ML23156A503
| ML23156A503 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/30/1984 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC/SECY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| PRM--050-038 | |
| Download: ML23156A503 (1) | |
Text
DOCUMENT DATE:* 10/30l1984
TITLE:. PRM-050-038 - - PETITION FOR RULEMAKING BY THE UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP REGARDING IMPORTANT TO SAFETY-AND SAFETY RELATED..
. CATEGORIES
CASE
REFERENCE:
PRM--050-038
KEY WORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS
Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive*-SUNSI Review Complete HUNTON & WILLIA:~r' 1~tETJ:.D
- ) ' I 707 EAST MAIN STREET Po. Box 1535
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TELEX 7eee2e FIRST TENNli:SSli:E BANK 1:!.UILDING PO BOX 951 4011 CHAIN ~RIDGE ROAD October 30, 1984 KNOXVILLE:, TE!:NNESSEE 37fil01 FAIRP°AX, VIRGINIA 22030-----* TS::Ul:PHON£ e,e-e.37-4311 Tll!:.Ll!:PHONE 703*3~2-2eoo FILE NO
DIRECT DIAL NO 804 7B8-
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS
Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.
11th Floor Washington, D.C. 20555
Safety Classification
Dear Chairman Palladino:
The Utility Safety Classification Group is pleased to_~ub
mit the enclosed petition for rulemaking on the issue of safety classification. As the Commission d~cbgnized ~n its June 6 l
- order in the Shoreham case, Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham
Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-9, 19 NRC 1323, 1325
(1984), the relative scope of the terms "important to safety"
and "safety related" is an important generic issue that needs
to be resolved through the rulemaking process.
HUNTON & WILLIAMS
The Utility Group, whose members own a substa~tial number
of nuclear plants in operation or under construction, believes
that prior regulations, precedent, and practice establish that
the category of equipment "important to safety" is equivalent
to the category of "safety related" equipment. The "safety re lated" set consists, as it always has, of those structures,
systems and components that perform the safety functions set
out in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. The Utility Group's pro
posed rule would explicitly incorporate these longstanding in terpretations in the NRC's regulations.
In support of its view that items "important to safety"
should be equated with items historically called "safety
related," the petition demonstrates:
(a) A comparison of the proposed and final ver sions of Part 50, Appendix A shows that the term "important to safety" was substituted in the final version for a variety of terms in the proposed version, all of which referred to the "safety related" set.
(b) The regulatory history of Part 50, Appendix B provides compelling reason to believe that the scope of General Design Criterion 1 is identical in scope to Appendix B. It is un disputed that Appendix B applies only to safety related structures, systems and compo nents.
(c) The proposed and final versions of Part 100, Appendix A both indicate that "important to safety" and "safety related" were intended to be synonymous.
(d) Other Commission regulations equate "impor tant to safety" and "safety related."
HuNTbN & WILLIAMS
(e) NRC Staff guidance documents and reports con firm the synonymous use of the terms.
(f) The nuclear industry has consistently interpreted "important to safety" and "safety related" in the NRC's regulations and guid ance documents as equivalent. Utilities have designed, constructed and operated nuclear plants based on the equivalency of these terms, and the NRC has reviewed and licensed the plants on the same basis.
(g) In the face of recent Staff efforts to depart from prior practice, some licensing and ap peal boards have confirmed that "important to safety" and "safety related" are equivalent.
(h) There is inadequate health and safety justi fication for recent actions to expand the term "important to safety."
These points make clear that explicit recognition of the
equality of the terms would be consistent with a decade of
practice and sound policy. Thus, the Group urges the Commission
to adopt the following addition to 10 CFR § 50.2 (Definitions):
(y) "Structures, systems and components im portant to safety" and "safety related structures, systems and components" are equivalent terms that mean those struc tures, systems and components necessary to assure: ( i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condi tion, or (iii) the capability to prevent which could result in offsite exposures or mitigate the consequences of accidents comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR Part 100.
RuNTON & WILLIAMS
The Utility Group members emphasize, in the strongest terms
possible, that by endorsing the traditional equality of "important
to safety" and "safety related," they do not mean to denigrate
non-safety related equipment. Non-safety related structures, sys
tems and components can and do play a role in enhancing the safe
and reliable operation of nuclear power plants. In recognition of
this reality, utilities do treat non-safety related equipment com
mensurate with their function. But there has been no showing in the recent debate on safety classification that any need exists to
imp~se broad regulatory requirements on non-safety related
equipment. Any deviation from the traditional definition of
"important to safety" is likely to have far reaching, pervasive
consequences on the utility industry in licensing, general
regulation and economic impact. "Important to safety" appears
throughout the Commission's regulations, Staff regulatory guides,
NUREG documents and other licensing documents. Thus, an expansion
of its meaning would substantially affect diverse and important
aspects of the design, construction and operation of nuclear power
plants.
The broader definition of "important to safety" now endorsed
by some members of the NRC Staff has not yet had a substantial im
pact only because of widespread opposition by utilities to expan
sion of the term. Examples of potential problems abound. In the
ATWS rulemaking, the Commission decided to impose requirements for
the installation of certain equipment for the prevention and HuNTON & WILLIAMS
mitigation of ATWS events. In an early draft of the final rule,
NRC Staff members urged that this equipment, though not safety re
lated, be classified as "important to safety." The asserted goal
was to assure that appropriate quality measures were applied to
this equipment. Given the widespread use of the term "important
to safety," however, such a classification might have imposed far more requirements than intended. Ultimately, and properly in the
Group's view, the Commission abandoned the "important to safety"
classification in the final rule and specified only that particu
lar quality assurance elements of Appendix B be applied to it.
Significantly, in the process of developing a generic letter to implement this provision of the rule, certain NRC Staff members
attempted, once again, to brand the ATWS prevention/mitigation
equipment as "important to safety" (but not safety related). Al
though the attempt has been unsuccessful to date, the example un
derscores the need for prompt and definitive Commission action on
the definition of the terms.
Examples of the potential mischief from a broad, undefined
use of "important to safety" can also be found in recent inquiries
to utilities made by the Staff as part of its review process.
These inquiries have been designed to "encourage" utilities to
classify certain non-safety related equipment as "important to
safety" and place this equipment on plant Q lists. The utilities have routinely responded that they use the traditional two-tier
safety related/non-safety related classification scheme, that the HuNTON & WILLIAMS
equipment is not safety related, and that the utility takes appro
priate measures to ensure the quality of this non-safety related
equipment. Had these utilities acquiesced in the Staff's re
quests, they would have risked future ratchet attempts by interve
nors and, perhaps, the NRC I & E branch, to impose the whole pano-1 ply of regulatory requirements applicable to structures, systems
and components important to safety. This imposition of new
requirements would have occurred wholly apart from any showing
that the requirements were needed to protect the public health and
safety.
Finally, in addition to the potential effects on plant
hardware, utilities have identified potential impacts on quality
assurance programs,_maintenance programs and the like. These pro
grams were developed for plants designed and built using a
two-tiered classification scheme (safety related/non-safety relat
ed). The imposition of a new, three-tiered approach (safety
related/important to safety but not safety related/non-safety
related) would impose untold administrative burdens. As noted in
the rulemaking petition, the NRC's Systematic Evaluation Program
(SEP) provides an example of the extensive resources that must
inevitably be committed to review a plant's compliance with
criteria different from those to which it was designed.
' HuNTON & WILLIAMS
In short, the petition demonstrates that the Commission must
act now to restore stability to the regulatory process. The Util
ity Group recognizes that the rulemaking it proposes will take time despite the fact the proposed rule merely codifies long
standing usage. Thus, the petition proposes that the Commission
take interim steps. First, the Commission should confirm the
equivalence of the term "important to safety" to the current defi
nition of the term "safety related" in the regulations during the rulemaking, since this is the interpretation used in the design,
construction, licensing and operation of nuclear power plants.
Second, the Commission should direct Boards not to entertain argu
ments that any requirements beyond those explicitly included in
NRC regulations be placed on non-safety related equipment. Third,
the Commission should confirm that any existing commitment by a
licensee or applicant co~cerning particular measures for
non-safety related equipment that has been accepted by the NRC Staff would not be affected during the rulemaking. Given the
problems created by uncertainty over the definition of "important
to safety," the Utility Group urges the Commission to act quickly
on these interim measures.
liUNT@N &8w-ILLIAMS
The Group is anxious to resolve the safety classification
issuei to ~his end, thi GrciuR will gladly meet with the
Commissioners and members of the Staff to answer any questions
concerning the petition. Also, for your convenience, we have en
closed a draft Fed~ral Register notice announcing receipt of the
petition. We look forward to resolution of this important issue.
Respectfully submitted,
UTILITY SAFETY SSI ICS~N GROUP Ir~,fL/.
Anthony
- E~
Lee B. Zeugin
Counsel to the Group
Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O., Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212
cc: Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando M. Zech, Jr.
Herzel H. E. Plaine, General Counsel William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary DOCKETED ~SN,~C
Suggested Federal *s4 OCT 31 A11 :46 Register Notice
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. PRM
Utility Safety Classification Group; Filing of Petition for
Rulemaking
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ACTION: Publication of petition for rulemaking from electric utilities.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is publishing
for public comment a petition for rulemaking filed before the
Commission on October 15, 1984, by the Utility Safety Classifi
cation Group. This petition, which has been assigned Docket
No. PRM __, requests that the Commission address the issue
of safety classification of equipment for nuclear power plants.
Specifically, the Petitioner asks the Commission to establish a
definition for the terms "important to safety" and "safety
related" as those terms are used in the NRC's regulations.
DATE: Comment period expires [30 days after date of notice]
ADDRESSES: A copy of the petition for rulemaking is
available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Doc
ument room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. A copy of
the petition may be obtained by writing to
All persons who desire to submit written
comments concerning the petition for rulemaking should send
their comments to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 20555, Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: -----------
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Petitioner Utility Safety Classification Group
(a group of electric utilities owning a substantial number of
nuclear power reactors operating or under construction) re
quests that the Commission initiate rulemaking on the safety
classification issue. On June 6, 1984, the Commission indi
cated its intent to conduct such a rulemaking to consider the
relative scope of the terms "important to safety" and "safety
related." Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power
Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-9, 19 NRC __ (June 6, 1984).
Petitioner requests that the Commission use this notice-and
comment rulemaking proceeding to adopt the following proposed
addition to 10 CFR §50.2 (Definitions):
(y) "Structures, systems and com ponents important to safety" and "safety related structures, systems and components" are equivalent terms that mean those structures, systems and compo nents necessary to assure:
(i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (iii) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR Part 100.
In addition, Petitioner requests that conforming amendments be
made to §50.49 (Environmental Qualification) to delete the
words "important to safety" from the title of §50.49 and from
§50.49(b) to be consistent with the above definition. The
title should read "Environmental Qualification of Electric
Equipment," and §50.49(b) should read: "(b) Electric equipment
covered by this section is: II
The Petitioner states that "prior rules, precedent, and prac
tice establish that the category of equipment important to
safety is equivalent to the category of safety related equip
ment." The Petitioner also states that:
For years, the NRC, utilities, reactor vendors and architect engineers have built, licensed and operated nuclear power plants in reliance on a common under standing and interpretation of certain terms in the NRC's
regulations. Until recently, the regulatory terms "important to safety" and "safety related" and the non-regulatory term "safety grade" have been used synonymously by both industry and the NRC. The nuclear industry continues to follow this prac tice. Only recent NRC Staff actions have signaled a departure from this long-standing interpretation by using the term "important to safety" to cover a much broader set of plant struc tures, systems and components than is covered by the term "safety related."
According to the Petitioner, the rulemaking petition demon
strates the following points:
(a) A comparison of the proposed and final versions of Part 50, Appen dix A shows that the term "impor tant to safety" was substituted in the final version for a vari ety of terms in the proposed ver sion, all of which referred to the "safety related" set.
(b) The regulatory history of Part 50, Appendix B provides compel ling reason to believe that the scope of General Design Criterion 1 is identical in scope to Appen dix B. It is undisputed that Ap pendix B applies to safety relat ed structures, systems and components.
(c) The proposed and final versions of Part 100, Appendix A, both in dicate that "important to safety" and "safety related" were intend ed to be synonymous.
(d) Other Commission regulations equate "important to safety" and "safety related."
(e) NRC Staff guidance documents and reports confirm the synonymous use of the terms.
(f) The nuclear industry has consis tently interpreted "important to safety" and "safety related" in the NRC's regulations and guid ance documents as equivalent.
Utilities have designed, con structed and operated nuclear plants based on the equivalency of these terms, and the NRC has reviewed and licensed the plants on the same basis.
(g) In the face of recent Staff ef forts to depart from prior prac tice, some licensing and appeal boards have confirmed that "im portant to safety" and "safety related" are equivalent.
(h) There is inadequate health and safety justification for recent actions to expand the term "im portant to safety."
Although the petition advocates equating "important to safety"
and "safety related" and thus preventing widespread and unnec
essary regulation of non-safety related equipment, the Utility
Group members emphasize that they
do believe that non-safety relat ed structures, systems and compo nents can and do play a role, in varying degrees, in enhancing the safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants and that they should be treated according ly. Moreover, where a specific safety concern indicates the need
for broader regulation, the NRC has in the past regulated specif ic non-safety related equipment, and the Utility Group has no in tention of seeking any modification of such require ments. Thus, the Utility Group does not quarrel with the underlying concern that has prompted the recent attempts to deviate from the traditional definition of "important to safe ty." But there has been no con vincing showing that this occa sional concern needs to be elevated to a broad regulatory requirement attached to the prev alent term "important to safety" in order to provide reasonable assurance of no undue risk to the public health and safety. [foot note omitted]
The Petitioner further states that
The NRC has broad power to regu late all aspects of nuclear power plants to give reasonable assur ance that their operation does not pose an undue risk to the public health and safety. Rea sonable assurance of no undue risk generally has been achieved by imposing requirements on the safety related set of structures, systems and components. These regulations are designed to ensure that such equipment can perform the safety functions set out in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. But the NRC's focus on the safety related set does not mean that it has not exercised regulatory authority over non safety related structures, systems and components.
The petition describes examples where the NRC has imposed spe-
cific requirements on non-safety related equipment. It also
describes a number of industry-wide and utility efforts that
are aimed at ensuring that the function of non-safety related
systems is maintained. These actions are taken as a matter of
good engineering practice not because they are required by any
existing regulation.
Finally, Petitioner proposes the following interim requirements
to apply during the pendency of the rulemaking:
First, the Commission should con firm the equivalence of "impor tant to safety" and "safety re lated" as currently used throughout its regulations during the rulemaking since this is the interpretation used to date in the design, construction, licens ing and operation of nuclear power plants. Second, the Com mission should direct Boards not to entertain an argument that any requirements beyond those explic itly included in the NRC regula tions be placed on non-safety re lated equipment. Third, the Commission should confirm that any existing commitment by a li censee or applicant concerning particular measures for non safety related equipment which has been accepted by the NRC Staff would not be affected dur ing the rulemaking.
Dated at Washington, D.C. this day of
For the Commission,
Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
BEFORE THE COMMISSION
In the Matter of )
) PETITION FOR RULEMAKING SAFETY CLASSIFICATION )
UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP PETITION FOR RULEMAKING
UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. Northern States Power Co.
Consumers Power Co. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
Detroit Edison Co. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
Florida Power Corp. Public Service Co. of Gulf States Utility Co. New Hampshire (representing Houston Lighting & Power Co. also the Yankee Atomic Electric Long Island Lighting Co. Power Co., Maine Yankee Atomic Nebraska Public Power District Power Co., and Vermont Yankee Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. Nuclear Power Co.)
Northeast Utilities Service Co. Sacramento Municipal Utility (representing also District Connecticut Light and SNUPPS Power, Connecticut Yankee (representing Union Electric Atomic Power Co., Northeast Co., Kansas Gas & Electric Co.,
Nuclear Energy Co., and Kansas City Power & Light Co.,
Western Massachusetts and Kansas Electric Power Electric Co.) Coop., Inc.)
Wisconsin Public Service Co.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
BEFORE THE COMMISSION
In the Matter of )
) PETITION FOR RULEMAKING SAFETY CLASSIFICATION )
UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP PETITION FOR RULEMAKING
UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. Northern States Power Co.
Consumers Power Co. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
Detroit Edison Co. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
Florida Power Corp. Public Service Co. of Gulf States Utility Co. New Hampshire (representing Houston Lighting & Power Co. also the Yankee Atomic Electric Long Island Lighting Co. Power Co., Maine Yankee Atomic Nebraska Public Power District Power Co., and Vermont Yankee Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. Nuclear Power Co.)
Northeast Utilities Service Co. Sacramento Municipal Utility (representing also District Connecticut Light and SNUPPS Power, Connecticut Yankee (representing Union Electric Atomic Power Co., Northeast Co., Kansas Gas & Electric Co.,
Nuclear Energy Co., and Kansas City Power & Light Co.,
Western Massachusetts and Kansas Electric Power Electric Co.) Coop., Inc.)
Wisconsin Public Service Co.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction....................................... *.... 1
I I. Interests of Petitioner................................. 6
III. "Important to Safety" and "Safety Related" Have Been Treated as Equivalent......................... 9
A. NRC Regulations..................................... 11
- 1. Part 50, Appendix A............................. 11
- 2. Part 50, Appendix B............................. 16
- 3. Part 100, Appendix A............................ 18
- 4. Other Regulations............................... 22
B. NRC Guidance Documents and Reports.................. 24
C. Industry and NRC Practice........................... 27
D. Licensing* and Appeal Board Decisions................ 34
E. Recent NRC Actions Suggesting an Expanded Definition of "Important to Safety" Are Without a Sound Basis............................... 3 6 F. Long-Standing Practice Compels the Conclusion that "Important to Safety" and "Safety Related" Are Equivalent...................................... 44 IV. The Rulemaking Should Confirm the Equivalence of "Safety Related" and "Important to Safety"............................... 46
A. The Clear Equivalence of "Safety Related" and "Important to Safety" Has Not Resulted in Any Identified Generic Safety Concern............ 46
B. Existing Non-Safety Related Quality Measures Are Adequate....................... 48
-ii-C. Expansion of "Important to Safety" Will Have Significant Adverse Consequences.......... 58
V. The Proposed Rulemaking................................. 61
A. Proposed Rule....................................... 61
B. An Additional Suggestion............................ 64
VI. Interim Requirements.................................... 66
VII. Conclusion.............................................. 69
-iii-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Before the Commission
In the Matter of )
) PETITION FOR RULEMAKING SAFETY CLASSIFICATION )
UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP PETITION FOR RULEMAKING
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 6, 1984, the Commission ordered that a
rulemaking be initiated to consider the relative scope of the
terms "important to safety" and "safety related." Long Island
Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
CLI-84-9, 19 NRC 1323, 1325 (1984). Petitioner, a group of
electric utility companies (the "Utility Safety Classification
Group" or the "Utility Group") applauds the Commission's
decision to address the generic subject of safety
classification through the initiation of rulemaking. As
explained below, the Utility Group believes that prior rules,
precedent, and practice establish that the category of
equipment "important to safety" is equivalent to the category
of "safety related" equipment. In order to clarify any
existing misconceptions about the present status of the rules,
the Utility Group is hereby requesting that the Commission
propose the rule which is contained in this petition.
For years, the NRC, utilities, reactor vendors and
architect-engineers have designed, built, licensed and operated
nuclear power plants in reliance on a common understanding and
interpretation of certain terms in the NRC's regulations.
Until recently, the regulatory terms "important to safety" and
"safety related" and the non-regulatory term "safety grade"
have been used synonymously by both industry and the NRC. The
nuclear industry continues to follow this practice. Only
recent NRC Staff actions have signaled a departure from this
long-standing interpretation by using the term "important to
safety" to cover a much broader set of plant structures,
systems and compo_nents than is covered by the term II safety
related."
These recent actions are apparently motivated by a
concern on the part of the NRC Staff that the nuclear industry
has not fully considered the role uf non-safety related
structures, systems and components in the safe and reliable
operation of nuclear plants. The Utility Safety Classification
Group members want to emphasize, in the strongest terms
possible, that they do believe that non-safety related
structures, systems and components can and do play a role, in
varying degrees, in enhancing the safe and reliable operation
of nuclear power plants and that they should be treated
accordingly. Moreover, where a specific safety concern
indicates the need for broader regulation, the NRC has in the
past regulated specific non-safety related equipment, and the
Utility Group has no intention of seeking any modification of
such requirements.y Thus, the Utility Group does not quarrel
with the underlying concern that has prompted the recent
attempts to deviate from the traditional definition of
"important to safety." But there has been no convincing
showing that this occasional concern needs to be elevated to a
broad regulatory requirement attached to the prevalent term
"important to safety" in order to provide reasonable assurance
of no undue risk to the public health and safety.
Any redefinition of the regulatory term "important to
safety" is likely to have far-reaching, pervasive consequences
on the utility industry in licensing, general regulation and
1/ Throughout this petition, there are references to ll"non-safety related" equipment. This phrase refers to equipment that does not meet the traditional definition of "safety related" eq-.1ipment contained in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. It do~- not mean that the equipment has no "safety" significar,,.::e in the plain sense of the word.
economic impact. "Important to safety" appears throughout the
Commission's regulations, Staff regulatory guides, NUREG
documents and other licensing documents. Thus, an expansion of
its meaning would substantially affect diverse and important
aspects of the design, construction and operation of nuclear
power plants.
The rulemaking requested by this petition avoids the
serious consequences of such a wholesale alteration in the
Commission's rules. Instead, the petition proposes to have the
Commission confirm that the terms "important to safety" and
"safety related," as used throughout the Commission's rules,
will be treatea*as equivalent. The equivalency of these terms
must be established as a benchmark since essentially all
nuclear plants have been designed, constructed and operated
using this assumption. Thus, the Group proposes that a
definition be added to 10 CFR § 50.2 to confirm the equality of
the terms and to define them in a manner consistent with the
historic practice of the NRC and nuclear industry.
While the Utility Group does not believe further
regulation is required, this petition includes an alternative
suggestion for consideration of whether additional regulation
is needed to mandate appropriate levels of quality assurance
for some set of non-safety related equipment. Under this
alternative, if the Commission believes that a valid safety
concern may exist which should be treated generically, the
Utility Group requests the Commission to direct the Staff to
gather sufficient, relevant information on which to base a
judgment about the need for further regulatory action. Any
future proposal should be completely divorced from the terms
"important to safety" and "safety related"; it-should focus
specifically and exclusively on substantiated safety concerns,
if any.
In the June 6th Order, the Commission also directed
. that, during the pendency of this rulemaking, Boards should
apply current precedent in ongoing licensing proceedings. The
Commission understood current precedent to hold that the term
"important to safety" applies to a larger class of equipment
than the term "safety related." A set of "important to safety"
equipment, however, is not defined by the Commission's rules
but can only be determined by a particularized showing in a
licensing proceeding of clearly identified safety concerns
posed by the specific item of equipment. If such a showing is
made, the requirements of General Design Criterion 1 (GDC 1)
must be tailored to the identified safety concerns. Order at
2-3.
The Utility Group commends the Commission for its
attention to the status of the safety classification issue in
ongoing licensing proceedings. As explained below, the Utility
Group does not agree that prior rules or precedent establish a
category of equipment "important to safety" which is broader
than "safety related" equipment. The Utility Group, therefore,
proposes the following interim requirements during the pendency
of the rulemaking. First, the Comrnis~ion should confirm the
equivalence of "important to safety" and "safety related" as
currently used throughout its regulations during the rulemaking
since this is the interpretation used to date in the design,
construction, licensing and operation of nuclear power plant~.
Second, the Commission should direct Boards not to entertain an
argument that any requirements beyond those explicitly included
in NRC regulations be placed on non-safety related equipment.
Third, the Commission should confirm that any existing
commitment by a licensee or applicant concerning particular
measures for non~safety related equipment which has been
accepted by the NRC Staff would not be affected during the
rulemaking.
II. INTERESTS OF PETITIONER
Petitioner is a group of electric utility companies
that own a substantial number of the planned or operating
commercial nuclear reactors in this country. All of these
plants have been designed and built in accordance with the
NRC's regulations. Those plants now operating also are
governed by NRC regulations. In applying the appropriate NRC
regulations to the design, construction and operation of their
plants, utilities in this Group have interpreted the terms
"important to safety" and "safety related" as synonymous since
these terms came into common usage in the early 1970s.y This
interpretation has been sanctioned again and again in NRC
licensing actions, and indeed over the years the NRC has used
this interpretation in its own regulations and regulatory
guidance.
Throughout the NRC's regulations, certain requirements
and standards are imposed on structures, systems and components
that are "safety related" or, equivalently, "important to
safety." For example, the term "important to safety" ap*pears
at least ten times in the General Design Criteria. Since
plants were designed and licensed under the assumption that
"safety related" and "important to safety" are identical terms,
an expansion of the definition might place in doubt each
utility's compliance with the NRC's regulations. And while it
may be possible to show that nuclear plants meet even an
expanded definition of "important to safety" because of the
Y Wherever the non-regulatory term "safety grade" was used in design, construction and operation of nuclear plants, it, too, was and is considered to be equivalent to "safety related."
large measure of conservatism built into them, an extensive,
time-consuming review of each regulatory requirement for
structures, systems and components "important to safety" would
very likely be required to verify such compliance.3/
A more significant commitment of resources would be
necessary to review the myriad of regulatory guides and other
regulatory guidance documents containing the term to determine
whether the applicable provisions have been met. Significant
impacts might also occur in those instances in which utility
programs and plant equipment had to be modified to meet a broad
interpretation of the term "important to safety."_1/ Existing
programs and equipment may well be able to perform their
intended function and yet not comply with every "jot and
tittle" of the requirements for structures, systems and
y The NRC's Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) provides an example of the extensive resources that must inevitably be committed to a review of a plant's compliance with regulatory criteria different from those to which it was designed. SEP involved a review of older nuclear plants against the current NRC Standard Review Plan -- a review plan not in effect when the plants were designed, constructed or licensed. All licensees might have to undertake an SEP-type review to assess how their plants stack up against a new, broader interpretation of "important to safety."
- 1/ This exercise will be further complicated if utilities are required to backfit a three-tiered (safety related, important to safety but not safety related, and non-safety related) classification scheme on plants designed and built using a two-tiered (safety related and non-safety related) approach.
components important to safety as newly defined. Finally, the
lack of any functional definition of "important to safety" as
the Staff now uses the term might result in protracted
"ratcheting" as individual NRR reviewers, I&E inspectors and
intervenors in licensing cases attempt to impose their own
views of important to safety on applicants and licensees.
These activities would divert substantial industry and NRC
resources to an effort for which no benefits have been shown.~
In summary, expansion of the term "important to safety"
beyond "safety related" to include some undefined set of
structures, systems and components would greatly increase the
requirements to which utilities' nuclear plants* are subjected.
Given the extensive use of the term "important to safety" in
the NRC's regulations, the cost of such a change would be
substantial but without any proven benefit in plant safety.
I I I. "IMPORTANT TO SAFETY" AND "SAFETY RELATED" HAVE BEEN TREATED AS EQUIVALENT
The Utility Group's proposal to adopt an explicit
recognition of the equality of "important to safety" and
"safety related" merely codifies well-established NRC and
industry practice. As this section shows:
~/ Indeed, the NRC's Committee to Review Generic Requirements was unable to find any clear benefit. See section IV.A below.
(a) A comparison of the proposed and final versions of Part 50, Appendix A shows that the term "important to safety" was substituted in the final version for a variety of terms in the proposed version, all of which referred to the "safety related" set.
(b) The regulatory history of Part 50, Appendix B provides compelling reason to believe tliat the scope of General Design Criterion 1 is identical in scope to Appendix B. It is undisputed that Appendix B applies only to safety related structures, systems and components.
(c) The proposed and final versions of Part 100, Appendix A both indicate that "important to safety" and "safety related" were intended to be synonymous.
( d)* Other Commission regulations equate "important to safety" and "safety related."
(e) NRC Staff guidance documents and reports confirm the synonymous use of the terms.
(f) The nuclear industry has consistently interpreted "important to safety" and "safety related" in the NRC's regulations and guidance documents as equivalent.
Utilities have designed, constructed and operated nuclear plants based on the equivalency of these terms, and the NRC has reviewed and licensed the plants on the same basis.
(g) In the face of recent Staff efforts to depart from prior practice, some licensing and appeal boards have confirmed that "important to safety" and "safety related" are equivalent.
(h) There is inadequate health and safety justification for recent actions to expand the term "important to safety."
These eight points demonstrate that explicit recognition of the
equality of the terms would be consistent with a decade of
practice and sound policy.
A. NRC Regulations
- 1. Part 50, Appendix A
As proposed in 1967, Part SO's Appendix A did not use
the term "important to safety." See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,213
(1967). In the version adopted in 1'971, however, the term
appeared in a number of places. The Federal Register notice
adopting Appendix A discussed the substantive changes between
the proposed and final rules. Significantly, that discussion
of substantive changes did not mention the addition of the term
"important to safety." This silence confirms that the
Commission did not consider that the change in terminology made
- any difference in scope or substance. See 36 Fed. Reg. 3255
(1971). In fact, a comparison of the proposed and final rules
reveals that "important to safety" was merely substituted for a
number of similar terms referring to features that are now
known as "safety related."
The principal instance of this exchange of equivalent
terms was the substitution of "structures, systems and
components important to safety" for "engineered safety
features." "Engineered safety features," as defined in
Criterion 37 of the proposed Appendix A, were those provided to
assure the safety provided by the core design, the reactor
coolant pressure boundary and their protective systems. At a
minimum, "engineered safety features" were intended to cope
with all reactor coolant pressure boundary breaks, including
the circumferential rupture of any pipe in that boundary with
unobstructed discharge from both its ends. See 32 Fed. Reg.
10,216-17 (1967). In other words, "engineered safety feature"
in the proposed Appendix A is essentially similar to the
current terminology of 10 CFR Part 100, particularly
§§ 100.2(b) and 100.lO(a) and (d), which are unmistakably
limited to "safety related" egu-ipment. Thus, the scope of
Appendix A to Part 50 is clearly bound to a narrowly defined
set of engineered safety features and not a broad set of
structures, systems and components encompassing nearly the
entire plant, as some NRC Staff members would now define
"important to safety."
Numerous examples of the substitution of "important to
safety" for "engineered safety features" exist. Proposed GDC 3, which in final form applies to structures, systems and
components "important to safety," specifically referred to
"critical" parts of the facility such as the containment and
control room as "engineered safety features." See 32 Fed. Reg.
10,215 (1967). And GDC 4, which in final form also applies to
structures, systems and components "important to safety,"
evolved from proposed GDCs 40 and 42, which dealt with
"engineered safety features." See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,217 (1967).
By the same token, the current GDC 20 requires, in
part, that protection systems be designed to sense accident
conditions and to initiate the operation of systems and
components "important to safety." This portion of GDC 20
evolved from an earlier, proposed version of GDC 15, which
required protection systems to sense accident situations and to
initiate the operation of necessary "engineered safety
features." See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,216 (1967).
The current GDC 44 requires a cooling water system to
transfer heat from structures, systems and components
"important to safety" to an ultimate heat sink. The cooling
water system requirements in GDC 44 evolved from proposed GDCs
37, 38 and 39, which established the design basis and
requirements for "engineered safety features." See 32 Fed.
Reg. 10,216-17 (1967). Thus, the cooling water system referred
to in GDC 44 is, in reality, the safe~y related engineered
safety feature necessary to support other engineered safety
features previously discussed in the proposed Appendix A.
Another example is GDC 16, which requires a reactor
containment and associated systems to assure that containment
design conditions "important to safety" not be exceeded during
postulated accident conditions. This GDC evolved from GDC 10
of the proposed Appendix A, which required the containment
structure to sustain the initial effects of gross equipment
failures, such as a large coolant boundary break, without loss
of required integrity and, together with other "engineered
safety features," to retain for as long as necessary the
capability to protect the public. See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,216
(1967). In other words, the containment design requirements in
the proposed GDC 10 dealt with loss of coolant accidents.
Structures, systems and components needed to deal with a L0CA
are, of course, safety*related.
A final example of the substitution in Appendix A of
the term "important to safety" for "engineered safety
features," a synonym for safety related, involves GDC 17, which
requires offsite and onsite electric power systems for
structures, systems and components "important to safety." This
GDC evolved from proposed GDCs 24 and 39, which required
emergency power sources for protection systems and "engineered
safety features." See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,216-17 (1967).§/
§_I In addition to substituting the term "important to safety" for "engineered safety features," the final version of Appendix A also used the term "important to safety" in place of other phrases that describe the safety related set. GDCs 1 and 2
(footnote continued)
Thus, the regulatory history of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix A, indicates (i) that "important to safety" was
inserted into Appendix A in lieu of a number of other terms to
describe what are now known as "safety related" structures,
systems and components, and (ii) that the Commission believed
there was no significant difference between "important to
safety" and the terms used in the proposed version of the
rule.I/ Consequently, it was proper to conclude, as industry
(footnote continued)
establish requirements for structures, systems and components important to safety. These criteria evolved from proposed GDCs 1 and 5, and 2, respectively. Proposed GDCs 1 and 2 applied to systems and components "essential to the prevention of accidents which could affect the public health and safety or to mitigation of their consequences." This language is similar to that in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, which means safety related.
Proposed GDC 5 applied to records for "essential" components.
11 As already indicated, the complete lack of any discussion of the substitution in the Commission's explanation of the final rule confirms that no substantive change was intended.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that notice and comment rulemaki~g be a meaningful process. Section 553(b)(3) of the APA provides that the notice of a proposed rule must be sufficiently detailed to give interested parties a realistic chance to understand and critique the would-be rule. United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973);
see also Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 79 (1982). One of the
~equirements of meaningful notice is an obligation that the agency include in the notice all definitions essential to the proposed rule. PPG Industries v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1239, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1981). And, although agencies may make changes between the proposed and final rules, the changes must be the "logical outgrowth" of the notice and comment process. Sierra
(footnote continued)
did, that "important to safety" and "safety related" were
equivalent terms.
- 2. Part 50, Appendix B
Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 applies only to safety
related structures, systems and components._§/ The relationship
between Appendix Band GDC 1 of Appendix A, Part 50, indicates
that it was the NRC's intent that "important to safety" be
synonymous in scope and meaning with the term "safety related."
(footnote continued)
Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 352 n.193 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Connecticut Light and Power Co., 673 F.2d at 533. Thus, unless "important to safety" was equivalent to the terms it replaced
-- as in fact it was -- Appendix A was promulgated without adequate notice. One cannot assume that the rule was adopted in disregard of the APA if this assumption can be avoided, and it can only be avoided if "important to safety" is equated in scope and meaning with "safety related." See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-769, 19 NRC 995, 1002 (1984) ("lack of any specific explication for the change in language between the proposed and final rule lends credence to the LILCO claim that no.
substantive difference was intended").
~/ While it has been suggested that Appendix B was originally intended to apply to a broader set, the official Federal Register notices concerning the rule indicate its scope has remained unchanged. Both the proposed and final versions of the rule apply, by their terms, to activities affecting the safety related functions of structures, systems and components that prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident. 34 Fed. Reg. 6599 (1969); 35 Fed. Reg. 10,498 (1970). The prevention and mitigation of the consequences of postulated accidents, of course, are among the safety related functions of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A.
The notice of proposed rulemaking for Appendix B, ~tated
that its quality assurance (QA) criteria would supplement GDC 1
of proposed Appendix A, which had been previously noticed in
the Federal Register in 1967. 34 Fed. Reg. 6599, 6600 (1969).
Although the precise meaning of this statement is not clear, it
does appear that the Commission's intention was to specify, in
detail, what the general provisions of GDC 1 meant. This
interpretation is supported by the fact that Appendix B was
intended to "assist applicants. to comply with Section
50.34(a) (7)." 35 Fed. Reg. 10,498 (1970). Section 50.34(a) (7)
requires that the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report include a
description of the quality assurance program to be applied to the design, fabrication, construction, and testing of the structures, systems, and components of the facility.
Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," sets forth the requirements for quality assurance programs for nuclear power plants and fuel reprocessing plants.
10 CFR § 50.34(a)(7). When§ 50.34(a)(7) states that Appendix
B "sets forth the requirements for quality assurance programs"
(emphasis added), it must include those of GDC 1.
Thus, a reading of the regulatory history, first, does
not reveal any intention to apply Appendix B to more than
"safety related" features and, second, suggests that Appendix B
is a more detailed specification of the requirements contained
in GDC 1, thereby again equating "important to safety" with
"safety related."
- 3. Part 100, Appendix A
The interchangeability of the terms "safety related"
and "important to sa~ety" is also illustrated by the regulatory
history of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, which was proposed on
November 25, 1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 22,601 (1971). The proposed
rule included a number of passages making clear that the
category "important to safety" in 1971 meant "safety related."
- For example, the proposed rule stated:
(c) The "Safe Shutdown Earthquake" is that earthquake which produces the vibratory ground motion for which structures, systems and components important to safety are designed to remain functional.
These structures, systems and components are those necessary to assure:
(1) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary,
(2) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or
(3) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR Part 100.
36 Fed. Reg. 22,602 (1971) ("emphasis added); see also id. at
22,604. This definition of the "imp'ortant to safety" functions
is the same as that in the final (and current) version of the
rule, which is recognized as providing the basic definition of
the "safety related" functions. See 38 Fed. Reg. 31,279,
31,281 (1973); 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, III(c).
Although the reference in paragraph (c) of the proposed
rule to "structures, systems and c*omponents important to
safety" was changed in the final version to refer to "certain
structures, systems and components," there was no indication in
the Commission's discussion of changes between the proposed and
final rules to indicate that this substitution represented a
change in scope. See 38 Fed. Reg. 31,279 (1973). In fact, the
final rule added a reference in its purpose section to GDC.2,
which applies to structures, systems and components "important
to safety," thereby once again equating "safety related" and
"important to safety."
In addition to defining "important to safety" in terms
of the "safety related" definition, the proposed version of 10
CFR Part 100, Appendix A, used the terms "safety related" and
"important to safety" interchangeably in a number of instances.
For example, § VI(a) of the proposed rule reiterated the
definition of structures, systems and components important to
safety quoted above and went on to say that "[i]n addition to
seismic loads,... loads shall be taken into account in the
design of these safety-related structures, systems and
components." 36 Fed. Reg. 22,604 (1971) (emphasis added).
Thus, the language in the proposed version of Part 100,
Appendix A, made abundantly clear that the terms "important to
safety" and "safety related" were interchangeable and
equivalent.V
Finally, the approved version of Part 100, Appendix A,
contained critical information that supports the equivalence of
the two terms. The Federal Register notice stated:
The proposed rule required that the Operating Basis Earthquake selected be related to the operability of those structures, systems and components necessary for power generation.
Many of the comments questioned the legality of imposing safety requirements on portions of the plant which were not safety related.
As a result of these comments, the definition of the Operating Basis Earthquake was made more restrictive.
38 Fed. Reg. 31,279 (1973). Thus, the Commission narrowed the
Operating Basis Earthquake "to those features of the plant that
are safety related." Id. Since Part 100, Appendix A, provided
specific requirements for implementing GDC 2, there is a strong
implication that the term "structures, systems and components
important to safety" is limited to the safety related set.l.Q/
9/ It is not plausible to argue that removal of "important to safety" from portions of the final version of Part 100, Appendix A, indicated an intent to change the meaning. See note 7 above. Both the draft and fir1al versions provide a sound basis for concluding that "safety related" and "important to safety" are synonymous. As stated above, the equality of the terms was quite explicit in the draft rule, while in the final rule the reference to GDC 2 provided strong evidence that the equality remained unchanged.
10/ In an attempt to_ bolster its position on the II important to safety" issue, the Staff, by letter dated December 19, 1983,
(footnote continued)
-21..
More important, the Commission also equated systems
preventing undue risk to the public health and safety with the
safety related set. This conclusion follows from the final
definition of the Operating Basis Earthquake that states, in
relevant part:
[I]t is that earthquake which produces the vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public are designed to remain functional.
10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, § III(d) (emphasis added). As
noted above, the Operating Basis Earthquake was intended to
apply to the safety related features of the plant. 38 Fed.
Reg. 31,279 (1973). Thus, at least at the time of the
promulgation of these regulations, the definition of "important
to safety" in Part 50, Appendix A (structures, systems and
components that prevent undue risk to the public health and
- safety), meant "safety related. "l!I
(footnote continued)
from Harold R. Denton to T. S. Ellis, III, cited§§ VI(a)(l) and VI(a)(2) to 10 CFR Part 100 as support for the Staff position. To the contrary, § VI(a)(l) explicitly defines safety related in terms of the Part 100, Appendix A, Sqfety functions and, as noted above, the Operating Basis Earthquake discussed in§ VI(a)(2) was explicitly limited to safety related features by the text accompanying the final rule.
11/ See also 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Introduction (equating equipment that prevents undue risk to the public
(footnote continued)
- 4. Other Regulations
Other examples of NRC regulations which equate the
terms "important to safety" and "safety related" include 10 CE'R
Part 21, Part 72 and§ 50.54.
Part 21 applies to "basic components" defined in
§ 21.3(a)(l) as those components that perform the Part 100,
Appendix A, safety functions. In other words, a basic
component is a safety related component. Section 21.3(a)(3)
notes that a "'basic component' includes design, inspection, testing, or consulting services important to safety. II
In discussing this section, supplementary information
accompanying the regulation states that Part 21 covers
"responsible officers of firms and organizations supplying
safety-related components, including safety-related design,
testing, inspection and consulting services." 42 Fed. Reg.
(footnote continued)
health and safety with safety related equipment). The Utility Group's point is not that the NRC is limited to regulating safety related equipment. Rather, these examples reflect that,
.in the early 1970s, the prevailing view was that the important to safety set (which prevents undue risk) was the safety related set. Under the Atomic Energy Act, however, the NRC has broad authority to impose requirements to protect the public health and safety. Consequently, in specific instances the NRC has since elected to regulate areas that do not fall within the safety related definition of Part 100, Appendix A. See Section IV.B below.
28,891, 28,892 (1977). Thus, this description evidently
assumes that the use of the term "important to safety" in
conjunction with design, testing, inspection and consulting
services in§ 21.3(a)(3) is meant to be synonymous with "safety
related." This interpretation is confirmed in NUREG-0302,
Revision 1. The document provides a clear indication of the
Staff's position that 10 CFR Part 21 is limited to safety
related equipment. NUREG-0302, Rev. 1, at 21.3(a)-5. See
Shoreham, ALAB-769, slip op. at 12-13 (Part 21 "suggest[s] an
identity between items that are 'safety related' and those that
are 'important to safety'").
Part 72 of 10 CFR, adopted in November 19.Sb, also
equates "important to safety" and "safety related." This
regulation states, in part, that applications for a license for
an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) shqll
describe the quality assurance program for the ISFSI.
The description of the quality assurance program shall identify structures, systems, and componente important to safety and shall show how the criteria in Appendix B to Part 50 of this chapter will be applied to those safety related components, systems and structures in a manner consistent with their importance to safety.
10 CFR § 72.15(a)(l4) (emphasis added). Although not directly
related to nuclear power plants, the language of this NRC
regulation uses "important to safety" and "safety related"
.interchangeably.
As recently as January 1983, the Commission's
regulations have treated "important to safety" and "safety
related" as equivalent. On January 10, 1983, the Commission
amended 10 CFR § 50.54 in a way that compels the conclusion
that implementation of a quality assurance program satisfying
Appendix B constitutes compliance with all NRC quality
assurance requirements. See 48 Fed. Reg. 1026 (1983). The
NRC's quality as$urance requirements include both Appendix B
and GDC 1. Since Appendix B applies only to safety related
structures, systems and components_, this January 1983
regulation equates the scope of "safety related" in Appendix B
with "important to safety" in GDC 1.
B. NRC Guidance Documents and Reports
Many NRC regulatory guides either explicitly or
implicitly equate "important to safety" with "safety related."
For example, Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Instrument Setpoints"
(Rev. 1, November 1976), defines "systems important to safety"
as:
tho*se systems that are necessary to ensure (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, or (3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures Of 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria."
Regulatory Guide 1.105, Rev, 1, at 1.105-2 (emphasis added).
This is the same definition of safety related structures,
systems and components that appears in Appendix A to Part
100.12/ A proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.105, which
was issued for comment in December 1981, reiterates the NRC's
intention to equate "safety related" and "important to safety."
A more recent example of the synonymous use of
"important to safety" and "safety related" in NRC regulatory
guides is found in Regulatory Guide 1.151, "Instrument Sensing
Lines" (July 1983). The introduction to this guide explains
that 10 CFR § 50.34 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, corttain
certain requirements for structures, systems and components
important to safety. After stating the pertinent regulatory
requirements, the regulatory guide describes
a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the Commission's regulations with regard to the design and installation of safety-related instrument sensing lines in nuclear power plants.
Regulatory Guide 1.151, at 1 (emphasis added). Eere again, the
NRC has explicitly equated the terms.
12/ Regulatory Guide 1.118, "Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems" (Rev. 2, June 1978), also explicitly equates "important to safety" and "safety related" by adopting the definition of important to safety set out in Regulatory Guide 1.105, Revision 1.
Similarly, Staff safety evaluation reports (SERs)
routinely contain statements equating safety related and
important to safety. For example, in discussing GDC 2's
seismic design requirements, the Staff typically states in SERs
that this GDC
requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems and components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes without loss of capability to perform their safety function. These plant features are those necessary to assure (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (3) capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in the potential offsite exposures comparable to 10 CFR 100 guideline exposures.13/
Such plant features are those covered in Appendix A of Part
100, which are the safety related set of structures, systems
and components.
Another SER example, this one dealing with turbine
missiles, notes that "General Design Criterion 4 requires that
a nuclear power plant be designed against internally and
externally generated missiles to assure no loss of function or
damage to safety-related equipment essential for a safe plant
shutdown." Because GDC 4 applies to "structures, systems, and
13/ ~, NUREG-0420 at 3, NUREG-0899 at 3-1, NUREG-0528 at 3-1, NUREG-0742 at 3-1, NUREG-0422 at 3-1 (emphasis added).
components important to safety," this SER statement equates the
two terms. See NUREG-0420 at 3-8; NUREG-0528 at 3-6.
C. Industry and NRC Practice
There can be no serious dispute that the regulatory
history equating "important to safety" and "safety related" has
been confirmed by the actual use of these terms by industry and
the NRC Staff. The record in the Shoreham proceeding compels
this conclusion.W See,~, Long Island Lighting Co.
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC
445,l2j slip op. at 576 (J-311, -312), 594 (J-360), 747
(J-766), 749 (J-770) (Sept. 21, 1983). With respect to
industry, witnesses in that case from both Stone & Webster and
General Electric testified that the terms are synonymous. Id.
at 603 (J-389). This is especially significant given that
Stone & Webster and General Electric have designed and/or built
a large number of nuclear power plants licensed by the NRC.
Id. at 609-10 (J-410, -411), 620-621 (J-441, -443, -444).
The Director of the Division of System Integration of
the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation acknowledged in the
W As does the existence and position of this Utility Safety Classification Group.
15/ References to the unpublished findings of fact in the Shoreham Partial Initial Decision will be "slip op. at II
Shoreham proceeding that the Denton Memorandum definition of
"important to safety" was new, that prior to Shoreham it had
been applied to only one other plant (TMI-1) and that the Staff
was insisting that LILCO adopt the definition because the Staff
"had to start somewhere." He made unmistakably clear that the
Staff is now moving towards imposing the new definition on
other plants. Shoreham, LBP-83-57, slip op. at 554-55 (J-249
to -251).
Evidence that the NRC, until recently, has equated
"important to safety" and "safety related" is also reflected in
the degraded core rulemaking:
Furthermore, *in reviewing reactor plant designs using the "design basis accident" approach, the NRC. does not review all structures, systems, and components but rather reviews, in varying levels of detail, only those considered "safety grade" by the applicant submitting a Safety Analysis Report. Items considered by the applicant to be outside the scope of design basis accident analyses are generally not considered to be "safety grade" and are not reviewed by the NRC to see whether they will perform as intended or meet various dependability criteria. This method of classification is based on the notion that things credited in the analysis of a design basis event or specified in the regulations are important to safety and thus are "safet* grade" while all else is "non-safety grade.'
45 Fed. Reg. 65,464, 65,475 (1980) (emphasis added).1§/
16/ In the Three Mile Island restart case, the Appeal Board suggested that this language should not be read literally (footnote continued)
The Staff's safety classification practice was also
studied by the Kemeny Commission. Excerpts of its report are
telling:
Met Ed had a plan for a quality assurance program that met NRC requirements. The NRC requirements, however, were inadequate because they did not require quality assur ance programs to be applied to the plant as a whole, but rather only to systems classified as "safety-related."
- (footnote continued)
because the NRC Staff does review non-safety related equipment.
See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814, 876 n.286 (1983). But the Staff's review of non-safety related equipment is entirely consistent with the use of a safety related/non-safety related classification system. The Staff must review non-safety related items to ensure that the safety related set does not inadvertently exclude something that meets the requirements for classification as safety related. As Kemeny Commission member Pigford noted: *
[T]he well-established practice of the NRC is to require that any component, system, or feature needed for the prevention or mitigation of a serious accident must meet documented require-ments of quality, redundancy, testablility, environmental qualifications, etc., and must be categorized as "safety-related." Although other components, systems, or features are classed as non-"safety related," they must meet requirements appropriate to their operational function. NRC practice is to subject all "safety-related" items to review. Additionally, non-"safety-related" items are reviewed by NRC to reassess their possible reclassification.
Report of the President's Commission on The Accident at Three Mile Island at 93 (1979). Moreover, as set out in section IV.B below, there are specific regulatory requirements for non-safety related equipment(~, § 50.59; Appendix R).
Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three
Mile Island at 44 (1979). While, for reasons stated below, the
Utility Group disagrees with the report's conclusions
concerning the adequacy of quality assurance requirements, the
Kemeny Commission clearly found that the NRC's regulations
concerning QA (GDC 1 and Appendix B) are required only for
safety related items.
The NRC's own TMI Lessons Learned Task Force also
confirms the Staff's prior practice of using the safety grade
(safety related) or non-safety grade (non-safety related) dual
classification scheme:
Current practice in the licensing of nuclear power plants is _to apply design requirements to one class of components, equipment, systems and structures, the so-called safety-grade class, but not to another non-safety-grade class. This system of classification is based on the premise that things can be classed either as important to safety (that is, the function is credited in the analysis of a design basis event or is specified in the regulations) or not important to safety. Such a clear and distinct separation does not really exist; in fact, modifications of this classification have evolved in past practice to meet specific situations. Thus, for example, the functioning of some components that are not seismically qualified (a general requirement of safety-grade equipment) has been credited in the analysis of some events that are not initiated by an earthquake. Another example is that in some designs the function of non-safety-grade equipment is credited in the analysis of anticipated transients but not in the analysis of lower probability accidents.
TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report, NUREG-0585, at
3-2 (1979). In short, NRC practice, at least through 1979, was
to use a two-tiered classification scheme.17/
A variety of trade organizations, which are
authoritative on industry practice, have also confirmed the
equivalence of "important to safety" and "safety related." In
response to the Staff's recent, abrupt change in position, the
Committee on Reactor Licensing and Safety of the Atomic
Industrial Forum (AIF) sent William F. Dircks a letter statihg,
in pertinent part:
Our [safety classification] subcommittee is virtually unanimous in its agreement that, with regard to interpretation of the regulations, the terms "important to safety" and "safety related" have been considered synonymous.
Letter from M.R. Edelman (AIF) to W.J. Dircks (NRC) (Aug. 29,
1983).
.!1J The comment that modifications to the scheme have evolved does not suggest the creation of a new classification category.
Instead, it reflects the reality that an absolutely precise demarcation between safety related and non-safety related is impossible even with the functional definition provided in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. Thus, in specific case3, dispute about whether certain equipment does or does not fall within the definition of "safety related" has been avoided by reaching accommodations that reflect the role of the equipment in plant operation. In contrast, the Staff's new definition of "important to safety" would impose new requirements on virtually all non-safety related equipment.
Similarly, the Nuclear Power Engineering Committee of
IEEE wrote to Mr. Robert B. Minogue, Director of the Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research, in May 1982, indicating that
expansion of the scope of important to safety would be contrary
to the long~standing interpretation of NRC regulations by both
nuclear industry and the NRC Staff:
[O]ver the years, the terminology of the General Design Criteria of Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50 has been understood through common usage to equate systems important to safety to safety related or safety systems.
Repeated references within the General Design Criteria to preservation of the safety function being performed by "structures, systems, and components important to safety" enforces this equivalence of terms.
Letter from R.E. Allen (NPEC, IEEE) to Robert B. Minogue (NRC)
(May 10, 1982). This letter also indicated that the Nuclear
Power Engineering Committee of IEEE opposed the expansion of
the term "important to safety."
Yet another example is a recommendation of the Nuclear
Standards Board (of the American National Standards Institute)
Ad Hoc Committee on "Important to Safety" that states as
follows:
The current practice utilizing two major classifications, safety related and nonsafety related, for design, construction, testing and operation of nuclear power plants is acceptable and appropriate. This has occurred with a general understanding and usage that the terms "Important to Safety" and "Safety Related" are equivalent in meaning. The
current practice has recognized that within the nonsafety related set, there are varying degrees of importance to safe and reliable operation. For many or most items of this nature, standards have been promulgated to guide design, construction, testing and operation.
Even so, the NRC may determine there is a need, for licensing purposes, to identify a category of items, although nonsafety related, [that] are of more importance to the safe and reliable operation of the plant than other nonsafety rel,ated i terns.
If so, the term "Important to Safety" should not be used to designate this set of items because of the past history of equivalence to the term "Safety Related".
To apply the term "Important to Safety" across the body of regulations to a new set of items would cause the term to become unclear as to the meaning ot all current regulation and.licensing commitments that stern therefrom.
Letter from Walter H. D'Ardenne (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on
Important to Safety) to George L. Wessman (National Standards
Board, ANSI) (March 30, 1983) (emphasis added). Consistent
with the proposal in this petition, the Ad Hoc Committee
sensibly suggested that, if an expansion of certain regulatory
requirements to non-safety related equipment is deemed
necessary, it should not be accomplished by redefining a
commonly used regulatory term.18/
18/ The nuclear industry's view that "important to safety" and "safety related" have always been synonymous was reaffirmed at an April 30, 1984 meeting on the issue with the NRC Staff.
(footnote continued)
D. Licensing and Appeal Board Decisions
During most of the decade of the 1970s, industry and
the NRC Staff held *a common view about the equivalence of these
two terms based on the regulatory materials described above.
This shared understanding is confirmed by the fact that a
contested issue over the meaning *of these terms never arose in
a licensing proceeding prior to 1979. When the Staff abruptly
departed from prior practice in the TMI-1 restart proceedinglij
and thereafter, Boards were first faced with this new issue.
In several decisions, the equivalency of the two terms
has been confirmed by various licensing and appeal boards in
the face of Staff's position. For 'example, the Diablo Canyon
Appeal Board has recently ruled that historically there had
been no distinction between the terms:
- ( footnote continued)
There, representatives of this Utility Group, the Atomic Industrial Forum, ANSI Nuclear Standards Board, the Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee of the American Nuclear Society and individual utilities noted that in the past standards had been written and nuclear plants licensed based on a two-tiered (safety related/non-safety related) classification scheme.
Where the term "important to safety" was used, it was considered synonymous with "safety related." See,~,
Transcript of April 30, 1984 Meeting at 35, 43, 50, 53, 66, 68, 69.
12/ Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59J 14 NRC 1211 (1981), aff'd, ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814 (1983).
We reviewed the history of this particular application, and whereas in the letter that was written in 1981, which makes a distinction between items which are important to safety and items which are safety-related, and to the extent that such a distinction now exists, we do not believe that such a distinction was intended between General Criterion [l] and the items covered by Appendix B.
So at that time [1974], the Staff explicitly and using the terminology "important to safety," agreed with the categorization of equipment, structures, systems and components [Seismic Category I]
established by the Applicant. I thin~ the regulatory history is fairly well defined here. If there is now to be a distinction made between safety-related items and important to safety, it is our opinion that it should not be applied retrospectively to the design phase of the Diablo Canyon plant.
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant,
Units 1 and 2), Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Tr. D-67 to -68
(Aug. 23, 1983) (emphasis added); see also Pacific Gas and
Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
2), ALAB-763, 19 NRC 571, 620-21 (1984), modified, CLI-84-14,
slip op. at 2 (Aug. 20, 1984). Licensing boards have also
reached the same conclusion. Public Service* Co. of New
Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), Memorandum and
Order, slip op., at 2-3 (May 13, 1983). Thus, the plain
equivalence of these two terms, as used in NRC regulations, has
received confirmation from some NRC adjudicatory boards. But
see TMI-1, LBP-89-59, 14 NRC 1211, aff'd ALAB-721, 17 NRC 814;
Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit
1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 546 (1983), certified to Commission
ALAB-769, 19 NRC 995, 1000 (1984), decided by Commission,
CLI-84-9, 19 NRC 1323, 1325 (1984).
E. Recent NRC Actions Suggesting an Expanded Definition of "Important to Safety" Are Without a Sound Basis
Beginning with the TMI-1 restart proceeding, the Staff
has departed from its historical practice and has taken the
position that the category of equipment "important to safety"
may be broader than that of "safety-related" equipment. As a
result of the Staff's change of position, there have been
several general statements from Boards or the Staff suggesting
that, as a historical matter, "important to safety" has been
understood to be broader, in some unarticulated fashion, than
"safety-related." These statements are unsupported and provide
no basis for the proposal of a particular rule or of interim
requirements for ongoing licensing proceedings.
The origin of the "important to safety" controversy can
be traced to NRC Staff testimony in the TMI-1 restart
proceeding. The intervenors contended that non-safety related
equipment that had contributed to the TMI-2 accident should be
made safety grade prior to the restart of TMI-1. The NRC Staff
opposed upgrading this equipment, but relied on the novel
argument that this equipment was in the category of "important
to safety," which the Staff claimed was broader than just the
"safety grade" category.
The decisions of the Licensing Board (LBP-81-59, 14 NRC
1211 (1981)) and the Appeal Board (ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814 (1983))
in TMI-1 both agreed with the Staff's new definition of
"important to safety." In the TMI-1 case, however, the Boards
apparently did not have the benefit of the testimony of the
licensee or the rest of the industry on the historical
interpretation and application of this term.£Q; Also, because
the TMI-1 hearing focused narrowly on particular components,
the record did not consider the broader implications for the
Commission's entire regulatory structure of an expanded
definition of the pervasive term "important to safety." See
Shoreham, ALAB-769, slip op. at 17-18.
The Staff's evolving position on "important to safety"
was next addressed in a November 20, 1981 memorandum to all NRR
personnel from NRR Director Harold Denton (Denton Memorandum).
This memorandum, which has never been circulated_for public
£QI There is no indication in either the Licensing Board or Appeal Board opinion that any evidence was presented on the licensee's or industry's interpretation of "important to safety."
comrnent,W in effect sought to establish a new and expanded
definition of "important to safety" for use by NRR
personnel.22/
In reality, the vague definition propounded by the
Denton Memorandum fails to provide any clearly discernible
guidance on future obligations to companies who operate or are
attempting to license nuclear power plants. As the Shoreham
Licensing Board found, the Denton Memorandum does not advance
"any reasonably precise definition of what is included in the
category of important to safety" and is "wholly silent on what
quality standards and quality assurance should be applied to
that category of structures, systems and components."
Shoreham, LBP-83-57, slip op. at 552 (J-243). As such, the
memorandum fails to afford a reasonable warning of proscribed
conduct, as due process requires. PBR, Inc. v. Secretary of
Labor, 643 E.2d 890, 897 (1st Cir. 1981). In fact, this defect
was underscored by the NRC's Committee to Review Generic
21/ Nor was it widely circulated within the NRC. For example, it was not sent to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
See Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 558.
22/ The memorandum disclaims any inten~ to alter existing regulatory requirements. Despite the disclaimer, the redefinition of "important to safety" to make it a broader category than "safety related" is a regulatory change of far-reaching, pervasive consequences for the licensing and regulation of these plants. See section IV.C below.
Requirements which concluded "that the proposed generic letter
to licensees [requiring a broader important to safety set]
represents imposition of a previously unimposed requirement of
indeterminate magnitude with an undefined burden on the
resources of both industry and Staff." Minutes of CRGR Meeting
Number 50 (November 14, 1983), at 3.
Finally, in the Shoreham case, the Licensing Board
imposed a license condition requiring a broader definition Of
"important to safety" despite the conclusion that LILC0 1 s
treatment of non-safety related equipme~t had more than
adequately ensured the safe and reliable operation of the
plant_. See*, ~, Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 563-64. In
reaching its conclusion about the definition, the Shoreham
Board relied on the TMI-1 Appeal Board decision. Id. at
558-60. The reliance was ~nwarranted in light of the important
differences between the cases. First, the extensive regulatory
history presented in Shoreham was absent in TMI-1. Second, the
licensee in TMI-1 apparently did not express its views on the
usage of important to safety. And third, unlike the Shoreham
case, there was little discussion in TMI-1 about past NRC and
industry practice.
The* Shoreham Appeal Board, neither affirming nor
reversing the Licensing Board's conclusions, certified the
"important to safety" issue to the Commission. The Appeal Board posed the following questions:
- 1. Are the terms "important to safety" and "safety-related" to be deemed synonymous for the purpose of establishing an acceptable quality assurance program in accordance with GDC 1 of Appendix A and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50?
- 2. How should the outcome of Question 1 be applied to the operating license application proceeding before us?
Shoreham, ALAB-769, 19 NRC at 1010.
In reaching its decision to certify the issue, the
Appeal Board agreed with LILCO that significant portions of the
regulations equated "important to safety" and "safety related."
Id. at 1001-02. The Board, however, found "existing
regulations too varied and the historic industry and agency
practice too diverse simply to set forth what we perceive to be
the* proper interpretation of the regulations." Id. at 1000.
An important element in the Appeal Board's inability to
reach a definitive conclusion on the definition is 10 CFR
§ 50.49(b), dealing with environmental qualification 0£
equipment. This relatively recent regulation distinguishes
between "important to safety" and "safety related." Although
the Appeal Board was not free to disregard§ 50.49, the section
does not reflect a Commission determination on the meaning of
"important to safety" in all of its myriad uses. First, the
presence of "important to safety" in§ 50.49(b) of the EQ rule
was not subjected to notice and comment; the term did not
appear in the text of the proposed rule. See 47 Fed. Reg.
2876, 2878, col. 1 (1982).llf Only after the definition became
a subject of considerable controversy in the Shoreham case in
1982 did the NRC Staff insert the term in the final rule
presented for Commission approval. Apparently, the Commission
was not adequately informed of the dispute over the definition
before the rule was adopted in January 1983 (48 Fed. Reg.
2729).
Second, nothing in revised§ 50.49 or its rulemaking
record suggests the Commission intended to define "important to
safety" for other regulatory contexts. If the Commission so
intended, it would surely have set out a definition in its
notice of proposed rulemaking and sought comments on it.
Indeed, as a matter of administrative law, the rule could not
be construed as a definition of "important to safety" for all
its uses in the regulations. See PPG Industries, Inc. v.
23/ In fact, the preamble to the proposed rule, in large part, implicitly equated "important to safety" and "safety related."
For example, the preamble discussed a number of guidance documents for environmental qualification of electric equipment "important to safety," all of which apply only to "safety related" (or Class lE) electric equipment. ~, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, IEEE 279-1971, Regulatory Guide 1.89, IEEE 323-1971, IEEE 323-1974, DOR Guidelines and NUREG-0588. It also stated that "the proposed rule covers the same electric equipment as [Commission Memorandum and Order] CLI-80-21,"
which explicitly applied to safety grade equipment. See 47 Fed. Reg. 2876-77.
Costle, 659 F.2d 1239, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (notice defective
if object of rulemaking not clearly specified). Revised
§ 50.49 was concerned with the difficult but confined issues
regarding environmental qualification, not with the even more
complex and virtually limitless issues involving "important to
safety." Thus, revised§ 50.49 provides no basis for
application of an expanded version of "important to safety" in
anything but the EQ context.
Third, it is inappropriate to rely on§ 50.49 to
conclude that there is significant conflict in the regulatory
definition of "important to safety." The distinction in
§ 50.49 b~tween "important to safety" and "safety related" is
not necessary for the purpose of the EQ rule, and has very
little practical significance in the EQ context. As is clear
on the face of the rule, removal of the term "important to
safety" from the rule would have no impact on its scope or
effect. Thus, the language of§ 50.49, which is of very recent
vintage, does not provide persuasive proof of a long-standing
practice of interpreting "important to safety" as broader than
"safety related. "24/
24/ The Appeal Board cited no other examples of inconsistent usage in the NRC regulations. Other references dealt with very recent unilateral attempts by the Staff to buttress its position. See Shoreham, ALAB-769, 19 NRC at 1003-04.
Similarly, Regulatory Guide 1.29 does not indicate that
a conflict exists in the Staff's regulatory guides. See
Shoreham, ALAB-769, 19 NRC at 1003. Regulatory Guide 1.29 does
not define "important to safety." While it does specify
seismic requirements for certain non-safety related equipment,
those requirements are imposed to protect safety related
equipment in the vicinity.~ Thus, although the Shoreham
Appeal Board correctly recognized that there is now confusion
over the proper definition of "important to safety," it should
have noted the confusion is of recent vintage and has been
caused by Staff attempts to redefine a previously well
understood regulatory term.
It is imp~rtant to observe the extremely narrow context
of each of the NRC actions which arguably support a broad
interpretation of "important to safety." None of them either
considered or adopted requirements which are automatically
- applied each time the term "important to safety" appears in the
NRC's rules. In fact, these pronouncements do not even purport
to adopt specific requirements that are automatically imposed
on a particular piece of non-safety related equipment in every
~ For example, moving the non-safety related equipment so that it could not fall on safety related equipment eliminates any need *to meet seismic requirements. Regulatory position C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29 clearly indicates that this non-safety related equipment is not required to remain functional.
future license proceeding. Rather, at most, they use the term
"important to safety" in a loose fashion to signify ad hoc
requirements applied to pieces of equipment selected on an ad
hoc basis.
Equally important, in each of these isolated instances
the Board or Staff did not provide reasoned justification for
expanding the definition of "important to safety" beyond its
well-established meaning. The TMI-1 Boards had no record of
regulatory development or industry practice with regard to this
pervasive term; the Denton memorandum did not solicit any
comments about industry understanding or practice and issued a
definition of "important to safety" which is so vague that it
cannot be reasonably understood; the Shoreham Licensing Board
relied on TMI-1; and the Shoreham Appeal Board cited two
regulatory provisions which are clearly distinguishable. Thus,
those few instances lack persuasive force and cannot overcome
the accumulated weight of regulatory development and
demonstrable industry practice.
F. Long-Standing Practice Compels the Conclusion That 11 Important to Safety" and "Safety Related" Are Equivalent
In summary, these and other facts compel the conclusion
that the industry and, at least until very recently, the NRC
have equated "important to safety" and "safety related" in
their activities. This is significant because an agency's
long-standing construction and application of its own
regulations strongly suggest their correct interpretation.
See,~, National Ass'n of Greeting Card Pub. v. United
States Postal Service, 569 F.2d 570, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
vacated on.other grounds sub nom. United States Postal Service
- v. Associated Third Class Mail Users, 434 U.S. 884 (1977);
United States v. Bd. of Supervisors, 611 F.2d 1367, 1372 (4th
Cir. 1979); cf. Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 582
F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978) (administrative interpretation,
practice and usage accorded great weight in interpreting
statutes). In this regard, the NRC Staff's new interpretation
of "important to s,afety" should be accorded little weight
because it is inconsistent with prior agency interpretation and
action. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974); Standard
Oil Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (TECA 1978); National
Ass'n of Greeting Card Pub., 569 F.2d at 600.
The NRC Staff suggests that the facts do not clearly
show long-standing NRC equation of "important to safety" and
"safety related." Instead, the Staff argues that, although the
terms have been equated at times, agency usage has been
inconsistent. Even if this were so, it would still be
necessary to conclude that the terms are synonymous. In the
absence of consistent agency interpretation of regulatory
terms, the terms must be given their "commonly understood
definitions." Tenneco Oil Co. v. Federal Energy
Administration, 613 F.2d 298, 302 (TECA 1979). And when, as
here, a regulatory requirement has no meaning outside the
industry it governs, the requirement must be viewed from an
"industry standpoint." Wiggins Brothers, Inc. v. Department of
Energy, 667 F.2d 77, 81 (TECA 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905
(1982).
IV. THE RULEMAKING SHOULD CONFIRM THE EQUIVALENCE OF "SAFETY RELATED" AND "IMPORTANT TO SAFETY"
A. The Clear Equivalence of "Safety Related" and "Important to Safety" Has Not Resulted in Any Identified Generic Safety Concern
In determining the content of a proposed rule on safety
classification, the Commission should assess whether there is
substantiated information showing that the long-standing
equivalent use of these two terms has resulted in a generic
safety concern. If not, the Commission should propose a rule
which merely confirms that "important to safety" and "safety
related" are synonymous. The facts support only this latter
course.
As described in the previous section, the Commission's
rules and regulatory guides have used the terms "safety
related" and "important to safety" interchangeably, and it has
been the accepted practice of the utility industry and, until
quite recently, the NRC Staff to regard these terms as
synonymous. Significantly, since the initial incorporation of
these terms into the Commission's 'regulations, there has been
no allegation that their equivalence has resulted in any
generic safety concern. The Staff, for example, has not
contended that plants designed or licensed prior to the TMI-1
restart proceeding are any less safe due to the traditional
shared understanding between industry and the Staff about the
equivalence of these terms. Moreover, even on the several
occasions since the TMI-1 restart proceeding where Staff has
urged a broad interpretation of "important to safety," the
Staff has not claimed that the equivalent usage of these terms
will give rise to a specific concern about plant safety.
Moreover, although the safety classification issue has been the
- subject of considerable debate, no generic safety concern has
been identified outside the context of licensing proceedings to
justify a change in the historical practice under the
Commission's rules. In fact, after a review of this issue, the
NRC's Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) concluded
that "[t]here is no clear and present safety problem that
exists as a result of the blurred usage of the terms 'important
to safety' and 'safety-related' and the frequent
interchangeable and synonymous use of these terms in licensing
safety reviews." Minutes of CRGR meeting Number 50 (Nov. 14,
1983), at 2; see id at 3. This view was confirmed by the NRC
Staff at the April 30, 1984 meeting with industry
representatives. ~, transcript of April 30, 1984 meeting at
- 11. Thus, there is no factual basis on which to justify a
change from the historical equivalence of these terms.
B. Existing Non-Safety Related Quality Measures Are Adequate
As just explained, there is no specific generic safety
problem with equating "important to safety" and "safety
related." As best the Utility Group can determine, the NRC
Staff's motivation for departing from historical practice seems
to be the desire to expand some measure of design and quality
regulation beyond the traditional focus of the NRC's
regulations. Discussions with Staff representatives, testimony
in NRC proceedings and a review of the instances in which the
Staff has departed from the traditional use of "important to
safety" indicate that the Staff's principal objective is to
ensure that the appropriate design standards already built into
nuclear power plants are maintained throughout the life 'of the
plant.26/ The concern expressed both informally and on the
26/ See generally transcript of April 30, 1984 meeting.
record by Staff members is that, without a broad definition of
"important to safety," there is no explicit regulatory
provision to ensure that the non-safety related equipment,
properly designed and constructed, will be maintained
throughout the life of the plant in a manner commensurate with
the functi9n it performs.llf The Staff, however, does not
claim that such standards are not being maintained.
Consequently, the Staff's concern is not over safety
but over a perceived lack of regulatory authority. The Staff's
fear, however, is not justified. The NRC has broad power to
regulate all aspects of nuclear power plants to give reasonable
assurance that their operation does not pose an undue risk to
the public health and safety. Reasonable assurance of no undue
risk generally has been achieved by imposing requirements on
ll/ Thus, at the Staff's urging, the Shoreham Board imposed a license condition to:
(1) confirm the Commission's regulatory authority over SS&Cs and related activities beyond those which are safety-related, and (2) to assure, as a regulatory requirement, the continuation by LILCO of the application of quality assurance [to] important to safety SS&Cs and related activities, commensurate with their safety function.
Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 563-64. In the wake of the Commission's action on Shoreham (CLI-84-9), however, the NRC Staff now believes that this license condition is unnecessary.
NRC Staff Response to Order of June 7, 1983 Allowing Comments on the Application of CLI-84-9, at 5 (July 6, 1984).
-so-
the safety related set of structures, systems and components.
These regulations are designed to ensure that such equipment
can perform the safety functions set out in 10 CFR Part 100,
Appendix A. But the NRC's focus on the safety related set does
not mean that it has not exercised regulatory authority over
non-safety related structures, systems and components. In
specific instances, many of which are described below,
regulations have been enacted to impose requirements on
non-safety related equipment.
It is important to note that even when non-safety
related items have been regulated, the emphasis has generally
been on the protection of the safety related set. In other
words, the NRC historically has imposed requirements not
because of the inherent safety significance of the non-safety
related equipment but rather because the equipment may have
some impact (positive or negative) on the operation of safety
related equipment.28/ Regardless of the reason for their
imposition, however, it is obvious from the following examples
that the NRC has not hesitated to prescribe requirements for
28/ The NRC Staff's efforts to regulate non-safety related equipment through the expansion of the term "important to safety" reflects a fundamental departure from this traditional regulatory approach. By broadly defining the category of structures, systems and components important to safety, the Staff has eliminated the need to show any significant relationship to the safety related functions of the plant.
non-safety -related equipment when a generic safety concern has
been demonstrated. These examples include:
- 1. Regulatory Guide 1.70: this document provides guidance for applicants in the preparation of Safety Analysis Reports. SARS prepared in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.70 will address a large number of non-safety related structures, systems and components. For example, SARs may describe the codes, standards, and other design and quality measures applied to specific non-safety related equipment. The Staff is apparently satisfied that its current process for reviewing applications adequately ensures that non-safety related equipment that may play an important role in the safe and reliable operation of a plant is properly designed and constructed. See,~,
Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 564.
- 2. Standard Review Plan: the NRC Staff conducts its review of an application in accordance with the SRP. In doing so, the Staff reviews the design and quality standards applied to many non-safety related structures, systems and components.
- 3. Fire Protection (10 CFR Part 50, App.
R): fire protection equipment is not considered to be safety related equipment within the definition of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. GDC 3, however, does require that structures, systems and components important to safety be "designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions."
Thus, GDC 3 focuses on protecting what has traditionally been the safety related set. This protection may be provided by certain non-safety related
fire protection equipment. In the NRC's judgment, it was appropriate to impose certain regulatory standards on this specific type of equipment, hence 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R.29/
~- Environmental Qualification (10 CFR
§ 50.49(b) (2), (3)): as already noted, the environmental qualification rule imposes requirements on certain non-safety related electrical equipment.
- 5. Seismic Design (Regulatory Guide 1.29): certain design recommendations are made for non-safety related (non-seismic category I) equipment which could adversely affect safety related equipment in a seismic event.
Again, the focus of this regulatory guidance is the protection of the safety related set. A utility may elect (1) to design the non-safety related equipment so it will not adversely affect the safety related equipment; (2) to interpose a barrier between the safety related and non safety related equipment to protect the former; or (3) to move either the safety related or the non-safety related equipment so that the latter cannot cause failure of the former.
29/ Interestingly, the fire protection issue (i) demonstrates the proper procedural approach to imposing specific regulatory requirements and (ii) provides another example of the equality of "important to safety" and "safety related" in NRC regulations. After almost ten years of experience under the general fire protection requirements of GDC 3, the Commission enacted by rulemaking in 1980 very specific fire protection regulations on the subject. 10 CFR § 50.48 and Appendix R. In the rule, the Commission equates "important to safety" and "safety related" and uses them interchangeably: "The phrases
'important to safety,' or 'safety related,' will be used throughout this Appendix Ras applying to all safety functions." 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, § I; see generally Appendix R.
- 6. § 50.59 Analysis: § 50.59 requires licensees to notify the NRC prior to making changes in the facility or procedures, or conducting tests or experiments, if such activities involve an unreviewed safety question.
To meet this requirement, both safety related and non-safety related modifications, tests or experiments must be reviewed. Thus, throughout the life of the plant, there will be reviews of the impact of non-safety related modifications on plant safety.
The NRC's exercise of this undoubted regulatory
authority has not been extensive, however, because the
utilities' established practice of applying design and quality
measures to non-safety related structures, systems and
components as a matter of good engineering practice makes such
regulation unnecessary. Since utilities have applied these
measures even though they believed there was no regulatory
requirement to do so, little or no real gain in safety would be
achieved by expanding the NRC's regulations to encompass some
- or all of these good engineering practices. Thus, the NRC's
regulations (as they have been historically interpreted) do
provide reasonable assurance of no undue risk to the public
health and safety. A review of the extensive quality measures
already applied to the non-safety related set is helpful in
understanding why the Utility Group is confident that this is
so.
To repeat a prior point, utilities do recognize that
non-safety related structures, systems and components play a
role in enhancing safe and reliable operation of a nuclear
power plant.30/ In order to help ensure that the function of
these systems is maintained, utilities, as a matter of good
engineering practice, apply quality measures to these items
commensurate with the function performed. These measures
include:
- 1. Industry efforts:
- a. INPO Significant Event Evaluation and Information Network (SEE-IN}: this program, which was endorsed by the NRC in Generic Letter 82-04, provides a mechanism for central collection and screening of all events from both U.S.
and foreign nuclear plants. This program is not limited to safety related structures, systems and components.
- b. Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS}: this computerized system, now under the aegis of INPO, allows all nuclear plants to input and receive failure data on individual pieces of safety related and some non-safety related equipment.
- c. Other INPO Activities: INPO has a number of other activities in progress or under development which address NRC
30/ It is also important to recognize, however, the nature of this role. By design, non-safety related equipment is not essential to maintain the safe operation of a nuclear plant.
Rather, this equipment can enhance the safety of an already safe plant.
concerns about the operation of nuclear power plants. These initiatives are summarized in a letter dated August 29, 1983, from Lelan F.
Sillin, Jr., Chairman, INFO Board of Directors, to the Honorable Nunzio J.
Palladino. These INPO initiatives are not limited to safety related structures, systems and components.
Rather, they focus on all aspects of plant operations. Significantly, where regulatory requirements tend to specify minimum acceptable standards, the INPO efforts have established much higher goals called "benchmarks of excellence." Also, the INFO approach seeks the same goal the Staff seeks -
safe and reliable operation -- while allowing necessary flexibility for individual plants. This flexibility would be difficult to achieve in writing new regulations to cover non-safety related equipment and their operation.
- 2. Individual Utility Practices:
- a. Preventive maintenance practices:
utilities employ preventive maintenance practices for non-safety related structures, systems and components.
- b. Controls on non-safety related ma-in tenance: utilities impose certain controls on maintenance performed on non-safety related structures, systems and components, including:
(i) the same or similar work pro cedures for safety related and non-safety related maintenance on similar equipment;
(ii) the same maintenance control forms for safety related and non-safety related items;
(iii) audit/review of non-safety related maintenance and maintenance records; and
(iv) the same process for both safety related or non-safety related design activities and modifications.
- c. Independent on-site safety evaluation groups: these groups, required by NUREG-0737, generally review, among other things, operating experience, both plant-specific and industry-wide.
In many instances, these reviews will explore the role of non-safety related equipment in the event under investigation.
- d. Start-up testing of non-safety related structures, systems and components:
plant start-up test programs include integrated tests of major plant systems, both safety related and non-safety related.
- e. Procurement, testing and calibration of non-safety related equipment:
utilities generally develop their own set of internal controls for the pro curement, testing and calibration of non-safety related equipment.
- f. Training/workshops for non-safety related activities: utilities conduct training sessions or workshops on subjects relating to non-safety related activities including maintenance.
It must b~ emphasized that: (1) the above list is not
comprehensive (it provides representative examples of
non-safety related quality measures), and (2) the list does not
necessarily reflect what any particular utility does for
non-safety related items; individual utilities exercise their
judgment in selecting the measures they believe to be
appropriate. The list does confirm, however, that utilities do
undertake measures, consi*stent with good engineering practice,
to ensure the safe and reliable operation of non-safety related
items.
Given existing practices for non-safety related
structures, systems and components, there is no justification
for imposing new regulatory requirements on the operation of
this equipment now. First, there is no evidence of any
specific risk due to the lack of more expansive regulations for
non-safety related equipment. If, indeed, a specific risk were
involved, the appropriate response should address that risk as
NRC has done in past and not revise the NRC's entire regulatory
scheme, as would the new definition of "important to safety"
proposed in the Denton Memorandum.llJ
And second, given the existing programs and
requirements, both regulatory and non-regulatory, for
31/ A possible mechanism is already under development to identify specific; unacceptable risks from non-safety related structures, systems and components. A two-year trial of the NRC's proposed safety goal is currently in progress. If the Commission elects to adopt some form of safety goal, it may provide a means to determine whether to impose more stringent requirements on particular non-safety related items if such a need exists.
non-safety related equipment, there is no indication that
expanding the regulatory umbrella to cover more non-safety
related items and activities would add any additional
protection of public health and safety. Indeed, the contrary
may be true. NRC Staff members have conceded that the safety
related set is of primary importance in protecting the public
health and safety. A broad expansion of the NRC's regulations
can only serve to divert industry's and the Staff's finite
resources from this critical area.
C. Expansion of "Important to Safety" Will Have Significant Adverse Consequences
A proposed rule which addresses a specific safety
- eoncerrr-by-exp-anding -the -definition o-f - "important to safety"
would have far reaching, unintended, and potentially disastrous
consequences. "Important to safety" is one of the most
pervasively used of all NRC regulatory terms. It appears at
least ten times in the General Design Criteria alone. It is
also used in Parts 21, 50, and 72 of the Commission's
regulations and is widely interspersed throughout NRC guidance
documents.
If a proposed rule were to modify the meaning of this
term, industry and ultimately the Staff might be required to
review each piece of equipment in operating plants, as well as
those under construction, in order to determine whether the
equipment is arguably covered by at least one of the many uses
of "important to safety" throughout the NRC regulations and
regulatory documents. Given the pervasive use of the term,
mere'iy identifying each place it appears in regulations and
guidance documents will be an extensive undertaking. Moreover,
substantial additional effort might have to be spent trying to
define the requirements applicable to each new category of
equipment "important to safety." In many cases, this
time-consuming review of every plant and plant design could
result in the imposition of new and potentially costly
requirements not because of any articulated safety concern but
-- ---- ------- -- - - ---merely because of an ~r~~_le __ reLa_t._i__on _ _to_ -a-rul-e-0r- ~--clanee-
document which has loosely used the term "important to safety."
Ultimately, all of these activities and requirements will only
serve to detract from the industry and Staff effort to assure
- performance of the "safety related" set of equipment.
This result would be particularly inappropriate since
the Staff has claimed that its concerns are limited to the GDC 1 context. See,~, transcript of April 30, 1984 meeting at
189-190. To remedy the Staff's limited concern by expanding
the definition of "important to safety" would inappropriately
broaden the term in its other uses. If, on the other hand, as
the Staff has suggested on occasion, the broader definition is
limited to GDC 1, a regulatory scheme would result in which
"important to safety" had different meanings in different
contexts. This regulatory inconsistency would provide fertile
ground for spawning arguments over the meaning of the term in
each of its contexts.
Finally, expansion of "important to safety" in GDC 1
would not accomplish the Staff's professed goal of providing a
specific regulation for ensuring the continued application of
non-safety related quality measures during plant operation.
GDC 1 is a criterion which deals with design, fabrication,
erection and testing. Thus, even with a new definition of
"important to safety," GDC 1 would not cover plant
operation.w
Clearly, expansion of the term "important to safety"
would have unwanted and undesirable consequences which are not
justified by any safety concern conceivably at issue in this
rulemaking. Thus, if the Commission decides that a safety
concern has been demonstrated, the Commission should under no
circumstances consider substituting an expanded definition of
32/ Compare GDC 1 ("structures, syst:ems and components important to safety shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested.. ") with Appendix B ( "these activities include designing, purchasing, fabricating, handling, shipping, storing, cleaning, erecting, installing, inspecting, testing, operating, maintaining, repairing, refueling, and modifying" (emphasis added)).
"important to safety" for a carefully tailored rule focusing on
the particular safety concern and any requirements derived from
that concern.~
V. THE PROPOSED RULEMAKING
A. Proposed Rule
In order to eliminate any potential confusion created
by recent usage of the term "important to safety" in a manner
inconsistent with its historical interpretation and application
by the NRC and the nuclear industry, the Utility Group
petitions the Commission to adopt the following:
Proposed 10 CFR § 50.2(y)
"Structures, systems and components important to safety" and "safety related structures, systems and components" are equivalent terms that mean those structures, systems and components necessary to assure: (i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (iii) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of
33/ This is the course the Commission has successfully followed in its recent ATWS rulemaking. The ATWS rule requires the jnstallation of certain equipment for the prevention and mitigation of ATWS events. An early draft of the final rule attempted to classify this equipment as "important to safety" (but not "safety related"). The final rule approved by the Commission abandoned the "important to safety" classification and specified that, while the equipment was not safety related, particular quality assurance elements of Appendix B should be applied to it. 49 Fed. Reg. 26,036 (1984).
accidents which could result in offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR Part 100.
This definition is consistent with the historical
interpretation and application of these terms as they appear in
the NRC's regulations. Thus, it can serve as a benchmark from
which the need for additional regulatory requirements for
non-safety related structures, systems and components can be
examined.
To emphasize that this rule is meant to confirm
existing practices, the Federal Register notice accompanying
this definition should indicate that the rulemaking is not
intended to result in any substantive changes in plants already
in operation or under construction. For example, where
licensees have applied certain design, construction or quality
standards to plant equipment and such standards have been
reviewed and approved by the NRC Staff, this new rule shall not
be used as a basis to reduce or increase the agreed upon
standards. To ensure that this intent is clear, the rule
promulgating the above definition should include the following
note:
This definition is not intended to require any changes in the design, construction or quality standards for any nuclear power plant for which an operating license or construc tion permit has been granted prior to the effective date of this rule.
Such a provision would-be consistent with the NRC Staff's view
that there is no concern about existing industry practice for
non-safety related equipment.34/ This provision would also be
consistent with the result reached in the Commission's Shoreham
order, which precludes the imposition of additional regulatory
requirements on non-safety related equipment simply because it
might be identified as "important to safety."
Finally, a conforming amendment should be made to
§ 50.49 (Environmental Qualification) to delete the words
"important to safety" from the title of:§ 50.49 and from
§ 50.49(b) to be consistent with the above definition. The
title should read "Environmental Qualification of Electric
Equipment," and section§ 50.49(b) should read: "(b) Electric
equipment covered by this section is:. " As already
noted, this change would have no substantive effect on the
scope of the equipment subject to the environmental
qualification rule. Rather, consistent with the historical
interpretation of the term, "important to safety," the change
would merely eliminate the confusion caused by the unexplained
inclusion of the term in the final environmental qualification
rule.
34/ See section IV.A above.
B. An Additional Suggestion
In light of the considerations discussed in Section IV,
the Utility Group does not believe additional regulation of
non-safety related equipment or activities is required. If the
Commission disagrees, however, more work must be performed
before proposing any new regulations or requirements for non
safety related equipment. At a minimum, the Staff should be
required to gather basic factual information on such matters as
the quality practices that are currently being applied to non
safety related structures, systems and components; the design
and construction standards that are available and in use for
non-safety related,structures, systems and components; the
industry practices that are in place to help assure that
utilities are providing appropriate quality measures for non
safety related equipment; and the degree to which non-safety
related equipment could affect the safety and reliable
operation of the plant. Moreover, the Staff must articulate
clearly its specific safety concerns. Only with this
information can the Staff determine whether current quality
practices for non-safety related structures, systems and
components adequately address its identified safety concerns
and, if not, what particular areas remain of concern.
Should particular areas of concern be identified, the
Staff must then determine whether regulation is the appropriate
means of addressing them, or whether alternative, less
burdensome, measures could be used to accomplish the same
result.35/ Finally, if the Staff concludes that further
regulation is the only way to address its concerns about non
safety related structures, systems and components, careful
consideration must be given to tailoring those regulations to
the Staff's specific concerns. For instance, in the event the
Staff believes that the only way to achieve the needed
additional regulation is by expansion of the term "important to
safety," the Staff must then pursue such questions as:
(1) Is the broader definition of "important to safety" set out in the Denton Memorandum too vague to apprise utilities of the equipment that falls into the category? If not, what exactly does it mean?
(2) Has any assessment been made of the impact of exp~nding the definition of "important to safety" everywhere it appears in the regulations and NRC regulatory guidance? If so, what are the results of that assessment?
When the Staff has gathered this information and has
35/ In this regard, the Staff must balance the costs of diverting finite NRC and industry resources from other activities against the safety benefits of an expansion of the NRC's regulations.
answered these and other pertinent questions, interested
parties should assess the results and determine whether further
rulemaking is necessary.
VI. INTERIM REQUIREMENTS
The Commission's order in Shoreham recognizes the
importance of protecting the legitimate expectations of
- licensees and applicants during the pendency of the rulemaking.
As noted, the members of the Utility Group own a substantial
number of the commercial nuclear power plants currently in
operation or under construction. These plants have been or are
being designed, constructed, tested and operated using the
long-standing industry practice of equating "important to
safety" and "safety related." These plants have been licensed
by the NRC for construction or operation based on this assumed
equivalence.36/ As the previous discussion reflects, there is
no sound basis for a conclusion to the contrary.
In order to ensure orderly and reasoned consideration
of the appropriate scope of the definition of "important to
36/ Some of the older plants owned by Group members may have been designed and constructed before the terms "safety related" and "important to safety" came into common usage. Since that time, however, owners of these plants have interpreted these terms as synonymous in complying with applicable regulatory requirements.
safety," the Utility Group urges the Commission to mainta~i::i the
traditional classification scheme until the completion of its
rulemaking. Thus, the Commission should direct that the
long-standing synonymous interpretation of the term "important
to safety" and "safety related" be applied in all of the NRC's
activities during the pendency of the rulemaking.TIJ This
would be in keeping with established tenets of administrative
law which mandate that a rulemaking must "give notice that the
standard is being changed... and [must] apply the changed
standard only to those actions taken by parties after the new
standard has been proclaimed as in effect."~
In order to protect the integrity of the Commission's
rulemaking, the Commission should also direct that during the
rulemaking, contentions that seek to impose requirements on
non-safety related equipment not explicitly mandated by NRC
regulations should not be admitted for litigation. For the
reasons stated in Section IV above, removal of this issue from
W Thus, the license condition imposed by the Shoreham licensing board should be removed, Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 635, and no similar license condition should be issued for other plants while the rulemaking is in progress. The NRC Staff agrees that no license condition is necessary. See note 27 above.
~ Boston Edison Co. v. FPC, 557 F.2d 845, 849 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 956 (1977); see generally, Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 590 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1979).
consideration (_except in the context of this rulemaking) will
not reduce the level of safety provided by the NRC's
regulations. The interim provisions of this rule would merely
perpetuate the long-standing equivalency of the terms pending
the completion of the rulemaking without any substantive safety
impact.39/
The Commission should also ensure that there is no
confusion about existing quality measures for non-safety
related structures, systems and components. Consequently, it
should indicate that the rulemaking is not intended to increase
or decrease any commitments for non-safety related items
previously made by an applicant or licensee and accepted by the
NRC Staff.
39/ The Licensing Board's decision in the Shoreham case confirms that this is possible. The Shoreham Board concluded that
LILCO has complied with NRC requirements.
[because] with respect to the treatment of structures, systems, and components, whether for classification and qualification, quality assurance or safety analysis, such treatment may and should be effected commensurate with the items' importance to safety. LILCO has applied this latter treatment to every structure, system, and component in the Shoreham design, notwithstanding the fact that it used only two classification classes, i.e., safety-related and nonsafety-related.
Shoreham, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC at 546.
VII. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission should propose the rule set out in this
petition in the Safety Classification rulemaking.
Respectfully submitted,
UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUP
~f. ~ Ea~
Lee B. Zeugin Counsel for Utility Group
HUNTON & WILLIAMS P. 0. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212
DATED: October 30, 1984