05000263/FIN-2009002-02
From kanterella
Revision as of 20:32, 28 October 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Failure to Adequately Evaluate Temporary Changes to RCIC Surveillance Procedures Prior to Implementation |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was self-revealed when the performance of an inadequately prepared temporary procedure change resulted in the inadvertent repositioning of a reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) containment isolation valve during the system restoration section of a RCIC surveillance test. The licensee took immediate corrective actions to identify the cause of the inadvertent valve actuation and to restore the valve to its proper position. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency affected the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, having work practices components, and involving aspects associated with appropriately coordinating work activities by incorporating actions to ensure that supervisory and management oversight of work activities is sufficient to support nuclear safety. (H.4(c)) The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately evaluate the impact of making temporary changes to existing plant procedures used to conduct Technical Specification surveillance testing was a performance deficiency warranting significance evaluation in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Disposition Screening. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Attachment 1, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, using the Phase 1 Worksheet for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. After answering No to all five questions in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone column of Table 4a, Characterization Worksheet for Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity Cornerstones, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance |
Site: | Monticello ![]() |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000263/2009002 Section 1R22 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
Inspectors (proximate) | K Riemer T Bilik K Stoedter S Thomas L Haeg V Meghani |
CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
INPO aspect | LA.2 |
' | |
Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2009002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Monticello) @ 2009Q1
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||