ML23156A503
| ML23156A503 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/30/1984 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC/SECY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| PRM--050-038 | |
| Download: ML23156A503 (1) | |
Text
ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE:* 10/30l1984 TITLE: . PRM-050-038 - - PETITION FOR RULEMAKING BY THE UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP REGARDING IMPORTANT TO SAFETY-AND. SAFETY. RELATED
. CATEGORIES CASE
REFERENCE:
PRM--050-038 KEY WORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive*- SUNSI Review Complete
HUNTON & WILLIA:~r'1~tETJ:.D * ) ' I 707 EAST MAIN STREET Po. Box 1535 20--00 ~NN.5YLVANIA AVliNU~ N W Z99 PARK AVENUE P O BOX 1~230 Nl!CW YORK, N!:W YORK 10171 WASHINGTON, D C 2003e T!:LE.PHONE 212-980-8200 Tli:LEPHONE. 202-g55-l~OO TELl!:PHON E 804-788 - 8200 TELEX 7.e-4708 B B & T BUILDING P O BOX 109 l'"IR~T VIRGINIA BANK TOWER TWX-710-956-00~1.:IC°-=: , *. ::_
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NORl'"OLK, VIRGINIA 23514
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FIRST TENNli:SSli:E BANK 1:!.UILDING TELEX 7eee2e PO BOX 951 4011 CHAIN ~RIDGE ROAD October 30, 1984 KNOXVILLE:, TE!:NNESSEE 37fil01 FAIRP°AX, VIRGINIA 22030-----*- TS::Ul:PHON£ e,e-e.37-4311 Tll!:.Ll!:PHONE 703*3~2-2eoo FILE NO DIRECT DIAL NO 804 7B8-VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.
11th Floor Washington, D.C. 20555 Safety Classification
Dear Chairman Palladino:
The Utility Safety Classification Group is pleased to_~ub-mit the enclosed petition for rulemaking on the issue of safety classification. As the Commission d~cbgnized ~n its June 6 l
- order in the Shoreham case, Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-9, 19 NRC 1323, 1325 (1984), the relative scope of the terms "important to safety" and "safety related" is an important generic issue that needs to be resolved through the rulemaking process.
HUNTON & WILLIAMS The Utility Group, whose members own a substa~tial number of nuclear plants in operation or under construction, believes that prior regulations, precedent, and practice establish that the category of equipment "important to safety" is equivalent to the category of "safety related" equipment. The "safety re-lated" set consists, as it always has, of those structures, systems and components that perform the safety functions set out in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. The Utility Group's pro-posed rule would explicitly incorporate these longstanding in-terpretations in the NRC's regulations.
In support of its view that items "important to safety" should be equated with items historically called "safety related," the petition demonstrates:
(a) A comparison of the proposed and final ver-sions of Part 50, Appendix A shows that the term "important to safety" was substituted in the final version for a variety of terms in the proposed version, all of which referred to the "safety related" set.
(b) The regulatory history of Part 50, Appendix B provides compelling reason to believe that the scope of General Design Criterion 1 is identical in scope to Appendix B. It is un-disputed that Appendix B applies only to safety related structures, systems and compo-nents.
(c) The proposed and final versions of Part 100, Appendix A both indicate that "important to safety" and "safety related" were intended to be synonymous.
(d) Other Commission regulations equate "impor-tant to safety" and "safety related."
HuNTbN & WILLIAMS (e) NRC Staff guidance documents and reports con-firm the synonymous use of the terms.
(f) The nuclear industry has consistently interpreted "important to safety" and "safety related" in the NRC's regulations and guid-ance documents as equivalent. Utilities have designed, constructed and operated nuclear plants based on the equivalency of these terms, and the NRC has reviewed and licensed the plants on the same basis.
(g) In the face of recent Staff efforts to depart from prior practice, some licensing and ap-peal boards have confirmed that "important to safety" and "safety related" are equivalent.
(h) There is inadequate health and safety justi-fication for recent actions to expand the term "important to safety."
These points make clear that explicit recognition of the equality of the terms would be consistent with a decade of practice and sound policy. Thus, the Group urges the Commission to adopt the following addition to 10 CFR § 50.2 (Definitions):
(y) "Structures, systems and components im-portant to safety" and "safety related structures, systems and components" are equivalent terms that mean those struc-tures, systems and components necessary to assure: ( i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condi-tion, or (iii) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR Part 100.
RuNTON & WILLIAMS The Utility Group members emphasize, in the strongest terms possible, that by endorsing the traditional equality of "important to safety" and "safety related," they do not mean to denigrate non-safety related equipment. Non-safety related structures, sys-tems and components can and do play a role in enhancing the safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants. In recognition of this reality, utilities do treat non-safety related equipment com-mensurate with their function. But there has been no showing in the recent debate on safety classification that any need exists to imp~se broad regulatory requirements on non-safety related equipment. Any deviation from the traditional definition of "important to safety" is likely to have far reaching, pervasive consequences on the utility industry in licensing, general regulation and economic impact. "Important to safety" appears throughout the Commission's regulations, Staff regulatory guides, NUREG documents and other licensing documents. Thus, an expansion of its meaning would substantially affect diverse and important aspects of the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants.
The broader definition of "important to safety" now endorsed by some members of the NRC Staff has not yet had a substantial im-pact only because of widespread opposition by utilities to expan-sion of the term. Examples of potential problems abound. In the ATWS rulemaking, the Commission decided to impose requirements for the installation of certain equipment for the prevention and
HuNTON & WILLIAMS mitigation of ATWS events. In an early draft of the final rule, NRC Staff members urged that this equipment, though not safety re-lated, be classified as "important to safety." The asserted goal was to assure that appropriate quality measures were applied to this equipment. Given the widespread use of the term "important to safety," however, such a classification might have imposed far more requirements than intended. Ultimately, and properly in the Group's view, the Commission abandoned the "important to safety" classification in the final rule and specified only that particu-lar quality assurance elements of Appendix B be applied to it.
Significantly, in the process of developing a generic letter to implement this provision of the rule, certain NRC Staff members attempted, once again, to brand the ATWS prevention/mitigation equipment as "important to safety" (but not safety related). Al-though the attempt has been unsuccessful to date, the example un-derscores the need for prompt and definitive Commission action on the definition of the terms.
Examples of the potential mischief from a broad, undefined use of "important to safety" can also be found in recent inquiries to utilities made by the Staff as part of its review process.
These inquiries have been designed to "encourage" utilities to classify certain non-safety related equipment as "important to safety" and place this equipment on plant Q lists. The utilities have routinely responded that they use the traditional two-tier safety related/non-safety related classification scheme, that the
HuNTON & WILLIAMS equipment is not safety related, and that the utility takes appro-priate measures to ensure the quality of this non-safety related equipment. Had these utilities acquiesced in the Staff's re-quests, they would have risked future ratchet attempts by interve-nors and, perhaps, the NRC I & E branch, to impose the whole pano-1 ply of regulatory requirements applicable to structures, systems and components important to safety. This imposition of new requirements would have occurred wholly apart from any showing that the requirements were needed to protect the public health and safety.
Finally, in addition to the potential effects on plant hardware, utilities have identified potential impacts on quality assurance programs,_maintenance programs and the like. These pro-grams were developed for plants designed and built using a two-tiered classification scheme (safety related/non-safety relat-ed). The imposition of a new, three-tiered approach (safety related/important to safety but not safety related/non-safety related) would impose untold administrative burdens. As noted in the rulemaking petition, the NRC's Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) provides an example of the extensive resources that must inevitably be committed to review a plant's compliance with criteria different from those to which it was designed.
' HuNTON & WILLIAMS In short, the petition demonstrates that the Commission must act now to restore stability to the regulatory process. The Util-ity Group recognizes that the rulemaking it proposes will take time despite the fact the proposed rule merely codifies long-standing usage. Thus, the petition proposes that the Commission take interim steps. First, the Commission should confirm the equivalence of the term "important to safety" to the current defi-nition of the term "safety related" in the regulations during the rulemaking, since this is the interpretation used in the design, construction, licensing and operation of nuclear power plants.
Second, the Commission should direct Boards not to entertain argu-ments that any requirements beyond those explicitly included in NRC regulations be placed on non-safety related equipment. Third, the Commission should confirm that any existing commitment by a licensee or applicant co~cerning particular measures for non-safety related equipment that has been accepted by the NRC Staff would not be affected during the rulemaking. Given the problems created by uncertainty over the definition of "important to safety," the Utility Group urges the Commission to act quickly on these interim measures.
liUNT@N &8w-ILLIAMS The Group is anxious to resolve the safety classification issuei to ~his end, thi GrciuR will gladly meet with the Commissioners and members of the Staff to answer any questions concerning the petition. Also, for your convenience, we have en-closed a draft Fed~ral Register notice announcing receipt of the petition. We look forward to resolution of this important issue.
Respectfully submitted, SSI ICS~N UTILITY SAFETY GROUP Ir~,fL/.
Anthony
- E ~
Lee B. Zeugin Counsel to the Group Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O., Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 cc: Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando M. Zech, Jr.
Herzel H. E. Plaine, General Counsel William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary
DOCKETED
~SN,~C
- s4 OCT 31 A11 :46 Suggested Federal Register Notice NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50
[Docket No. PRM Utility Safety Classification Group; Filing of Petition for Rulemaking AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission ACTION: Publication of petition for rulemaking from electric utilities.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is publishing for public comment a petition for rulemaking filed before the Commission on October 15, 1984, by the Utility Safety Classifi-cation Group. This petition, which has been assigned Docket No. PRM-50-__ , requests that the Commission address the issue of safety classification of equipment for nuclear power plants.
Specifically, the Petitioner asks the Commission to establish a definition for the terms "important to safety" and "safety related" as those terms are used in the NRC's regulations.
DATE: Comment period expires [30 days after date of notice]
ADDRESSES: A copy of the petition for rulemaking is available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Doc-ument room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. A copy of the petition may be obtained by writing to All persons who desire to submit written comments concerning the petition for rulemaking should send their comments to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 20555, Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Petitioner Utility Safety Classification Group (a group of electric utilities owning a substantial number of nuclear power reactors operating or under construction) re-quests that the Commission initiate rulemaking on the safety classification issue. On June 6, 1984, the Commission indi-cated its intent to conduct such a rulemaking to consider the relative scope of the terms "important to safety" and "safety related." Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-9, 19 NRC __ (June 6, 1984).
Petitioner requests that the Commission use this notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding to adopt the following proposed addition to 10 CFR §50.2 (Definitions):
(y) "Structures, systems and com-ponents important to safety" and "safety related structures, systems and components" are equivalent terms that mean those structures, systems and compo-nents necessary to assure:
(i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (iii) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR Part 100.
In addition, Petitioner requests that conforming amendments be made to §50.49 (Environmental Qualification) to delete the words "important to safety" from the title of §50.49 and from
§50.49(b) to be consistent with the above definition. The title should read "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment," and §50.49(b) should read: "(b) Electric equipment II covered by this section is:
The Petitioner states that "prior rules, precedent, and prac-tice establish that the category of equipment important to safety is equivalent to the category of safety related equip-ment." The Petitioner also states that:
For years, the NRC, utilities, reactor vendors and architect-engineers have built, licensed and operated nuclear power plants in reliance on a common under-standing and interpretation of certain terms in the NRC's
regulations. Until recently, the regulatory terms "important to safety" and "safety related" and the non-regulatory term "safety grade" have been used synonymously by both industry and the NRC. The nuclear industry continues to follow this prac-tice. Only recent NRC Staff actions have signaled a departure from this long-standing interpretation by using the term "important to safety" to cover a much broader set of plant struc-tures, systems and components than is covered by the term "safety related."
According to the Petitioner, the rulemaking petition demon-strates the following points:
(a) A comparison of the proposed and final versions of Part 50, Appen-dix A shows that the term "impor-tant to safety" was substituted in the final version for a vari-ety of terms in the proposed ver-sion, all of which referred to the "safety related" set.
(b) The regulatory history of Part 50, Appendix B provides compel-ling reason to believe that the scope of General Design Criterion 1 is identical in scope to Appen-dix B. It is undisputed that Ap-pendix B applies to safety relat-ed structures, systems and components.
(c) The proposed and final versions of Part 100, Appendix A, both in-dicate that "important to safety" and "safety related" were intend-ed to be synonymous.
(d) Other Commission regulations equate "important to safety" and "safety related."
(e) NRC Staff guidance documents and reports confirm the synonymous use of the terms.
(f) The nuclear industry has consis-tently interpreted "important to safety" and "safety related" in the NRC's regulations and guid-ance documents as equivalent.
Utilities have designed, con-structed and operated nuclear plants based on the equivalency of these terms, and the NRC has reviewed and licensed the plants on the same basis.
(g) In the face of recent Staff ef-forts to depart from prior prac-tice, some licensing and appeal boards have confirmed that "im-portant to safety" and "safety related" are equivalent.
(h) There is inadequate health and safety justification for recent actions to expand the term "im-portant to safety."
Although the petition advocates equating "important to safety" and "safety related" and thus preventing widespread and unnec-essary regulation of non-safety related equipment, the Utility Group members emphasize that they do believe that non-safety relat-ed structures, systems and compo-nents can and do play a role, in varying degrees, in enhancing the safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants and that they should be treated according-ly. Moreover, where a specific safety concern indicates the need
for broader regulation, the NRC has in the past regulated specif-ic non-safety related equipment, and the Utility Group has no in-tention of seeking any modification of such require-ments. Thus, the Utility Group does not quarrel with the underlying concern that has prompted the recent attempts to deviate from the traditional definition of "important to safe-ty." But there has been no con-vincing showing that this occa-sional concern needs to be elevated to a broad regulatory requirement attached to the prev-alent term "important to safety" in order to provide reasonable assurance of no undue risk to the public health and safety. [foot-note omitted]
The Petitioner further states that The NRC has broad power to regu-late all aspects of nuclear power plants to give reasonable assur-ance that their operation does not pose an undue risk to the public health and safety. Rea-sonable assurance of no undue risk generally has been achieved by imposing requirements on the safety related set of structures, systems and components. These regulations are designed to ensure that such equipment can perform the safety functions set out in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. But the NRC's focus on the safety related set does not mean that it has not exercised regulatory authority over non-safety related structures, systems and components.
The petition describes examples where the NRC has imposed spe-cific requirements on non-safety related equipment. It also describes a number of industry-wide and utility efforts that are aimed at ensuring that the function of non-safety related systems is maintained. These actions are taken as a matter of good engineering practice not because they are required by any existing regulation.
Finally, Petitioner proposes the following interim requirements to apply during the pendency of the rulemaking:
First, the Commission should con-firm the equivalence of "impor-tant to safety" and "safety re-lated" as currently used throughout its regulations during the rulemaking since this is the interpretation used to date in the design, construction, licens-ing and operation of nuclear power plants. Second, the Com-mission should direct Boards not to entertain an argument that any requirements beyond those explic-itly included in the NRC regula-tions be placed on non-safety re-lated equipment. Third, the Commission should confirm that any existing commitment by a li-censee or applicant concerning particular measures for non-safety related equipment which has been accepted by the NRC Staff would not be affected dur-ing the rulemaking.
Dated at Washington, D.C. this day of For the Commission, Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of )
) PETITION FOR RULEMAKING SAFETY CLASSIFICATION )
UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP PETITION FOR RULEMAKING UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. Northern States Power Co.
Consumers Power Co. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
Detroit Edison Co. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co .
Florida Power Corp. Public Service Co. of Gulf States Utility Co. New Hampshire (representing Houston Lighting & Power Co. also the Yankee Atomic Electric Long Island Lighting Co. Power Co., Maine Yankee Atomic Nebraska Public Power District Power Co., and Vermont Yankee Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. Nuclear Power Co.)
Northeast Utilities Service Co. Sacramento Municipal Utility (representing also District Connecticut Light and SNUPPS Power, Connecticut Yankee (representing Union Electric Atomic Power Co., Northeast Co., Kansas Gas & Electric Co .,
Nuclear Energy Co., and Kansas City Power & Light Co .,
Western Massachusetts and Kansas Electric Power Electric Co.) Coop., Inc.)
Wisconsin Public Service Co.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of )
) PETITION FOR RULEMAKING SAFETY CLASSIFICATION )
UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP PETITION FOR RULEMAKING UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. Northern States Power Co.
Consumers Power Co. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
Detroit Edison Co. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
Florida Power Corp. Public Service Co. of Gulf States Utility Co. New Hampshire (representing Houston Lighting & Power Co. also the Yankee Atomic Electric Long Island Lighting Co. Power Co., Maine Yankee Atomic Nebraska Public Power District Power Co., and Vermont Yankee Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. Nuclear Power Co.)
Northeast Utilities Service Co. Sacramento Municipal Utility (representing also District Connecticut Light and SNUPPS Power, Connecticut Yankee (representing Union Electric Atomic Power Co., Northeast Co., Kansas Gas & Electric Co.,
Nuclear Energy Co., and Kansas City Power & Light Co.,
Western Massachusetts and Kansas Electric Power Electric Co.) Coop., Inc.)
Wisconsin Public Service Co.
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . 1 II. Interests of Petitioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 III. "Important to Safety" and "Safety Related" Have Been Treated as Equivalent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A. NRC Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 1. Part 50, Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 2. Part 50, Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
- 3. Part 100, Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
- 4. Other Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 B. NRC Guidance Documents and Reports .................. 24 C. Industry and NRC Practice ........................... 27 D. Licensing* and Appeal Board Decisions ................ 34 E. Recent NRC Actions Suggesting an Expanded Definition of "Important to Safety" Are Without a Sound Basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 F. Long-Standing Practice Compels the Conclusion that "Important to Safety" and "Safety Related" Are Equivalent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 IV. The Rulemaking Should Confirm the Equivalence of "Safety Related" and "Important to Safety" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A. The Clear Equivalence of "Safety Related" and "Important to Safety" Has Not Resulted in Any Identified Generic Safety Concern ............ 46 B. Existing Non-Safety Related Quality Measures Are Adequate ....................... 48
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C. Expansion of "Important to Safety" Will Have Significant Adverse Consequences .......... 58 V. The Proposed Rulemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 A. Proposed Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 B. An Additional Suggestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 VI. Interim Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 VII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Commission In the Matter of )
) PETITION FOR RULEMAKING SAFETY CLASSIFICATION )
UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP PETITION FOR RULEMAKING I. INTRODUCTION On June 6, 1984, the Commission ordered that a rulemaking be initiated to consider the relative scope of the terms "important to safety" and "safety related." Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
CLI-84-9, 19 NRC 1323, 1325 (1984). Petitioner, a group of electric utility companies (the "Utility Safety Classification Group" or the "Utility Group") applauds the Commission's decision to address the generic subject of safety classification through the initiation of rulemaking. As explained below, the Utility Group believes that prior rules, precedent, and practice establish that the category of
equipment "important to safety" is equivalent to the category of "safety related" equipment. In order to clarify any existing misconceptions about the present status of the rules, the Utility Group is hereby requesting that the Commission propose the rule which is contained in this petition.
For years, the NRC, utilities, reactor vendors and architect-engineers have designed, built, licensed and operated nuclear power plants in reliance on a common understanding and interpretation of certain terms in the NRC's regulations.
Until recently, the regulatory terms "important to safety" and "safety related" and the non-regulatory term "safety grade" have been used synonymously by both industry and the NRC. The nuclear industry continues to follow this practice. Only recent NRC Staff actions have signaled a departure from this long-standing interpretation by using the term "important to safety" to cover a much broader set of plant structures, II systems and compo_nents than is covered by the term safety related."
These recent actions are apparently motivated by a concern on the part of the NRC Staff that the nuclear industry has not fully considered the role uf non-safety related structures, systems and components in the safe and reliable operation of nuclear plants. The Utility Safety Classification Group members want to emphasize, in the strongest terms
possible, that they do believe that non-safety related structures, systems and components can and do play a role, in varying degrees, in enhancing the safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants and that they should be treated accordingly. Moreover, where a specific safety concern indicates the need for broader regulation, the NRC has in the past regulated specific non-safety related equipment, and the Utility Group has no intention of seeking any modification of such requirements.y Thus, the Utility Group does not quarrel with the underlying concern that has prompted the recent attempts to deviate from the traditional definition of "important to safety." But there has been no convincing showing that this occasional concern needs to be elevated to a broad regulatory requirement attached to the prevalent term "important to safety" in order to provide reasonable assurance of no undue risk to the public health and safety.
Any redefinition of the regulatory term "important to safety" is likely to have far-reaching, pervasive consequences on the utility industry in licensing, general regulation and 1/ Throughout this petition, there are references to ll"non-safety related" equipment. This phrase refers to equipment that does not meet the traditional definition of "safety related" eq-.1ipment contained in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. It do~- not mean that the equipment has no "safety" significar,,.::e in the plain sense of the word.
economic impact. "Important to safety" appears throughout the Commission's regulations, Staff regulatory guides, NUREG documents and other licensing documents. Thus, an expansion of its meaning would substantially affect diverse and important aspects of the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants.
The rulemaking requested by this petition avoids the serious consequences of such a wholesale alteration in the Commission's rules. Instead, the petition proposes to have the Commission confirm that the terms "important to safety" and "safety related," as used throughout the Commission's rules, will be treatea*as equivalent. The equivalency of these terms must be established as a benchmark since essentially all nuclear plants have been designed, constructed and operated using this assumption. Thus, the Group proposes that a definition be added to 10 CFR § 50.2 to confirm the equality of the terms and to define them in a manner consistent with the historic practice of the NRC and nuclear industry.
While the Utility Group does not believe further regulation is required, this petition includes an alternative suggestion for consideration of whether additional regulation is needed to mandate appropriate levels of quality assurance for some set of non-safety related equipment. Under this alternative, if the Commission believes that a valid safety
concern may exist which should be treated generically, the Utility Group requests the Commission to direct the Staff to gather sufficient, relevant information on which to base a judgment about the need for further regulatory action. Any future proposal should be completely divorced from the terms "important to safety" and "safety related"; it-should focus specifically and exclusively on substantiated safety concerns, if any.
In the June 6th Order, the Commission also directed
. that, during the pendency of this rulemaking, Boards should apply current precedent in ongoing licensing proceedings. The Commission understood current precedent to hold that the term "important to safety" applies to a larger class of equipment than the term "safety related." A set of "important to safety" equipment, however, is not defined by the Commission's rules but can only be determined by a particularized showing in a licensing proceeding of clearly identified safety concerns posed by the specific item of equipment. If such a showing is made, the requirements of General Design Criterion 1 (GDC 1) must be tailored to the identified safety concerns. Order at 2-3.
The Utility Group commends the Commission for its attention to the status of the safety classification issue in ongoing licensing proceedings. As explained below, the Utility
Group does not agree that prior rules or precedent establish a category of equipment "important to safety" which is broader than "safety related" equipment. The Utility Group, therefore, proposes the following interim requirements during the pendency of the rulemaking. First, the Comrnis~ion should confirm the equivalence of "important to safety" and "safety related" as currently used throughout its regulations during the rulemaking since this is the interpretation used to date in the design, construction, licensing and operation of nuclear power plant~.
Second, the Commission should direct Boards not to entertain an argument that any requirements beyond those explicitly included in NRC regulations be placed on non-safety related equipment.
Third, the Commission should confirm that any existing commitment by a licensee or applicant concerning particular measures for non~safety related equipment which has been accepted by the NRC Staff would not be affected during the rulemaking.
II. INTERESTS OF PETITIONER Petitioner is a group of electric utility companies that own a substantial number of the planned or operating commercial nuclear reactors in this country. All of these plants have been designed and built in accordance with the NRC's regulations. Those plants now operating also are
governed by NRC regulations. In applying the appropriate NRC regulations to the design, construction and operation of their plants, utilities in this Group have interpreted the terms "important to safety" and "safety related" as synonymous since these terms came into common usage in the early 1970s.y This interpretation has been sanctioned again and again in NRC licensing actions, and indeed over the years the NRC has used this interpretation in its own regulations and regulatory guidance.
Throughout the NRC's regulations, certain requirements and standards are imposed on structures, systems and components that are "safety related" or, equivalently, "important to safety." For example, the term "important to safety" ap*pears at least ten times in the General Design Criteria. Since plants were designed and licensed under the assumption that "safety related" and "important to safety" are identical terms, an expansion of the definition might place in doubt each utility's compliance with the NRC's regulations. And while it may be possible to show that nuclear plants meet even an expanded definition of "important to safety" because of the Y Wherever the non-regulatory term "safety grade" was used in design, construction and operation of nuclear plants, it, too, was and is considered to be equivalent to "safety related."
large measure of conservatism built into them, an extensive, time-consuming review of each regulatory requirement for structures, systems and components "important to safety" would very likely be required to verify such compliance.3/
A more significant commitment of resources would be necessary to review the myriad of regulatory guides and other regulatory guidance documents containing the term to determine whether the applicable provisions have been met. Significant impacts might also occur in those instances in which utility programs and plant equipment had to be modified to meet a broad interpretation of the term "important to safety."_1/ Existing programs and equipment may well be able to perform their intended function and yet not comply with every "jot and tittle" of the requirements for structures, systems and y The NRC's Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) provides an example of the extensive resources that must inevitably be committed to a review of a plant's compliance with regulatory criteria different from those to which it was designed. SEP involved a review of older nuclear plants against the current NRC Standard Review Plan -- a review plan not in effect when the plants were designed, constructed or licensed. All licensees might have to undertake an SEP-type review to assess how their plants stack up against a new, broader interpretation of "important to safety."
- 1/ This exercise will be further complicated if utilities are required to backfit a three-tiered (safety related, important to safety but not safety related, and non-safety related) classification scheme on plants designed and built using a two-tiered (safety related and non-safety related) approach.
components important to safety as newly defined. Finally, the lack of any functional definition of "important to safety" as the Staff now uses the term might result in protracted "ratcheting" as individual NRR reviewers, I&E inspectors and intervenors in licensing cases attempt to impose their own views of important to safety on applicants and licensees.
These activities would divert substantial industry and NRC resources to an effort for which no benefits have been shown.~
In summary, expansion of the term "important to safety" beyond "safety related" to include some undefined set of structures, systems and components would greatly increase the requirements to which utilities' nuclear plants* are subjected.
Given the extensive use of the term "important to safety" in the NRC's regulations, the cost of such a change would be substantial but without any proven benefit in plant safety.
I I I. "IMPORTANT TO SAFETY" AND "SAFETY RELATED" HAVE BEEN TREATED AS EQUIVALENT The Utility Group's proposal to adopt an explicit recognition of the equality of "important to safety" and "safety related" merely codifies well-established NRC and industry practice. As this section shows:
~/ Indeed, the NRC's Committee to Review Generic Requirements was unable to find any clear benefit. See section IV.A below.
(a) A comparison of the proposed and final versions of Part 50, Appendix A shows that the term "important to safety" was substituted in the final version for a variety of terms in the proposed version, all of which referred to the "safety related" set.
(b) The regulatory history of Part 50, Appendix B provides compelling reason to believe tliat the scope of General Design Criterion 1 is identical in scope to Appendix B. It is undisputed that Appendix B applies only to safety related structures, systems and components.
(c) The proposed and final versions of Part 100, Appendix A both indicate that "important to safety" and "safety related" were intended to be synonymous.
( d)* Other Commission regulations equate "important to safety" and "safety related."
(e) NRC Staff guidance documents and reports confirm the synonymous use of the terms.
(f) The nuclear industry has consistently interpreted "important to safety" and "safety related" in the NRC's regulations and guidance documents as equivalent.
Utilities have designed, constructed and operated nuclear plants based on the equivalency of these terms, and the NRC has reviewed and licensed the plants on the same basis.
(g) In the face of recent Staff efforts to depart from prior practice, some licensing and appeal boards have confirmed that "important to safety" and "safety related" are equivalent.
(h) There is inadequate health and safety justification for recent actions to expand the term "important to safety."
These eight points demonstrate that explicit recognition of the equality of the terms would be consistent with a decade of practice and sound policy.
A. NRC Regulations
- 1. Part 50, Appendix A As proposed in 1967, Part SO's Appendix A did not use the term "important to safety." See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,213 (1967). In the version adopted in 1'971, however, the term appeared in a number of places. The Federal Register notice adopting Appendix A discussed the substantive changes between the proposed and final rules. Significantly, that discussion of substantive changes did not mention the addition of the term "important to safety." This silence confirms that the Commission did not consider that the change in terminology made
- any difference in scope or substance. See 36 Fed. Reg. 3255 (1971). In fact, a comparison of the proposed and final rules reveals that "important to safety" was merely substituted for a number of similar terms referring to features that are now known as "safety related."
The principal instance of this exchange of equivalent terms was the substitution of "structures, systems and components important to safety" for "engineered safety
features." "Engineered safety features," as defined in Criterion 37 of the proposed Appendix A, were those provided to assure the safety provided by the core design, the reactor coolant pressure boundary and their protective systems. At a minimum, "engineered safety features" were intended to cope with all reactor coolant pressure boundary breaks, including the circumferential rupture of any pipe in that boundary with unobstructed discharge from both its ends. See 32 Fed. Reg.
10,216-17 (1967). In other words, "engineered safety feature" in the proposed Appendix A is essentially similar to the current terminology of 10 CFR Part 100, particularly
§§ 100.2(b) and 100.lO(a) and (d), which are unmistakably limited to "safety related" egu-ipment. Thus, the scope of Appendix A to Part 50 is clearly bound to a narrowly defined set of engineered safety features and not a broad set of structures, systems and components encompassing nearly the entire plant, as some NRC Staff members would now define "important to safety."
Numerous examples of the substitution of "important to safety" for "engineered safety features" exist. Proposed GDC 3, which in final form applies to structures, systems and components "important to safety," specifically referred to "critical" parts of the facility such as the containment and control room as "engineered safety features." See 32 Fed. Reg.
10,215 (1967). And GDC 4, which in final form also applies to structures, systems and components "important to safety,"
evolved from proposed GDCs 40 and 42, which dealt with "engineered safety features." See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,217 (1967).
By the same token, the current GDC 20 requires, in part, that protection systems be designed to sense accident conditions and to initiate the operation of systems and components "important to safety." This portion of GDC 20 evolved from an earlier, proposed version of GDC 15, which required protection systems to sense accident situations and to initiate the operation of necessary "engineered safety features." See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,216 (1967).
The current GDC 44 requires a cooling water system to transfer heat from structures, systems and components "important to safety" to an ultimate heat sink. The cooling water system requirements in GDC 44 evolved from proposed GDCs 37, 38 and 39, which established the design basis and requirements for "engineered safety features." See 32 Fed.
Reg. 10,216-17 (1967). Thus, the cooling water system referred to in GDC 44 is, in reality, the safe~y related engineered safety feature necessary to support other engineered safety features previously discussed in the proposed Appendix A.
Another example is GDC 16, which requires a reactor containment and associated systems to assure that containment
design conditions "important to safety" not be exceeded during postulated accident conditions. This GDC evolved from GDC 10 of the proposed Appendix A, which required the containment structure to sustain the initial effects of gross equipment failures, such as a large coolant boundary break, without loss of required integrity and, together with other "engineered safety features," to retain for as long as necessary the capability to protect the public. See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,216 (1967). In other words, the containment design requirements in the proposed GDC 10 dealt with loss of coolant accidents.
Structures, systems and components needed to deal with a L0CA are, of course, safety*related.
A final example of the substitution in Appendix A of the term "important to safety" for "engineered safety features," a synonym for safety related, involves GDC 17, which requires offsite and onsite electric power systems for structures, systems and components "important to safety." This GDC evolved from proposed GDCs 24 and 39, which required emergency power sources for protection systems and "engineered safety features." See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,216-17 (1967).§/
§_I In addition to substituting the term "important to safety" for "engineered safety features," the final version of Appendix A also used the term "important to safety" in place of other phrases that describe the safety related set. GDCs 1 and 2 (footnote continued)
Thus, the regulatory history of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, indicates (i) that "important to safety" was inserted into Appendix A in lieu of a number of other terms to describe what are now known as "safety related" structures, systems and components, and (ii) that the Commission believed there was no significant difference between "important to safety" and the terms used in the proposed version of the rule.I/ Consequently, it was proper to conclude, as industry (footnote continued) establish requirements for structures, systems and components important to safety. These criteria evolved from proposed GDCs 1 and 5, and 2, respectively. Proposed GDCs 1 and 2 applied to systems and components "essential to the prevention of accidents which could affect the public health and safety or to mitigation of their consequences." This language is similar to that in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, which means safety related.
Proposed GDC 5 applied to records for "essential" components.
11 As already indicated, the complete lack of any discussion of the substitution in the Commission's explanation of the final rule confirms that no substantive change was intended.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that notice and comment rulemaki~g be a meaningful process. Section 553(b)(3) of the APA provides that the notice of a proposed rule must be sufficiently detailed to give interested parties a realistic chance to understand and critique the would-be rule. United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973);
see also Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 79 (1982). One of the
~equirements of meaningful notice is an obligation that the agency include in the notice all definitions essential to the proposed rule. PPG Industries v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1239, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1981). And, although agencies may make changes between the proposed and final rules, the changes must be the "logical outgrowth" of the notice and comment process. Sierra (footnote continued)
did, that "important to safety" and "safety related" were equivalent terms.
- 2. Part 50, Appendix B Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 applies only to safety related structures, systems and components._§/ The relationship between Appendix Band GDC 1 of Appendix A, Part 50, indicates that it was the NRC's intent that "important to safety" be synonymous in scope and meaning with the term "safety related."
(footnote continued)
Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 352 n.193 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Connecticut Light and Power Co., 673 F.2d at 533. Thus, unless "important to safety" was equivalent to the terms it replaced
-- as in fact it was -- Appendix A was promulgated without adequate notice. One cannot assume that the rule was adopted in disregard of the APA if this assumption can be avoided, and it can only be avoided if "important to safety" is equated in scope and meaning with "safety related." See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-769, 19 NRC 995, 1002 (1984) ("lack of any specific explication for the change in language between the proposed and final rule lends credence to the LILCO claim that no.
substantive difference was intended").
~/ While it has been suggested that Appendix B was originally intended to apply to a broader set, the official Federal Register notices concerning the rule indicate its scope has remained unchanged. Both the proposed and final versions of the rule apply, by their terms, to activities affecting the safety related functions of structures, systems and components that prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident. 34 Fed. Reg. 6599 (1969); 35 Fed. Reg. 10,498 (1970). The prevention and mitigation of the consequences of postulated accidents, of course, are among the safety related functions of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A.
The notice of proposed rulemaking for Appendix B, ~tated that its quality assurance (QA) criteria would supplement GDC 1 of proposed Appendix A, which had been previously noticed in the Federal Register in 1967. 34 Fed. Reg. 6599, 6600 (1969).
Although the precise meaning of this statement is not clear, it does appear that the Commission's intention was to specify, in detail, what the general provisions of GDC 1 meant. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Appendix B was intended to "assist applicants . to comply with Section 50.34(a) (7)." 35 Fed. Reg. 10,498 (1970). Section 50.34(a) (7) requires that the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report include a description of the quality assurance program to be applied to the design, fabrication, construction, and testing of the structures, systems, and components of the facility.
Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," sets forth the requirements for quality assurance programs for nuclear power plants and fuel reprocessing plants.
10 CFR § 50.34(a)(7). When§ 50.34(a)(7) states that Appendix B "sets forth the requirements for quality assurance programs" (emphasis added), it must include those of GDC 1.
Thus, a reading of the regulatory history, first, does not reveal any intention to apply Appendix B to more than "safety related" features and, second, suggests that Appendix B is a more detailed specification of the requirements contained in GDC 1, thereby again equating "important to safety" with "safety related."
- 3. Part 100, Appendix A The interchangeability of the terms "safety related" and "important to sa~ety" is also illustrated by the regulatory history of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, which was proposed on November 25, 1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 22,601 (1971). The proposed rule included a number of passages making clear that the category "important to safety" in 1971 meant "safety related."
- For example, the proposed rule stated:
(c) The "Safe Shutdown Earthquake" is that earthquake which produces the vibratory ground motion for which structures, systems and components important to safety are designed to remain functional.
These structures, systems and components are those necessary to assure:
(1) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (3) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR Part 100.
36 Fed. Reg. 22,602 (1971) ("emphasis added); see also id. at 22,604. This definition of the "imp'ortant to safety" functions is the same as that in the final (and current) version of the rule, which is recognized as providing the basic definition of
the "safety related" functions. See 38 Fed. Reg. 31,279, 31,281 (1973); 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, III(c).
Although the reference in paragraph (c) of the proposed rule to "structures, systems and c*omponents important to safety" was changed in the final version to refer to "certain structures, systems and components," there was no indication in the Commission's discussion of changes between the proposed and final rules to indicate that this substitution represented a change in scope. See 38 Fed. Reg. 31,279 (1973). In fact, the final rule added a reference in its purpose section to GDC.2, which applies to structures, systems and components "important to safety," thereby once again equating "safety related" and "important to safety."
In addition to defining "important to safety" in terms of the "safety related" definition, the proposed version of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, used the terms "safety related" and "important to safety" interchangeably in a number of instances.
For example, § VI(a) of the proposed rule reiterated the definition of structures, systems and components important to safety quoted above and went on to say that "[i]n addition to seismic loads, . . . loads shall be taken into account in the design of these safety-related structures, systems and components." 36 Fed. Reg. 22,604 (1971) (emphasis added).
Thus, the language in the proposed version of Part 100,
Appendix A, made abundantly clear that the terms "important to safety" and "safety related" were interchangeable and equivalent.V Finally, the approved version of Part 100, Appendix A, contained critical information that supports the equivalence of the two terms. The Federal Register notice stated:
The proposed rule required that the Operating Basis Earthquake selected be related to the operability of those structures, systems and components necessary for power generation.
Many of the comments questioned the legality of imposing safety requirements on portions of the plant which were not safety related.
As a result of these comments, the definition of the Operating Basis Earthquake was made more restrictive.
38 Fed. Reg. 31,279 (1973). Thus, the Commission narrowed the Operating Basis Earthquake "to those features of the plant that are safety related." Id. Since Part 100, Appendix A, provided specific requirements for implementing GDC 2, there is a strong implication that the term "structures, systems and components important to safety" is limited to the safety related set.l.Q/
9/ It is not plausible to argue that removal of "important to safety" from portions of the final version of Part 100, Appendix A, indicated an intent to change the meaning. See note 7 above. Both the draft and fir1al versions provide a sound basis for concluding that "safety related" and "important to safety" are synonymous. As stated above, the equality of the terms was quite explicit in the draft rule, while in the final rule the reference to GDC 2 provided strong evidence that the equality remained unchanged.
10/ In an attempt to_ bolster its position on the II important to safety" issue, the Staff, by letter dated December 19, 1983, (footnote continued)
-21 ..
More important, the Commission also equated systems preventing undue risk to the public health and safety with the safety related set. This conclusion follows from the final definition of the Operating Basis Earthquake that states, in relevant part:
[I]t is that earthquake which produces the vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public are designed to remain functional.
10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, § III(d) (emphasis added). As noted above, the Operating Basis Earthquake was intended to apply to the safety related features of the plant. 38 Fed.
Reg. 31,279 (1973). Thus, at least at the time of the promulgation of these regulations, the definition of "important to safety" in Part 50, Appendix A (structures, systems and components that prevent undue risk to the public health and
- safety), meant "safety related. "l!I (footnote continued) from Harold R. Denton to T. S. Ellis, III, cited§§ VI(a)(l) and VI(a)(2) to 10 CFR Part 100 as support for the Staff position. To the contrary, § VI(a)(l) explicitly defines safety related in terms of the Part 100, Appendix A, Sqfety functions and, as noted above, the Operating Basis Earthquake discussed in§ VI(a)(2) was explicitly limited to safety related features by the text accompanying the final rule.
11/ See also 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Introduction (equating equipment that prevents undue risk to the public (footnote continued)
- 4. Other Regulations Other examples of NRC regulations which equate the terms "important to safety" and "safety related" include 10 CE'R Part 21, Part 72 and§ 50.54.
Part 21 applies to "basic components" defined in
§ 21.3(a)(l) as those components that perform the Part 100, Appendix A, safety functions. In other words, a basic component is a safety related component. Section 21.3(a)(3) notes that a "'basic component' includes design, inspection, II testing, or consulting services important to safety.
In discussing this section, supplementary information accompanying the regulation states that Part 21 covers "responsible officers of firms and organizations supplying safety-related components, including safety-related design, testing, inspection and consulting services." 42 Fed. Reg.
(footnote continued) health and safety with safety related equipment). The Utility Group's point is not that the NRC is limited to regulating safety related equipment. Rather, these examples reflect that,
.in the early 1970s, the prevailing view was that the important to safety set (which prevents undue risk) was the safety related set. Under the Atomic Energy Act, however, the NRC has broad authority to impose requirements to protect the public health and safety. Consequently, in specific instances the NRC has since elected to regulate areas that do not fall within the safety related definition of Part 100, Appendix A. See Section IV.B below.
28,891, 28,892 (1977). Thus, this description evidently assumes that the use of the term "important to safety" in conjunction with design, testing, inspection and consulting services in§ 21.3(a)(3) is meant to be synonymous with "safety related." This interpretation is confirmed in NUREG-0302, Revision 1. The document provides a clear indication of the Staff's position that 10 CFR Part 21 is limited to safety related equipment. NUREG-0302, Rev. 1, at 21.3(a)-5. See Shoreham, ALAB-769, slip op. at 12-13 (Part 21 "suggest[s] an identity between items that are 'safety related' and those that are 'important to safety'").
Part 72 of 10 CFR, adopted in November 19.Sb, also equates "important to safety" and "safety related." This regulation states, in part, that applications for a license for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) shqll describe the quality assurance program for the ISFSI.
The description of the quality assurance program shall identify structures, systems, and componente important to safety and shall show how the criteria in Appendix B to Part 50 of this chapter will be applied to those safety related components, systems and structures in a manner consistent with their importance to safety.
10 CFR § 72.15(a)(l4) (emphasis added). Although not directly related to nuclear power plants, the language of this NRC regulation uses "important to safety" and "safety related"
.interchangeably.
As recently as January 1983, the Commission's regulations have treated "important to safety" and "safety related" as equivalent. On January 10, 1983, the Commission amended 10 CFR § 50.54 in a way that compels the conclusion that implementation of a quality assurance program satisfying Appendix B constitutes compliance with all NRC quality assurance requirements. See 48 Fed. Reg. 1026 (1983). The NRC's quality as$urance requirements include both Appendix B and GDC 1. Since Appendix B applies only to safety related structures, systems and components_, this January 1983 regulation equates the scope of "safety related" in Appendix B with "important to safety" in GDC 1.
B. NRC Guidance Documents and Reports Many NRC regulatory guides either explicitly or implicitly equate "important to safety" with "safety related."
For example, Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Instrument Setpoints" (Rev. 1, November 1976), defines "systems important to safety" as:
tho*se systems that are necessary to ensure (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, or (3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures Of 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria."
Regulatory Guide 1.105, Rev, 1, at 1.105-2 (emphasis added).
This is the same definition of safety related structures, systems and components that appears in Appendix A to Part 100.12/ A proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.105, which was issued for comment in December 1981, reiterates the NRC's intention to equate "safety related" and "important to safety."
A more recent example of the synonymous use of "important to safety" and "safety related" in NRC regulatory guides is found in Regulatory Guide 1.151, "Instrument Sensing Lines" (July 1983). The introduction to this guide explains that 10 CFR § 50.34 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, corttain certain requirements for structures, systems and components important to safety. After stating the pertinent regulatory requirements, the regulatory guide describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the Commission's regulations with regard to the design and installation of safety-related instrument sensing lines in nuclear power plants.
Regulatory Guide 1.151, at 1 (emphasis added). Eere again, the NRC has explicitly equated the terms.
12/ Regulatory Guide 1.118, "Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems" (Rev. 2, June 1978), also explicitly equates "important to safety" and "safety related" by adopting the definition of important to safety set out in Regulatory Guide 1.105, Revision 1.
Similarly, Staff safety evaluation reports (SERs) routinely contain statements equating safety related and important to safety. For example, in discussing GDC 2's seismic design requirements, the Staff typically states in SERs that this GDC requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems and components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes without loss of capability to perform their safety function. These plant features are those necessary to assure (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (3) capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in the potential offsite exposures comparable to 10 CFR 100 guideline exposures.13/
Such plant features are those covered in Appendix A of Part 100, which are the safety related set of structures, systems and components.
Another SER example, this one dealing with turbine missiles, notes that "General Design Criterion 4 requires that a nuclear power plant be designed against internally and externally generated missiles to assure no loss of function or damage to safety-related equipment essential for a safe plant shutdown." Because GDC 4 applies to "structures, systems, and 13/ ~ , NUREG-0420 at 3, NUREG-0899 at 3-1, NUREG-0528 at 3-1, NUREG-0742 at 3-1, NUREG-0422 at 3-1 (emphasis added).
components important to safety," this SER statement equates the two terms. See NUREG-0420 at 3-8; NUREG-0528 at 3-6.
C. Industry and NRC Practice There can be no serious dispute that the regulatory history equating "important to safety" and "safety related" has been confirmed by the actual use of these terms by industry and the NRC Staff. The record in the Shoreham proceeding compels this conclusion.W S e e , ~ , Long Island Lighting Co.
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445,l2j slip op. at 576 (J-311, -312), 594 (J-360), 747 (J-766), 749 (J-770) (Sept. 21, 1983). With respect to industry, witnesses in that case from both Stone & Webster and General Electric testified that the terms are synonymous. Id.
at 603 (J-389). This is especially significant given that Stone & Webster and General Electric have designed and/or built a large number of nuclear power plants licensed by the NRC.
Id. at 609-10 (J-410, -411), 620-621 (J-441, -443, -444).
The Director of the Division of System Integration of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation acknowledged in the W As does the existence and position of this Utility Safety Classification Group.
15/ References to the unpublished findings of fact in the II Shoreham Partial Initial Decision will be "slip op. at
Shoreham proceeding that the Denton Memorandum definition of "important to safety" was new, that prior to Shoreham it had been applied to only one other plant (TMI-1) and that the Staff was insisting that LILCO adopt the definition because the Staff "had to start somewhere." He made unmistakably clear that the Staff is now moving towards imposing the new definition on other plants. Shoreham, LBP-83-57, slip op. at 554-55 (J-249 to -251).
Evidence that the NRC, until recently, has equated "important to safety" and "safety related" is also reflected in the degraded core rulemaking:
Furthermore, *in reviewing reactor plant designs using the "design basis accident" approach, the NRC. does not review all structures, systems, and components but rather reviews, in varying levels of detail, only those considered "safety grade" by the applicant submitting a Safety Analysis Report. Items considered by the applicant to be outside the scope of design basis accident analyses are generally not considered to be "safety grade" and are not reviewed by the NRC to see whether they will perform as intended or meet various dependability criteria. This method of classification is based on the notion that things credited in the analysis of a design basis event or specified in the regulations are important to safety and thus are "safet* grade" while all else is "non-safety grade.'
45 Fed. Reg. 65,464, 65,475 (1980) (emphasis added).1§/
16/ In the Three Mile Island restart case, the Appeal Board suggested that this language should not be read literally (footnote continued)
The Staff's safety classification practice was also studied by the Kemeny Commission. Excerpts of its report are telling:
Met Ed had a plan for a quality assurance program that met NRC requirements. The NRC requirements, however, were inadequate because they did not require quality assur-ance programs to be applied to the plant as a whole, but rather only to systems classified as "safety-related."
- (footnote continued) because the NRC Staff does review non-safety related equipment.
See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814, 876 n.286 (1983). But the Staff's review of non-safety related equipment is entirely consistent with the use of a safety related/non-safety related classification system. The Staff must review non-safety related items to ensure that the safety related set does not inadvertently exclude something that meets the requirements for classification as safety related. As Kemeny Commission member Pigford noted: *
[T]he well-established practice of the NRC is to require that any component, system, or feature needed for the prevention or mitigation of a serious accident must meet documented require-ments of quality, redundancy, testablility, environmental qualifications, etc., and must be categorized as "safety-related." Although other components, systems, or features are classed as non-"safety related," they must meet requirements appropriate to their operational function. NRC practice is to subject all "safety-related" items to review. Additionally, non-"safety-related" items are reviewed by NRC to reassess their possible reclassification.
Report of the President's Commission on The Accident at Three Mile Island at 93 (1979). Moreover, as set out in section IV.B below, there are specific regulatory requirements for non-safety related equipment(~, § 50.59; Appendix R).
Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island at 44 (1979). While, for reasons stated below, the Utility Group disagrees with the report's conclusions concerning the adequacy of quality assurance requirements, the Kemeny Commission clearly found that the NRC's regulations concerning QA (GDC 1 and Appendix B) are required only for safety related items.
The NRC's own TMI Lessons Learned Task Force also confirms the Staff's prior practice of using the safety grade (safety related) or non-safety grade (non-safety related) dual classification scheme:
Current practice in the licensing of nuclear power plants is _to apply design requirements to one class of components, equipment, systems and structures, the so-called safety-grade class, but not to another non-safety-grade class. This system of classification is based on the premise that things can be classed either as important to safety (that is, the function is credited in the analysis of a design basis event or is specified in the regulations) or not important to safety. Such a clear and distinct separation does not really exist; in fact, modifications of this classification have evolved in past practice to meet specific situations. Thus, for example, the functioning of some components that are not seismically qualified (a general requirement of safety-grade equipment) has been credited in the analysis of some events that are not initiated by an earthquake. Another example is that in some designs the function of non-safety-grade equipment is credited in the analysis of anticipated transients but not in the analysis of lower probability accidents.
TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report, NUREG-0585, at 3-2 (1979). In short, NRC practice, at least through 1979, was to use a two-tiered classification scheme.17/
A variety of trade organizations, which are authoritative on industry practice, have also confirmed the equivalence of "important to safety" and "safety related." In response to the Staff's recent, abrupt change in position, the Committee on Reactor Licensing and Safety of the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) sent William F. Dircks a letter statihg, in pertinent part:
Our [safety classification] subcommittee is virtually unanimous in its agreement that, with regard to interpretation of the regulations, the terms "important to safety" and "safety related" have been considered synonymous.
Letter from M.R. Edelman (AIF) to W.J. Dircks (NRC) (Aug. 29, 1983) .
.!1J The comment that modifications to the scheme have evolved does not suggest the creation of a new classification category.
Instead, it reflects the reality that an absolutely precise demarcation between safety related and non-safety related is impossible even with the functional definition provided in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. Thus, in specific case3, dispute about whether certain equipment does or does not fall within the definition of "safety related" has been avoided by reaching accommodations that reflect the role of the equipment in plant operation. In contrast, the Staff's new definition of "important to safety" would impose new requirements on virtually all non-safety related equipment.
Similarly, the Nuclear Power Engineering Committee of IEEE wrote to Mr. Robert B. Minogue, Director of the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, in May 1982, indicating that expansion of the scope of important to safety would be contrary to the long~standing interpretation of NRC regulations by both nuclear industry and the NRC Staff:
[O]ver the years, the terminology of the General Design Criteria of Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50 has been understood through common usage to equate systems important to safety to safety related or safety systems.
Repeated references within the General Design Criteria to preservation of the safety function being performed by "structures, systems, and components important to safety" enforces this equivalence of terms.
Letter from R.E. Allen (NPEC, IEEE) to Robert B. Minogue (NRC)
(May 10, 1982). This letter also indicated that the Nuclear Power Engineering Committee of IEEE opposed the expansion of the term "important to safety."
Yet another example is a recommendation of the Nuclear Standards Board (of the American National Standards Institute)
Ad Hoc Committee on "Important to Safety" that states as follows:
The current practice utilizing two major classifications, safety related and nonsafety related, for design, construction, testing and operation of nuclear power plants is acceptable and appropriate. This has occurred with a general understanding and usage that the terms "Important to Safety" and "Safety Related" are equivalent in meaning. The
current practice has recognized that within the nonsafety related set, there are varying degrees of importance to safe and reliable operation. For many or most items of this nature, standards have been promulgated to guide design, construction, testing and operation.
Even so, the NRC may determine there is a need, for licensing purposes, to identify a category of items, although nonsafety related, [that] are of more importance to the safe and reliable operation of the plant than other nonsafety rel,ated i terns.
If so, the term "Important to Safety" should not be used to designate this set of items because of the past history of equivalence to the term "Safety Related".
To apply the term "Important to Safety" across the body of regulations to a new set of items would cause the term to become unclear as to the meaning ot all current regulation and.licensing commitments that stern therefrom.
Letter from Walter H. D'Ardenne (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Important to Safety) to George L. Wessman (National Standards Board, ANSI) (March 30, 1983) (emphasis added). Consistent with the proposal in this petition, the Ad Hoc Committee sensibly suggested that, if an expansion of certain regulatory requirements to non-safety related equipment is deemed necessary, it should not be accomplished by redefining a commonly used regulatory term.18/
18/ The nuclear industry's view that "important to safety" and "safety related" have always been synonymous was reaffirmed at an April 30, 1984 meeting on the issue with the NRC Staff.
(footnote continued)
- D. Licensing and Appeal Board Decisions During most of the decade of the 1970s, industry and the NRC Staff held *a common view about the equivalence of these two terms based on the regulatory materials described above.
This shared understanding is confirmed by the fact that a contested issue over the meaning *of these terms never arose in a licensing proceeding prior to 1979. When the Staff abruptly departed from prior practice in the TMI-1 restart proceedinglij and thereafter, Boards were first faced with this new issue.
In several decisions, the equivalency of the two terms has been confirmed by various licensing and appeal boards in-the face of Staff's position. For 'example, the Diablo Canyon Appeal Board has recently ruled that historically there had been no distinction between the terms:
- ( footnote continued)
There, representatives of this Utility Group, the Atomic Industrial Forum, ANSI Nuclear Standards Board, the Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee of the American Nuclear Society and individual utilities noted that in the past standards had been written and nuclear plants licensed based on a two-tiered (safety related/non-safety related) classification scheme.
Where the term "important to safety" was used, it was considered synonymous with "safety related." S e e , ~ ,
Transcript of April 30, 1984 Meeting at 35, 43, 50, 53, 66, 68, 69.
12/ Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59J 14 NRC 1211 (1981), aff'd, ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814 (1983).
We reviewed the history of this particular application, and whereas in the letter that was written in 1981, which makes a distinction between items which are important to safety and items which are safety-related, and to the extent that such a distinction now exists, we do not believe that such a distinction was intended between General Criterion [l] and the items covered by Appendix B.
So at that time [1974], the Staff explicitly and using the terminology "important to safety," agreed with the categorization of equipment, structures, systems and components [Seismic Category I]
established by the Applicant. I thin~ the regulatory history is fairly well defined here. If there is now to be a distinction made between safety-related items and important to safety, it is our opinion that it should not be applied retrospectively to the design phase of the Diablo Canyon plant.
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Tr. D-67 to -68 (Aug. 23, 1983) (emphasis added); see also Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-763, 19 NRC 571, 620-21 (1984), modified, CLI-84-14, slip op. at 2 (Aug. 20, 1984). Licensing boards have also reached the same conclusion. Public Service* Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), Memorandum and Order, slip op., at 2-3 (May 13, 1983). Thus, the plain equivalence of these two terms, as used in NRC regulations, has received confirmation from some NRC adjudicatory boards. But
see TMI-1, LBP-89-59, 14 NRC 1211, aff'd ALAB-721, 17 NRC 814; Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 546 (1983), certified to Commission ALAB-769, 19 NRC 995, 1000 (1984), decided by Commission, CLI-84-9, 19 NRC 1323, 1325 (1984).
E. Recent NRC Actions Suggesting an Expanded Definition of "Important to Safety" Are Without a Sound Basis Beginning with the TMI-1 restart proceeding, the Staff has departed from its historical practice and has taken the position that the category of equipment "important to safety" may be broader than that of "safety-related" equipment. As a result of the Staff's change of position, there have been several general statements from Boards or the Staff suggesting that, as a historical matter, "important to safety" has been understood to be broader, in some unarticulated fashion, than "safety-related." These statements are unsupported and provide no basis for the proposal of a particular rule or of interim requirements for ongoing licensing proceedings.
The origin of the "important to safety" controversy can be traced to NRC Staff testimony in the TMI-1 restart proceeding. The intervenors contended that non-safety related equipment that had contributed to the TMI-2 accident should be made safety grade prior to the restart of TMI-1. The NRC Staff
opposed upgrading this equipment, but relied on the novel argument that this equipment was in the category of "important to safety," which the Staff claimed was broader than just the "safety grade" category.
The decisions of the Licensing Board (LBP-81-59, 14 NRC 1211 (1981)) and the Appeal Board (ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814 (1983))
in TMI-1 both agreed with the Staff's new definition of "important to safety." In the TMI-1 case, however, the Boards apparently did not have the benefit of the testimony of the licensee or the rest of the industry on the historical interpretation and application of this term.£Q; Also, because the TMI-1 hearing focused narrowly on particular components, the record did not consider the broader implications for the Commission's entire regulatory structure of an expanded definition of the pervasive term "important to safety." See Shoreham, ALAB-769, slip op. at 17-18.
The Staff's evolving position on "important to safety" was next addressed in a November 20, 1981 memorandum to all NRR personnel from NRR Director Harold Denton (Denton Memorandum).
This memorandum, which has never been circulated_for public
£QI There is no indication in either the Licensing Board or Appeal Board opinion that any evidence was presented on the licensee's or industry's interpretation of "important to safety."
comrnent,W in effect sought to establish a new and expanded definition of "important to safety" for use by NRR personnel.22/
In reality, the vague definition propounded by the Denton Memorandum fails to provide any clearly discernible guidance on future obligations to companies who operate or are attempting to license nuclear power plants. As the Shoreham Licensing Board found, the Denton Memorandum does not advance "any reasonably precise definition of what is included in the category of important to safety" and is "wholly silent on what quality standards and quality assurance should be applied to that category of structures, systems and components."
Shoreham, LBP-83-57, slip op. at 552 (J-243). As such, the memorandum fails to afford a reasonable warning of proscribed conduct, as due process requires. PBR, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 643 E.2d 890, 897 (1st Cir. 1981). In fact, this defect was underscored by the NRC's Committee to Review Generic 21/ Nor was it widely circulated within the NRC. For example, it was not sent to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
See Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 558.
22/ The memorandum disclaims any inten~ to alter existing regulatory requirements. Despite the disclaimer, the redefinition of "important to safety" to make it a broader category than "safety related" is a regulatory change of far-reaching, pervasive consequences for the licensing and regulation of these plants. See section IV.C below.
Requirements which concluded "that the proposed generic letter to licensees [requiring a broader important to safety set]
represents imposition of a previously unimposed requirement of indeterminate magnitude with an undefined burden on the resources of both industry and Staff." Minutes of CRGR Meeting Number 50 (November 14, 1983), at 3.
Finally, in the Shoreham case, the Licensing Board imposed a license condition requiring a broader definition Of "important to safety" despite the conclusion that LILC0 1 s treatment of non-safety related equipme~t had more than adequately ensured the safe and reliable operation of the plant_. See*, ~ , Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 563-64. In reaching its conclusion about the definition, the Shoreham Board relied on the TMI-1 Appeal Board decision. Id. at 558-60. The reliance was ~nwarranted in light of the important differences between the cases. First, the extensive regulatory history presented in Shoreham was absent in TMI-1. Second, the licensee in TMI-1 apparently did not express its views on the usage of important to safety. And third, unlike the Shoreham case, there was little discussion in TMI-1 about past NRC and industry practice.
The* Shoreham Appeal Board, neither affirming nor reversing the Licensing Board's conclusions, certified the "important to safety" issue to the Commission. The Appeal Board posed the following questions:
- 1. Are the terms "important to safety" and "safety-related" to be deemed synonymous for the purpose of establishing an acceptable quality assurance program in accordance with GDC 1 of Appendix A and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50?
- 2. How should the outcome of Question 1 be applied to the operating license application proceeding before us?
Shoreham, ALAB-769, 19 NRC at 1010.
In reaching its decision to certify the issue, the Appeal Board agreed with LILCO that significant portions of the regulations equated "important to safety" and "safety related."
Id. at 1001-02. The Board, however, found "existing regulations too varied and the historic industry and agency practice too diverse simply to set forth what we perceive to be the* proper interpretation of the regulations." Id. at 1000.
An important element in the Appeal Board's inability to reach a definitive conclusion on the definition is 10 CFR
§ 50.49(b), dealing with environmental qualification 0£ equipment. This relatively recent regulation distinguishes between "important to safety" and "safety related." Although the Appeal Board was not free to disregard§ 50.49, the section does not reflect a Commission determination on the meaning of "important to safety" in all of its myriad uses. First, the presence of "important to safety" in§ 50.49(b) of the EQ rule was not subjected to notice and comment; the term did not
appear in the text of the proposed rule. See 47 Fed. Reg. 2876, 2878, col. 1 (1982).llf Only after the definition became a subject of considerable controversy in the Shoreham case in 1982 did the NRC Staff insert the term in the final rule presented for Commission approval. Apparently, the Commission was not adequately informed of the dispute over the definition before the rule was adopted in January 1983 (48 Fed. Reg. 2729).
Second, nothing in revised§ 50.49 or its rulemaking record suggests the Commission intended to define "important to safety" for other regulatory contexts. If the Commission so intended, it would surely have set out a definition in its notice of proposed rulemaking and sought comments on it.
Indeed, as a matter of administrative law, the rule could not be construed as a definition of "important to safety" for all its uses in the regulations. See PPG Industries, Inc. v.
23/ In fact, the preamble to the proposed rule, in large part, implicitly equated "important to safety" and "safety related."
For example, the preamble discussed a number of guidance documents for environmental qualification of electric equipment "important to safety," all of which apply only to "safety related" (or Class lE) electric equipment. ~ , 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, IEEE 279-1971, Regulatory Guide 1.89, IEEE 323-1971, IEEE 323-1974, DOR Guidelines and NUREG-0588. It also stated that "the proposed rule covers the same electric equipment as [Commission Memorandum and Order] CLI-80-21,"
which explicitly applied to safety grade equipment. See 47 Fed. Reg. 2876-77.
Costle, 659 F.2d 1239, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (notice defective if object of rulemaking not clearly specified). Revised
§ 50.49 was concerned with the difficult but confined issues regarding environmental qualification, not with the even more complex and virtually limitless issues involving "important to safety." Thus, revised§ 50.49 provides no basis for application of an expanded version of "important to safety" in anything but the EQ context.
Third, it is inappropriate to rely on§ 50.49 to conclude that there is significant conflict in the regulatory definition of "important to safety." The distinction in
§ 50.49 b~tween "important to safety" and "safety related" is not necessary for the purpose of the EQ rule, and has very little practical significance in the EQ context. As is clear on the face of the rule, removal of the term "important to safety" from the rule would have no impact on its scope or effect. Thus, the language of§ 50.49, which is of very recent vintage, does not provide persuasive proof of a long-standing practice of interpreting "important to safety" as broader than "safety related. "24/
24/ The Appeal Board cited no other examples of inconsistent usage in the NRC regulations. Other references dealt with very recent unilateral attempts by the Staff to buttress its position. See Shoreham, ALAB-769, 19 NRC at 1003-04.
Similarly, Regulatory Guide 1.29 does not indicate that a conflict exists in the Staff's regulatory guides. See Shoreham, ALAB-769, 19 NRC at 1003. Regulatory Guide 1.29 does not define "important to safety." While i t does specify seismic requirements for certain non-safety related equipment, those requirements are imposed to protect safety related equipment in the vicinity.~ Thus, although the Shoreham Appeal Board correctly recognized that there is now confusion over the proper definition of "important to safety," it should have noted the confusion is of recent vintage and has been caused by Staff attempts to redefine a previously well understood regulatory term.
It is imp~rtant to observe the extremely narrow context of each of the NRC actions which arguably support a broad interpretation of "important to safety." None of them either considered or adopted requirements which are automatically
- applied each time the term "important to safety" appears in the NRC's rules. In fact, these pronouncements do not even purport to adopt specific requirements that are automatically imposed on a particular piece of non-safety related equipment in every
~ For example, moving the non-safety related equipment so that it could not fall on safety related equipment eliminates any need *to meet seismic requirements. Regulatory position C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29 clearly indicates that this non-safety related equipment is not required to remain functional.
future license proceeding. Rather, at most, they use the term "important to safety" in a loose fashion to signify ad hoc requirements applied to pieces of equipment selected on an ad hoc basis.
Equally important, in each of these isolated instances the Board or Staff did not provide reasoned justification for expanding the definition of "important to safety" beyond its well-established meaning. The TMI-1 Boards had no record of regulatory development or industry practice with regard to this pervasive term; the Denton memorandum did not solicit any comments about industry understanding or practice and issued a definition of "important to safety" which is so vague that it cannot be reasonably understood; the Shoreham Licensing Board relied on TMI-1; and the Shoreham Appeal Board cited two regulatory provisions which are clearly distinguishable. Thus, those few instances lack persuasive force and cannot overcome the accumulated weight of regulatory development and demonstrable industry practice.
F. Long-Standing Practice Compels the Conclusion That 11 Important to Safety" and "Safety Related" Are Equivalent In summary, these and other facts compel the conclusion that the industry and, at least until very recently, the NRC have equated "important to safety" and "safety related" in
their activities. This is significant because an agency's long-standing construction and application of its own regulations strongly suggest their correct interpretation.
S e e , ~ , National Ass'n of Greeting Card Pub. v. United States Postal Service, 569 F.2d 570, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
vacated on .other grounds sub nom. United States Postal Service
- v. Associated Third Class Mail Users, 434 U.S. 884 (1977);
United States v. Bd. of Supervisors, 611 F.2d 1367, 1372 (4th Cir. 1979); cf. Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978) (administrative interpretation, practice and usage accorded great weight in interpreting statutes). In this regard, the NRC Staff's new interpretation of "important to s,afety" should be accorded little weight because it is inconsistent with prior agency interpretation and action. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974); Standard Oil Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (TECA 1978); National Ass'n of Greeting Card Pub., 569 F.2d at 600.
The NRC Staff suggests that the facts do not clearly show long-standing NRC equation of "important to safety" and "safety related." Instead, the Staff argues that, although the terms have been equated at times, agency usage has been inconsistent. Even if this were so, it would still be necessary to conclude that the terms are synonymous. In the absence of consistent agency interpretation of regulatory
terms, the terms must be given their "commonly understood definitions." Tenneco Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Administration, 613 F.2d 298, 302 (TECA 1979). And when, as here, a regulatory requirement has no meaning outside the industry it governs, the requirement must be viewed from an "industry standpoint." Wiggins Brothers, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 667 F.2d 77, 81 (TECA 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982).
IV. THE RULEMAKING SHOULD CONFIRM THE EQUIVALENCE OF "SAFETY RELATED" AND "IMPORTANT TO SAFETY" A. The Clear Equivalence of "Safety Related" and "Important to Safety" Has Not Resulted in Any Identified Generic Safety Concern In determining the content of a proposed rule on safety classification, the Commission should assess whether there is substantiated information showing that the long-standing equivalent use of these two terms has resulted in a generic safety concern. If not, the Commission should propose a rule which merely confirms that "important to safety" and "safety related" are synonymous. The facts support only this latter course.
As described in the previous section, the Commission's rules and regulatory guides have used the terms "safety
related" and "important to safety" interchangeably, and it has been the accepted practice of the utility industry and, until quite recently, the NRC Staff to regard these terms as synonymous. Significantly, since the initial incorporation of these terms into the Commission's 'regulations, there has been no allegation that their equivalence has resulted in any generic safety concern. The Staff, for example, has not contended that plants designed or licensed prior to the TMI-1 restart proceeding are any less safe due to the traditional shared understanding between industry and the Staff about the equivalence of these terms. Moreover, even on the several occasions since the TMI-1 restart proceeding where Staff has urged a broad interpretation of "important to safety," the Staff has not claimed that the equivalent usage of these terms will give rise to a specific concern about plant safety.
Moreover, although the safety classification issue has been the
- subject of considerable debate, no generic safety concern has been identified outside the context of licensing proceedings to justify a change in the historical practice under the Commission's rules. In fact, after a review of this issue, the NRC's Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) concluded that "[t]here is no clear and present safety problem that exists as a result of the blurred usage of the terms 'important to safety' and 'safety-related' and the frequent
interchangeable and synonymous use of these terms in licensing safety reviews." Minutes of CRGR meeting Number 50 (Nov. 14, 1983), at 2; see id at 3. This view was confirmed by the NRC Staff at the April 30, 1984 meeting with industry representatives. ~ , transcript of April 30, 1984 meeting at
- 11. Thus, there is no factual basis on which to justify a change from the historical equivalence of these terms.
B. Existing Non-Safety Related Quality Measures Are Adequate As just explained, there is no specific generic safety problem with equating "important to safety" and "safety related." As best the Utility Group can determine, the NRC Staff's motivation for departing from historical practice seems to be the desire to expand some measure of design and quality regulation beyond the traditional focus of the NRC's regulations. Discussions with Staff representatives, testimony in NRC proceedings and a review of the instances in which the Staff has departed from the traditional use of "important to safety" indicate that the Staff's principal objective is to ensure that the appropriate design standards already built into nuclear power plants are maintained throughout the life 'of the plant.26/ The concern expressed both informally and on the 26/ See generally transcript of April 30, 1984 meeting.
record by Staff members is that, without a broad definition of "important to safety," there is no explicit regulatory provision to ensure that the non-safety related equipment, properly designed and constructed, will be maintained throughout the life of the plant in a manner commensurate with the functi9n it performs.llf The Staff, however, does not claim that such standards are not being maintained.
Consequently, the Staff's concern is not over safety but over a perceived lack of regulatory authority. The Staff's fear, however, is not justified. The NRC has broad power to regulate all aspects of nuclear power plants to give reasonable assurance that their operation does not pose an undue risk to the public health and safety. Reasonable assurance of no undue risk generally has been achieved by imposing requirements on ll/ Thus, at the Staff's urging, the Shoreham Board imposed a license condition to:
(1) confirm the Commission's regulatory authority over SS&Cs and related activities beyond those which are safety-related, and (2) to assure, as a regulatory requirement, the continuation by LILCO of the application of quality assurance [to] important to safety SS&Cs and related activities, commensurate with their safety function.
Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 563-64. In the wake of the Commission's action on Shoreham (CLI-84-9), however, the NRC Staff now believes that this license condition is unnecessary.
NRC Staff Response to Order of June 7, 1983 Allowing Comments on the Application of CLI-84-9, at 5 (July 6, 1984).
-so-the safety related set of structures, systems and components.
These regulations are designed to ensure that such equipment can perform the safety functions set out in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. But the NRC's focus on the safety related set does not mean that i t has not exercised regulatory authority over non-safety related structures, systems and components. In specific instances, many of which are described below, regulations have been enacted to impose requirements on non-safety related equipment.
It is important to note that even when non-safety related items have been regulated, the emphasis has generally been on the protection of the safety related set. In other words, the NRC historically has imposed requirements not because of the inherent safety significance of the non-safety related equipment but rather because the equipment may have some impact (positive or negative) on the operation of safety related equipment.28/ Regardless of the reason for their imposition, however, it is obvious from the following examples that the NRC has not hesitated to prescribe requirements for 28/ The NRC Staff's efforts to regulate non-safety related equipment through the expansion of the term "important to safety" reflects a fundamental departure from this traditional regulatory approach. By broadly defining the category of structures, systems and components important to safety, the Staff has eliminated the need to show any significant relationship to the safety related functions of the plant.
non-safety -related equipment when a generic safety concern has been demonstrated. These examples include:
- 1. Regulatory Guide 1.70: this document provides guidance for applicants in the preparation of Safety Analysis Reports. SARS prepared in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.70 will address a large number of non-safety related structures, systems and components. For example, SARs may describe the codes, standards, and other design and quality measures applied to specific non-safety related equipment. The Staff is apparently satisfied that its current process for reviewing applications adequately ensures that non-safety related equipment that may play an important role in the safe and reliable operation of a plant is properly designed and constructed. See,~,
Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 564.
- 2. Standard Review Plan: the NRC Staff conducts its review of an application in accordance with the SRP. In doing so, the Staff reviews the design and quality standards applied to many non-safety related structures, systems and components.
- 3. Fire Protection (10 CFR Part 50, App.
R): fire protection equipment is not considered to be safety related equipment within the definition of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. GDC 3, however, does require that structures, systems and components important to safety be "designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions."
Thus, GDC 3 focuses on protecting what has traditionally been the safety related set. This protection may be provided by certain non-safety related
fire protection equipment. In the NRC's judgment, it was appropriate to impose certain regulatory standards on this specific type of equipment, hence 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R.29/
~- Environmental Qualification (10 CFR
§ 50.49(b) (2), (3)): as already noted, the environmental qualification rule imposes requirements on certain non-safety related electrical equipment.
- 5. Seismic Design (Regulatory Guide 1.29): certain design recommendations are made for non-safety related (non-seismic category I) equipment which could adversely affect safety related equipment in a seismic event.
Again, the focus of this regulatory guidance is the protection of the safety related set. A utility may elect (1) to design the non-safety related equipment so it will not adversely affect the safety related equipment; (2) to interpose a barrier between the safety related and non-safety related equipment to protect the former; or (3) to move either the safety related or the non-safety related equipment so that the latter cannot cause failure of the former.
29/ Interestingly, the fire protection issue (i) demonstrates the proper procedural approach to imposing specific regulatory requirements and (ii) provides another example of the equality of "important to safety" and "safety related" in NRC regulations. After almost ten years of experience under the general fire protection requirements of GDC 3, the Commission enacted by rulemaking in 1980 very specific fire protection regulations on the subject. 10 CFR § 50.48 and Appendix R. In the rule, the Commission equates "important to safety" and "safety related" and uses them interchangeably: "The phrases
'important to safety,' or 'safety related,' will be used throughout this Appendix Ras applying to all safety functions." 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, § I; see generally Appendix R.
- 6. § 50.59 Analysis: § 50.59 requires licensees to notify the NRC prior to making changes in the facility or procedures, or conducting tests or experiments, if such activities involve an unreviewed safety question.
To meet this requirement, both safety related and non-safety related modifications, tests or experiments must be reviewed. Thus, throughout the life of the plant, there will be reviews of the impact of non-safety related modifications on plant safety.
The NRC's exercise of this undoubted regulatory authority has not been extensive, however, because the utilities' established practice of applying design and quality measures to non-safety related structures, systems and components as a matter of good engineering practice makes such regulation unnecessary. Since utilities have applied these measures even though they believed there was no regulatory requirement to do so, little or no real gain in safety would be achieved by expanding the NRC's regulations to encompass some
- or all of these good engineering practices. Thus, the NRC's regulations (as they have been historically interpreted) do provide reasonable assurance of no undue risk to the public health and safety. A review of the extensive quality measures already applied to the non-safety related set is helpful in understanding why the Utility Group is confident that this is so.
To repeat a prior point, utilities do recognize that non-safety related structures, systems and components play a role in enhancing safe and reliable operation of a nuclear power plant.30/ In order to help ensure that the function of these systems is maintained, utilities, as a matter of good engineering practice, apply quality measures to these items commensurate with the function performed. These measures include:
- 1. Industry efforts:
- a. INPO Significant Event Evaluation and Information Network (SEE-IN}: this program, which was endorsed by the NRC in Generic Letter 82-04, provides a mechanism for central collection and screening of all events from both U.S.
and foreign nuclear plants. This program is not limited to safety related structures, systems and components.
- b. Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS}: this computerized system, now under the aegis of INPO, allows all nuclear plants to input and receive failure data on individual pieces of safety related and some non-safety related equipment.
- c. Other INPO Activities: INPO has a number of other activities in progress or under development which address NRC 30/ It is also important to recognize, however, the nature of this role. By design, non-safety related equipment is not essential to maintain the safe operation of a nuclear plant.
Rather, this equipment can enhance the safety of an already safe plant.
concerns about the operation of nuclear power plants. These initiatives are summarized in a letter dated August 29, 1983, from Lelan F.
Sillin, Jr., Chairman, INFO Board of Directors, to the Honorable Nunzio J.
Palladino. These INPO initiatives are not limited to safety related structures, systems and components.
Rather, they focus on all aspects of plant operations. Significantly, where regulatory requirements tend to specify minimum acceptable standards, the INPO efforts have established much higher goals called "benchmarks of excellence." Also, the INFO approach seeks the same goal the Staff seeks --
safe and reliable operation -- while allowing necessary flexibility for individual plants. This flexibility would be difficult to achieve in writing new regulations to cover non-safety related equipment and their operation.
- 2. Individual Utility Practices:
- a. Preventive maintenance practices:
utilities employ preventive maintenance practices for non-safety related structures, systems and components.
- b. Controls on non-safety related ma-in-tenance: utilities impose certain controls on maintenance performed on non-safety related structures, systems and components, including:
(i) the same or similar work pro-cedures for safety related and non-safety related maintenance on similar equipment; (ii) the same maintenance control forms for safety related and non-safety related items;
(iii) audit/review of non-safety related maintenance and maintenance records; and (iv) the same process for both safety related or non-safety related design activities and modifications.
- c. Independent on-site safety evaluation groups: these groups, required by NUREG-0737, generally review, among other things, operating experience, both plant-specific and industry-wide.
In many instances, these reviews will explore the role of non-safety related equipment in the event under investigation.
- d. Start-up testing of non-safety related structures, systems and components:
plant start-up test programs include integrated tests of major plant systems, both safety related and non-safety related.
- e. Procurement, testing and calibration of non-safety related equipment:
utilities generally develop their own set of internal controls for the pro-curement, testing and calibration of non-safety related equipment.
- f. Training/workshops for non-safety related activities: utilities conduct training sessions or workshops on subjects relating to non-safety related activities including maintenance.
It must b~ emphasized that: (1) the above list is not comprehensive (it provides representative examples of non-safety related quality measures), and (2) the list does not necessarily reflect what any particular utility does for
non-safety related items; individual utilities exercise their judgment in selecting the measures they believe to be appropriate. The list does confirm, however, that utilities do undertake measures, consi*stent with good engineering practice, to ensure the safe and reliable operation of non-safety related items.
Given existing practices for non-safety related structures, systems and components, there is no justification for imposing new regulatory requirements on the operation of this equipment now. First, there is no evidence of any specific risk due to the lack of more expansive regulations for non-safety related equipment. If, indeed, a specific risk were involved, the appropriate response should address that risk as NRC has done in past and not revise the NRC's entire regulatory scheme, as would the new definition of "important to safety" proposed in the Denton Memorandum.llJ And second, given the existing programs and requirements, both regulatory and non-regulatory, for 31/ A possible mechanism is already under development to identify specific; unacceptable risks from non-safety related structures, systems and components. A two-year trial of the NRC's proposed safety goal is currently in progress. If the Commission elects to adopt some form of safety goal, it may provide a means to determine whether to impose more stringent requirements on particular non-safety related items if such a need exists.
non-safety related equipment, there is no indication that expanding the regulatory umbrella to cover more non-safety related items and activities would add any additional protection of public health and safety. Indeed, the contrary may be true. NRC Staff members have conceded that the safety related set is of primary importance in protecting the public health and safety. A broad expansion of the NRC's regulations can only serve to divert industry's and the Staff's finite resources from this critical area.
C. Expansion of "Important to Safety" Will Have Significant Adverse Consequences A proposed rule which addresses a specific safety
- eoncerrr-by- exp-anding -the -definition o-f - "important to safety" would have far reaching, unintended, and potentially disastrous consequences. "Important to safety" is one of the most pervasively used of all NRC regulatory terms. It appears at least ten times in the General Design Criteria alone. It is also used in Parts 21, 50, and 72 of the Commission's regulations and is widely interspersed throughout NRC guidance documents.
If a proposed rule were to modify the meaning of this term, industry and ultimately the Staff might be required to review each piece of equipment in operating plants, as well as
those under construction, in order to determine whether the equipment is arguably covered by at least one of the many uses of "important to safety" throughout the NRC regulations and regulatory documents. Given the pervasive use of the term, mere'iy identifying each place it appears in regulations and guidance documents will be an extensive undertaking. Moreover, substantial additional effort might have to be spent trying to define the requirements applicable to each new category of equipment "important to safety." In many cases, this time-consuming review of every plant and plant design could result in the imposition of new and potentially costly requirements not because of any articulated safety concern but merely because of an ~r~~_le __ reLa_t._i__on _ _to_ -a-rul-e-0r- ~--clanee-document which has loosely used the term "important to safety."
Ultimately, all of these activities and requirements will only serve to detract from the industry and Staff effort to assure
- performance of the "safety related" set of equipment.
This result would be particularly inappropriate since the Staff has claimed that its concerns are limited to the GDC 1 context. S e e , ~ , transcript of April 30, 1984 meeting at 189-190. To remedy the Staff's limited concern by expanding the definition of "important to safety" would inappropriately broaden the term in its other uses. If, on the other hand, as the Staff has suggested on occasion, the broader definition is
limited to GDC 1, a regulatory scheme would result in which "important to safety" had different meanings in different contexts. This regulatory inconsistency would provide fertile ground for spawning arguments over the meaning of the term in each of its contexts.
Finally, expansion of "important to safety" in GDC 1 would not accomplish the Staff's professed goal of providing a specific regulation for ensuring the continued application of non-safety related quality measures during plant operation.
GDC 1 is a criterion which deals with design, fabrication, erection and testing. Thus, even with a new definition of "important to safety," GDC 1 would not cover plant operation.w Clearly, expansion of the term "important to safety" would have unwanted and undesirable consequences which are not justified by any safety concern conceivably at issue in this rulemaking. Thus, if the Commission decides that a safety concern has been demonstrated, the Commission should under no circumstances consider substituting an expanded definition of 32/ Compare GDC 1 ("structures, syst:ems and components important to safety shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested . . ") with Appendix B ( "these activities include designing, purchasing, fabricating, handling, shipping, storing, cleaning, erecting, installing, inspecting, testing, operating, maintaining, repairing, refueling, and modifying" (emphasis added)).
"important to safety" for a carefully tailored rule focusing on the particular safety concern and any requirements derived from that concern.~
V. THE PROPOSED RULEMAKING A. Proposed Rule In order to eliminate any potential confusion created by recent usage of the term "important to safety" in a manner inconsistent with its historical interpretation and application by the NRC and the nuclear industry, the Utility Group petitions the Commission to adopt the following:
Proposed 10 CFR § 50.2(y)
"Structures, systems and components important to safety" and "safety related structures, systems and components" are equivalent terms that mean those structures, systems and components necessary to assure: (i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (iii) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of 33/ This is the course the Commission has successfully followed in its recent ATWS rulemaking. The ATWS rule requires the jnstallation of certain equipment for the prevention and mitigation of ATWS events. An early draft of the final rule attempted to classify this equipment as "important to safety" (but not "safety related"). The final rule approved by the Commission abandoned the "important to safety" classification and specified that, while the equipment was not safety related, particular quality assurance elements of Appendix B should be applied to it. 49 Fed. Reg. 26,036 (1984).
accidents which could result in offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR Part 100.
This definition is consistent with the historical interpretation and application of these terms as they appear in the NRC's regulations. Thus, it can serve as a benchmark from which the need for additional regulatory requirements for non-safety related structures, systems and components can be examined.
To emphasize that this rule is meant to confirm existing practices, the Federal Register notice accompanying this definition should indicate that the rulemaking is not intended to result in any substantive changes in plants already in operation or under construction. For example, where licensees have applied certain design, construction or quality standards to plant equipment and such standards have been reviewed and approved by the NRC Staff, this new rule shall not be used as a basis to reduce or increase the agreed upon standards. To ensure that this intent is clear, the rule promulgating the above definition should include the following note:
This definition is not intended to require any changes in the design, construction or quality standards for any nuclear power plant for which an operating license or construc-tion permit has been granted prior to the effective date of this rule.
Such a provision would-be consistent with the NRC Staff's view that there is no concern about existing industry practice for non-safety related equipment.34/ This provision would also be consistent with the result reached in the Commission's Shoreham order, which precludes the imposition of additional regulatory requirements on non-safety related equipment simply because it might be identified as "important to safety."
Finally, a conforming amendment should be made to
§ 50.49 (Environmental Qualification) to delete the words "important to safety" from the title of:§ 50.49 and from
§ 50.49(b) to be consistent with the above definition. The title should read "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment," and section§ 50.49(b) should read: "(b) Electric equipment covered by this section is: . " As already noted, this change would have no substantive effect on the scope of the equipment subject to the environmental qualification rule. Rather, consistent with the historical interpretation of the term, "important to safety," the change would merely eliminate the confusion caused by the unexplained inclusion of the term in the final environmental qualification rule.
34/ See section IV.A above.
B. An Additional Suggestion In light of the considerations discussed in Section IV, the Utility Group does not believe additional regulation of non-safety related equipment or activities is required. If the Commission disagrees, however, more work must be performed before proposing any new regulations or requirements for non-safety related equipment. At a minimum, the Staff should be required to gather basic factual information on such matters as the quality practices that are currently being applied to non-safety related structures, systems and components; the design and construction standards that are available and in use for non-safety related,structures, systems and components; the industry practices that are in place to help assure that utilities are providing appropriate quality measures for non-safety related equipment; and the degree to which non-safety related equipment could affect the safety and reliable operation of the plant. Moreover, the Staff must articulate clearly its specific safety concerns. Only with this information can the Staff determine whether current quality practices for non-safety related structures, systems and components adequately address its identified safety concerns and, if not, what particular areas remain of concern.
Should particular areas of concern be identified, the Staff must then determine whether regulation is the appropriate means of addressing them, or whether alternative, less burdensome, measures could be used to accomplish the same result.35/ Finally, if the Staff concludes that further regulation is the only way to address its concerns about non-safety related structures, systems and components, careful consideration must be given to tailoring those regulations to the Staff's specific concerns. For instance, in the event the Staff believes that the only way to achieve the needed additional regulation is by expansion of the term "important to safety," the Staff must then pursue such questions as:
(1) Is the broader definition of "important to safety" set out in the Denton Memorandum too vague to apprise utilities of the equipment that falls into the category? If not, what exactly does it mean?
(2) Has any assessment been made of the impact of exp~nding the definition of "important to safety" everywhere it appears in the regulations and NRC regulatory guidance? If so, what are the results of that assessment?
When the Staff has gathered this information and has 35/ In this regard, the Staff must balance the costs of diverting finite NRC and industry resources from other activities against the safety benefits of an expansion of the NRC's regulations.
answered these and other pertinent questions, interested parties should assess the results and determine whether further rulemaking is necessary.
VI. INTERIM REQUIREMENTS The Commission's order in Shoreham recognizes the importance of protecting the legitimate expectations of
- licensees and applicants during the pendency of the rulemaking.
As noted, the members of the Utility Group own a substantial number of the commercial nuclear power plants currently in operation or under construction. These plants have been or are being designed, constructed, tested and operated using the long-standing industry practice of equating "important to safety" and "safety related." These plants have been licensed by the NRC for construction or operation based on this assumed equivalence.36/ As the previous discussion reflects, there is no sound basis for a conclusion to the contrary.
In order to ensure orderly and reasoned consideration of the appropriate scope of the definition of "important to 36/ Some of the older plants owned by Group members may have been designed and constructed before the terms "safety related" and "important to safety" came into common usage. Since that time, however, owners of these plants have interpreted these terms as synonymous in complying with applicable regulatory requirements.
safety," the Utility Group urges the Commission to mainta~i::i the traditional classification scheme until the completion of its rulemaking. Thus, the Commission should direct that the long-standing synonymous interpretation of the term "important to safety" and "safety related" be applied in all of the NRC's activities during the pendency of the rulemaking.TIJ This would be in keeping with established tenets of administrative law which mandate that a rulemaking must "give notice that the standard is being changed . . . and [must] apply the changed standard only to those actions taken by parties after the new standard has been proclaimed as in effect."~
In order to protect the integrity of the Commission's rulemaking, the Commission should also direct that during the rulemaking, contentions that seek to impose requirements on non-safety related equipment not explicitly mandated by NRC regulations should not be admitted for litigation. For the reasons stated in Section IV above, removal of this issue from W Thus, the license condition imposed by the Shoreham licensing board should be removed, Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 635, and no similar license condition should be issued for other plants while the rulemaking is in progress. The NRC Staff agrees that no license condition is necessary. See note 27 above.
~ Boston Edison Co. v. FPC, 557 F.2d 845, 849 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 956 (1977); see generally, Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 590 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1979).
consideration (_except in the context of this rulemaking) will not reduce the level of safety provided by the NRC's regulations. The interim provisions of this rule would merely perpetuate the long-standing equivalency of the terms pending the completion of the rulemaking without any substantive safety impact.39/
The Commission should also ensure that there is no confusion about existing quality measures for non-safety related structures, systems and components. Consequently, it should indicate that the rulemaking is not intended to increase or decrease any commitments for non-safety related items previously made by an applicant or licensee and accepted by the NRC Staff.
39/ The Licensing Board's decision in the Shoreham case confirms that this is possible. The Shoreham Board concluded that LILCO has complied with NRC requirements .
[because] with respect to the treatment of structures, systems, and components, whether for classification and qualification, quality assurance or safety analysis, such treatment may and should be effected commensurate with the items' importance to safety. LILCO has applied this latter treatment to every structure, system, and component in the Shoreham design, notwithstanding the fact that it used only two classification classes, i.e., safety-related and nonsafety-related.
Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 546.
VII. CONCLUSION For all of the reasons stated above, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should propose the rule set out in this petition in the Safety Classification rulemaking.
Respectfully submitted, UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP
~
~ f. Ea~
Lee B. Zeugin Counsel for Utility Group HUNTON & WILLIAMS P. 0. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: October 30, 1984