Regulatory Guide 5.7

Control of Personnel Access to Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas

ML13350A204
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/30/1973
From:	US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
To:
References
RG-5.007
Download: ML13350A204 (10)

i U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

REGULATORY

DIRECTORATE

OF REGULATORY

STANDARDS Juno 1973 GuIDE REGULATORY

GUIDE 5.7 CONTROL OF PERSONNEL

ACCESS TO PROTECTED

AREAS, VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS

A. INTRODUCTION

Proposed amendments to the Commission regulations of 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities." 10 CFR Part 70. "Special Nuclear Material," and 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material," would, if adopted. require nuc..ures (I) for the protection against industrial sabotage of fuel reprocessing plants and certain facilities subject to tic provisions of 10 CFR Part 70 and (2) for tile protection of special nuclear mtaterial (SNM) against theft or diversion from certain licensed lacilities.

One element of this protection is proper control of access of personnel to and from protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas. Searching persons and packages for tirearms.

explosives, and other devices which could aid in sabotage or theft of SNM is another element of physical protection.

This guide describes acceptable methods of searching personnel prior to entry into a protected area and upon exit from a material access area, and of controlling access to protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas.

B. DISCUSSION

The objective of controlling access to protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas is to ensure that (I) only persons authorized access to a protected area are permilled within that area and (2) that only individuals authorized access to vital equipment or special nuclear material will be allowed within vital areas or material access areas.The objective of searching individuals prior tc permitting entry into a protected area is to prevent illicit passage into tile protected area of objects such as firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices which could aid in industrial sabotage to the facility or in tile theft of special nuclear material.

Searching individuals and packages for conce:;Ied special nuclear material at exit points from material access areas provides a means of detecting attempted theft or diversion of special nuclear material.Some meanis by which control of access can be accomplished include a key and lock system. a magnetic or electronic key-card system. an attendant guard or watchman, or a closed-circuit TV (CCTV) in conjunction with keys or key-cards.

Of these means. the magnetic or electronic key-card system in conjunction with closed.circuit TV offers the greatest security with a ininimurn of personnel.

The key-cards are mutch more difficult to duplicate tian keys and the locks cannot be "picked." Further, the control system can "read" the key-card and record the identity of the card (to whom it was issued)and the time of entry. A closed-cilcuit

1V system would allow visual observation of the access point without requiring an attendant guard or watchman.

In fact, by use of closed-circuit TV several such access points can be maintained under observation by a single guard or watchman.

Such a system would be especially useful at access points to remote or normally unoccupied vital areas or material access areas. In any case, visual observation, either directly or via CCTV, provides a positive neans of assuring that only individuals authorized access to an area pass through the access point into the area.Searching of individuals can be carried out by means of a hands-on search ("frisking").

or by means of devices which will detect the presence of weapons and explosives or SNM concealed on the individual, or by a combination of both. The search should be conducted in a manner which (I) provides as.surance that firearms, explosives, and other such contraband are not being carried into the protected area and that SNM is not USAEC REGULATORY

GUIDES Copies ol published guides may be obtained by request Indicating the divisions desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commisston.

Wathinglon, D.C 240645, Regulatory Guides are issued to denoribe and rrake available to the public Attention:

Director of Regulatory Standerds.

Comments and suggestions for methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of Implementing specific parts of Improvements In theta guides are encouraged end should be sent to the Secretary the Commisson';

regulations, to delineate techniques used by the stafl In of the Commission.

US. Atomic Energy CommIsslon, Washington.

DC. 20545, evaluating probtems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to Attention:

Chief. Public Proceedinmt Staff.applicants.

Regulatory Guidet are not substitutla for regulations and complIance with thenm is not reouired.

Methods and solutions different from those set out In The guides are Issued In the following lan broad divisions:

the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.

2. Poewerds and Teas Reactors 7. Traneportotlon I. Fuels and Matatials Facilities

8. Occupt.lional Health Published guides will he revised periodically, at appropriate, to accommodate

4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitruitt Review comments and to reflect new information or experience.

5. Materials and Plant Protection

10. Geonwal I.I being transportcd out of a material access area and (2)nminimizcs inconvenience to the individuals being searched.

The use of equipment capable of detecting weapons, explosives, or SNM is usually the preferable form of searching, since the use of detection devices avoids the personal imposition of a hands-on search.An "airport type" weapon (me tal) detector located in a passageway arranged so that all individuals entering the protected area pass through the detector provides a convenient and effective means ofsearching for firearms.Devices capable of detecting dynanmite.

TNT, and other explosives can be used to search individuals for concealed explosives.

Most explosive detectors commercialiy available at present are of the hand-held"sniffer" variety- hence an attendant guard or watchman must pass the detector over the individual being searched.

However, it is possible to locate an explosive detector in a passageway and to use the detector in the sanre manner that a fixed weapon detector is used.If a hand-held explosive detector is used, tIle explosive check is best made after the weapon detector has indicated that no weapon is concealed upon the individual.

This procedure affords greater protection to the attendant guard or watchman on the presumption that concealed explosives offer less of an immediate danger to the guard or watchman than a concealed firearm.One alternative approach to the hand-held explosive detector would be tile location of an explosive detector within a revolving-door frame. The rather small volume of air trapped in a section of the revolving door would be sampled by tile explosive detector and, as the isý)lation of the air volume by a revolving door section provides some concentration of vapors emitted by any explosives within that section, the 41fectiveness of the detector would be increased.

To further increase efficiency of thie explosive detector, the air in the door section might be flushed through the detector.Searching individuals for concealed SNM upon exit from material access areas can be accomplished in a variety of ways. For example, at facilities processing plutonium or uranium-233 the search for concealed SNM can be made in an attended air lock between change rooms. At areas where only highly enriched uranium is processed.

the search can be carried nut by use of a doorway SNM monitor and a metal detector in conjunction with a clused-circiit TV (C"CTV) system.hence a guard om watchman need notl be alleirdattl, However, whether or not the access voint is Attended.the use of both an SNM .-ot;iitor ain ,I itetal de tIotl would seemn iiecessary to asstirr that eni iched rIrailrl.shielded or Li1lshieldcd, is niot tnecorlcealcd.

It addition, exit from any imaterial access area sNhould bu controlled to assure that all individuals and packages exiting from a material access area pass through the SNM check system.It is the facility guards and watchmen who are charged with the responsibility of assuring that firearms, explosives, and other similar items or devices are not transported into the protected area and that SNM is not removed from a material access area without authorization.

Hence, they should search any packages being carried into thc protected area or out of a material access area. No individual should be allowed to directly hand carry any package, valise, tool box, or similar hand-carriable item into the protected area or out ot" a material access area. Such objects should be handed to an attendant guard or watchman who will check them and pass them into the protectcd area or out of the material access area. To further reduce the possibility of concealment, where feasible, bulky outer clothing such as overcoats, raincoats, greatcodits, and ski jackets should be left in a cloak room provided outside the protected area and in any case should never be taken into a material access area. The licensee may wish to use several members of the security force to check packages, coats, etc.. during shift change to minimize tile delay encountered in gaining access. Unattended access points into the protected area can be used. provided observation of such points is maintained by CCTV to assure that packages are not being hand carried into the protected area at that point.Posting of a sign in a conspicuous location will inform individuals requesting access into the protected area that they will be searched, and that any packages, etc., they wish to take into the protected area will also be searched.Although the Commission regulations do not require searching of individuals entering a material access area, observation of access points provides a convenient method of ensuring that personnel do not carry weapons, explosives, and other similar items or devices into the material access area.In emergency situations, such as those which may require the evacuation of a material access area, the objectives of access control and search should not be allowed to compromise health and safety. Hence, the licensee should develop plans of action and provide areas and equipment for searching and controlling access under emergency conditions compatible with the objectives of both safety and security.

Such emergency procedures will minimize the effectiveness of an emergency situation deliberately perpetrated to conceal theft of SNMN Admiinisirtaive controls, as well as physical barriers where applicable.

may be employed to gather evacuating individuals within a holding area. Such controls would serve both ro vetif' that to one has remained in 1he evacuated area and to ensure that an emergency 57.2

(0 situation will not successfully conceal an attempted theft of SNM.C. DEFINITIONS

For the purpose uf this guide (he following dve illilions

lLe provided

I ."Guard'" incan.i in armed arid uniforiied individual whose primary ditty is thie protection of materials and property to the ,txlcnit that theft of SNM or sabotage of thie facility curl Id pose a threat to tile common defense arid security or result in a r:adiological hazard to public health and sal'ct y.2. "Walchilnlul" Illealls all tin arnd individual.

nto nieces.iarily uinifornied, who provides protection for nialerials and property in tile course of performing oilier duties.3. -Patrol watrman'" means an ainis-qualified individual whose primary duty, at lcast during threat or enmergency situations, is the protection

.,f material and property, arid hvlio is normally unarmed but who may be armed during emergency or threat situations.

A patrol watchman may or may not be uniformed.

D. REGULATORY

POSITION I. Protected Areas I. Identity and Authorization At each access point into a protected area, an identlity and access authorization check should be made ini conjunction willi a search for firearms and explosives'

Si.!,:], idenlitv and access authorization checks should be performied by an attendant guard or watchman or by nmeans of an electronic or magnetic key-card system and a closed-circuit TV systenm. Packages should be taken into the protected area only at access points attended by a guard or watchman.

If the access point is unattended, the individual monitoring.

the access point via closed-circuit TV should carefully observe any individual requesting access at that point to ensure that no packages arc being carried into the protected area.b. Personnel Search If tile search of individuals is to be carried out by mezuis of detection equipment, a weapon (metal)detector anl(] an explosive detector should be used. An acceptable arrangement for the use of detection equipnmenI

in a secure access passageway is illustrated in Figure 1. The doors oil the secure access passageway should be interlocked so that both cannot be sinniltaneously open, thus providing positive access control. An explicit enabling act should be required of a security individual, either attending the secure access passageway or in the central alarm station, to open the inner door.c. Metal Detector The metal detector located within (tie secure access passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum of 200 grams of non-forrous metal placed anywhere on the body at a )0% conifidence limit. The false alarm rate should be a niaxi mnum of' I d. Explosive Detector The explosive detector, as a miliniumn.

hould be capable of' detecting dynaimite.

TNT. and similar nitrogen compounds in nminiimim amountsl of 200 gramis at a 90%-. confidence hinil, The false alarii rate should be a miaxinium of 1V,.. If deteclor is hand held rather than permanently fixed to a passageway or revolving door framle, lieice requiriing an attendanlt guard or watchlmaui, the search for explosives should be IerTornied after the search for firearms.

An acceptable arrangi.ent is illustrated in Figure 2.e. Alarm Ani. niciation The alarins of tile weapon detector arid tile explosive detector should annunciate at the location of tile detectors, if attended, as well as in a centrad alarm station. The alarm annunciation at the location of tile detectors need not be aural.f. Alarm System The alarms of the weaponi (metal) detector and tihe explosive detector should be interfaced with (lie inner door lock so ihal. with aln alarm triggered.

Ihe inner door cannot be opened from either side without a specific action by the individual manning the central alarm station acknowledging the alarm and enabling the inner door to be opened.2. Material Access Areas Containing Pu or U-233 a. Change Room Exit Checking for c on cealed plutoniumn or uranirim-233 at all exit point from a material access area into a protected area should be performed in an attended secure access passageway located between change rooms. An acceptable arrangement is shown in Figure 3. Unless exit is into a contiguous material access area, all individuals should exit from a nmatcrial access area, other than a vault, only via tie change rooms arid should be required to deposit all work clothing in tile inner change room. walk through tihe passageway, and dress in street clothing in (lie outer change room. The licensee should generally not allow packages to be transported out of the miaterial access area via tire change rooms. Showers, except those used exclusively for health plhysic.s, should be located in thie outer change room. A guard or watchman need not be altendant except when personnel are exiting from the material access area.b. SNM Detector An SNM detector should be located within the passageway.

T1he detector should be capable of detecting 0.5 gram of plutonium or I gram of uraniun-233 shielded by 3 min of brass concealed anywhere on an individual at a 9Oi confidence limit. The false alarm rate on the detector should be less than 0.1%.5.7-3

0 c. Door Interlock The doors of tile attended secure access passageway should be interlocked so that both cannot be simultaneously open. The doors should also be alarmed.so that an explicit action must be taken by either the attendant security individual or the individual manning the central alarm station to enable either door to open without triggering the alarm.d. Packages All packages.

including waste barrels and work clothes hampers, being transported out of a material access area should be checked by an attendani guard or watchman for concealed SNM, preferably at an exit point expressly provided for packages.

SNM packages should be checked for proper seals, identification, and transfer documentation.

e. Change Room Access Access by personnel into a material access area should he permitted only through the change rooms.Control of access should be accomplished either by a guard or watchman attending the secure access passageway between the change rooms, or by a combination of key-card and CCTV when the passageway is unattended.

f. Observation of Individuals Procedures should be employed in the control of access to material access areas to ensure that no lone indihidual is allowed within a material access area without some means to observe that individual's activities.

3. Material Access Areas Containing Highly Enriched Uranium, and Vaults Containing SNM a. Exit At material access area exit points, the check for concealed SNM should be carried out by means of an SNM doorway monitor and a metal detector.

A secure access passageway located at the exit point from the material access area should house the detection equipment.

An attendant guard or watchman or a closed-circuit TV connected to the central alarm station should also be provided.

Administrative procedures should require the passage of packages only through attended exit points. The doors of the secure access passageway should be interlocked so that both cannot be simultaneously open. A suggested layout is illustrated in Figure 4.b. SNM Detector The SNM doorway monitor in the secure access passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum of 3 grams uranium enriched to 90t10 in the uranium-235 isotope in 3 mm of brass concealed anywhere on an individual at a 50,7 confidence limit. The false alarm rate should not exceed 0. 1%, c. Metal Detector The metal detector in the secure access passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum of 100 grams of non-ferrous metal (shielding)

at a 90%confidence limit concealed anywhere on an individual.

The false alarm rate should not exceed 0.1%.d. Alarms The doors of the se. :tre access passageway should be alarmed and interfaced with the doorway monitor such that an individual can be detained for a sufficient time for the doorway monitor to operate. If an individual passes through without waiting for the proper period of time (perhaps indicated by a light) the alarm should sound. The doorway monitor and metal detector alarms and the door alarms should annunciate in the central alarm station and may also annunciate at the passageway.

e. Access The exit points from the material access area should be used for access points as well. Control of access should be by either the attendant security individual or by a key-card CCTV system.f. Closed-Circuit TV Observation If observation of the passageway is accomplished by CCTV, the guard or watchman monitoring the passageway should carefully observe any individual widtin to ensure that no packages are being carried into or out of the access area.g. Observation of Individuals Procedures should be employed in the control of access to material access areas to ensure that no lone individual is allowed within a material access area without sonic means to observe that individual's activities.

h. Vaults A key-card CCTV system should be employed to control access to and from a vault if such access and exit points do not open to or from material access areas contiguous to the vault. In addition, all individuals who transport SNM between material access areas or to or from a vault, should be escorted by a member of the facility's security force during any period of the transport that the SNM is not within a material access area.4. Vital Areas Control of access into vital areas should be accompli fl ither by an attendant guard or watchman, or by meiýn , i nagnetic or electronic key-card access in conjunctint:

with closed-circuit TV. The identification checi: .,tid include either direct observation by an.attendant guard or watchman or observation by CCTV of each individual passing into the vital area, or some alternate means (e.g.. an escort) which will provide 5.7-4 pisitive asstrance that only individuals authorized access to the vital area are permitted to pass into that area.5. Security Force Response to an Alarm The guard:; and patrol watchmen should be trained and prepared to protect the facility from sabot::ge and tihe SNM within from theft.a. Protected Area Access Point SIlion anlnunciatiot, ot all alarni from explosive Or Lea rt detectir tl eqtuirnment loc:ated at a protected area access point attended by a lone guard or watchman.a gtr:-rd 'hould lc dispatched iCnIlediatelV

to the access point oripinating the "d:rni. If the ac,:ess point is unaltellded.

two .,r: should h%, sent to thie access pointi. At the a,ces, poittil th,: 0ti'rd or watchmlan should!eLicsi t tha 11,Cividluafl'.

pockets be emptied and that the ilndividUal la.s arilin 1hioudi the detection cquiipmen'n.

I1 the i: dividu.al complies and if the alarms do inot register.

tie individual may be allowed to pass into the protected area after the contents of the individual's pocketis have beet examnined verifying that nto atleruipt has been made to pass explosives or firearms into the proleeted area. If. however, all alarmi continues t) register.

tie individual should be physically searched 1w a%,n tiarned security individual, while at least one gCaif or armcd pitrol watchnian observes.

to verify that no firearms or explosives are yet concealed by the hndividtral.

I!* tile individual relfuses to comply with the ren.ýuesl tI r furthher searching, or if a weapon or cexpiosives

tic ftound. tlie individual should be denied h. -Materil Access Area Exit Point If an SNM or metal delector alarii or a door.'ir~i is triggered at a miatcrial access area exit point ated bd hv a guard or watchman or at all unattended A.,lt point, security personnel, at least one of whom is armled (a guard or arnied patrol watchman).

should be dispatched to that exit point. The individual should be scatrhed bw emptying pockets and passing again through!O detection equipment or by a hands-on search 1.xrfortned by an unarmed security individual while at least ote guard or arnied patrol watchman observes.

Th, ca~(, of the alarm should be determined before the individual is ieleased.

If the cause of the alarti was an uhiect. metal or SNM, not concealed by the individual.

thl. individual should be searched without the object to ensure that the object is not a decoy and that SNM is olt still tk:ing concealed by the individual.

If the::cur 1ity personnel determine that attempted unauthtorized removal of SNM has been made with tile intent to .;teal SN.M, local police and the Federal Bureau Wf Investigation should be contacted.

and tile individual should be field by the security personnel until the local polio: arrive and arrest the individual.

c. Unoccupied Vital Areas and Material Access Areas It1 unautllioried ent ry is made or atlempted into a vital area or material access arca. or if atn intrusiorn alarm protecting all unoccupied vital or material access area is triggered, two drnied xecuirity personnel should he dispatched immediately to the area of al:irn. If.however. the area of the alarm can be obsev.:ed by CCTV. tile guard or valchniman in the alrm :.iation whiere the TV mronitor is located should first verily tile existence of intrusiOn and assess tile extent of a tharc:. if any. before dispatching flie security persottnef.

If ilie ,,i,.cti ce of all intrusion is verified, cither by CCTV or:;CCLMiy personnel in tile area, a law en 'oreeren juimi'ty should be nolified imnmediately.

It" pos,;ible.

tli ifiatruder(s)

found by tile security persotnel shothd searched and detadned until arrest by local police.6. Emergency Procedures The licensee should provide proteduhres anrd equipmen t to maintain the level of access control and SNM and facility protection during condilions of emergency or equipment failure. E-mergency procedures should be developed and executed in a rimtiner consistent with safety.a. Evacuation Procedures During emergency conditions which require evacuation of part or all of the facility.

lemporafry SNM checking stations should be established at the perinucler of tile protected area or at a personnel collection area outside the protected area. All individuals should he searched for concealed SNM before being released from the protected area or collection area. In addition, a roll of all individuals

%,,ho had entered tile evacutated area should be taken to ensure that all have evacuated .alfely.If an evacuation or other emergency alarm souttids.guards and watchmen should take at prearranged surveillance points to ensure that: (I) Proper evacuation routes :ire being observed, (2) SNM is not being tossed over tile protected area perimeter harrier, and (3) No one atteinpts to gain trnatlhorized access to the protected area during tile emergency.

b. Failed Detection Equipment Failed detection equipment should be repaired as quickly as possible.

Ill the interim, alternate access or exit points or hand-held detection devices or hands-on search procedures should be employed, Ili no case should the failure of equipment be allowed to compromise tihe protection of the facility or the SNM within the facility.

S ip4sitive assurance that only individuals authorized access to the vital area are permit ted to pass into that area.5. Security Force Response to an Alarm The guard:, and patrol watchnmen should be trained and prepared to protect tlie l'acility firom sahotage and the SNNI within fromi thelt.a. Protected Area Access Point I Ilion1 annunciation of an alarin from explosive or weapon detctiiOn equipment located at a protected area access point attended by a lone guard or watchman, a guard should be dispatched inmediately to the access poii't originating tile alarm. If the aczess point is t1tlat tenrdell.

two .should be sent to the access point. At the ajces; point the guard or watchman shouldthar dhc itlividual's pockets be emptied and that the individual pas again tlhr'ough Ltie detection equipment.

If the individual complies and if tile alarms do not register.

tile individual may be allowed to pass into the protected area after the contents of the individual's pockets have been examined verifying that no at lempt has been made to pass explosives or firearms init, the protected area. It1. however. an alarm continues fit register.

thle individual should be physically searched 1wv all unarmed security individual.

while at least one.Ciad or armed patrol watchman observes.

to verify that nio firearms or explosives are yet concealed by tie individual.

If the individual rfiuses to comply with the request for further searching, or if a weapon or expiosives are found, the individual should be denied*kcces:ý.1). Material Access Area Exit Point If an SNM or nietal detector alarm or a door ,arran, is triggered at a material access area exit point t by a guard or watchman or at an unattended exit point. security personnel, at least one of whom is armied (a guard or armed patrol watchman).

should be dispatched to that exit point. Tile individual should be searched by emptying pockets and passing again through thi' detection equipment or by a hands-on search performed by an unarmed security individual while at least one guard or armed patrol watchman observes.

The caosc of the alarm should be determined before the individual is feleased.

If the cause of the alarm was an object, metal or SNM, riot concealed by the individual, tile individual should be searched without the object to ensure that tile object is not a decoy and that SNM is nrot still b-ing concealed by the individual.

If the security personnel determine that attempted unauthorized removal of SNM has been made with the intent to .4tcal SNM, local police and the Federal Bureau of Invesligation should he contacted.

and the individual should be held by the security personnel until the local police arrive and arrest the individual.

c. Unoccupied Vital Areas and Material Access Areas It' unauthoried en ry is made or atternited into a vital area or material access area. or if an intrusion alarm protecting an unoccupied vilal or material access area is triggered.

two arrmed security personnel should he dispatched imnediately to tihe area of alarm. It.however. tile area of' the alarmn can be obsc.'ed by CCTV, the guard or vatlchman in the alarm ,,atlihri where the TV monitor is located should first verify the existence of intrusion and assess the extent of 'tihrkal.

it l any. before dispatching thie security personnel.

i1 the exiStence of anl intrusion is verified, either by CCTV or sccuniny personnel in tlie area, a law enforcement aJltno ily should be nolified immediately.

If' pts,.ihle.

th,' nitnider(s)

found by the security personnel sh,0tm1d searched and detained until arrest by local police.6. Emergency Procedures The licensee should provide procedures

nd equipment to maintain the level of access conitrol ;anld SNM and facility protection during conditions ot'emergency or equipment failure. Etmergency procedures should be developed and executtcd in a mn

arne consistent with safety.a. Evacuation Procedures During emergency conditions whicil reqinte evacuation of part or all of live facility.

lemporary SNM checking stations should be established at the peri neler of thie protected area or at a personnel collection area outside the protected area. All individuals should Le searched for concealed SNM before being released nrono tile protected area or collection area. In addition, a roll of' all individuals who had entered the evacu:ated area should be taken to ensure that all have evacuated .allly.if an evacuation or other emergency alarm souinds.guards and watchmen should take positio- at prearranged surveillance peints to ensure that: (i) Proper evacuation rouics are being observed, (2) SNM is not being tossed over tire protected area perimeter barrier, and (3) No one attempts to gain unarlhtorized access to the protected area during tIre emergency.

b. Failed Detection Equipment Failed detection equipment should be repaired as quickly as possible.

In the interim, allernlale access or exit points or hand-held detection devices or hands-on search procedures should be employed.

In no case should the failure of equipment be allowed to compromise the protection of tlie facility or tire SNM within the facility.0 5.7-5 PROTECTED

AREA-J'CCTV CAMERA-N PERIMETER

FENCE-x_ X-xx-X-x--

EXPLOSIVES

DETECTOR-/

1 KEY-CARD READER---'

INNER DOOR-WEAPON (METAL) DETECTOR KEY-CARD READER (FOR EXIT),-PERIMETER

FENCE a ----ACCESS PASSAGEWAY

OUTER DOOR Figure 1 SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY

INTO PROTECTED

AREA (UNATTENDED)

0.

t" PROTECTED

AREA INNER DOOR WEAPON DETECTOR PERIMETER

FENCE co cn>0 0 m mCA I/GUARD STATION I PERIMETER f FENCE_kz __ lz %y _%Z-J OFFICES--- ~ I OUTEF DOOR RECEPTION AREA-I.Figure 2 SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY

AT ENTRANCE TO PROTECTED

AREA (ATTENDED)

PROTECTED

AREA ENTRANCE Figure 3 SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY

BETWEEN CHANGE ROOMS

I PROTECTED

AREA--MATERIAL ACCESS AREA KEY-CARD Figure 4 READER~SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY

AT EXIT FROM MATERIAL ACCESS AREA