ML20199G695
| ML20199G695 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, 07007001 |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1998 |
| From: | Mcgaffigan E NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199G650 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-98-275-C, NUDOCS 9901220376 | |
| Download: ML20199G695 (12) | |
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NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY NOTATION VOTE AVAILABLE AFTER THE REPORT l IS SENT TO CONGRESS l
RESPONSE SHEET TO: John C. Hoyle, Secretary FROM: COMMISSIONER MCGAFFIGAN
SUBJECT:
SECY-98-275 - REPORT TC CONGRESS ON THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS LOCATED NEAR PADUCAH, KENTUCKY, AND PORTSMOUTH, OHIO Approved I Disapproved Abstain Not Participating COMMENTS:
See attached edits and comments.
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Entered on "AS" Yes 6 No NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE AFTER THE REPORT IS SENT TO CONGRESS
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. Insert on Paae 24 of SECY-98-275 Current law (section 193(b) of the Atomic Energy Act) requires the Comnission to conduct "a single adjudicatory hearing on the record with regard to the licensing of the construction and operation of a uranium enrichment facility" such as the proposed AVLIS facility. The Commission in a j September 4. 1998 staff requirements memorandum stated that "the NRC should
- consider seeking legislation that would modify section 193's inflexible l approach to hearings." The Commission directed the staff "to review and l advise the Commission on legislative and rulemaking options that would further enhance the Commission's ability to utilize informal procedures in any proceeding in which formalized trial type procedures are currently used,"
l That staff report is due on December 31, 1998. The Commission will report to l Congress on its decision whether to seek an amendment to section 193 as part of its FY 2000 legislative program.
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This report is being provided to Congress as required by Section 1701 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). This is the second such report to be issued. It covers the period from October 1,1997, to September 30,1998. Information reported herein is as of September 30,1998, unless otherwise specified As directed by the AEA, the U. S. Department of X l Energy (DOE) and the U. S. Environ ental Protection Agency have been consulted i regarding this report. DOE continue to be responsible for regulatory oversight of portions of both plants. . m 4rd reg 4 e m. , N. p, .d b p 3, icM h Sgu 3$ im i
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A major regulatory activity for this period was the privatization of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC). The Commission gave its consent for transfer of the Certificates of Compliance to the privatized entity to occur after concluding that the resulting l private corporation would meet all applicable U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) I regulatory requirementyMthose derived from the National Industrial Security X Program regarding restricting foreign involvement in entities that require access to classified information and the USEC Privatization Act regarding foreign ownership, control, and domination; common defense and security; and the maintenance of a reliable and economical source of dg'nestic enrichment services.
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During this period, thePaducah and Pgrtsmouth gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) have provided adequate rotection o(heattiy safety, safeguards, security, and 4L. X environme and have g4nerally operated in compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. Offsite radiological do nos, as well as doses to the workers, are very low, and well within regulatory limits. There hiwe been no events, at either site, requiring activation of the emergency response centers orinvolving a significant release of radioactive material.
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Conditions at the GDPs at Paducah and Portsmouth are generally in compliance with NRC regulations. ExcepCons are described in Compliance Plans, provided for by the AEA and approved by NRC, which document binding commitments for actions and schedules to achieve full compliance. Progress has been made in completing issues in the Compliance Plans during this period, thereby bringing the plants closer to full compliance with NRC regulations than they were at the time of initial certification in November 1996.
However, USEC is assessing the adequacy of completion of certain Portsmouth Compliance Plan issues and may need to readdress some issues previously considered complete, in addition, USEC has indicated that seismic modifications required by the Paduceh Compliance Plan cannot be completed by the current due date of June 30,1999.
For those instances where, during the normal course of operation, violations of NRC i
regulations occurred, USEC generally took actions to reestablish compliance and developed plans to prevent recurrence.
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CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND ENERGY POLICY ACT in October 1992, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992, which amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), to create the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)'. Provisions of the AEA direct the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to lease the gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) near Piketon, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky, to USEC. These GDPs produce enriched uranium (EU), and the AEA specifies that USEC operate the GDPs efficiently and market EU on a profitable basis. Although the AEA established USEC as a government corporation, the AEA also required that within 2 years after the trgnsition date of July 1,1993, USEC prepare a plan for transferring ownership of USEC to private investors. In the Lease Agreement Between The United States Depanment of Energy and The United States Enrichment Corporation (Lease) dated July 1,1993, and in other subsequent agreements, DOE and USEC established the roles and responsibilities for each organization at both GDPs. The AEA also requireT[. S. Nuclear Regulatory y.
Commission (NRC), in consultation with DOE and the Environmental Protection Agency l
(EPA), to report to Congress on the status of health, safety, and environmental (HS&E) conditions at the gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment facilities. This report is the second report. It encompasses the period from October 1,1997, through September 30,1998.
! 4 The AEA assigns safety, safeguards, and security regulatory responsibility at the _
USEC-operated GDPs to NRC. Further, the AEA required that within 2 years of the date of I the passage of the EPAct NRC establish, by regulation, both: (1) safety, safeguards and security standards for the GDPs; and (2) a certification process to ensure that USEC complies with these standards. This certification process is in lieu of any requirement for a license.
Thus, the AEA made NRC regulation of the GDPs conditional on the issuan:e of new-regulations, which were to be promulgated by October 1994. In accordance with these requirements, NRC promulgated Title 10 of the U.S. Code ofFederalRegulations, Part 76 I (10 CFR Part 76), " Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants," in September 1994.
l The EPAct changes to the AEA made provision for the possibility that USEC might l . not initially be able to comply with the safety, safeguards, and security standards established j by NRC. To address this contingency, the AEA permined NRC to approve continued USEC l operation of the GDPs if NRC approved DOE-prepared plans for bringing the GDPs into compliance with any unsatisfied provisions of NRC regulations. On November 26,1996, NRC issued Certificates of Compliance certifying USEC's operation of the GDPs in accordance with 10 CFR Part 76 and approved a Compliance Plan for each GDP for l
l l 8 A listing of abbreviations and acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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achieving compliance with NRC regulations for those areas not in full compliance. After an interim period allowing for USEC to transition to NRC regulation in an orderly manner, NRC began regulatory oversight of USEC operations on March 3,1997. NRC has continued regulatory oversight of USEC operation of the GDPs for the entire period covered by this report.
l NRC/ DOE INTERFACE AND RESPONSIBILITIES l
The AEA does not require that DOE lease the entire GDP sites to USEC. For example, those areas containing legacy material from operations under DOE and which are not required to support current enrichment activities and those areas containing significant
! quantities of accessible highly enriched uranium [(HEU) 1.e., uranium that is enriched to 20 l percent or more in uranium-235 (US)) are excluded from the I. case. Consequently, DOE l
retains responsibility for the environmental protection, safety, safeguards, and security for those portions of the GDPs that are not leased to USEC and for those portions of the GDPs leased to USEC that contain HEU material. At Portsmouth, DOE will regulate the HEU
- material activities that occur in the leased areas until
- all of the HEU material has been
! down-blended into the low enriched uranium cascade, all cylinders that contain residual HEU l
material are cleaned, all remaining HEU in those areas is transferred elsewhere, and .he associated areas are transitioned to NRC regulation. These activities are currently projected to be completed in early 2000. At that time, all that will remain under DOE regulatory oversight will be areas within the GDP sites not leased to USEC or its successor organization.
The AEA further assigns responsibility to DOE for the payment of any costs of
- decontamination and decommissioning, response actions, or corrective actions that are related to conditions existing before USEC leased the GDPs. With this assignment, DOE retains responsibility for environmental restoration activities and legacy 2waste management at the i
GDP sites and for the operation of facilities used for the storage of DOE-owned source and
, special nuclear material, such as the cylinder storage yards for depleted uranium hexafluoride l (DUF.) generated before July 1993. In addition, DOE has been assigned responsibility for all DUF. generated up to the date of USEC's privatization (July 28,1998).
In D~~M 1993, NRC and DOE approved a " Joint Statement of Understanding Between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy on Implementing l the Energy Policy Act Provisions on the Regulation of Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Plants." This joint statement established the areas of responsibility between NRC and DOE. In August 1994, NRC and DOE approved an " Agreement Establishing Guidance
, for NRC laWon Activities at the Paducah and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants l Between Dep uoeut of Energy Regulatory Oversight Manager and Nuclear Regulatory l
2 The term " legacy" refers to items that are a carryover from the era when DOE managed the facility (e.g., legacy waste and legacy equipment).
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however, some of the HS&E improvements were initiated by USEC and are neither required p by NRC nor included in the Compliance Plans. Improvements include the following:
- VA Nuclear Safety
l Completed the refeed of HEU material at Portsmouth (under DOE regulatory ,
oversight);
Continued to upgrade the criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) at both plants; Initiated seismic upgrades and conducted analysis to determme if seismic-related deficiencies exist; and Contimwl to upgrade the SARs.
Industrial Safety: i Improved the control of freon, including identification and repair of leaks;
- - Completed combustible loading analysis for process buildings;
- Certified Emergency Medical Technicians to use defibrillators in the event of medical emergencies; Conducted asbestos abatement in the steam plant at Paducah to protect the workforce; and Improved the control of hydrogen fluoride to reduce exposure of personnel.
Radiation Protection:
- Deconenminated additional areas; Completed site chidecisik. tion surveys; Completed efforts to reduce personnel doses; and 1
Reduced the generation of mixed waste at both sites through implementation of the Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization program.
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e PRIVATIZATION 4
- A major regulatory activity, for this period, that affects future certification of the GDPs was the privatization of USEC. On April 26,1996, the President signed the U.S.
j Enrichment Corporation Privatization Act, which directed USEC to implement a privatization i plan. USEC developed a privatization plan centaining two alternative methods of privatizing:
(1) a sale through an initial public offermg of common stock or (2) a merger and acquisition.
l The NRC prepared a Standard Review Plan (SRP) in cooperation with the other involved j government agencies to describe NRC's review process and acceptwe criteria to approve the j transfer of the Certificates of Compliance to the privatized entity. In January 1998, USEC was authorized by the U. S. Treasury Dep-mest to begin a dual-path process to privatize
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USEC through either a merger and acquisition or an initial public offering of common stock.
The Commission determined that the private corporation would meet all applicable NRC regulatory requirements, including those derived from the National Industrial Security Program that restricts foreign involvement in entities that require access to classified l information and the USEC Privatization Act regarding foreign ownership, control, and l domination; common defense and security; and the maintenance of a reliable and economical '
i source of domestic enrich =aar services. These conclusions were based on a review of the !
j documentation and on interactions with DOE and other appropriate agencies of the United :
I j States government. The Commission provided its consent to the transfer of the Certificates of l Compliance to a pdvatized corporation on May 28,1998. On June 29,1998, the USEC j
i Board of Directors announced its decision to privatize USEC through an initial public offering l of securities to the public. The Board concluded that the sale of USEC to the public through l an initial public offering best met the statutory criteria, provisions, and requirements l governing the sale. The decision was approved by the U.S. Treasury Depanment. USEC !
j was formally privatized by the U.S. Treasury Department on July 28,1998.
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perform their intended safety fur ction. For all violations identified during inspections, USEC either took corrective action to bring the facility back into compliance with NRC regulations, or in the case of the criticality safety program at Portsmouth developed a comprehensive corrective action plan.
The NRC also issued a Confirmatory Order for the Paducah plant in response to the NRC's fg , identification that in the event of an evaluation basis earthquake, the accumulators could fail resulting in a uranium hexafluoride release that could have greater offsite consequences than previously assumed.
- 9 j During the review period, NRC required USEC to investigate the NRC's concern regarding the f+L potential for a chilled environment to be developing, or in existence, at the Portsmouth and Paducah GDPs. USEC engaged a contractor to la4F*My charah the nuclear safety culture including the environment for addressing employee concerns at the GDPs. The USEC investigation concluded that the majority of responding individuals did not feel harassed or intimidated or that retaliation or retribution would occur if they identified concerns to management. USEC did identify " pockets" ofindividuals who did believe that they would be retaliated against by management for identifying concerns. USEC is developing an action plan to correct the problems which were identified during the investigation.
INSPECTION
SUMMARY
FOR PADUCAH During the period October 1,1997, through September 30,1998, NRC Headquarters and regional personnel, including the resident inspectors, conducted 30 routine inspections and one special inspection, totaling approximately 4300 inspection-hours, of plant operations, plant maintenance, plant suppon, engineering', fire safety, chemical process safery, nuclear criticality safety, MC&A, and security of classified information.
The inspections resulted in one Severity Level III violation, one Confinnatory Order, and 27 Severity level IV violations assessed against USEC. Nineteen non-cited violations were also documented in iaWion reports. The one Severity level III violation, which was of significant regulatory concern, involved a breakdown of the USEC security program for failure to properly implement certain provisions ofits security plan. NRC noted in an inspection report issued in July 1998, that the corrective actions taken by USEC for the Severity level III violation of the security program for control of classified matter were comprehensive. The April 1998, Confumatory Order was issued in response to the NRC's identification that in the event of an evaluation-basis canhquance, the uranium hexafluoride accumulators could fail resulting in greater offsite consequences to membens of the public than previous 21 assumed. NRC issued the Confumatory Order to limit the amounts of uranium hexafluoride in the accumulators to minimal levels until corrective actions to increase the seismic capabilities of the accumulators to withstand the evaluation-basis earthquake were complete. USEC has completed the required modifications. NRC has confirmed the completion of the modifications through direct field observations. In all cases, corrective 18
actions and plans were taken by USEC to reestablish compliance with NRC regulations. A brief summary of the 1.evel IV violations is provided below.
Nine violations involved NCS-related issues. The violations included conducting potentially fissile material activities without a nuclear criticality safety evaluation or approval; failure to include certain operational controls in an approval into the implementing procedure; failure to perform a TSR surveillance for a cascade deposit containing an amount of fissile material greater than safe mass; and violations of certain criticality safety controls. Five violations involved failures to properly implement the Quality Assurance Program requirements. The violations included improperly identifying and implementing design controls and not verifying all aspects of the design for CAAS modifications, lack of effective corrective action for a criticality safety violation, lack of appropriate written instructions for switchyard fire sprinkler testing that affected the CAAS system, and failure to fully implement the quality assurance requirements. Seven violations involved use ofimproper procedures or failure to implement procedures involving various activities and different functional groups at the site, both durmg routine operations and in response to events. Three violations involved Lympi implementation of the requirements in 10 CFR 76.68 for evaluating and approving plant changes or as-found discrepancies between the actual plant and the design basis in the SAR. One violation involved the late submittal of the SAR upgrade.
One violation involved the failure to ensure that the quality assurance requirements associated with the fabrication of UF. cylinders were properly implemented. Finally, a violation was issued for the lack of a fully functional TSR-required design feature for rail stops for a cylinder levelator (lift) to prevent the cylinder scale cart from rolling off the lift.
--7 i NRC closed a Confirmatory Action I.etter issued to USEC on February 28,1997, for g criticality safety deficiencies associated with the Building C-400 spray booth and cylinder 7 cleaning operations. The corrective actions taken by USEC were comprehensive and corrected the deficiencies.
INSPECTION
SUMMARY
FOR PORTSMOUTH
' During the period October 1,1997, through September 30,1998, NRC Headquarters and regional personnel, including the resident inspectors, conducted 25 routine inspections and one special inspection, totaling approximately 5400 inspection-hours, of plant operations, plant rnaintenance, plant support, engineering, fire safety, chemical process safety, nuclear criticality safety, MC&A, and security of classified information.
The inspections resulted in 44 Severity level IV violations assessed against USEC.
Nine non-cited violations were also documented in inspection reports. One Severity 1.evel III violation and one Severity 1.evel III problem warranted civil penalties of $55,000 each. In all cases, USEC took or is taking corrective actions to reestablish compliance. A brief summary of the level III and IV violations is provided below.
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l j' CHAPTER 8 REGULATORY ACTIVITIES RULEMAKING i
Since initial certification of the GDPs, USEC has requested NRC approval of several amendments to its certificates. When processing the amendment requests, as described in 10 CFR 76.45, NRC identified several areas in the process that should be revised and improved i so that they are more effective and efficient. NRC initiated a rulemaking to modify the l process for certificate renewals and amendments, revise the appeal process for amendments, eliminne the significant designation for amendments, simplify the criteria for persons who are eligible to file a petition for review of the amendment action, remove references to the initial '
application W- the initial certificates have been issued, and lengthen the time periods associated with filing a petition for review. The proposed rulemakmg was published in the Federal Engisst for public comment on September 15,1998 (63FR49301). The comment period sad / November 16,1998, tJ0C Wu camlu 4L, bend r,e c',ul h Y MM de.njop'q & bl Me. ,
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE On April 1,1998, a full-scale emergency preparedness exercise was conducted at the Paducah GDP. NRC inspectors observed the drill. The response orgamzations of the State of Kentucky and the County of McCracken participated. The purpose of the exercise was to test the plant's capabilities to implement its Emergency Plan (EP), including the response of the various participants and the effectiveness of the information flow from the Paducah Emergency Operations Center. Overall performance during the exercise demonstrated that the onsite EP was effective, and that the staff wp capable of implementing the EP by correctly classifying scenario emergencies, notifying offsite agencies of the event, activating emergency response personnel and facilities, providing protective action recommendations when warranted, and taking accident mitigation actions.
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AVLIS The USEC Privatization Act granted USEC the exclusive commercial right to deploy and use Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) patents, processes, and technical information owned or controlled by the Federal Government, upon completion of a royalty agreement with DOE. To the extent requested by USEC prior to privatization, and subject to the requirements of the AEA, the President was required to transfer title to all of the property
! owned by the United States or under its control that is useful for the development of AVLIS or alternative technologies for enriching uranium.
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. AVLIS technology involves processing uranium metal alloy feedstock rather than UF.
gas, through the use oflasers and separator systems. Based on engineering studies, it is l.
expected that an AVLIS facility will use only about 5 percent of the power used by the GDPs, require less capital investment than a new centrifuge plant, and use 20 to 30 percent less i uranium to produce comparable amounts of EU. Currently, AVLIS development, demonstration, and design activities are being conducted at 12wrence Livermore National 1 Laboratory in Livennore, California; General Electric Company in Wilmington, North I Carolina; and Cameco Corporation in Port Hope, Ontario, Canada.
In July 1994, USEC's Board of Directors authorized USEC management to begin i taking steps necessary to commercialize the AVLIS technology. In April 1995, USEC entered into an agraement that provided for the transfer of intellectual and physical property pertaining to AVLIS technology from DOE. By letter dated October 6,1998, USEC 4 informed the NRC that it expects to submit a license application to NRC no earlier than l IM= hi 1999 to obtain an NRC license to construct an AVLIS facility. USEC is investigating alternative sites and plans to announce the site location in the spring of 1999.
USEC has submitted some preliminary reports for NRC review, and preliminary meetings are l being conducted on nonsite-specific technical issues. NRC will continue to participate in l ,.
l these meetings and to review reports submitted by USEC. -
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The AVLIS project will present some unique and highly complex issues for NRC
.r review. Since this is the first facility to employ laser technology, NRC currently has no documents to guide its review of such a facility, other than a general 10 CFR Part 70 SRP. l To remedy this situation, the staff has an SRP for AVLIS in development, based on the proposed Part 70 SRP, to assist the staff in its AVLIS review. The AVLIS technology will present some unique issues in the areas of: nuclear criticality safety (novel forms of EU consisting of vapor and metal), criticality computer code validation, accident analysis, matenal control and accounting, fire, explosions, and other issues. NRC currently has a l project manager working nearly full-time on the AVLIS activities and other technical staff working part-time on AVLIS reviewing pre licensing application submittals. Thus far, NRC activities concerning AVLIS have consisted of reviewing the AVLIS Quality Assurance Plan, the AVLIS Nuclear Criticality Safety Validation Report, and the Classified Matter Protection
, Plan, as well as conducting preliminary Wags with USEC on these and other topics and to lay the groundwork for USEC's AVLIS license application. NRC resources provided for one full-time equivalent in fiscal year (FY) 1998 to initiate preparation of the staff's guidance and to initiate review of the AVLIS preliminary submittals from USEC. Budgeted resources increase in FY 1999 as NRC recruits and trains staff in preparation of receipt and review of the AVLIS application.
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The Honorable Frank Murkowski, Chairman .
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources United States Senate I, Ms Neg, me<'^5 N
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Dear Mr. Chairman:
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The Energy Policy Act of 1992 modified the ic Ene Act to require the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to prepare rt to ngress discussing the status of health, safety, and environmental eer#
at the gaseous diffusion plants located near Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio required by the Act, this report i has been coordinated with the U. S. Department of Energy and the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Enclosed is the second NRC Report to Conareas. coverino tha naried from October 1,1997, tol Raatamber 20 1oon lin additen, the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is _
pursuing development and licensing of Atomic Vapor Isotope Separation (AVLIS) technology as !
an altamate method to enrich uranium. NRC has had some preliminary meetings with USEC to lay the groundwork for USEC's AVLIS licensing application'. A discussion of AVLIS is included in the Report since the availability of AVLIS technology has the potential to impact gaseous diffusion plant operations.
Sincerely, Shirley Ann Jackson
Enclosure:
Report to Congress on the Gaseous Diffusion Plants located in Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio cc: Senator Dale Bumpers