05000244/FIN-2009004-03
From kanterella
Revision as of 22:08, 16 November 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure To Meet Technical Specifications For Inservice Testing Requirements |
| Description | An NRC-identified NCV of TS 5.5.7, Inservice Testing (IST) Program, was identified when Ginna failed to implement the IST program in accordance with relief request GR-2. Relief request GR-2 states that if any limiting value is exceeded , the valve is immediately declared inoperable and the appropriate TS action statement is entered, if applicable. However, because only the high limiting value for stroke time was contained in the surveillance procedure, plant personnel did not identify that a valve did not meet the low IST limiting value for stroke time. As a result, Ginna did not declare turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TOAFW) recirculation valve, air-operated valve (AOV) 4291, inoperable until 9 days after it exceeded the IST low limiting value. Ginna\'s corrective actions included issuing an operations night order which provided instructions that after valve stroke timing was complete, the shift technical advisor or control room supervisor shall compare the stroke times to the action limit low and high values in Ginna\'s IST summary document prior to exiting the TS limiting condition for operation. Ginna entered this issue into their CAP for resolution. This finding was more than minor because additional unavailability of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system was accrued due to retesting AOV-4291 and Ginna\'s failure to include action limits and low limiting values for valve stroke timing in surveillance procedures is programmatic in nature and is not isolated to STP-0-16Q-T, AFW Turbine Pump Quarterly, Revision 00200, or TOAFW recirculation valve, AOV-4291. Therefore, if left uncorrected, this finding could become a more significant safety concern due to the potential not to detect valve degradation which could impact valve operability. This finding also affected the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding has a very low safety significance because the conditions did not result in an actual failure of the TDAFW recirculation valve or a loss of safety function, and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or a severe weather-initiating event. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect related to appropriate corrective actions in the CAP component of the problem identification and resolution area because Ginna did not take appropriate action to address this issue when it was identified on June 19, 2009, and documented in CR 2009-4248 (P.i.d. per IMC 0305). |
| Site: | Ginna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000244/2009004 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Rolph L Casey E Burket J Hawkins P Kaufman M Marshfield K Kolaczyk E Gray G Dentel N Perry |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
| ' | |
Finding - Ginna - IR 05000244/2009004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Ginna) @ 2009Q3
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||