A Green, self-revealing, non-cited violation (
NCV) of
Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 was identified which requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities referenced in NRC
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, dated February 1978, including safety related activities carried out during operation of the reactor plant. Licensee surveillance test procedure 2-OSP- 63.01, Unit 2
RPS Logic Matrix Test, was not complied with as written when a
Reactor Protection System (
RPS) logic matrix switch was inadvertently placed out of position resulting in an unplanned
reactor trip. The licensee entered this violation in their corrective action program as condition report 1657802. The licensees failure to fully implement
RPS testing procedure 2-OSP-63.01, Unit 2
RPS Logic Matrix Test, as written is a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be of more than minor significance because it resulted in a
reactor trip and is similar to
NRC Manual Chapter 0612 Appendix E, example 4.b. The inspectors evaluated the risk of this finding using
IMC 0609,
Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a
reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The finding involved the cross-cutting area of human performance, in the component of work practices and the aspect of procedural compliance (
H.4.b), in that the licensee failed to ensure that personnel followed procedure requirements to prevent unexpected results.