Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 40163 | 16 September 2003 16:14:00 | U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) was notified by U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) on September 16, 2003 of an accident at Fort McCoy, WI on July 19, 2003. On July 19th, a M109 howitzer was being transported by a HumV when the HumV rolled over. Responders to the scene of the accident observed no physical damage to the M14 quadrant of the howitzer, which contains 2.2 Curies of tritium. Since no physical damage was observed, no wipe test was performed. On or near September 10, 2003, the howitzer was sent to a combined support maintenance shop (CSMS) for repair. At the CSMS site, a wipe test was performed on the quadrant (per procedure: prior to any repair on tritium fire control devices, a wipe test is performed). The quadrant was wipe tested on September 15, 2003 at a location inside the dial cavity and showed removable tritium contamination at 300,000 decades per minute. CECOM reported the incident to TACOM on September 16, 2003. Direction was given by TACOM to remove the device from the M109 howitzer, double bag it, and transfer to waste disposal. The area on the howitzer where the M14 quadrant was mounted is to be decontaminated and retested. Leak test results will be forthcoming from the CECOM lab to TACOM. |
| ENS 40207 | 30 September 2003 17:47:00 | On 9/19/03, the U.S. Army Base at Fort Wainwright, AK sent a shipment of five M-119 Howitzers to the National Forest Service in California to be used for avalanche control. Prior to shipment, the Tritium fire control devices were removed from the Howitzers and placed in boxes. The boxes containing the fire control devices were inadvertently shipped along with the Howitzers. Two boxes, containing a total of 19.4 curies of tritium, ended up at the Alpine Meadows ski resort in Tahoe City, CA. Another 3 boxes, containing a total of 28.2 curies of tritium, ended up at the Mammoth Mountain ski resort in Mammoth Lake, CA. The National Forest Service will keep the tritium fire control devices in a secure storage location overnight, and they will be picked up by the Radiation Safety Officer from Hawthorne Army Depot on the morning of 10/1/03.
Fort Wainwright, Alaska was given authority to ship 5 ea M119 howitzers to the National Forest Service in California as part of the avalanche control program. Three of the M119's were to be shipped to Mammoth Lakes, CA and two to Alpine Meadows ski area in Tahoe City, CA. The howitzers were in storage and therefore had their tritium fire control devices removed and placed in their associated BII boxes. All of the fire control devices were properly stored in their BII boxes prior to shipment from Alaska. When the shipment was processed the shippers failed to remove the tritium devices from the Bll boxes (a grand total of 47.6 curies). Therefore the tritium devices were inadvertently shipped with the howitzers on 19 Sept 2003. On 29 Sept 2003, two howitzers, with BII boxes, were received at Alpine Meadows ski area, Tahoe City, CA and three howitzers, with BII boxes, were received at Mammoth Mt. ski area, Mammoth Lake, CA. Upon discovering radioactive commodities had been received, the National Forest Service called the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command (TACOM). The TACOM RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) contacted the RSO at Hawthorne Army Depot, Hawthorne, CA on 30 Sept 2003 and requested their aid in capturing the radioactive components. On October 1st, 2003 the Hawthorne Army Depot RSO took possession of all the tritium fire control devices. Wipe surveys are being evaluated and disposition of the components will be determined upon receipt of the results. Notified R3DO (Lara), R4DO (Cain) and NMSS EO (Janosko). |
| ENS 40271 | 23 October 2003 12:45:00 | The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile: Army personnel discovered a broken M1A1 collimator at the MATES (Maneuver Area Training Equipment Site) VAARNG (Virginia Army National Guard), Ft. Pickett, Blackstone, VA on 9 October 2003. The item was leak tested, double bagged and placed into a foot locker in an outdoor location. (Tritium) contamination levels on the collimator (were) 2.68 (micro Curies) and in the footlocker where the collimator sat, .087 (micro Curies). The state RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) will retrieve this item and place it in a low level radioactive waste storage site for future disposal. The State of Virginia has been notified of the incident. |
| ENS 40529 | 18 February 2004 12:47:00 | On December 16, 2003, the US Army shipped a telescope firing component containing a 2.65 curie tritium source via DHL air from Vicenza, Italy to St. Louis MO destined to Siler Instruments, a US Army contractor. The source was discovered missing on January 5, 2004. It was determined that the package did not arrive in Cincinnati, OH, the point of entrance through US Customs. The US Army received a final notice from DHL on January 26, 2004 that the box containing the missing source cannot be located. The Army Health Physicist has contacted NRC Region 3 and is in the process of finalizing the 30-day written report. |
| ENS 40606 | 23 March 2004 15:15:00 | On 03/03/04 the Texas National Guard discovered that one of their M1A1 tanks which was stored in a outside fenced area at their Army training facility in Wylie, Texas was missing a tritium beam splitter from its muzzle reference sensor. A thorough search was made of the entire area with negative results and a wipe of the tank also tested negative. The beam splitter contained a sealed 10 curie tritium source. All of the other tanks stored in the same fenced area with the one having the missing source were inspected and found to be intact.
Following reinspection, it was determined that the tritium beam splitter was not missing from the muzzle reference sensor. The individual who conducted the initial inspection could not see the illumination in the day light. When it was reinspected in a dark area, appropriate illumination was noted. Therefore the source was still in the beam splitter. Notified NMSS (Psyk), R3DO (Madera) and R4DO (Graves). |
| ENS 40650 | 6 April 2004 12:15:00 | The US Army Tank Automotive Armaments Command reported that, during routine maintenance following live fire exercises at the National Training Center, Fort Erwin, CA, the US Army determined that the beam splitter from the muzzle reference sensor was missing from the muzzle of one of the tanks. The beam splitter contains a 10 curie tritium sealed source. The range was searched with negative results. Device number: NR-155D-120-S. |
| ENS 40751 | 14 May 2004 17:38:00 | The incident occurred at Ft Carson, CO in the Direct Support (DS) maintenance Shop on 13 May 2004. It involved a M64A1 mortar sight unit containing 6.69 curies of tritium gas in sealed source form (NSN 124001-379-7953). The M64 mortar was being turned in by the 10th Special Forces for routine maintenance. It was discovered that a mechanical pin needed to be removed from the M64 in order to fix it. After fixing the pin the device was leak tested. Leak test results showed removable contamination of approximately 2.5 million dpm (disintegrations per minute) (1.12 microcuries). The RSO took immediate action upon receiving the wipe test result of the device. He double bagged the device and placed it in a secured area. Several area wipes were performed of the shop area and of areas outside the shop area. The shop area showed contamination ranging from 500 dpm to 900 K dpm. The RSO took action to remove items from the shop that were contaminated. Survey results showed that the tritium contamination did not spread outside of the machining area. Three persons were bioassayed. Bioassay results were not available at the time of this report. |
| ENS 40941 | 11 August 2004 12:06:00 | On 28 July 2004, at approximately 0920 hours, the installed Tritium-in-Air monitor for the Tritium Instrument Repair Room (TIRR) at Maintenance Center Albany ((MCA), Georgia) abruptly alarmed. On 27 July 2004, the six counter sources (0.45 Curies each/2.7 Curie total) contained within the gear box of an M137 panoramic telescope had been replaced. The M137 unit was placed on an alignment fixture on the morning of 28 July. Upon alarm actuation, the TIRR and the Optics/Fire Control Shop were evacuated. Assembly of personnel was in a common area exterior to the shop. The MCA radiation protection assistant (RPA) and the Base radiation safety officer (BRSO) were summoned. Entry into the TIRR was made with the use of a Johnston Labs Model 111 portable tritium-in-air monitor. Suspicions were satisfied when the portable tritium-in-air monitor indicated 30-microCuries/m3 of tritium gas in the immediate vicinity of the test fixture and mounted M137 panoramic telescope. The TIRR utilizes a negative pressure ventilation system, which is directly ducted to the environment. The door to the TIRR was opened and within approximately one-half hour, the gaseous tritium levels had been reduced to background. The M137 was double bagged and placed within the TIRR vent hood. Two workers were present in the TIRR when the evacuation alarm sounded. The shop supervisor entered the area to assess the accuracy of the alarm condition. These three individuals were sent to the on-base medical clinic for urine collection. Samples were taken at time zero plus four hours, time zero plus eight hours, and for the-twenty-four hour period immediately following the time zero plus eight hour sample. The primary worker received a slight uptake of gaseous tritium. Dose calculations for that uptake proved the uptake to be (statistically) less than 0.0 milliRem. The other worker and the supervisor showed no evidence of any tritium uptake. Contamination wipes revealed no contamination of the test fixture or the wall.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: This note is to rescind the incident report number 40941. The event occurred at a Marine Corp Base in Albany, GA. The initial call into the NRC Operation Center on 10 August, 2004, stated that this was a potential incident under Part 30.5. After further review of the incident we have concluded and concurred with by Mr. Darrel Wiedeman, Region III, that the release of tritium was very minimal resulting in no closure of work areas, no surface contamination of work areas, or radiation dose to employees involved. The event therefore is determined to be non-reportable. Notified R1DO(Jackson), R2DO(Julian), R3DO(Clayton) and NMSS (Essig). |
| ENS 41211 | 19 November 2004 15:08:00 | During an exercise conducted in May 2004 at Camp Shelby, MS an M1A1 Collimator, NSN 1240-00-332-1780, containing 10 Curies Tritium was removed from service, i.e., possibly broken, and double-bagged for storage. The device was subsequently transported from Camp Shelby to Shelbyville, TN and ultimately forwarded to the Combined Support Maintenance Shop of the TN National Guard located in Smyrna, TN for repair. A routine pre-maintenance wet swipe test indicated contamination levels as high as 619,094 disintegrations/min using a liquid scintillation meter. This corresponds to an activity of 0.27 microcuries. Two TN National Guard staff have submitted samples for bioassay. The results will be available on Monday, 11/22. Radiation surveys conducted at the Shelbyville and Smyrna, TN storage locations were negative. The device is currently double-bagged in the low level rad waste storage area of the Combined Support Maintenance Shop awaiting disposal. |
| ENS 41325 | 12 January 2005 16:36:00 | On 1/5/05 during maintenance activities at the Oregon National Guard Camp Withycombe located in Clackamas, OR, two (2) M43A1 Chemical Agent Cells (reg. device #1129-D-102S) were discovered missing. Each missing Chemical Agent Cell contained an Am-241sealed source of 250 microCuries. The serial numbers for the two (2) missing sources are Z03-C-12123 and Z03-C-05051. An exhaustive search of the maintenance area including the low-level waste disposal facility was conducted with negative results. |
| ENS 41514 | 22 March 2005 13:50:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee by fax. On 17 March 2005, the TACOM-RI RSO received a call from the Ft. Sill RSO informing the licensee that he discovered 3 ea broken M1A1 collimators (nsn 1240-00-332-1780 sealed source registration no. NR-155-S-102-S). Each M1A1 collimator contains a 10 curie sealed source lamp. One collimator (s/n 933) was discovered in a training area. After this collimator was discovered, the Ft Sill RSO immediately proceeded to inspect all M1A1 collimators found in the 3/30th Field Artillery, sections 2nd, 3rd, and 6th. As a result of this inspection, the RSO discovered two additional broken M1A1 collimators, (s/n's 8644, 4116). The RSO immediately took survey wipes of the collimators and areas where they were located. There was no physical damage on the exterior of the devices or cases containing the devices. Physical damage was observed of the tritium sealed source cell itself, however exterior lenses were intact on all three collimators. It could not be determined how the damage occurred. Leak tests were performed on the three collimators with the following results s/n 933 (837,000 dpm or 3.7E-4 millicuries), s/n 8644 (6,950 dpms or 3.1E-7 millicuries), and s/n 4116 (26,300 dpms or 1.2E-5 millicuries). Only Collimator s/n 933 exceeded reportable limits (110,000 DPM). The RSO secured the purging and training areas upon discovery of the broken devices and conducted area survey in the purging area, conex trailers (where collimators are stored) and training area. None of the areas surveyed had removable tritium contamination in excess of 5,000 dpms. Tritium bioassay samples were taken on individuals (approx 10) who may have actually handled the broken M1A1 collimators. Bioassay samples will be analyzed at the US Army lab, CHPPM Aberdeen, MD. At the time of this report, the bioassay results were not available, The Ft Sill RSO has secured the three collimators in a low-level rad waste storage site for future disposal. |
| ENS 41865 | 22 July 2005 19:43:00 | The following information was discussed with the U.S. Army (Gizicki), and faxed to HOC: On 23 Dec 04 a Stryker vehicle (sn CV007-01) containing one ea M88 ACADA detector (NSN 6665-01-438-3673 with possible s/n Y14-D-19158 ) was shipped from Ft. Lewis, WA to General Dynamics Land System (GSLS) in Sterling Hts, MI. The M88 ACADA is hard mounted in the Stryker vehicle. The M88 ACADA contains 30 millicuries of Ni-63 in sealed source form. The particular vehicle with the M88 was to be retrofitted and tested for shipment to Iraq. The stryker vehicle was received at GDLS Sterling Hts. on 28 Feb 2005. The Stryker vehicle with the M88 was driven from GDLS, Sterling Hts, MI to GDLS Shelby, MI on 28 Feb 05 in order to be equipped with other components and inspected. On 25 March 2005 the Stryker was shipped to Fort Huachuca, AZ where the vehicle was to be further tested. The Stryker vehicle was shipped from EPG Ft. Huachuca, AZ to Yuma Proving Grounds, AZ on 25 March 2005 for additional testing. The vehicle was then shipped from Yuma PG to Ft. Lewis, WA where it was received on 4 April 05. On 13 April 05 the M88 ACADA was discovered missing at Ft. Lewis WA. The Licensee was notified on 17 May 05 of the missing M88 detector. Between May 17 and 11 July 2005 an extensive search for the missing M88 occurred at GDLS (Sterling Hts., MI, Shelby MI and Auburn, WA sites), Yuma PG, AZ, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, and Ft. Lewis, WA. The missing M88 could not be found and presumed lost or stolen. The Army is currently conducting their own investigation of the lost device through the Army CID office. |
| ENS 42713 | 18 July 2006 13:58:00 | On July 6, 2006 a range indicator SSDR no. NR-155-S-116-S containing (four) 0.8 Ci (curies) tritium lamps (3.2 curies total) was broken during a maintenance procedure at Ft. Bragg, NC Special OPS, 3rd Group Direct Support weapons room, Bldg E-1978. The Ft. Bragg RSO was notified on 7 July 2006 of the incident. Improper maintenance procedure was the reason for the breakage of the tritium sealed source. Two persons were involved in the incident. One tritium bioassay was taken of one individual. The second individual did not have a bioassay taken due to the fact he went on TDY (Temporary Duty) before the discovery of the accident. Leak test of the broken range indicator showed removable contamination of 0.95 microcuries. An area survey of the weapons room by the Ft. Bragg RSO showed a maximum contamination of 0.3 micro curies (64,944 dpm). The Ft. Bragg RSO closed and secured the arms room from re-entry of personnel. The Ft Bragg RSO performed decontamination of the weapons room and brought the tritium removable contamination below regulatory concerns (<10,000 dpm). The licensee was notified of the incident on July 12, 2006. |
| ENS 43548 | 3 August 2007 16:32:00 | Location : Anniston AD (Army Depot), Anniston, AL Date reported to the licensee: 2 Aug 2007 by the Anniston AD RSO Licensed material involved: M114A1 elbow telescopes 2 each. NSN 1240-00-150-8889. Each elbow telescope contains 5.6 curies of tritium ( gaseous form). Historical information: On 30 June, two M102 howitzers left the maintenance repair facility at Anniston Army Depot from bldg. 418. Each howitzer contains a carrying case that contains the M114A1, M140 alignment device and M137 pantel telescope. The M102 howitzers and associated cases were transported to a contractor operated paint facility located on post in bldg 143. The howitzers were to be painted. When work was completed by the contractor, the howitzers and associated carrying cases (containing the tritium fire control devices) were moved to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) shipping area on or about July 23rd. During the week of July 23rd, DLA personnel inspected the howitzers and associated components prior to them being shipped. It was at this time that DLA discovered that the M114A1 elbow telescopes were missing from each of the respective cases. The other tritium devices in the carrying case (M140 and M137) were still present. The licensee RSO contacted Army CID on 3 August for assistance in investigating the loss of the devices. Army CID from Ft. McPherson, GA office will begin their investigation on Monday August 6th 2007. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| ENS 45158 | 24 June 2009 12:29:00 | Two Improved Chemical Agent Monitors (ICAMs) were lost during a shipment from ORNG (Oregon National Guard) to Guam National Guard. Each ICAM contains a sealed source containing 10 mCi of Ni-63. (SSDR NR-1129-D-103-S). The ICAMs were packaged by ORNG personnel in May, 2007. The missing ICAMs were reported missing to the licensee on 9 Feb 09. In the weeks following the notification, the licensee conducted an investigation to determine if the ICAMs were actually lost or misplaced within military control. The licensee believes the two ICAMs were lost during the transport between Andersen AFB and Guam National Guard between 15-17 Aug 2007. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| ENS 46090 | 13 July 2010 18:00:00 | An electrical fire consumed a wooden building at Ft. Bragg, NC which housed two chemical detection devices. The first device was an Advanced Chemical Detection Alarm (M22) which contained 20 milliCuries of Ni-63 and the second device was an Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) which contained 10 milliCuries of Ni-63. The SSDR numbers for these devices are NR0155-D-125-S and NR0155-D-103-S, respectively. The building was destroyed and the area is covered with a foot of ash. The fire department has not been able to find the devices, and they do not know the configuration of the material. The area is secured and the base RSO is sampling the area for loose surface contamination material. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| ENS 46530 | 10 January 2011 16:22:00 | On 4 January 2011 at 0900 hrs an Army National Guard employee was performing maintenance on a M64A1 sight unit in an attempt to remove the course elevation deflection scale on the sight unit which contained a 1 curie tritium lamp. The assembly is considered a module which is authorized by the licensee for replacement. During the removal of the scale assembly the tritium lamp was damaged. The worker immediately realized what had happened and called the local RSO to handle the incident. The State RSO was notified of the incident who in turn notified the US Army CECOM health physicist. The device was double bagged by the local RSO and placed in a designated LLRW storage area for future disposal. The local RSO performed contamination wipes of the device and surrounding works areas on Jan 4th. The arms room in the CSMS shop was immediately shut down and had limited access by authorized personnel. Wipe test results were received back from the Army lab on 6 Jan that indicated tritium contamination of 60 K dpm on the device itself and a few thousand dpm of the surrounding work bench. The RSO proceeded to decontaminated the affected contaminated areas and rewiped the work area to release it from radiological control. The second contamination survey (after decon) showed tritium contamination significantly reduced. At the time of this report the licensee does not have the final test results. The maintenance person involved in the incident was required by the licensee to have a tritium bioassay taken. Tritium bioassay results were not available at the time of the report. Investigation by the licensee is being conducted as to determine how the device was damaged during maintenance. The event occurred at the New York Army National Guard, Combined Support maintenance Shop - Arms Room in Rochester New York. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 47257 | 12 September 2011 17:19:00 | A Michigan National Guard Unit in Lansing, MI while preparing for deployment identified that a 250 microcurie Am-241 special form sealed source (S/N Z03-C-36663) was missing from a M43A1 Chemical Agent Detector. The detector was last confirmed intact in 2008 prior to the Unit's last deployment to Iraq. The licensee has initiated a formal investigation and notified the State of Michigan of the incident.
Description of the event: On September 12, 2011 the Michigan Army National Guard, United States Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) warehouse, Lansing, MI reported to the licensee of a missing Am-241 cell from a M43A1 chemical agent detector. The Am-241 cell is a sealed source, special form that contains 250 microcuries of Am-241. The Am-241 cell (s/n C-36663) belonged to detector s/n D-36025. Detector is NSN 6665-01-081-8140 and SSDR no. NR-1129-D-102-S (inactive). The detector with Am-241 cell belongs to 'A' Co. 125th Infantry. A physical inventory was performed by 'A' Co. in January 2008 at which time the unit was deployed to Kuwait for 1 year. The unit was getting ready for redeployment to Kuwait in the next several weeks and performed an inspection of all equipment needing to be shipped. It was at this time that cell C-36663 was discovered missing from the detector. The USPFO warehouse was searched wall to wall and the missing cell was not found. The Michigan National Guard is conducting a formal investigation regarding the lost radioactive cell. Exposure to personnel is not likely to occur in an unrestricted area since the Am-241 source is contained in a cell module that is sealed source special form. Notified R3DO (Lipa) and FSME (McIntosh). Provided to ILTAB (Whitney) via e-mail. * * * RETRACTION AT 1148 EDT ON 09/22/11 FROM THOMAS GIZICKI TO PETE SNYDER * * * The item identified as lost was located on post therefore this report is retracted. Notified R3DO (Stone) and FSME (McIntosh). Provided to ILTAB (Allston) via e-mail. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source. |
| ENS 47791 | 30 March 2012 15:31:00 | When returning from deployment a Virginia National Guard unit discovered that they had lost a M43A1 Chemical Detector containing 250 uCi of Am-241. The unit searched the facility as well as a storage warehouse located in Richmond, VA for the device, but they were unable to locate it.
Retraction due to the detector found in the same location in a different Army unit. Notified the R1DO (Caruso), R3DO (Bloomer) and the FSME (McIntosh). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| ENS 48523 | 20 November 2012 11:41:00 | An ICAM (Improved Chemical Agent Monitor) is missing at Fort Riley, KS. The ICAM contains a 10 mCi Nickel-63 source. The licensee has initiated a formal investigation and notified NRC Region 3 Inspector (McGraw). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 48917 | 12 April 2013 11:46:00 | On 4/11/13 at 1300 EDT, a 1 Ci tritium lamp was broken during routine maintenance on a M64 mortar sight unit. The sealed source tritium lamp broke when a wrench hit the tritium module. Surveys were conducted, but the results will not be available until next week. Bioassays are being perform on 4 individuals and based on historic records, the RSO expects minimal intake of less than 5 mrem. The device was bagged, tagged and placed in a secure storage area for future disposal. The licensee attempted to notify R3 (McCraw).
The US ARMY is retracting this event due to a miniscule bio-assay indicated dose rate to the four workers (maximum dose of 0.9 mRem to an individual) and survey results of the maintenance shop indicating no contamination. The device has been secured and properly stored for future disposal. The licensee notified R3 (McCraw). Notified the R1DO (Joustra), R3DO (Hills) and FSME Events Resource via email. |
| ENS 49654 | 18 December 2013 13:50:00 | The US Army in Warren, Michigan, reported that 3 improved chemical agent monitors were stolen from a storage facility at Fort Bragg, NC. Each of the 3 detectors contained a sealed 15 mCi Ni-63 source. The detectors were stored in building N-5342 and the locks on the building, storage area, and storage locker were damaged. The Fort Bragg Criminal Investigation Unit is conducting an investigation. The US Army has also notified NRC Region 3. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |