05000327/FIN-2009004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Emergency Diesel Generator Operating Procedure |
| Description | A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the licensees failure to follow plant procedures for performing independent verifications of procedural steps. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1B-B was declared operable when it was unable to perform its required safety function due to 11 of 32 cylinder test plugs not being positioned as required following pre-start rolling, which subsequently resulted in EDG damage during testing. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 201282. The licensee performed corrective maintenance and returned the emergency diesel generator to service. The finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, in that operator error and damage to the 1B-B EDG rendered the EDG unavailable to perform its safety function. Using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the it did not represent a loss of safety function, a loss of single train of safety equipment for greater than the TS allowed outage time, a loss of significant maintenance rule equipment for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The cause of this finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component. It was directly related to the training of personnel H.2(b). Specifically, the operator that performed the independent verification of the vent valves positions did not receive training on the operation of the new design of EDG cylinder vent valves. (Section 1R15) |
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
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| Report | IR 05000327/2009004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Guthrie R Moore C Young M Speck B Collins J Eargle |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Sequoyah - IR 05000327/2009004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Sequoyah) @ 2009Q3
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