ML22045A867
| ML22045A867 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/21/2021 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML22045A867 (4) | |
Text
First Safety Culture Program Effectiveness Review Team Charter I. Background
The NRC has long recognized the importance of a strong nuclear safety culture. In 1989, in response to an incident at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Statio n, the NRC issued Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Plant Operations. T his policy statement describes the NRCs expectation that licensees place appropriate emphasis on safety in the operation of nuclear power plants, including personal dedication and account ability of all individuals engaged in any activity that has a bearing on the safety of nuclear pow er plants. Additionally, the policy statement underscores managements responsibility for fostering the development of a healthy safety culture at each facility and for providing a professiona l working environment in the control roomand throughout the facilityto ensure safe operations.
In 1996, following an incident at the Millstone Power Station i n which workers were retaliated against for whistleblowing, the Commission issued Freedom of E mployees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns without Fear of Retaliation. This policy statement describes the NRCs expectation that all NRC licensees establish a safety conscious work environment (SCWE) in which workers feel free to raise nuclear safety conce rns without fear of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination. A SCWE is an imp ortant attribute of a strong nuclear safety culture.
In 2002, investigations into the discovery of degradation of th e reactor pressure vessel head at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station revealed that safety culture weaknesses were the root cause of the event. The NRC made significant changes to the Re actor Oversight Process (ROP) to strengthen the agencys ability to effectively monitor licensee performance and detect potential safety culture weaknesses during inspections and perf ormance assessments.
Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-13, Information on the Changes M ade to the Reactor Oversight Process to More Fully A ddress Safety Culture, dated July 31, 2006, provides information to reactor licensees on the revised ROP. Most nota bly, the NRC revised the existing cross-cutting areas o f human performance, problem iden tification and resolution, and SCWE to incorporate aspects that are important to safety cultur e. The intent of the revisions to the ROP was threefold:
- 1. Provide better opportunities for the NRC staff to consider s afety culture weaknesses and to encourage licensees to take appropriate actions before signi ficant performance degradation occurs.
- 2. Provide the NRC staff with a process to determine the need t o specifically evaluate a licensees safety culture after performance problems have place d the licensee in the Degraded Cornerstone column of the Action Matrix.
- 3. Provide the NRC staff with a structured process to evaluate the licensees safety culture assessment and to independently conduct a safety culture assess ment for a licensee in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone column of the Acti on Matrix.
In 2008, the NRC developed several additional changes to the gu idance on oversight of safety culture in the ROP as a result of lessons learned from a supple mental inspection conducted at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
The NRCs final Safety Culture Policy Statement (SCPS) was publ ished on June 14, 2011. The SCPS provides the NRCs expectation that individuals and organi zations performing regulated activities establish and maintain a healthy safety culture that recognizes the safety and security 2
significance of their activities and the nature and complexity of their organizations and functions.
Because safety and security are the primary pillars of the NRC s regulatory mission, consideration of both safety and security issues, commensurate with their significance, is an underlying principle of the SCPS. The NRC has not conducted an effectiveness review on these changes.
II. Purpose
The purpose of this effectiveness review is to evaluate how saf ety culture is currently incorporated into the ROP and determine whether this is achievi ng its objective of sufficiently detecting safety culture issues, providing confidence that a li censees safety culture is healthy, and to provide recommendations on any necessary program changes. This review will include:
- Understanding how safety culture is currently incorporated in the baseline and supplement inspection procedures and manual chapters and identi fication of any gaps.
- Determining what training is currently provided to inspectors in the area of safety culture and identifying any gaps.
- Determining what licensee information is currently available t o the inspection staff to determine the health of safety culture at each site.
In 2021, the NRC received fifty-four allegations referring to c hilled work environment or other SCWE/safety culture issues. Of those fifty-four, the agency in spected fourteen and substantiated nine. This data indicates that there continue to be concerns with SCWE/safety culture issues at our licensed fa cilities. This review may enable the staff to develop more comprehensive tools to identify these issues sooner.
III. Tasking
A. Review ROP documents describing the Safety Culture program t o ensure a clear understanding of the basis for the program and how it is implem ented.
- IP 95003 and 95003.02
B. Review documentation including inspection reports and lesson s learned reports from plants with longstanding performance issues, including those assessed in Column 4 of the Action Matrix including:
- Pilgrim 95003 inspection report (ML17129A217)
- ANO 95003 inspection report (ML16161B279)
- Watts Bar SCWE inspection Reports and Confirmatory Orders 3
(ML16083A479, ML18229A153, ML18073A202, ML18242A458, ML17069A133, ML17208A647, ML19357A240, ML20218A483, ML20310A353, and ML21048A200)
- Grand Gulf 95002 inspection report (ML21306A311)
In addition, review the following information:
- Operating Experience trends from RRPS related to safety cultur e and performance
- SCWE related allegations trending details
- Cross-Cutting Issues Effectiveness Review Final Report (ML2023 9A806)
- Problem Identification and Resolution Review Final Report (ML2 0247J59
C. Review safety culture training for inspectors:
- IMC 1245 Appendix A and B
- IMC 1245 Appendix C-12
D. Review the 2018 Safety Culture Common Language effectivenes s review (ML18219A687)
E. Use public meetings, such as ROP public meetings in which th e Safety Culture program or the Safety Culture program effectiveness review is an agenda to pic, to seek feedback on the Safety Culture program and communicate potential recommendation s changes.
F. Leverage the work from the recent CCI and PI&R reviews and R OP framework to identify where additional attention to safety culture may be appropriate, such as:
- How safety culture is addressed in the baseline inspection pro gram.
- How safety culture is addressed in IP95001 for plants in colum n 2 of the action matrix.
- How safety culture is addressed in training activities for ins pectors.
G. Identify safety culture inspection activities that affect li censees outside of Operating Reactors, i.e. vendors, research and test reactors, constructio n, fuels, and materials licensees.
H. Discuss with regional staff and management their experiences with the Safety Culture program to identify examples where it has led to positive outco mes and where it hasnt, and why.
I. Seek internal and external stakeholder views about the effec tiveness of the Safety Culture program and recommended changes. External views may be solicit ed via the monthly ROP public meetings.
J. Determine whether changes should be made to the Safety Cultu re program objectives, and determine changes needed to ensure intended objectives are achi eved. If so, develop specific recommendations including pros and cons of proposed changes to provide to management for decisions.
K. Develop a draft report documenting the teams efforts, conc lusions, and recommendations.
An example of an effectiveness review report is the IFRM Effect iveness Review (ML18123A319).
IV. Team Leader Functions
- Schedule and lead team meetings
- Ensure action items are identified and tracked
- Circulate draft products for members to review 4
- Present at public meetings to get external stakeholder insight and provide status of review
- Provide periodic status briefings to the NRR/DRO Director or D eputy Director and the regions of the status of the effectiveness review
V. Team Membership
- Molly Keefe-Forsyth, Safety Culture Program Manager NRR/DRO/IRAB (Team Lead)
- Rebecca Sigmon, NRR/DRO/IOEB
- April Nguyen, Senior RI, RIII
- Elise Eve-RI
- Dori Willis, OE/Allegations Team Lead
- Chris Hunt, RIII
- Alex Garmoe, NRR/DRO/IRAB (Team consultant)
VI. Duration This charter will remain in effect until the effectiveness revi ew report is issued, which is expected by the end of calendar year 2022.
VII. Level of Effort Members are expected to review reference information, participa te in periodic teleconference meetings, and complete action items assigned at team meetings. Travel might be necessary for some team meetings. In addition, team m embers are expected to dial in or attend public meetings in which the effectiveness review will be discussed.
Estimated Timeline: (Subject to change per DRO/NRR management r eview)
Review Team Kick-off - January 20, 2022 Review and Assess program - January 20- March 15, 2022
KM session to solicit internal feedback and insights - March/Ap ril, 2022
ROP monthly Public meetings to solicit external feedback from i ndustry and public - February 2022 and April 2022
Evaluate program and feedback - May 2022
Brief Internal NRR management - May 2022 Brief Regional management - May 2022
Complete draft report - May 30, 2022
Brief NRR management on draft report - June 2022 Brief Regional management on draft report - June 2022
Brief Regions on draft report in KM session - June 2022
Finalize report and capture decisions in memo - June/July 2022 Present final report at ROP public mtg - July 2022
Disband working group - September 2022