Middle Harrison Elementary Robert Perdue Robert Perdue Charles Zeppenfeld Beth Massey DHS-FEMA DHS-FEMA ICF DHS-FEMA L
L May 25 0930 - Ooltewah High 100- Sequoyah Vocational Robert Perdue DHS-FEMA Charles Zeppenfeld ICF_
Beth Massey DHS-FEMA Emergency Worker Decontamination - May 20 May20 1000 Red Bank High School Robert Perdue Tom Reynolds Beth Massey DHS-FEMA DHS-FEMA DHS-FEMA Shelters (Reception and Congregate Care)
May19 0900 - Brainerd High Robert Perdue Tom Reynolds Beth Massey DHS-FEMA DHS-FEMA DHS-FEMA
- - 25
1030 - Dalewood High 1300 - Chattanooga High Robert Perdue Beth Massey Robert Perdue Beth Massey DHS-FEMA DHS-FEMA DHS-FEMA DHS-FEMA I
I 1
1 1
1 1
1 A
1 AI I
I
'I 26
APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix lists the exercise criteria scheduled for demonstration in the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercise on June 23, 2004 and the extent-of-play agreement approved by FEMA Region IV.
A.
Exercise Criterion Attached are the specific radiological emergency preparedness criteria scheduled for demonstration during this exercise.
B.
Extent-of-Play Agreement The Extent-of-Play Agreement on the following pages was submitted by Tennessee and was approved by FEMA Region IV.
27
I I:
Mr:i1tr:. -FEMA1
- \\prIil _ '. 200(4 l1lieL'rgen Nhinaucmeien IPllainer lixed N uclear lFacilities Tenn essee lrinierteniicv Nlanaeement A\\tteiic Mlilitary ID)epartlent olI lnnessee 3041 Sidco D)rive Nashville. Tennessee 37'204i-i502 I)ear Mir. Lima:
The lExtent ol P'lav aureemient tl;r the ()(04 1111 PIIIrticipalt iolln Sequo.yah Ncldear PoIcr PIlan1t exercise hlas been accepted "jibh the l;llowing clarilicati(o:
ITraltie ontrol lPoints in l3radlve and I laiihon cOunties %%ill be demonstriaIted during the exercise at a 1uLtiuIIally niereed timie between the emergency nianag-,ers in (lie respective couLmies and the FENIA [O.1()C evalualtors.
Should you have questions, please contact me at 770-2210-5464.
Sincerel v.
Rober 1. Ier.due Iechnno!t'ii;cal Serjces Branchi cc: Tim Hlolden ITennessee Emercgency Nlannoement Agency Mlifitary Department ot rrennessec 3041 Sidco Drive Nashville. Tennessee 37204-1 502 m %% d l ;l. *,,(,
THE STATE OF TENNESSEE TENNESSEE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF LTNNESSEE 3041 SIDCO DRIVE. P.O. BOX 41502 NASIVILLE. TENNESSEE 37204-1502 (615) 741-0001 February 23, 2004 Mr. Robert E. Perdue Emergency Management Spccialist Radiological Preparedness FEMA Region IV 3003 Chamblee - Tucker Road Atlanta, 03341
Dear Dr. Perdue:
I forward to you the Extent-of-play (EOP) and matrix for approval for Sequoyah '04 (Graded Evaluation), scheduled for June 23, 2004. For any questions pertaining to the EOP and/or the Exercise Scenario, please feel free to contact me at 615 741-4503.
ThaRnk you for your response to this request.
GlbtN. Lima EM Planner, FNF Enclosurc L
L L
L
1-C--(
17-W F7 F-r-
F -
17 F-I -
I I
Table 2.
Summary Results of Exercisc Evaluation ELEM NNIr/Sui)-F.lement SitX RMC I cc l
ii 1.11:
II.
1.1.1) 1 IRAI)II hY IIANILMN I
1 iI AMs C C 't IN COt IN I
- 1. EME:RIME.MWOP(ItRA
%GEN>;M~
li:IE:NTI7 I a I Mohilteauon X
N X
j N
X ILh I I::l 11CltaS X
X X
N X
Nf l
X I c I I)rectlon and Contrnl X
X X
X X
I X
I x
I d l. Commnications Ituiptmnt X
_X X
X X
N I
X I e.
l EqiuprmnC &! upito to Suppo.peritions X
X X
.X N
\\
X X
X
- 2. I'RlECTIVF..w(rlON IDECISION MAIKIN(i
=
2 a I Ftim r!enCev Worker l:\\inII Controt N
X X
X X
' h I ad Awsvenent & PAIs &: PAI') lased onmAw:iahle Into X
X
' h '
Rad AXSsvsnnt and l'As
-and l'AOls lir the (ieival 1'ohic XN 2 c I. I'roicti n Action IXc osion %
lIir Srp cial P'otpula mins
=N
=
XX 2 d 1 Rtd,1W.
Assment & IXcision Making fvr Ingetmon Lxpo'urc
' c I Rad A.smenint &
s IXcision Making Ibr Pethxation. Re-enty &
Rettim J. IR( ITE:-rI E A(3I()N IMPI'I.:NT1AT1I(X-3aI trIcmplanitaon o1I ThfwrL'co Worker Conirot N
N N
X__
X_
X_
XiX t1 It Imptmnentation ol'KI I cisions N
X X
N X
3 c. I mplemninalton oli'Al)s for Spc Ial I'opoitin
__l_
I X
X 3, 2 timpletmpnatton OlAI)% Im Schiiot 3 d 1.ImplrInenvnation ot 'rratic andJ Access Control N____
3 d 2. Impediments to acuattion and I rflic and Access Control X
l_
X 3 c I. Implenw-manlon nt Ingotion Dcismont I Jsmre,dequlate hlh I
i 3 C.'.
tmpWmentation ot 11' D)ecisnM1a Shomlng Strakegsts and Ininictiontal Maaterm I
I I 1 Implementation ol'Relchation. Re-enin :nd IReitrn t )ecisioos J. Fl~
l) iIASt RF.MEN-I miii A SAI.A Dll i
4 a I l'lume l'hase hield Weasureawnt & Anwlhtss lEuinpont X
N i
X 4 a 2. '11tini I'haw Field -leasirenvnt & Anaila MaXvi N
4 a 3 I'ttitc 11hase FictlJ hMeastireients & Anamsss l'rccdutres X
i i
i X
4 h I loqt li'lme lield Measurement &t Anatlvw 4 hi 2. 1 atiratorv 1 tpera~tonm 4
4 4 a I Actinatimn of l'rompt Alen and Notiltcation X
X j
X l
5 a 2. Acitintono ilPrompt Alen and Notlitiation IS-MInlte it llreakerl II____
4a 3 Acination ol l'Prompt Alen and Nolitictaton llackup Atll and Notification
_i i
I I
I s II ttfrecuv tImt :ad Inir Iun' tot IIW I'Khtc MMd thU %Itedl:i X
N t\\
I X
- 6. St Ii lR
'F:ttAtt()S*A(II.IIIES l_i I _
I a I Montoring:ind alcon fi'Lauciesi and l:WVsand oKrattion oi X
1 X
N EBaclices I
_Ill W
n I I. MWnttortnga ad I )econ ollicnrccnVw Workert inl im I
Il ov remrir
';r t-l N
n d I I ranqrxn and I re.itmcnt olrConiainimited Inltlred IndoIdtuI%
X.
DATE ANI) SITE: June 23, 2004 - Sequoahli Nuclear Power Plant LEGEND:
N= N=ekt A = ARCA z I) = I)clDficic y X I)eoisirliot Rqittred
THE STATE OF TENNESSEE TENNESSEE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE 3041 SIDCO DRIVE. P.O. BOX 41502 NASHVILLE. TENNESSEE 37204-1502 (615) 741-0001 2004 Sequoyahl Nuclear Plant GRADED EVALUATION STATE OlF TEN N ESSEE-l'LUMIEI EXIPOSURE IPATIINN'A' ZOINE (10-MiLE EPZ)
GOALS, CRITERIA, AND) EXTENT-OF-ILAY' A lull participation exercise will be conducted during the week of June 23, 2004 for the purpose of demonstrating, an integrated radiological emergency response capability tor tlhe Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN).
The exercise will be a one-day event (approximately S hours).
encompassing response capabilities and reqtirements of tie State, local governmcnlts. and thle Tennessee Valley Authority (T%'A) in the 10-M~ile Emer-gency Planning Zone (EPZ.)
The State of Tennessee and Tennessee Valley Autihority have prepared goals addressing respective obligations.
Both reflect the necessary interactions between the State and local i"overniments as well as thle utility as set forth in tile Multi-JUrisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MIJRERP) Ibr tile Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The six (6) evaluation areas coupled witi specific criteria to acconliplisl tih otollowing-goals hlave been written in-accordance Wiitil-tli-h Federal Emergency Ni anagement Agency (FEMA) Federal Register Notice, "Radiological Enmergencly Preparedness: Exercise Evaluiation Methodology."
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXERCISE GOALS:
State and local government goals for this exercise are:
I1.
Test as well as evaltiate the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Multi-jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan concurrently with local government impicnmienting procedures
- 2.
Demonstrate and assess the continued viability of tile integrated radiological emergency response efforl through state alnd local government olfsite personnel implementing respoiise actions in accordance with established guidancc
- 3.
Ensure the safety of thle general public through the issuance of protectivc action recommendations, as appropriate.
SQN'04 Page1I April 20. 2004
- 4. Ensure all agencies' capabilities anid inadequacies ure noted and corrected as well as pertinelnt recommendations for improvement implemented.
- 5. Out-of-sequence evaluated criteria can be re-demionstrated as all option.
Evaluation Area I - Emergency Operations MaIiaagemienit L.a.
Mobilization Criterion l.a.l: 01fsile Response Organizations (OROs) should use cffective procedures to alert, notily, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely mianner (NUREG-0654, A.4A
).3, 4: F.l ; 1H.4.)
EXTENT-O F-PLAY-The State EmeruLency Operations Center (S EOC) wvill receive the emergency notification from the Tennessee \\'alley Autihorit) (TVA),
verify tile loltification:, and contact, alert, and mobilize key personnel in a timely manner. Notification to adjacent states wvill also be demonstrated at the SEOC in accordance with the lappropriate notification checklist as contained in tile Sequoyalh MtJRERP. Facilitics will be considered operational at START EX with assigned personnel lo [lie SEOC, Field Coordination Center (FCC). Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RNICC) pre-positioned and in place no later thaln 9:00 AMI Eastern/8:00 AMI Central (to include field monitoring teamis.) Risk Coun1tx (Bradley and Ilamilton) Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) will be pre-positioned and in-place no later than.9:30 AM Eastern8:30 ANM Central time.
The Risk County EMIA Directors will discuss with evaluiators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs.
The Joint Information Center (JIC) personnel. State/local and TVA, wvill process through SECURITY SCREENING at 9:00 AM Eastern time, be pre-positioned and in place no later thanl 9:30 AM Eastemr time and remaill in place. The SEOC,
- _FCC, RNICC. and Risk Coutty EOC assigned personnelwill remaimon duty until END EX.
I.b.
Facilities Criterion I.b.l:
Facilities are suflicienit to support the emergiency response (NUREG-0654, 11.3.)
EXTENT-OF-PLAY The SEOC, FCC. RMCC, JIC, and Risk Coulity EOCs (Bradley aid Hamilton) will be set upl in accordance with established plalls and procedures and remain fully operational during tile course of the exercise.
I.e.
Direction and Control Criterion I.c.l:
Key personnel witl. lcadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of tile overall resprone effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654, A.l.d; A.,2.a, b.)
SON'04 Page 2 April 20, 2004
EXTENT-OF-PlLAY -- The SEOC D;rector will assume primary responsibility for direction and control; working in concert with the FCC, JIC, and Risk County EOC Directors.
t I.d.
Com11muLnications Equipment Criterion I.d. I: At least two communicaltions systems, are available, at least one i
operates properly, and communications links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of ecmer-lgency operations (NUREG-0654, 1.1, 2.)
1 EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The SEOC, FCC/RNICC. and Risk County EOCs will demonstrate primary and alternate communicat ions systems at START EX. The communications network between tile DRII Field tealns and RNICC and tile RNICC and SEOC/CECC will be evaluated at tile RNICC.
j ILe.
Equipment and Supplies to Sutpport Operations Criterion I.e.l: Equilpment, maps;' displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (K!).
and other supplies are sufficient to support enlergency operalimis (NUREG-0654,
[1.7, 10; J.lOa, b,,e; J.l I; K.3.a.)
J EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Thle SEOC. FCC, RNICC, JIC, and Risk County EOCs (Bradley and Hlamilton) will be set up in acccordance with established plans and procedures.
Evaluation Area 2 - ProtectiveAction Decision Makin-2.a.
Emergency Worker Exposture Control
_ Criterion 2.a.I:
OROs use a decisionmiakingppcc,7 ess,_-o-isiderinl-rlcvaait_
tflctors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation cxposurc in excess of administrative limits or protective action iuides (NUREG-0654. K.4; J.10.e. f.)
EXTENT-OF-PLAN' - Demonstration will be scenario driven and accomplished by Dose Assessment, the Chief Medical Officer and tile Director of Emergency Operations in tIle SEOC. (See Criterion 2.b.2, STATE EXTENT1OF PLAY) 2.b.
Radiological assessmnit altnd Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for tile Plume Phase of the Emergency:
Criterion 2.b.l:. Appropriate protective action recommendations are based oln available information and plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions (NUREG-0654, 1.8, 10 and Supplement 3.)
SQN '04 Page 3 April 20, 2004
EXTENT-OI-PLAY - Demonstration will bl 'sccnatio driven and accomplished by appropriate s'taff in the' SEOC. RMCCand CECC. Div'ision of Radiological Healtih (DRH) personnel at the SEOC. in concert with TVA counterparts in the CECC, will perform dose assessment and independently validate dose projections.
Radiological data for the field teamns will be inserted by Controller injects and sent to the SEOC via the RMCC. Projections will be based on plant data provided by TVA and field radiation measurements.
Criterion 2.b.2:
.A decisionl-ma171k ing process involving consideration of appropriate t'actors and mwcssry'crdinatioii is used -to make protective aclion decisions (PAD) flor tile gucneral public (including the recommendation lor the use of Ki, it ORO policy (NUREG-.;0654,'J.9, IlOf, hi.)
EXTENI-O F-PILAY - DDenQinstratiion *ill be scenario driven and accomplished by appropriate staff in the. SEOC;. The Chidf Medical Offlicer for the Tennessee Department of Health, after consultation with DRII, will make all decisions concerning tile administration of. KlI-tonemergericy vorkers institutionalized persons' and tile general public. W\\'hen a decision is made, instructions will be relayed through1 tilc local EQCs and if the general population is include d distribution of KI to shelters will be. simulated. Prior to implementation. decisions will be coordinated in a timely manniair with the Risk Count) EOC Directors to L
ensure utiderstaniding/iilielmieiniltationi.
2.c.
Protection Action Deqisions Co'nsideriltion for thie Protection of Special L
.Populations:
Criterion 2.c. 1: IProtectjgc kigtioll decisions are liia l. as appropriate. for special L
population groups (NUREG-0654, J.9. I(.d. e.)
EXTENT-OF-P;-lLAY - Demonstration of thiis process by appropriate staff: i.e.,
L DRH. ENS, TEMIA. etc.. in tlhe State E nier-uecy Operations-Center_ ill-be---
scenario driven and based on 'projected exposure. Decisions. ill be coordinated throunh affected Risk County EOCs for uniderstanding and implementation. Lists L
of tile special needs as well as the resources. necessary and available for evacuation are maintained by local EMA Directors and when requested, will be provided to tile evaluator for review.
Organizational procedures for executing}
L protective actionlls Will be discussed with dvaltiators. Contact with the Public ScIhool Systemi will be actual. (See Criterion 3.c.2/6.c.l)I 2.d.
Radiological Assessnienit
.and Decision-Makling for tile Ingestion Exposure Pathway:
L Critciion 2.d. I:
Radiological consequiences for the ingestion pathway are assessed andappropriatc protective action decisionis are made based on the ORO
- planiniigi criteria (NUREG-0654, 1.8; J.lI.)
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not aimlicable for this exercise.
SQN'04 Page 4 April 20. 2004
2.e.
Radiological Assessilment and Decision-N lakling Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return:
Criterion 2.e.l: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and I
coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of tile radiolotical conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures (NUREG-0654, A.I.b; 1.10;
]Jj 1.l1.)
EXTENT-OF-PLA'Y' - Not applaicable for this exe'rcise.
Evaluatioin Area 3 - I'rotectivction Imiilemnitation.
3.a.
Implementation ol Emergency \\Worker Exposure Control:
Criterion 3.a.1:
The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry anld procedures, *id a
m1llanle radiological exlposure to emergency workers in accordance with tile plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at tile end ot each mission read their dosimeters and record tile readings on tile appropriate exposure record or chart (NUUREG-0654, K.3.a, b.)
.EXTENT-OF-i'LAN' - Emergency workers with assigznments in the 10-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological mollitoring andlor decontaimnation are issued Emergency Worker Dosimetry Kits. Two (2) emiergency workers in each of the Risk County EOCs (Bradley and Hamilton)' will be available to evaluators for I
interview as to kilowledge of recordinlg dosimetry readings and actions to be taken
%%hen certain planned thresholds ale reached, 6spcially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeded.
3.b.
Implementation of KI Decision:
j
__Criterion-3.b.l;.-Kl. antid-.pproprialte instructions are available should-a-decisiolltto recommend use of KI be nmade. Appropriate record keeping of thle administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general 11 public) is maintained (NUREG-0654. E.7: J. l0.e, f.)
EXTENT-OF-PLAY Demonstration by appropriate staff in the State 1
Emergency Operations Center will be: scenario driven and based oln projected exposure. The Chief Medical Oflicer for the Tennessee Department of Health is located at the SEOC and, after consultation with DRI, wvill make all decisions 11 concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons and the general public. When a decision is mnaide, instructions will be relayed through tile local EOCs and, if tile general population is included.
distribution of KI to shelters wvill be simulated. The Chief Medical Officer and other appropriate staff in the SEOC will be available for procedura discussions with evaluators.
SQN '04 Page 5 April 20, 2004
3.c.
Implementation of Protective Actions lor Slpecial Populations:
Criterion 3.c. 1:
Protective action decisio ns are iliplemented for special population groups withini areas subject to protective actions (NUREG-0654, J.10.c,d, g.)
EXTENT-O1-PLAY 7' Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff in tile SEOC and local EOCs' will be' scenario driven and based on projected contamination exposure levels. Decisions will be coordinated through affected local EOCs for understanding and implementaition.
(See Sub-paragraph 2.c.l)
Implenieiltation of protective actions and contact ithl the special populations/reception centers wvill be simulated however, procedural discussions between alppropriate stalt in tile Slate/Risk-County EOCs and tile evaluators will be conducted, and actual contact miade xvith at least one (1) government/private transportation asset.
Criterion 3.c.2: OROsischool officia!s imniplement protective actions for schools (NUREG-0654. J.10.c, d,-s)-
.g EXTENT-OF-PLAY Counlty skhboof superinte'ndents and transportation supervisors or designees xvill be available at respective EOCS for interviewvs by evaluiators.
For. the pu-pose of ascertaiiing' staiftf knowledge of relocation plans and procedures; aqn out-of-sequence interview with tile followiine school principal/staff wvill be conducted, but contact by telephone iith the school will occur during tile Exercise L
I ENDANGERED.
LOCATON-s' DATE SCHOOL._..__..,___-
Prospect Elementary Cleveland, TN May 18, 2004 School 1:00 PMI Daisy Elementary Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee May 24, 2004
-School
-1 000-AMI McConnell Elementary.
McConnell, Tennessee May 24, 2004 School 1130 AM Brown Middle School Chattanoonzi, Temncn'see Msay 24, 2004 1:30 PM Harrison Elementary Harrison, Tennessee May 24, 2004 School 2:45 PMI
.Ooltcwvali Higth School Ooltewvah, Tenncssce May 25, 2004
_. 9:30 ANM Sequoyalh Vocational Chattanooga, Tennessee May 25, 2004 School I
1 1:00 An NOTE: Evaluator escort to each school location ill be provided by the Hamilton County EOC.
SON'04 Page 6 April 20. 2004
"I 3.d.
Imiplemientation of Trallie and Access Control:
Criterion 3.d. 1: Appropriate traffic and access. control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel (NUREG-0654, I
J. I.g. j)
EXTEN'r-OF-l'LAY' - Deployment of tralfic and access control personnel will be sinimilatedI however, two (2) Emergency Workers tasked with perlorming such dLItiCS will be interviewved at each oftlie Risk County EOCs. This activily may be in sequenIce With tile scenario; i.e., at the point when a roadblock or access point il Would be established, the EWs will be dispatched to tile EOC rather than tile location in tile field.
Interviews will cover such poilnts: as: responsibilities, personal dosimetry, turn-back values, and KI proceduires:- Specific interview i
times will be negotiated between the evaluator/s and Risk COuInty Director.
Criterion 3.d.2:
Impedinieits to evacuiation are' Identified and Resolved (NUREG-0654. J. I 0.k.)
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Deiiion:irution or impediments, if any, will be scenario driven.
Retardless, appropriaite stafl personnel at thle SEOC and Risk County' EOCs will be available for discussioits with the evaluators.
IL 3.e.
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisi6ns:
Criterion 3.e. I: Thle ORO denionstrates the anailability and appropriate use of' adequate in formation r'rgardinig wvater' food' supplies. milk. and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure patihnvay eniergency plannins-zone for l
implementation of protective actions (NUREG-0654, J.9, I1.)
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable for this exercise.
Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate nieasures. strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated wvater, food products, milk, and agricultural production (NUREG-0654, E.5, 7. J.9, I1.)
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable foir this exercise.
- 3. f.
Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions:
I Criterion 3.tIN:
Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate ii organizations and implemented (NUREG-0654, N.,1 3.)
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable for this exercise.
I SQN'04 Page 7 April 20, 2004
Ev'aluationi Areai 4 - Field iIeIastiremniit atid Aiialvsis-4.a.
Pluie Phase Field Measurements and Analysis:
Criterion 4.a. 1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measureiicnts of direct radiation exposure '(cloud and ground shine) and to saimple airborne L
radioiodinie and particulaltes (NUREG-,654, 11.10; 1.7, 8,9..)
EXTENT-OF-PLAY' -. Field teamils will utilize appropriate instrumenttlion and guidelinies as established in DR II Standard Operrating Procedures.
Criterion 4.a.2: Field teanis are anlailgaed to-obtain sufficient information to help L
.characterize tile release and to control radiation exposure (NUREG-0654, 11.12; 1.8, I I; J. I0.a.).
L EXTENT-OF-PLAY - (See Sub-paragraph 4.a.1.) All field teamis wvill be uinder the direction of the RMCC.
L Criterion 4.a.3:
Ambient radiationl ileasuimments are mnaide and recoided at appropriate locations, and radioiodine.; and particulate samples are collected.
Teamis miust milove to ain appropriate l. w background location to determine L
whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the saimnpling, media (NUREG-0654, 1.9.)
EXTENT-OF-PLAY'L
- Four (4) field,mollitorini teams w ill be evaluated.
Each
..field teamn will obtain at least oneair.sample with a minimumri sample volume of 10 cubic feet. The particulate filter and absorber media cartridge will be bauged, labeled and transported, to *a.. collection point for simulated transport to a laboratory. Field monitoring data will be injected by controllers supporting the exercise, and be,. transmitted. by. the teamns to the RMCC over the normal communications : etw'ork--(porhtble'llIlind-lield.radios).-Ce ilular-telephlones -will be utilized for back-up communications.
L NOTE:
Radiological Monitoring Teams will be ready to link with tile Evalulator(s) at 9:30 ANM.
L 4.b.
Post Plume Phase Field MAeasurements and Sampling:
Criterion 4.b.1: Field teams will demonstrate tile capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate sampies (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetatioiA, and soil) to support-adequate assessments and protective action decision-miaikiing (NUREG-0654, 1.8; J.l 1.) ;
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable for tills exercise.
4.c.
Laboratory Opcrations' SQN'04 Page 8 April 20. 2004
Criterion 4.c.l: Thle laboratory is capable of performing required radiological I
aialysis to support protective action decisions (NUREG-0654. C.3: J. I 1.)
EXTEN'r-OF-l'PLAY - Evaluated durig, WVaits Bar Exercise 2004 (1neliston Pathwav~y) - jNot :l)j)plicualle for thxis exercise,.
E':viltiat ihll,\\A-ca 5 - l'inerenIcv Notification anid Public Intormation i.ai.
Activation ol the Irompt Alert and Notifiation System:
j Criterion 5.a.l: IActivities associated with primary alertitig atid nolilication of the public are completed in a timely manner following tIle initial decision by I
authorized off-site e:mergclcy ofticials to notify thle public of an1 emergency situation. The initiation instructionall 1essage to tile ltiblic mluist include as a minimum the elements required by current FENIA REP guidance. (11 CFR Part I
- 50. Appendix E.IV.D and NIJREG-0654, I,.5,6,7):
ExTENT-OF-PLAY - The Emergency Alert System (EAS) will he activated I
sinultaneouslv with the initial activation (SILENT TEST) of the Sequoyah (PNS) sirens %vith the broadcast of a test nmessage (EAS Message '1).
Alfier the initial n;
activation of tlhe PNS sirens and broadcast of tthe spccial;jest messa-e. subsequent Jj PNS activations and contact withl-the LP-l EAS control station wvill be sinullatcd.
Should there be a difference between the State and.TVA System Status Monitors n
(SS.%ls) or if siren failure's isalre indicated. backup rotute alertinia for the allected i
coveraue areas will be simulated.
Risk County personnel will be available to discuss thle routes and procedures that would he h
tilizied in. an actual emergellcy situation.
AREAS RE.QUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION R
71-03-5.a.1-A-011 (State Emergency Operations Center) - The initial EAS nlcssatye sent out to the public at 0931, did not contain, one of tile required
'H
-a-lenenelts;-as listed-iin-t~ile-lert-and~-Nsotificatlion EinaLEedecral legistvr N'oticc, Ji dated September 12,2001.
Thte. EAS message sent out did not include a s refe;rence to Radiological Emergency Preparedniess specific inrormation H
(e.g. brochures and inforimation. in telephone books) for use hb tile general l
public (luring an emiergen cy."
Criterion 5.a.2: Reservcd at thlis time. (NUREG-0654) i Criterion 5.a.3:
Activitics associated with FENIA approvcd excelption areasR (where applicable) are completed wilhin 45 minules l'ollowing tIc initial decision
-i by authorized off-sit ecmergency oflicials to notify the public of an emergency situation.
Backup: alert and notilication of the public is completed %vitrian 45 minutes lollowing tlhc detection by tlhe ORO of a fiailure of tile primary alert and notification system (NUREG-0654. E.6, Appendix 3.13.2.c.)
'I'EXNT-OF-PLAY - Not ani)licable for this exercise.
i SON 04 Page 9 April 20. 2004 ii D
5.b).
llelmerlecy Ilt'onliation and Ihisti-iitions lor thet Public and the Medii:
Criterion 5.b.l:: OROs provide accurate emergency inlfornmation and instrict ions i
lo)le I
public anJd the.news. mledia ii a timely maniner (NUREG-0)654, E.5., 7:
_(.3.;i. 4.c.)
EXI'E.N'-017-P L\\A'
- 1 llerelley wijsltlutions/inforation vilI oriliwiitlle roinll the SEOC prior to 'JIC acti'vation;. alter activation, infloratioll will be disseminated firom tile JIC ( Only) while emergency instrUiction' Wvill Continue to be disseminated firom tile SEOC via thi lEAS (SEOC will be responsible for iboth iniormation and instructions on )
Appropriate SEiOC stalf will be available to discu.ss' wilti evallaltors oillqnernLls ol. r-apid inlformat ion d issemi natini: i.e..
auricultura l e'c.).
Evaluation Airea 6 - SupportI Operatiot j
lls ilities:
.-1.
MNonlitillt o 111ad Decotamination; of lEvacuees and Emergency \\Worcr-S 11d Re-istra:tionl of livactue:;:
Criterion'.a:l:
'lihe recelitioni cei'neaeerricrgeicy wvorkcr falicility hi:s applropri;ate space.
adequate res'ources,
':and trained personnel to provide miiu tori ng.
decontarn:itlidiol.
and 'registrationi of evacuces and/lor-enmeri.encv workers (N'UtIG-0654. J.lO.h. 17: I;:D.:.)
L 1 ';
1 '1-01 -1' Al' - See.S~ul) lirap l
(.c. Ic.EXIIN'I-(
I
-l'l.A.'
L NOTE: There are no "Reception Center's" per se in the SQN NUJRERlP.
L
.{elocat ion CentieriContt'rcwilte C;,, ; Cenler acti itics are combiniied and de;iienoted
-Is llass Care Shlters."
s, e lterr ib (B..
MNonitorimi and Decontaiminatio'n ol 'mcueilney Worker llUilpilletll:
C riterion 6.1. : The flhcility/ORO has adequate procedures and resourcs lfor the acconlpi ishment ol'.IIo'itoring and deccnt ati ntion *o emergency worker cqluipment, including Kvehicles (NUREG-054. K.5.b)
.l'EX NT-OrF-l'LA.Y - Mon1iloi-ilig and decontamination of' emergency workers and equipment will be demo'stiraited, 'out-of-sequence. at the t'o lowintl location.
The decontamination point will be staffed willt trained personnel, and at least three (3) nionitor-ing demlnonstrations wvill he accomplished. I a1111d hell survey instruments will bc used. A walk-through of decolltamination procedures will be conducted for the...
eviluators with'respecl to personnel o
and equLiipment. School may be in session so denionstrations ofmonitorin-and deconltminiationl activities should be held to a1 llninum in order tt lessen disruption of regular school activities. Howeever, Ihc stall wvill be available flor interviews by evaluator/s.
L SQN'04 Page 10 April20. 2004
FACILITY LOCATON DATE Red Bank High School Red Bank May 20. 2004
_ I:OO) AMN1
- OTE: The Tennessee Department ot Forestry is lead agency and responsible to conduct the evaluators through the observation/walk-through process.
6.e.
Temporary Care of EVIICUees:
Criterion 6.c. 1: Malinage:rs of colngregate care l'acilities wvill demionstrate that the centers havc resources to provide services and accom modations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures throuuIh discussion to asIsur.e that evacuees have been monitored ior contmiination I
and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care
- 1. cilities (N UREG-0654, J. 10.h, 12.)
EXTENT-OF-PLAY - CoierecaLte care will be demonstrated. uut-ot-squence, at the followilna location.
Ihc sT c lter will b. slaffud with traine d pCersonnel, and at least six (6) monitorig deminonstrations will be accomplished.
Hand held I
survey instnimients wvill be uscd. A walk-thro6Lh of decontamination procedures will be conducted for the evaluators. School namv be in session so demonstrations of monitoring, decont'aimiination, anld sheltering activities should be held to a i minimum in order to lessen disruption of regular school activities. However, the stalffwill be available for intervicws by evaluator/s. (Sce 6.a.1, NOTE)
,i SHELTER LOCATON DATE Brainerd High School Chattanoo-a. Temiiessce May 19, 200(4
.9:00 AIM Dalewood Hieh School Chattanooga. Tennessee' May 19, 2004 I()10:30 AM 0
-at-anoogd-i Scli-Chaifiittano-Tennessee lNMay 19,2004 1:00 PM I
I Ii Ii NOTE:
If time, number of Cvacuecs and r-sources allow, periodic monitoring of vehicles coming to the shelter will occur, however tile first 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> priority is evacuee nionitoriing and sheltering.
In anticipation of heavy traffic. evacuee n
vehicles are impounded and assumed contaniinalecd till later mcniltoring can establish their actual status.
n 6.d.
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured IndiViduals:
Criterion 6.d.I: The Facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, J
and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring. decontamination. and medical services to contaminated injured individuals (NUREG-0654, F.2; 11.10; K.5.a. b; L. 1, 4.)
SON '04 Page 11 April 20. 2004
E-xTrENTr-OF-PLAY - Demonstrated out-o skequence Ldurintg M IS-I Drills at the lollowini locations:
rl FACI~LITY 1.OCATI IONI)A 1emorial Itlopia lti
- o.
Tennessee April 22. 2004 C,:
A M W arkii~!e 1Medical Center Caittianooga. Tennessee June __.
2004 9:0(1 ANM ACC'RONYNIS:-
A\\ I(CA Areas Reqluiring Corrective Action 11 livision ofl Radeological I CatliI EMA Emergency Nian~auement Agency
[:Ms Emergency Mledical Services IEND) EX End Exeri se WC Emergency Operations Center EI()lIExtent otpla:
_~~ZEmervency Plannime Zone l~~Enicrg.ency W~orker
':C.
FiePlsd Coof-diniiltion Center FRI)RII Federal Radiological Emergency espOnlse Plan
.1 IC Joint In lbr;n1tioL neltntt.
I P1.
inuestion PI iwhav Zone Mi RE RI Multi-jurisdictional Radiolog-_ical Emergency Response Plan11 O1S
.,L liceoloImergency er vie s (L()t OlT-site Response Organization 11AG Prolective Action Guide L
IAR Protection Action Recom mendation IbA\\I rotectiv-e Action Decision-RI:CC R:dioloicalt ionitoriun Control Center
_________ E(R-.IX' It:edEeral la vo perarions lltlC)' {ii~t~ilS:1 STAr.\\z i:X\\
start tE-xercise L
.1 E:CINITIONS:
B~aselint., - The1 Federal lEmengency Mannagemlent Atency data base Ibr mipport faicil ities in compliance with revised Evaluation MNethodolo-.-
I)iirect Read ing D~osinmctry - lDosimetrN' that alosindividual(s) ito read the administrative reporitin limits (that are pre-established at a level low enoug-h to consider subsequent calcuktion L fTotal
- Oletive Dose.Equivalent),nd miximim cxposure limits (for those enertencN workers involved in hifie-saving activities) cOntained in the ORO's plansand procedures.
e Adea subject to legal pioiition onagrilti cid..-cc.
Timelv - Responsible ORO i
demonstratenctions to disseminate the appropriat-in'ormationi/inistrctionis with a sense of urgency and withoott undtie delCy.
SONO04 Page 12 April 20. 2004
04I:/2/004 15:01 2531 340 TEMA PLItI.II I113
-^A;E, 02J103 I1 TIME-UINE AND EVENT MATRIX:
ENDANGERFD SCHOOLS:
ENDANGERED l LOCATON
- Sc1_OOl, Prospcct Elcmcntary ClcvchNid, TN May IS, 2004 School
._I:Ot)
PM Daisy Elernentary Soddy-Daisy. Tennessec M ay 24, 2004 School 10:00 ANI McConncil McConnell. Tcnncsscc May 24, 2004 Elcmcntary School 11:30 AMi.
Brown Middlc School Chattanooga, T.nncsscc May 24, 2004 1:30 PM Harrison Elcrncntary Harrison, TeIressee May 24, 2004 School 2:45 PM Ooltcvah High Schcol Ooh-ewvah. Tennessee May 25, 2004 9:30 AMQI Scquoyah Vocational Chattancoga, Tcn-ncssSc MIay 25, 2004 School 11:Q0 Am NOTE: Evaluator escort to each school location wvill be provided by the Hamilton County EOC.
EMERGENCY WORKER and EQUIPMENT DECON:
NOTE: The Tennessee Department of Forcstry is Icad agcncy and rcsponsibic to conduct the evaluators throu&h thc obscrvationiwalk-through process.
SHELTER EVALUATIONS:
SHELTER LOCATON DATE Brainerd High School Chattanooga, Tennesscc
'May 19, 2004 9:00 AM1 Dalcwood High School Chattanooga. Tcnncsscc May 19, 2004 10:30 AM Chattanooga High Chattanooga, Tcnnessee May 19, 2004 School
__1:00 PM April 20. 2004
o0?t/-0/04 1:3: ol0 5
2' 31 34a TElMV-PLA^I R 11I PAGE O0 3i L-.
MEDICAL DRILLS:
L FACIIT.1YT Memorial Hosp Parkridnc Icdi L
Ccnlcr L
L L..
L L
Api 20 200 LOCATION.'l DATE ihal Chitltanoona, Tenncs&ee.
April22. 2004 19:00 AuNl cal Chaltanooga, Tenncsscc...;,IJuIc 18,2004
-:w I9:00 AM I.
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 2004 REP EXERCISE JUNE 23, 2004 OFFSITE RESPONSE NARRATIVE This will be a one-day exercise, beginning at about 0900 EDT and lasting approximately 7.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. During the course of the exercise, the State and local governments will demonstrate their ability to protect the public within the 10-Mile EPZ from the affects of an accidental release of radioactive materials from the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The events described in the postulated accident as depicted in the plant (onsite) scenario wilt necessitate the activation of the Tennessee Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MJRERP) for the facility. All demonstrations, interviews and other activities performed for evaluation will occur during the course of the exercise; however, due to time constraints and travel time to different locations, some activities will occur out-of-sequence with the scenario events. These stipulations, along with mutually agreed simulations, are included in the extent-of-play clauses as depicted in the offsite exercise objectives.
Due to the severity of the postulated accident that drives the activities in this scenario, the time-line indicated herein may vary from the actual initiation of events. This may occur due to the fact that the Site Emergency Director (SED) may declare an Emergency Classification Level (ECL) earlier or later than the time indicated.
NOTE: All times indicated herein are based on Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) and indicate the approximate start time of the activities so designated. Further, the activities described are ongoing and may take a shorter or longer length of time than that indicated.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
UNIT 1:
L Was at 100% power for the last 120 days. The core is at MOL. The Boron concentration is 961 ppm at 9000 MWD/metric ton.
The 1 A-A RHR Pump is O.O.S. for repairs and LCO 3.5.2 has-been entered.
L The 1-400 Monitor is O.O.S. for repairs.
L UNIT 2:
As is.
L COMMON:
A Contractor is repairing the service building roof.
Background:
At fifteen minutes T=00:15 (9:15 EDT] into the exercise, the contractor's hose to his propane heater for the asphalt leaks, ignites and consequently catches the truck on fire. Shortly the truck blows up spreading burning asphalt around the area and causing damage to the SIG steam and FW lines as well as the service building. Insulation has been blown off of sections of the steam L
and FW lines. Some of the burning asphalt is around the RWST, the Steam and FW lines, and some is on the roof of the service building where the contractor's people are trapped. May 4,2004
Plant Conditions @ T=00:20 19:20 EDT): ALERTI An ABI and Control Room Vent isolation occurs due to the smoke and heat from the fire. An ALERT should be declared based on EAL 4. I (Fire in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 (RWST) that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown) or 4.2 (Explosion in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 (RWST) that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown).
STATE RESPONSE:
The State's response will begin when the Tennessee Valley Authority (VA)
Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at TVA'sCentral Emergency Control Center (CECC) notifies the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) Operations Officer (TEMA-00) at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in Nashville that an ALERT has been declared at the plant. After verifying the call, the TEMA-0O will notify the On-Call SEOC Director (Designated TEMA official who will notify the TEMA Director), and, utilizing the notification list in the TEMA Operations SOPs will notify the risk counties (Bradley and Hamilton) and then notify the appropriate Emergency Service Coordinators (ESC) representing state agencies for this Emergency Classification Level (ECL.)
Upon receiving notification and arriving at the SEOC, the SEOC Director will instruct the TEMA-00 to notify selected ESCs representing various state agencies to report immediately to the SEOC. When sufficient personnel arrive, the Director will declare the SEOC operational and continue mobilization of State personnel.
LOCAL RESPONSE:
The Bradley and Hamilton County EM Directors, after being notified of the ALERT by the TEMA-
- 00, will notify their respective County Executives and Mayors of the cities in the 10-Mile EPZ.
The Directors will activate their local EOCs by notifying all EOC personnel to report immediately.
All other governmental and private organizations with response roles will be placed on standby.
L County SOPs require that schools and day care centers in the 10-Mile EPZ are notified of the emergency situation and school bus drivers notified and instructed to report to their assigned schools to move the students should it become necessary. These notifications will be simulated.
The EM Directors of the host counties are notified and they simulate notification to the principals of the schools paired with endangered schools and those to be used as mass care shelters.
L_
Plant Conditions @T--1:10 (10:10 EDT]--
The FW flow indicator becomes erratic due to the fire flashing the water in the sensor lines to L
steam.
CONTINUING STATE RESPONSE:
L As SEOC personnel arrive in response to the notification and summons, discussions are held regarding activation of the Prompt Notification System (PNS). If and when the decision is made to activate, this and 'all subsequent siren activation will be simulated. The EAS Local Control station, WSKZ in Chattanooga, will be notified to activate the EAS and instruct all stations in the area to monitor the network and standby for further information or instructions. Simultaneously with the first simulated activation of the sirens, the EAS Coordinator PIO will contact WSKZ and request that they record (the PlO will read EAS Message #1 (System Test Tape] over the L
ringdowri line) and actually broadcast.the message.' The SEOC Director will fully activate the SEOC, especially the PIO staff, and depending on circumstances, may begin notification and
-mobilization of the Field Coordination Center (FCC), Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) including field monitoring teams, and if media interest and public concern is such that activation of the Joint Information Center (JIC) is advisable, he may coordinate with TVA in the activation of that facility.
May4, 2004 U_
CONTINUING LOCAL RESPONSE:
Activation of facilities and mobilization of personnel continues at the local level. Communication is maintained and updates are provided on a continuing 6asis. The CECC continually updates the SEOC on plant conditions and this information is relayed to the local EOCs.
Plant Conditions @ T=1.:15 [10:15 EDT]:.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY The heated SIG #1 Steam line breaks when water is sprayed on it during fire fighting efforts.
j Shrapnel from the steam line strikes the RWST. The RWST has been punctured about half way up and is leaking. When the MSIV for SIG #1 begins to close, it'sticks about 50% open. When the Reactor attempts to Scram an ATWS occurs. Some fuel clad damage occurs due to stresses during the ATWS. Additionally, the steam driven AFW pump fails to pump. An.SAE is declared AU based on EAL 2.3 (Reactor power >5% and not decreasing after valid auto and manual trip signals.)
STATE RESPONSE:
Upon notification of the' SITE AREA EMERGENCY declaration, the SEOC Director will order the full activation of the SEOC, FCC, RMCC, and JIC. The TEMA 00, using.the notification list for this ECL will notify all persons, agencies, departments and organizations, including the risk counties (Bradley and Hamilton) and Host-countles (Meigs, Rhea, and Sequatchie), that have a role in the response. Those persons assigned to the SEOC and other State field EOCs will report A
immediately to their assigned posts.
In cases where an"agericy' has numerous personnel involved in the response, contact will be made with a designated individual who will initiate a pyramiding system of phone calls to notify all persons in their respective organizations. This contact person will place them on standby or instruct them to report to their assigned duty station.
LOCAL RESPONSE:
Upon receiving notification of the SITE AREA' EMERGENCY from the SEOC, the Risk County A
EOCs (Bradley and Hamilton) are fully activated by the local Directors. All schools and day care centers located within the 10-Mile EPZ are notified by tone-alert radios andior public telephone (simulated) to' immediately relocate the student bodies to designated paired schools. The Principals of these paired schools would be advised to make preparations for the arrival of the relocated students. The Host County EM Directors are also notified to place all mass care shelter personnel on standby.
CONTINUING STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE:
Constant communication is maintained between the SEOC and the CECC. As situational reports, I
plant conditions and other pertinent information is received from the Site Emergency Director (SED) at the plant by the CECC, the information is provided immediately to the SEOC Director.
TVA makes protective action recommendations for the public if in the opinion of the CECC staff they are justified. However, if no recommendation is forthcoming from TVA and,,if after a critical study of plant conditions and other factors that could contribute to public endangerment, a unilateral decision may be made jointly by the SEOC staff either to order "sheltering-in-place" for fl residents of the 'Near Plant Area" or request that the Governor declare a "State-of-Emergency and order a precautionary evacuation of this area which is comprised of sectors A-1, B-1, C-1, and D-1.
If a decision is made to order protective actions. the SEOC Director will coordinate with the Risk County EM Directors in the activation (simulated) of the PNS. The EASC PlO at the SEOC will be instructed to contact the. EAS control' station and transmit the appropriate message(s) for broadcast over the network.
Simultaneously with activation of the PNS, the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, the U. S.
Coast Guard, and volunteer agencies will dispatch personnel in boats equipped with May 4, 2004 3
loudspeakers to warn commercial and civilian river traffic, fishermen, and those persons in parks and recreation areas along the river who may not be familiar with the purpose of the sirens. The U.S. Corps of Engineers will be requested to close the locks at Chickamauga and Watts Bar Dams; the Federal Aviation Administration will be requested to restrict air traffic over the area; and the Norfolk and Western Railroad will be instructed to stop all traffic approaching the area.
Communication is maintained between the SEOC and the CECC and.between the SEOC and local EOCs. The CECC provides continuous updates to the SEOC and current information is provided to the local EOCs; periodic briefings are conducted in. the EOCs to keep personnel apprised of the situation and give an opportdnity for each departrment head to review the actions taken and determine if they are suffitierit or' if mobilization of,erriergency personnel should be
-accelerated to cope with the worsening situatior'.
- r Mobilization of State personnel continues with Emergency ServiceCoordinators (ESC) and Public I Information Officers (PIO) reporting-to their assigned locations; state liaison personnel report to the local EOCs and the CECC; other State personnel who may become involved in field activities are instructed to report to their assignment or remain on standby. When the JIC becomes operational, press conferences and news releases will be used as a means to keep the media
-and the general public informed of conditions at the plant and to provide other information concerning the safety of the citizens' of the are;.a:..
L Mobilization also continues at the local level with department heads positioning staff and equipment as required. The Sheriffsinotify and c6odinate all.necessary support personnel and resources (municipal police, THP, fire departmenets' rescue squads, etc.). If an evacuation has been ordered, the Sheriffs will dispatch persorinel'to-strategic points on controlled evacuation routes for traffic conirol, and additional persohnelvil llbe dispatched to establish security around the affected area. The,EOC staff will notify the ARC and local health department monitoring and decontamination personnel to make-.preparati6ns and be ready to open shelters on a moment's L
notice. Monitoring and decontamination personnel assigned to emergency worker/vehicle decon points will be notified in a like manner.
Plant Conditions @ T=01:20 [10.20 EDT I3.
L The fires are extinguished.
- d. ' 7 Plant Conditions T=0225[111:25 EDTJ ;GENERAL EMERGENCY At about two hours twenty five minutes (T=02 :25) into the exercise, a SIG tube rupture occurs on SIG # 1. This results in a release of radioactivity at the ground level due to the broken steam line.
L _____
A GE should be declared based on EAL-7A -(EAB dose resulting from an -actuator immiriehtf release of gaseous radioactivity> 1 Rem TEDE or> 5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected release).
STATE RESPONSE:
iWhen the SEOC is notified by the CECC of the GENERAL EMERGENCY declaration, the loss of containment integrity and release to the atmosphere, the information is immediately passed to the Bradley and Hamilton County EOCs. In all likelihood, the deteriorating conditions at the plant will trigger a discussion about additional protective actions for the public. If no recommendation is received from TVA, the State may either,shelter or evacuate other areas that are deemed by DRH to be endangered.
i When the SEOC is notified of the worsening.situation and the continuing release, the staff L
immediately notifies the county EOCs. If evacuation of the "Near Plant Area" has not previously occurred, TVA will most likely make that recommendation at this time and further recommend that residents in downwind sectors be sheltered in place.
If after consultation with TVA's Dose Assessment Team, DRH feels that the recommended protective actions are sufficient, DRH will so advise the SEOC Director and the protective actions will be initiated.
However, after considering the worsening plant conditions and a radiological release in progress, the State may; 4-May 4, 2004
exercise its option of taking more stringent action by evacuating the downwind sectors rather than sheltering the population. DRH field monitoring teams will be dispatched from the RMCC to ill selected points and will report monitoring results back to the RMCC every fifteen minutes. The DRH and TVA dose assessment teams continually analyze the data to determine if additional protective actions are required.
The Tennessee Department of Agriculture continues to monitor the situation and issues i
appropriate instruction to the agricultural community.
Mobilization of State personnel and resources continue, with responders activated and positioned at the FCC, county EOCs, and field locations. The SEOC coordinates and provides additional personnel and equipment when requested by the counties, and if necessary, requests assistance from the Federal government through the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
While attempts are being made to stop the release and repair the malfunctioning equipment, communications between the CECC and SEOC, and the SEOC and local EOCs is maintained with information and updates being shared among all responsible authorities. All data is studied I
carefully and if additional protective actions are required, they will be initiated. The State Medical Officer confers with DRH and if radioiodine concentrations are a hazard. will issue instructions for emergency workers to begin taking KI and would consider a similar order for portions of the general population. The EAS Coordinator at the SEOC will relay all emergency instructions and information for the public to the EAS. The JIC will be notified of all messages and instructions being broadcast by the EAS and will keep the media and the general public informed by way of briefings and press conferences.
LOCAL RESPONSE:
After being notified of the GENERAL EMERGENCY and precautionary protective action i
recommendations from the SEOC, if any, the local EOC Directors would proceed with implementing the evacuation or sheltering plans for the affected area. The Sheriff dispatches personnel to man critical roadblocks, assists in an orderly evacuation along controlled routes, and j
provides security for the evacuated or sheltered areas. If additional personnel are required, the Sheriff will coordinate the request from other state and local organizations. The Bradley and Hamilton County Radiological Officers begin the distribution of monitoring kits to appropriate shelters, manned roadblocks, and Shelter Information Points. The county road departments and I
TOOT; set up road barricades at predetermined locations around the affected area. The ARC, assisted by DHS personnel opens and mans shelters as needed. All other personnel are notified of the GENERAL EMERGENCY and remain on standby.
The Bradley-and-Hamilton-County-EOCs-continue-mobilizatiWn and im-lementationof the evacuation plans for the affected sectors.
Essential personnel are notified to report to their assigned positions, while reserve personnel remain on standby.
If additional personnel are required, the Sheriffs will request assistance from the State and will coordinate the assignment of the personnel provided where they can be utilized to the greatest advantage.
Security is established around evacuated areas by the establishment of roadblocks and barricades; Shelter Information Points are set up at pre-determined locations; and Traffic Assist Teams are dispatched to patrol controlled evacuation routes.
i When the local EOC Directors are notified that emergency workers have been directed to take KI, they will ensure that this information is passed on to the personnel in the field. EOC officials continue to monitor the situation and study the availability of the local manpower and resources.
i If it is determined that additional personnel is required, a request for assistance will be made to the SEOC.
If additional evacuation or sheltering orders are issued, the sheriffs will re-evaluate the previously 1
established roadblocks and security measures. If necessary, they will be moved to new locations and additional blocks set up to encompass the enlarged area. ARC and OHS personnel will open additional shelters as required.
I 5.
May 4,2004 l
EXERCISE TERMINATION:
The exercise will terrrliriate when ali onsite and offsite objectives have been demonstrated.
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. May 4, 2004
APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO I.
This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercise on L
June 23, 2004.
This exercise scenario was submitted by the State of Tennessee and approved by FEMA Region L
IV.
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4.
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28
SM-I SEQUOYAH1 NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) 2004 NRC/FEMA GRADED EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE CONE]IDENTIAL Rev. Datc: 4/19104 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
UNIT-I:
I0010 powcr for the last 120 d.is. The core is at MIOL. The Boron concentration is 961 ppm. 90)()0 MWD/nictric ton.
IA-A RHR Pump is O.O.S. for rcpairs. LCO 3.5.2 has becn entcred.
1-40)0 M\\1onitor is O.O.S for repairs.
UNIT-2:
As is.
CONINION:
A contractor is repairing thc serviccbuilding roof.
EVENTS: Note: Times arc in scenario clapsed time (lhr: min). While thic Scenario has cenain EALs listed iihich the SED is expected to make declaration of the cumergency classifications (ALERT. SAE. GE), it is possible that the SED may declare an emergency classification based onjudgrnent or sonic other set of EAls which the Scenario did not expect. If any of thcse situations arise the Controllers must be rcadv to cv ahate the accurac-and timeliness of any unexpected enrergencv I'
declarations.
At fifteen minutes (T=00: Il5) into the exercise. tiev contractor's hosc to his Propane heater for the asphall leaks. ignites and consequently catches the tnick on fire. Shonly the tnick blows up spreading burning asphalt around the area and causing damnwc to the S!G stcam and FWV lines as Nscel as the service buildint. Insulation has been blo%%n off of sections of the stcam L
and F\\V lines. Sonic of the burning asphalt is around thc RW\\\\ST. the Stcam and FW lines. and sonic is on the roof of the scr\\ice building i~herc the contractor's pcople are trapped. WVithin a few minutes. an ABI and Control Room Vent isolation should occur due to the smokc and hreat from the fire. An ALERT should be declared based on EAL 4.1 (Firc in any of the areas listed l fi in Table 4-l(RWST) that is nffecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown) or 4.2(Explosion in any of thc areas listed in Table 4-1(RWST) that is afMecting sarety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown).
At about one hour ten minutes (T=01:11)) into thc cxcrcisc. the FW flo indicaior becomes erratic duc to the fire flashing the
,water in the sensor lines to stcam.
a At about one hour fifteen minutes (T=I:15) into the exercise thc heated SlG- #lSteam linc brcazks.wlen water is sprayed on it -
dmmriag
-fikilincor~ts.
from the steam line strikes the RWST. The RWVST has becn puncturedabout halfwiav up and is Iclng. When the MISIV for S/G fRI begins to close. it sticks about 50%l open. When the Reactor attempts to Scram an AT\\YS occurs. Sonic fucl clad daniagc occurs duc to stresses during the ATWS. Additionally. the steam driven AFW pump fails to pump. A SAE shoulid be declared based on EAL 2.3 (Reactor poi~cr >51%10 and not decreasing aftervalid auto and manual trip signals).
L'.
At about one hour tmenty minutes (T=0) 1:20) into the exercise. the fircs arc extinguished.
At about two hours twenty five minutes (T=02:25) into thc cxercisc. a S/G tube nipturc occurs on SIG # 1. This results in a L
release or radioactivity at the ground lcvel due to the broken steam line. The field survcy at EAB sample point 0-4 should report
> 1 Rcrmnhr gamnma. A GE shomald be declared based on EAL 7.1 (EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of gascous radioactivity > I Rem TEDE or > j Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected release).
l L
The exercise will terminate at about six hours (T=t)6:(0t3) into the exercise or when off site cnvironniental monitoring objectives havc been demonstrated.
L
SM-lB SEQUOYAHN UCLEAR PLANT (SQN) 2004 NRCIFENIA GRADED EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE CONFIDENTIAL Rcv. Date: 4/19104 The imporancc of scenario cvents:
I A-A RHR Pump is O.O.S. for repairs.
1-400 tMonitor is O.O.S for repairs.
A contractor is repairing the senrice buildin, roof.
S;G I Steam line breaks.
An ATWS occurs.
MSIV for S:G " I sticks about 501'. open.
Steam driven AFW' pump fails to pump.
A SIG tube rupture occurs on S'G = 1.
Provides an additional OSC task. Also as thre Scenario progresscs allo%%s an opportunity for the TSC/OSC to prioritize tasks.
Providcs an additional OSC task. Complicates Dose assessment. Also as the Scenario progresses allows an opportunity for the TSCYOSC to prioritize tasks.
Fire and Explosion from equipment becomes the initiating event for the ALERT declaration and also produces a needed fire brigade response.
Comibiied with the MNISIV taiilrc to closc and a later S/G libe nipture provides a releasc pathway for radioactivity for thI exercise.
Provides reason for fuel clad failures.
Provides an additional OSC task. Also as the Scenario progresses allows an opportunity for the TSC/OSC to prioritize tasks. Combined with the SIG & I Steam line break and a latcr S/G tube rupture provides a release patimay tor radioactivity for the exercise.
Provides an additional OSC task.
Combined with tlihe S/G '1 Steamn line brcak and MSIV for S/G 1l sticking about 50% open provides a release pathwiy for radioactivity for the excrcisc.
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I EA NARIO TIMELINE DATE 04-19-04
):30 01:00 01:30 02:00 02:30 I
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SCEA REV.
09:00(EDT) 00:00 OC I
SQN AERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 2004 GRADED EXERCISE (Adcministrativcly Confidential]
03:00 03:30 1
l-04:00 04:30 05:00 05:30 06:00 I
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I ALERT(EAL 4.1 or 4.2) l SAE(EAL 2.3 )
T L, 1. IA-A I II i 0.0rS. f* r II I
i rI T-1.C..1-400 Mtonitor~is O.0.S.
T- 0 1:00 1.(-400 Nonitor itmy be rusiltued to service'irrepaired.
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1=..
Th 00:'15 Explosioit spreadls T-,01:20n Te s
ires areallc O
Contrictor rcptairing J hunting te1r.
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I Servicc building roolt T01:15 So,! Steamlinereiks O2:2 S(i;!tiube,ililure ocurs.
anI SGIII MSIjV sticks501,0opell.
A, relcasc to tlhe ciirollnmcll begins.
I-'i:is+ Tj 01:25 The i. Ireaclt ii 'emnmed.
A : ~ATNVS I
uIsjru tjccurs on U-I leactor.
I I - 01:20 Somc fluel eild j
la I ilures bdgin to occur.l
- ; ;, 02:3() if le steam eriveit 0 (1:15 '11 1
'en u
will pump ie'eml (In
?'""puPpil p.,,.
_________u__
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thlie EA exceeds 1tRtmilir.
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