ML14164A712
| ML14164A712 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Aerotest |
| Issue date: | 06/13/2014 |
| From: | NRC/OGC |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| RAS 26037, ASLBP 14-931-01-LT-BD01, 50-228-LT | |
| Download: ML14164A712 (14) | |
Text
NRC-003 Submitted: June 13, 2014 June 13, 2014 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE PRESIDING OFFICER ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC. ) Docket No. 50-228-LT
)
(Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor) )
)
NRC STAFF TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER ADAMS JR.
REGARDING DENIAL OF THE INDIRECT LICENSE TRANSFER OF THE AEROTEST RADIOGRAPHY AND RESEARCH REACTOR Introduction Q.1. Please state your name, occupation, and by whom you are employed.
A.1. My name is Alexander Adams, Jr. I am employed as the Chief of the Research and Test Reactors Licensing Branch, in the Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). I have been employed by the NRC for over 27 years. A statement of my professional qualifications is attached as Exhibit NRC-006.
Background
Q.2. Please describe the nature of your responsibilities on behalf of the NRC.
A.2. I currently serve as the branch chief for the Research and Test Reactors Licensing Branch. The branch is responsible for the licensing of 31 U.S. Research and Test Reactors (RTRs), including the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR). The proposed indirect license transfer of the ARRR involving Aerotest Operations, Inc. (Aerotest or the licensee) and Nuclear Labyrinth, LLC (Nuclear Labyrinth) is the subject of this testimony.
The Research and Test Reactors Licensing Branch is also responsible for the licensing of facilities for the production of medical isotopes. Additionally, the branch is the point of contact
for Department of Defense (DOD) nuclear reactor projects and Department of Energy (DOE) research reactor projects. The branch develops guidance related to the licensing of RTRs and represents the NRC on research reactor issues to external parties such as the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards committees and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
My current collateral duties include serving as the NRC representative on standards committees associated with RTRs. I am the NRCs representative to the ANS Research and Advanced Reactors Consensus Committee and ANS Subcommittee, ANS-15, Operation of Research Reactors. I also represent the NRC on the working group for several individual American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/ANS standards pertaining to RTRs.
Q.3. Please describe your experience with RTRs.
A.3. Prior to holding the branch chief position, I was a licensing project manager for RTRs. I also served as a project manager for various RTR projects related to the DOD and the DOE. As project manager, I coordinated all aspects of the safety and environmental evaluations related to the NRC review of RTR licensing issues, such as license renewal, license amendment, decommissioning and license termination, and conversion from high-enriched to low-enriched uranium fuel. In addition, I reviewed licensee reports, inspection reports, and enforcement actions, and I interacted with other NRC personnel, as well as with State and other Federal agencies. In some instances, I acted as the Staffs technical reviewer for RTR licensing applications.
In addition to the above, I was the project manager for the development of NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, which is the NRCs primary guidance document for RTR licensing actions. I was also a consultant and technical committee member in the development of IAEA guidance documents for research reactors.
Finally, I held NRC Senior Reactor Operator and Reactor Operator licenses for the research reactor at the University at Buffalo for approximately 11 years. I was also the Reactor Engineer and a shift supervisor at the research reactor.
Q.4. Please explain what your duties have been in connection with the denial of the ARRR indirect license transfer application.
A.4. I have worked in the NRC organizational units responsible for the licensing of the ARRR from 1986 to present. As such, I have been aware of the NRC activities related to the ARRR during this time period and have participated in various internal discussions and in the drafting of various documents regarding the ARRR. Furthermore, since February 2013, I have served as the branch chief of the Research and Test Reactors Licensing Branch with first line management responsibilities for the licensing of the ARRR.
Q.5. What is the purpose of your testimony?
A.5. The purpose of my testimony is to explain the operational status of the ARRR in order to shed light on whether the assumptions and forecasts made by Aerotest and Nuclear Labyrinth that they will be able to operate the ARRR to generate sufficient revenue to cover its operation and spent fuel storage costs for the life of its license are at odds with governing realities.
Q.6. Please identify the documents that you reviewed or relied on for purposes of preparing your testimony.
A.6. The documents that I reviewed included the ARRR license1 and Technical Specifications2 as well as Aerotests 2005 application for renewal of the ARRR license.3 In 1
See Aerotest Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-228, Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR), Amendment to Facility Operating License, Amendment No. 1, License No. R-98 [Exhibit NRC-009] (ARRR License).
2 See Appendix A to License No. R-98, Technical Specifications for the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR) [Exhibit NRC-010] (ARRR TS).
addition, I relied on information in various NRC inspection reports associated with the ARRR.
Finally, I reviewed the Aerotest and Nuclear Labyrinth indirect license transfer application4 as well as their responses to Staff requests for additional information5 and the Staff safety evaluation associated with the application.6 Discussion Q.7. Please describe the ARRR.
A.7. The ARRR is a non-power reactor whose primary use is as a neutron source for neutron or N-ray radiography. The reactor is licensed for a maximum thermal power level of 250 kilowatts (kW).7 The reactor is not licensed for pulsing operation.8 The licensee normally operates the reactor at a maximum thermal power level of 150 kW. The applications for neutron radiography include: to ensure the correct assembly and positioning of small explosive devices; to detect hidden corrosion in aluminum components; to inspect mechanical systems; and to verify the integrity of welds.
3 See Aerotest Operations, Inc., Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR), Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Revision 0, Docket No. 50-228, License No. R-98 [Exhibit NRC-034]
(ARRR USAR).
4 See Letter from Dario Brisighella, President, Aerotest Operations, Inc., and Dr. David M.
Slaughter, Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear Labyrinth LLC, to NRC Document Control Desk, Application for Approval of Indirect Transfer of Control of License Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.80, Attachments 1-11 (May 30, 2012) [Exhibits NRC-008 and NRC-008(P)] (Application).
5 See Letter from Jay Silberg, Counsel, Aerotest Operations, Inc., to NRC Document Control Desk, Response to Request to Aerotest Operations, Inc. and Nuclear Labyrinth LLC to Supplement the License Transfer Application (July 19, 2012) [Exhibits NRC-018, NRC-018(P)] (RAI Response #1); Letter from Jay Silberg, Counsel, Aerotest Operations, Inc., to NRC Document Control Desk, Response to Request for Additional Information Re: Application for Approval of Indirect Transfer of Control of License of Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.80 (Oct. 15, 2012) [Exhibits NRC-022 and NRC-022(P)] (RAI Response #2); Letter from Jay Silberg, Counsel, Aerotest Operations, Inc., to the NRC Document Control Desk, Response to Request for Additional Information Re: Application for Approval of Indirect Transfer of Control of License of Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor Pursuant to CFR 50.80 (Jan. 10, 2013) [Exhibits NRC-026 and NRC-026(P)] (RAI Response #3).
6 See Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Indirect License Transfer of Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor Due to the Proposed Acquisition of Aerotest Operations, Inc. by Nuclear Labyrinth, LLC, Facility Operating License No. R-98, Docket No. 50-228 (Jul. 24, 2013)
[Exhibits NRC-027 and NRC-027(P)] (Safety Evaluation (SE)).
7 See Exhibit NRC-034 (ARRR USAR), at 4-1.
8 See id.
The neutron source for the ARRR is provided by nuclear fission in uranium fuel elements. The uranium fuel elements used in the ARRR are of two types: those which have aluminum cladding and those which have stainless steel cladding. Cladding is basically the shell that encases the uranium fuel. Cladding, among other things, serves to prevent the release of the radioactive fission products that are generated within the fuel during nuclear fission. The aluminum-cladded fuel elements are of the original Training, Research, Isotope production, General Atomic (TRIGA) fuel design from the 1950s. The stainless steel-cladded TRIGA fuel elements were developed in the 1960s by General Atomic; they provide a significant increase in safety margins over the aluminum fuel elements and have largely replaced the aluminum fuel elements, which are no longer manufactured. In fact, today, there are only three U.S. facilities in service in addition to the ARRR that use aluminum-clad TRIGA fuel elements and between them they only possess approximately 80 aluminum fuel elements. Both types of these fuel elements used in the ARRR are cylindrical in shape, with a diameter of about 1.5 inches and a height of about 29 inches. Uranium fuel slugs are stacked inside the cladding of each fuel element with a graphite reflector slug at the top and bottom of each fuel stack.
The ARRR has a lower and upper grid plate that are submerged in the reactor pool. The lower grid plate supports the reactor core and the upper grid plate helps maintain the geometry of the fuel elements. The fuel elements each have a nosepiece end fixture that fits into positioning holes in the lower grid plate that properly locates the fuel in the core. Fuel is loaded or removed from the reactor core by manually passing a fuel element through holes in the upper grid plate that align with the positioning holes in the lower grid plate to maintain the lateral position of the fuel. The ARRR core typically consists of about 85 fuel elements. Operation of the ARRR is prohibited when there are significant defects in any of its fuel elements.9 9
Exhibit NRC-010 (ARRR TS), at 11.
Q.8. What is a significant defect?
A.8. The ARRR Technical Specifications do not define what constitutes a significant defect. Historically, though, the Staff has considered fuel elements to be damaged if they are releasing fission products, do not meet the General Atomics stated limits on acceptable change in bow and length, or exhibit observable cladding defects. In my professional opinion, this would include fuel elements that are cracked and fuel elements that cannot be placed into or removed from the reactor core because they cannot pass through the upper grid plate due to swelling.
Q.9. Please describe the status of the ARRR.
A.9. On October 15, 2010, Aerotest voluntarily ceased operations of the ARRR.10 A letter from Aerotest dated January 7, 2011, stated that [r]eactor operations have ceased as of October 15, 2010 except for testing, sampling and fuel observations necessary to comply with the current reactor license. These observations may include annual fuel inspections, power calibration and quarterly excess reactivity testing.11 The last time that the reactor went critical was on December 5, 2011 at 100 watts for a required excess reactivity measurement.12 Q.10. Please describe the routine fuel inspection practices at the ARRR.
A.10. The practice at the ARRR is to visually inspect twenty percent of its fuel once each year and 100 percent of its fuel once every five years.
Q.11. Please describe the most recent 100 percent fuel inspection at the ARRR.
A.11. After the ARRRs October 15, 2010 shutdown, from December 5-12, 2011, the licensee attempted to conduct its once-every-five-years 100 percent fuel inspection. During that 10 Letter from Alfredo Meren, Reactor Supervisor, Aerotest Operations, Inc., to NRC, Annual Summary of Changes, Tests and Experiments at Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR),
Docket No. 50-228, for the period of 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 (July 31, 2012) [Exhibit NRC-035], at 1.
11 Letter from Michael Anderson, Secretary, Aerotest Operations, Inc., to NRC Document Control Desk, Docket No. 50-228 Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor License No. R-98 (Jan. 7, 2011)
[Exhibit NRC-036], at 1.
12 Letter from Sandra Warren, General Manager, Aerotest Operations, Inc., to Spyros Traiforos, NRC (Jan. 11, 2012) [Exhibit NRC-030], at 2.
inspection, the licensee discovered that a total of 27 aluminum fuel elements and 11 graphite reflector elements, which are similar in appearance to fuel elements but contain only graphite slugs, could not be removed from the reactor core (i.e., pulled out of the grid plates) because they were swollen in diameter.13 Specifically, because of swelling, these elements would not pass through the upper grid plate. Therefore, the licensee used an underwater video camera to inspect the aluminum fuel elements that could not be removed and discovered that four of them had cladding that was cracked. When a fuel elements cladding is cracked, radioactive fission products within the fuel can potentially escape the fuel.
From July 16-26, 2012, in order to complete its 100 percent fuel inspection, the licensee raised the upper grid plate and removed the 27 fuel elements from underneath using an articulating grapple tool.14 The inspection discovered 17 additional examples of aluminum fuel elements with cracked cladding.15 Combined with the four cracked aluminum fuel elements discovered from December 5-12, 2011 and an aluminum fuel element that had been previously taken out of service in 2007, this brought the total number of fuel elements at the ARRR with cracked cladding to 22 aluminum fuel elements. From December 10-13, 2012, the 22 cracked aluminum fuel elements were placed in canisters that were then stored at the bottom of the reactor pool.16 The Staff reviewing the licensees indirect license transfer application referred to the NRC inspection report detailing the discovery of these 22 cracked aluminum fuel elements in asking the licensee whether this discovery affected the operating condition of the ARRR and the 13 Id.
14 Letter from Gregory Bowman, NRC, to Sandra Warren, General Manager, Aerotest Operations, Inc., NRC Non-Routine Inspection Report No. 50-228/2012-204 (Aug. 14, 2012) [Exhibit NRC-032], at 9.
15 Id. at 10.
16 Letter from Gregory Bowman, NRC, to Sandra Warren, General Manager, Aerotest Operations, Inc., NRC Non-Routine Inspection Report No. 50-228/2012-206 (Jan. 7, 2013) [Exhibit NRC-037], at 8.
ARRRs cost-and-revenue projections.17 Subsequently, in its safety evaluation dated July 24, 2013, the Staff denied the indirect license transfer application in part because the status of the ARRR and its fuel created uncertainty regarding the ARRRs current and future operations.18 Q.12. What could be contributing to the occurrences of swelling and cracking of the ARRRs aluminum fuel elements?
A.12. Without conducting a detailed post-irradiation examination of one of the damaged aluminum fuel elements in a hot cell, a determination of the reason why this fuel is exhibiting the observed damage would be speculative. However, I have not seen such a large number of TRIGA fuel elements being removed from service as damaged over such a short period of time.
One factor that could possibly be contributing to this is the operating history of the ARRRs aluminum fuel elements. Before arriving at the ARRR, the aluminum fuel elements were first used in a TRIGA reactor in India and then in a General Atomic reactor. Subsequently, in 1965, Aerotest obtained these aluminum fuel elements19 and, since then, the ARRR has accumulated over 14 million kilowatt-hours of burn up20 and the fuel has been immersed in the reactor pool for almost 50 years.
Based on this operating history, environmental effects could be one potential factor for the development of the significant defects in the aluminum fuel elements. Specifically, fuel element cladding experiences a low level of corrosion even in high quality coolant. Therefore, even though there is no indication that the water quality has ever been compromised at the ARRR, corrosion effects on the aluminum fuel elements over time may have contributed to the observed fuel damage. Irradiation could be another potential factor. Specifically, the aluminum 17 Exhibits NRC-022 (RAI Response #2), at 5, 8 and NRC-022(P) (RAI Response #2), at 1-2, 4.
18 Exhibits NRC-027 (SE), at 14-15 and NRC-027(P) (SE), at 14-15.
19 Exhibit NRC-034 (ARRR USAR), at 1-6, 4-1.
20 Letter from Alfredo Meren, Reactor Supervisor, Aerotest Operations, Inc., to NRC, Annual Summary of Changes, Tests, and Experiments at Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR),
Docket No. 50-228, for the Period of 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 (July 28, 2011) [Exhibit NRC-043], at 5.
fuel elements have graphite reflectors at the top and bottom of their fuel stack and graphite can exhibit swelling given high neutron fluence. When their graphite reflectors swell, it can be difficult to remove fuel elements from the reactor core. This mirrors the recent experience at the ARRR where 27 aluminum fuel elements could not be removed due to swelling. Further, graphite reflector swelling can cause excessive stresses on the aluminum fuel elements, ultimately leading to cracks. Finally, since a significant number of the 27 aluminum fuel elements that could not be removed from the core were also cracked, there may be a relationship between fuel element swelling and cracking.
Q.13. With these cracked and swollen aluminum fuel elements, what was the status of the fuel at the ARRR at the time of the Staffs denial of the licensees indirect license transfer application?
A.13. The licensee owned and possessed 116 fuel elements, of which 77 were the older, aluminum-clad fuel elements and 39 were the newer, stainless-steel-clad fuel elements (12 of which were new and unused).21 As explained above, 22 of the aluminum-clad fuel elements had been removed from service because of cracked cladding, leaving 55 aluminum-clad fuel elements and 39 stainless-steel-clad fuel elements. However, about 10 of the remaining 55 aluminum fuel elements were swollen and could not be removed from the core.
The Staff considers swollen elements to be elements with significant defects and, therefore, not usable. In total, this left a potentially usable fuel inventory of about 84 fuel elements 22 21 Letter from Sandra Warren, General Manager, Aerotest Operations, Inc., to Spyros Traiforos, NRC (Aug. 15, 2013) [Exhibit NRC-033], at 4.
22 After the development of the Staffs safety evaluation, during the licensees next routine fuel inspection from July 24-26, 2013, the licensee discovered two more aluminum fuel elements with cracks, for a total of 24 cracked aluminum fuel elements that have been discovered. See Exhibit NRC-033, at 1.
These two elements have not yet been placed in canisters in order to allow for additional observation by the licensee. Id. at 4. This potentially decreases the ARRRs total usable fuel inventory to 82 fuel elements.
Q.14. Can the ARRR restart operations and operate for the period of its license with its fuel on hand?
A.14. This question requires detailed calculations for an exact answer; however, an approximate answer can be determined based on prior operating experience.
The ARRR normal operating core typically consists of about 85 fuel elements and may not contain more than 90 fuel elements according to the ARRR Technical Specifications.23 As a result, approximately 85 fuel elements (or possibly less if the 12 new stainless steel fuel elements are used in the core) would seem to be needed for ARRR operation today and the licensee does possess about this number of fuel elements.
This operational requirement of approximately 85 fuel elements, though, assumes that these fuel elements are actually usable in the ARRR, meaning that they must not have significant defects.24 The licensee has stated that it does not expect to need new fuel elements but that fuel evaluations were ongoing and would not be completed until the end of March 2013.25 Therefore, although the licensee has removed 22 cracked aluminum fuel elements from service and has about 10 swollen aluminum fuel elements, it is uncertain whether any more of its aluminum fuel elements have significant defects prohibiting their use in the ARRR.
Furthermore, in light of their shared design and operational history, it is uncertain whether the failure mechanism that led to the significant defects in these 22 cracked aluminum fuel elements and approximately 10 swollen aluminum fuel elements will lead to other of the aluminum fuel elements developing significant defects in the future. Because of these concerns, although the licensee may have enough fuel elements on hand to operate, it is currently unknown whether, or for how long, the licensee will actually be able to operate with this fuel consistent with the prohibition in its Technical Specifications against operations with fuel with significant defects.
23 Exhibit NRC-010 (ARRR TS), at 3.
24 See id. at 11.
25 Exhibits NRC-026 (RAI Response #3), at 7 and NRC-026(P) (RAI Response #3), at 4.
Q.15. Did the licensee ever provide the NRC with the fuel evaluations that it had stated that it was conducting and that would be done by the end of March 2013?
A.15. No.
Q.16. Could the licensee purchase new fuel elements to alleviate concerns with the operability of the ARRR and, if so, how much would this cost?
A.16. TRIGA fuel is made in France by TRIGA International. TRIGA fuel is not currently being fabricated due to upgrades to the fuel fabrication facility. It is anticipated that TRIGA fuel will again be available in the 2017 timeframe.26 Before fuel manufacturing was suspended, new stainless steel fuel elements similar to those used at the ARRR cost about
$60,000 each.27 Therefore, starting in 2017, the licensee could potentially purchase new fuel elements, at $60,000 per element, assuming that the price of the fuel elements does not change, in order to make up for any shortfall in its number of fuel elements on hand necessary to operate the ARRR.
Q.17. If the ARRR was shut down before the DOE acceptance of its fuel, scheduled for no earlier than 2055,28 what would be the licensees obligations under the Commissions regulatory requirements?
A.17. The licensee would need to conduct a number of activities to meet the requirements of the Commissions regulations and its license during a long-term period of reactor shutdown. The purpose of these activities is to safeguard nuclear material and protect the public health and safety and the environment. It is assumed that the fuel would continue to be stored in the reactor pool until removed prior to decommissioning activities.29 These fuel storage costs are not considered part of decommissioning.
26 Telephone Conversation with Tony Veca, General Atomics.
27 See email from Tony Veca, General Atomics, to Alexander Adams, NRC, RE: Typical fuel prices (May 6, 2014) [Exhibit NRC-038]; TRIGA Reactor Fuel Price List (Jan. 2012) [Exhibit NRC-039].
28 See Exhibits NRC-026 (RAI Response #3), at 6 and NRC-026(P) (RAI Response #3), at 3.
29 See Exhibits NRC-008 (Application), at 60, 81, 93, 102 and NRC-008(P), at 60, 81, 93, 102.
First, the material condition of the facility would need to be maintained. The facility was constructed in the 1960s. The structure and integrity of the building would need to be maintained. The integrity of the reactor pool would need to be maintained, along with the equipment for maintaining water quality and replacing pool water losses due to evaporation.
The security system would need to be maintained. Costs related to utilities, grounds maintenance, and taxes would continue to be incurred.
Second, the licensee would need to maintain a radiation protection program, a security program, and an emergency response capability. It would need to carry out surveillance requirements, such as verification that water chemistry continues to meet requirements, and periodic fuel inspections. The reactors safety committee would continue to operate and review licensee activities. The licensee would also need to continue to meet the administrative requirements of its Technical Specifications.
Third, the licensee would continue to pay fees for NRC activities such as license amendments and inspections.
Q.18. Approximately how much would these obligations cost per year?
A.18. The Staff has not performed a detailed analysis of these costs; however, the licensee has estimated them at $100,000 per year.30 Q.19. What are the total potential costs for the ARRR that could stem from the recently discovered significant defects in its aluminum fuel elements?
A.19. The significant defects in its aluminum fuel elements could affect whether, and for how long, the ARRR can operate and, thus, whether the licensee would have to purchase new fuel elements or else shut down the ARRR and incur spent fuel management costs. Any replacement of the ARRRs fuel elements would cost at least $60,000 per fuel element. If the ARRR lacked the requisite number of fuel elements without significant defects, it would have to 30 See Exhibits NRC-026 (RAI Response #3), at 6 and NRC-026(P) (RAI Response #3), at 3.
shut down. Maintaining the ARRR in a shutdown condition would cost approximately $100,000 per year and these costs would be incurred until its fuel elements are accepted by the DOE in 2055, at the earliest.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE PRESIDING OFFICER ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC. ) Docket No. 50-228-LT
)
(Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor) )
)
AFFIDAVIT OF ALEXANDER ADAMS JR.
REGARDING DENIAL OF THE INDIRECT LICENSE TRANSFER OF THE AEROTEST RADIOGRAPHY AND RESEARCH REACTOR I, Alexander Adams, Jr., do hereby declare under penalty of perjury that my statements in the foregoing testimony and my statement of professional qualifications are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Executed in Accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d)
Alexander Adams, Jr.
Branch Chief Research and Test Reactors Licensing Branch Division of Policy and Rulemaking Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (301) 415-1127 Alexander.Adams@nrc.gov Executed in Rockville, Maryland this 13th day of June, 2013