05000390/FIN-2010002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Establish Adequate Instructions or Procedure for Determining Vital Inverter Frequency |
| Description | A self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.7.1, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to properly implement SPP-2.2, Standard Programs and Processes Administration of Site Technical Procedures. Specifically, while performing vital inverter frequency verifications required by TS surveillance3.8.7.1, the licensee failed to take the actions specified in SPP 2.2 to implement a procedure change or write a new procedure when the surveillance could not be performed as written. As a result, the output of the unit 2 channel II safety-related vital inverter was short-circuited when improperly selected test equipment was connected across the inverters installed frequency meter. The short circuit condition damaged a power diode in the inverter circuit and caused annunciator fuses and the600 amp inverter power fuse to blow. The inverter automatically transferred to its nonbattery-backed bypass supply. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PER 212143.The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612 and determined that the finding was more than minor because the finding would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern if the licensees failure to work within the established work control process was left uncorrected. The finding was evaluated using the significance determination phase 1 screening criteria and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train of equipment for greater than its TS-allowed outage time. The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component. It was directly related to licensee making safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained H.1(a). Specifically, when it was determined the surveillance instruction could not be performed as written, the licensee did not use the established work control or procedure change processes in support of making the decision to substitute use of M&TE for the failed frequency meter. |
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
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| Report | IR 05000390/2010002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Guthrie R Baldwin M Pribish J Hamman W Deschaine R Monk |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Watts Bar - IR 05000390/2010002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Watts Bar) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Watts Bar)
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