05000289/FIN-2009005-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | Technical specification 6.8.1.e requires that written procedures covering the Fire Protection Program shall be properly implemented. Procedure AP-1038, Fire Protection Program, establishes TMI Unit 1 Fire Protection Program functions. Procedure 1303-12.9, Fire Barrier Seal Inspection, requires that penetration seals be verified functional to ensure compliance with procedure 1038. Contrary to these requirements, inspections of the fire seals for the five safety-related 120 volt vital inverters were not performed. In addition, fire seal inspections performed in July2008 as part of prior extent-of-condition reviews for multiple degraded fire seals (IR793088 and Green NCV 05000289/2008-004-01), did not identify two degraded fire seals for vital inverters \'C\' and \'E\' and did not initiate corrective measures. Consequently, the seals which were damaged during inverter replacement activities in November 2007, did not meet the required 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rating for a period of two years. However, engineers determined the degraded fire seals would have provided at least a one hour fire rating and due to defense-in-depth the degraded fire seals would not have affected operability of the vital inverters in the event of a fire. This finding adversely affected the reliability of equipment required to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition following a severe fire, because the degraded fire seals adversely affected the confinement defense-in-depth element of fire protection. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. This finding is of very low safety significance because the safe shutdown of the plant was not affected due to available defense-in-depth fire protection features such as incipient and ionization detectors, control room alarms, the plant\'s fire brigade team, and also because the degraded seals would have provided greater than a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire rating protection in the event of a fire. This issue was placed in Exelon\'s corrective action program as IR 995903. Corrective actions included extent-of-condition walkdowns, repair of the fire seals, and ensuring these seals are inspected every two years. |
Site: | Three Mile Island |
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Report | IR 05000289/2009005 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Spindler R Bellamy H Gray E Burket D Everhart J Lilliendahl P Kaufman R Nimitz J Brand D Kern |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Three Mile Island - IR 05000289/2009005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Three Mile Island) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Three Mile Island)
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