ML20080J242

Application to Amend Licenses DPR-53 & DPR-69,changing Tech Specs to Recognize Control Element Assembly full-out or full-in Reed Switch Position Indicator as Acceptable Means of Position indication.Marked-up Tech Specs Encl

ML20080J242
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	09/20/1983
From:	Lundvall A BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	John Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8309260263
Download: ML20080J242 (22)

Text

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BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER . P. O. BOX 1475. BALTIMOR E, MARYLAN D 21203 Antwun c. Luuovatt, Jn.

• VeCE PRESIDENT

$UPPLY Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 ATTENTION: Mr. 3. R. Miller, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2, Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Request for Amendment R EFERENCE: (a) Letter f rom A. E. Lundvall, Jr., to R. W. Reid, NRC, dated May 1,1978.

(b) Letter f rom A. E. Lundvall, Jr., to R. A. Clark, NRC, dated December 12,1980.

(c) Letter from R. A. Clark to A. E. Lundvall, J r., dated August 1,1983.

Gentlemen:

The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company hereby requests an Amendment to its Operating License Nos. DPR-53 & DPR-69 for Calvert Cliffs Unit Nos. 1& 2, respectively, with the submittal of the enclosed proposed changes to the Technical Specifications.

CHANGE NO.1 (FCR 83-85)

Remove existing pages 3/4 1-21 and 3/4 1-22 of the Unit Nos. I and 2 Technical Specifications and replace with attached, marked-up pages 3/4 1-21 and 3/4 1-22, Attachment I to this transmittal. In addition, remove existing pages B3/4 1-4 of the Technical Specification Bases for Unit Nos. I and 2, and replace with attached marked-up pages B3/41-4, Attachment I to this transmittal.

DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS The proposed change to the Technical Specification 3.1.3.3 recognizes the CEA " Full Out" or " Full In" reed switch position indicator as an acceptable means of position indication, so long as the CEA is positioned at the fully withdrawn or fully inserted point, as verified by the applicable position indicator.

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- Mr. 3. R. Miller F . September 20,1983 g Page 2 10 CFR 50 General Design Criterion 25 through 27 require redundant reactivity control systems to operate during accidents and transients. One of these reactivity control systems centers around Control Element Assemblies (CEA). Technical Specifications

3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, and 3.1.3.6 ensure the insertion limits and shutdown margin requirements are met. Technical Specification 3.1.3.3 requires the position indication system of the CEA's be available to ensure reliable means of CEA position determination to ensure the above requirements are met.

The current Technical Specification allows " credit" for the " Full Out" or " Full In" reed switch position indicator, for up to one CEA per group, allowing continued power operation provided that positions of the associated CEA's are periodically verified via the

" Full-Out" or " Full-In" reed ~ switches. The proposed change would allow unrestricted operation with two of the available three position indicators OPERABLE for any CEA.

This change provides essentially the same flexibility, as the current Technical Specification, since Action Statement 3.1.3.3.c already allows continued operation with

up to .one CEA per group having only the " Full Out" or " Full In" reed switch position

t indicator and one other indicator. (i.e., voltage divider reed switch or pulse counter)

- OPER ABLE. - By expanding this allowance to any Shutdown or Regulating CEA, no

additional safety questions have been created which were not previously addressed, since

actuating the " Full Out" or " Full In" position indicators provide accurate position indication for the associated CEA's. The actual position at which each CEA position

indicator " Full Out" or " Full In" reed switch actuates is delineated in Updated FSAR Section 7.5.3.4 and Figure 7-12. FSAR Figure 7-12 shows the Upper Electrical Limit

' actuates at approximately 136", and the Lower Electrical Limit actuates at approximately 1"..

The proposed surveillance requirements require verification of actual CEA position once i per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, utilizing the required CEA position indication channels, and once every four hours when the Deviation circuit is inoperable. These surveillance requirements should adequately. insure the required CEA position indicators remain OPERABLE. The i requirements of CEA insertion limits as specified in Technical Specification 3.1.3.6 L would still assure that the insertion limits are met,'and Technical Specification 3.1.3.5 would ensure the Shutdown Margin requirements are met.

I Updated.FSAR Section 14.2, Control Element Assembly Withdrawal Event, assumes the operability of the CMI(CEA Motion innibit) function. The CMI function is required to be

' OPERABLE 'by . Tecnnical Specification 3.1.3.1., so the operability and ACTION requirements for this function are already addressed by that Technical Specification.

The ACTION requirements have been revised to address the " Full Out" or " Full In" reed L ' switch position indicator as an allowable indicator for continued operation. The current L ACTION requirements allow continued operation for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with more than one CEA pulse counting channel inoperable, and the proposed ACTION requirement simply allows either the voltage divider or the " Full Out" or " Full in" reed switch position indicator to service as ' position indication, with the same time interval allowed for continued operation.

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- Mr. J. R. Miller j September 20,1983 Page 3 L

This proposed change does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated on the FSAR, since the change still ensures that CEA position indication is available to ensure the assumptions of the Updated FSAR are maintained, as described above. No new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluted in the FSAR is created, because the change only provides full acknowledgement of the operability of an independent meeas of CEA position indication, as described above. No reduction in the margin of safety as decribed in the bases for Technical Specification 3/4.1.3 would result from the proposed change. This is because

. the Technical Specification Bases already describe the " Full Out" or " Full In" limits as providing an additional independent means for determining the CEA positions when the CEAs are at either their fully inserted or fully withdrawn positions. Adding the words

" OPERABILITY and" to the ' ACTION statements applicable to inoperable CEA position indicators" represents an administrative clarification to make the Bases consistent with the proposed change.

~ Based upon the above determinations, and the guidance provided in page 14870 of Federal Register Notice dated April 6,'1983, Examples of Amendments that Are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations, subsection (i), this proposed change has been determined to not involve a significant hazard.

' CHANGE NO. 2 (BG&E FCR 83-86)

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Remove pages 3/4 '6-10 and 3/4 6-12 of the Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications and replace with marked-up pages 3/4 6-10 and 3/4 6-12, Attachment (2) of this transmittal.

DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS The containment air recirculation and cooling units are desuibed in Section 6.5 of the l - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Paragraph 6.5.1 of the Updated FSAR, Design Basis, states in part:

7 "The function of the containment air recirculation and cooling system is i to remove heat from the containment atmosphere during normal plant operation. In the event of occurrence of a LOCI, the system functions 'o limit the containment pressure rise to a level below the design value..."

i and "The containment air recirculation and cooling system is independent '

of the safety injection and containment spray systems. It is sized such -

that, following a' LOCI, three of the four containment air coolers will limit the containment pressure to less than the containment design

! pressure even if the containment spray system does not operate".

!~ The containment spray system is described in Section 6.4 of the Updated FSAR.

Paragraph 6.4.1 of the Update FSAR, Design Basis, states in part:

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Mr. 3. R. Miller September 20,1983 Page 4 "The function of the containment spray system is to limit the containment atmosphere pressure and temperature following a LOCl and thus reduce the possibility of leakage of airborne radioactivity to the outside environment".

Paragraph 6.4.2 of the Updated FSAR states in part:

! "The capacity of the two containment spray pumps is such that they can i limit the containment pressure to less than its design value following a LOCI without giving credit to the containment coolers".

. Both redundant systems are designed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 General Design Criterion 38, Containment Heat Removal. This General Design Criterion (GDC) requires that "The system safety function shall be to reduce rapidly, consistent with the

- functioning of other associated systems, the containment pressure and temperature following any loss-of-coolant accident and maintain them at acceptably low levels". The GDC also requires that anticipated single failures be assumed.

i The current Technical Specifications do not address the redundancy of the containment air recirculation and cooling units and the containment spray systems. With the proposed ACTION requirements, the minimum equipment required to limit the containment pressure and temperature rise following a LOCl will always be available. The containment air recirculation and cooling units are each 331/3% of the required cooling capacity. This is because three units meet the 100% cooling requirement. The

[ containment spray trains are each 50% of the required cooling capacity. This is because L two units meet the 100% cooling requirement. Therefore, the following combinations would meet or exceed the required cooling capacity:

a) . I containment spray train plus two containment coolers (116.7 %)

b) - 2 containment spray trains only (100%)

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c) 3 containment cooling units only (100%)

L-L The above is consistent with Section 6.4.3 of the Updated FSAR, page 6-29.

By rewording the ACTION statements to be consistent with the CE-STS provided in NUREG-0212, the redundancy _of the containment spray trains and containment air recirc'ilation and cooling units can be addressed in the Technical Specifications. The OPERABILITY and ACTION requirements from the C-E STS have been modified slightly l to establish the requirement for operability of the containment coolers during Modes 1, l 2, and 3, which is consistent with the current Technical Specification applicability and the accident analysis assumptions in Chapter 14 of the Updated FSAR.

[ The containment spray system is required by Chapter 14.24 of the Updated FSAR for

' iodine removal from the containment atmosphere, so the OPERABILITY and ACTION requirements for the containment spray system cannot be changed to substitute the containment coolers for an inoperable containment spray train.

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Mr. 3. R. Miller

. . September 20,1983 Page 5 1

The proposed change does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the Updated FSAR. This is because the minimum OPERABILITY requirements still allow for single failure of either containment spray or containment air

recirculation and cooling systems, as described in Chapter 6, Tables 6-7 and 6-9 of the

. Updated FSAR.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated in the Updated FSAR. This is because the requirements of General Design Criterion 38 are still being satisfied with the new

. ACTION requirements. In addition, no additional components are being added or deleted by this change.

The proposed change does not reduce the margin of safety as described in the ba'ses for Technical Specification 3/4 6.2.2. Section 3/4 6.2.2 of the Technical Specification bases states the following:

[ "The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the contain_ ment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-

, LOCA conditions".

In the. new proposed ACTION requirements, the containment spray system will be i- credited to meet the minimum containment cooling requirements following a LOCI, in conjunction with the containment air recirculation and cooling units, as described above.

t Based upon the above determinations, we have concluded that the proposed change

represents an example of an amendment - that is considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations under Section (i), as described in Page 14870 of Federal Register Notice dated April 6,1983.

l ' CHANGE NO. 3 (BG&E FCR 83-13)

Add snubber 2-15-10 to Table 3.7-4 as shown on attached marked-up page 3/4 7-31 of

Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Attachment 3 to this transmittal.

t DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS This request constitutes part of the corrective action delineated in Licensee Event Report 50-318/83-09.

Snubber 2-15-10 is installed on Class 11 safety-related piping in the Component Cooling System and meets the criteria for inclusion in the Technical Specifications. The snubber has been ' visually inspected and verified to be fully operational through functional l testing, thus, it has been fully upgraded to safety-related standards. Due to an oversight, this snubber had been unintentionally omitted from the safety-related snubber program for Unit 2. This snubber represents a component in the Component Cooling System,

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Mr. 3. R. Miller September 20,1983 Page 6 which is described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.5. The addition of the snuboer to the safety-related surveillance program represents an improvement to our existing surveillance program.

Accordingly, inclusion of the snubber 2-15-10 into the Unit 2 Technical Specifications will provide substantial assurance the snubber will be able to perform its design function in supporting dynamic loads on the Class 11 safety-related piping system.

The Component Cooling Water System is described in Table 9-17A of the Updated FSAR as providing cooling water for safety injection pumps and containment spray water (via the shutdown cooling heat exchanger). No previously analyzed accident is affected by this proposed change, since the Updated FSAR considers a total loss of the component cooling system due to passive failure.

l l No new accidents not previously analyzed in the Updated FSAR are created, since the

! proposed change is administrative in nature. The margin of safety as defined in the bases i for Technical Specification 3.7.8 is not reduced since the snubber has been verified to be i operable by both visual inspection and functional testing, and has been included in the l surveillance program for snubbers in safety-related systems.

Based upon the above considerations, the requested change is administrative in nature and does not involve a significant hazard.

i CHANGE NO. 4 (BG&E FCR 83-1036)

Remove existing pages . 3/4 7-28, 3/4 7-53, and 3/4 7-59 of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications and replace with the attached marked-up pages, Attachment 4 to this j transmittal.

DETERMINATON OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS Recent concerns within BG&E and NRC have precipitated a review of the original l

construction list by the Architectural Engineer to establish a controlled document that lists all safety-related and seismic hydraulic snubbers in the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. During this review, an error was discovered in the main steam hydraulic s

! snubber listing for Unit 1. Apparently this error was initiated by a BG&E Request for Amendment Letter dated June 17, 1982. License Amendments 77 and 58 added some i main steam line seismic hydraulic snubbers to the Table 3.7-4 in the Technical Specifications. Two snubbers added in that letter were incorrectly designated as snubber 1-83-17 and 1-83-24. These snubbers should actually have been designated as snubber l 1-83-13 and 1-83-18. During the period when the Technical Specifications listed the wrong snubber designations, the correct snubbers had been survelled. Therefore, these snubbers remained operable throughout the period.

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c Mr. 3. R. Miller

- September 20,1983 Page 7 A system - walkdown performed by BG&E and the NRC Senior Resident inspector

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identified some administrative corrections for Table 3.7-4. These changes address

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changing the "snuober location" column for one snubber (1-11-13) and the "especially

difficult to remove" column for two snubbers (1-11-13 and 1-11-11A). These changes only provide administrative clarification of the snubber table, and likewise do not affect the snubber operability or surveillance requirements. No accidents previously analyzed in the Updated FSAR are affected by either of these changes, since they only provide administrative clarification. No new accidents not previously analyzed would be created,

- since no new systems or components are being added by these changes. The margin of safety as defined in the bases for Technical Specification 3.7.8 are not affected, since the changes do not affect the operability or surveillance requirements for the snubbers.

~ Based upon the above considerations, the requested changes are administrative in nature and do not constitute a significant hazard.

- CHANGE NO. 5 (BG&E FCR 83-1066)

Remove. existing page 3/4 7-46 of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications and insert the attached,' marked-up page 3/4 7-46, Attachment (5) to this transmittal.

DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS The proposed change deletes snubber 1-60-7 from the list of snubbers in Table 3.7-4 of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications. Under an earlier modification, the Architectural Engineer performed revised stress calculations on safety-related systems to upgrade supports and hangers in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-14. As a result of these revised j

calculations, it was determined that this snubber was no longer required, due to low movement of the service water line under po.tulated loading conditions, including -

normal, transient, and analyzed accident conditions.

This snubber is located on the service water return line from #13 Containment Air Recirculation and Cooling Unit, in Unit 1 Containment on the 64 foot elevation. The service Lwater spstem is described in the Updated FSAR in Table 9-17A as providing cooling for the' Containment Coolers and Diesel Generators. No previously enalyzed accident is affected by this proposed change, since the Updated FSAP considers loss of a service water subsystem in the passive failure analysis. Since the stress calculations l have shown the snubber is no ; longer required, additional assurance is provided that no

!: new accidents not previously analyzed in the Updated FSAR are created.

The margin of safety in the bases for Technicc! Specification 3.7.8 is not reduced since this snubber is no longer required, and the remaining snubbers in the Table 3.7-4 are not affected, and no changes are being proposed to the OPER ABILITY and SURVEILLANCE requirements for the remaining snubbers in the Table.

~ Bas'ed upon the above considerations, the requested change is administrative in mture and does not involve a significant hazard.

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Mr. 3; R. Miller September 20,1983 Page 8 CHANGE NO. 6 (8G&E FCR 83-1039)

Remove existing pages 3/4 3-22 and 3/4 3-24 of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications and replace with attached, marked-up pages 3/4 3-22 and 3/4 3-24, Attachment (6) of this I transmittal. j l

DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDER ATIONS Reference (c) requires installation of a main feedwater train trip to satisfy the 1 requirements of IE Bulletin 80-04, by November 17, 1983, for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and i

2. This trip will be actuated by a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS), I Subchannels A-3 and B-3, and/or Steam Generator Isolation Signal (SGIS), subchannels A-1 and B-1, and will trip the following components: main feedwater pumps, condensate booster pumps, and heater drain pumps for the affected unit (s). In addition the actuation signals will close the Main Steam Isolation Yalves (MSIV's) and Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIV's) for the affected Unit (s). The only other components currently actuated by the CSAS Subchannel, supply and return service water valves for the spent fuel pool coolers, will no longer be actuated from CSAS Subchannels A-3 and B-3. These valves will be actuated by another CSAS Subchannel. The surveillance requirements for these valves will be controlled under the requirements of the other CSAS Subchannel. We understand based on' phone conversations between our staff and Mr. Jaffe that we will receive written confirmation allowing us to delay installation of the Unit 2 IE Bulletin

~ 80-04 fix until the Unit 2 refueling outage beginning in Spring of 1984.

This proposed change would exempt CSAS logic Subchannels A-3 and B-3 from testing ouring operation but would require testing at least once par 18 months during shutdown.

i. This change is necessary because testing of CSAS logic Subchannels A-3 and B-3 wnile at power will trip the associated unit due to loss of main feedwater and main steam isolation -valve closure. Recent phone conversations between BG&E personnel and the NRC Project Manager have determined that Technical Specification coverage of the Main Feedwater and MSIV trip on high containment pressure is not required. Adding these surveillance requirements imposes an additional limitation, restriction and control not presently included in the Technical Specifications. According to NRC Generic Letter i

83-19, this proposed change is an example of an amendment which is not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration, as described under section (ii), page 14870 of the Federal Register Notice dated April 6,1983.

l- This proposed change will not result in any significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident analyzed in the Updated FSAR. No new previously l

unanalyzed accident will be created by the proposed change, since the addition of the additional trip function to ESFAS will result in an improvement to safety. The proposed change to the Technical Specifications will not result in any reduction in the margin of l

safety as described in the bases for Technical Specifications Bases 3/4 3.3. Based upon

'the above considerations this change has been determined to involve no significant l- hazards per 10 CFR 50.92.

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f Mr. J. R. Miller September 20,1983 Page 9 FEE DETERMINATION We request that you consider Change No. 6 request above as a supplement to the Unit I re-load application dated August 22,1933.

We have determined, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 170, paragraph 170.22, that this Amendment request consists of a Class I and Class IV amendment for Calvert Cliffs Unit Nos.1 & 2, and accordingly, we are including Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Check No. B297516 in the amount of $12,700.00 to cover the fee for this request.

Very truly yours, 7 [

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AEL/LES/sjb STATE OF MARYLAND :

TO WIT:

CITY OF BALTIMORE :

Authur E. Lundvall, 3r., being duty sworn states that he is Vice President of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, a corporation of the State of Maryland; that he provides the foregoing response for the purposes therein set forth; that the statements made are true and correct to the best of his knowledge,information, and belief; and that he was authorized to provide the response on behalf of said Corporation. -

WITNESS my Hand and Notarial Seal: / Notary ch[Ptiblic x.s M My Commission Expires ht // /7[dh

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cc: J. A. Biddison, Esquire G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire D. H. Jaffe, NRC R. E. Architzel, NRC R. E. Corcoran, Chief (DHMH)

ALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY moce wet 93645-01 ~ ~~ ' B297516 c-tc w

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. m.2 w _ ,4,c .m.r e, or 9 , , o,c t om oi,coum iir~iLouhr 3U9081 09 12 83 $12,700.00 Class 4 and 1 Tech. Spec. change: Units 1 & 2 FCR 83-85 3.1.3.3. CEA Pos. Ind., FCR 83-86 3.6.2.2. cont. Coolers, FCR 83-1039 Table 4.3-2 Eng. Safety Sys. Surveil. Req. Unit 2 FCR 83-13 Table 3.7-4 Snubbers Unit 1 FCR 03-1036 and FCR 83-1066 '

T:blo 3.7-4 Snubbers. I i .

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I DETACH THIS PORTION 09 13 83 TOTALS > , $12,700.00 se,One Depos Tino cHecs v

's i?M5 BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY str 13 8'3 BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 -

woust [Gic ELits PAY EXACTLY **12,700.00**

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US NUCLEAR REGULATORY **

TO THE ColeGSSION**

ORDER Washington, DC 20555 OF EMAMINED MARYLAND NATIONAL BANK

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. '. ATTAClutENT I i; REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEr5 BASES Overpower margin is provided to protect the core in the event of a large misalignment (> 15 inches) of a CEA. However, this misalignment would cause distortion of the core power distribution. The reactor protective system would not detect the degradation-in radial peaking factors and since varia-tions in other system parameters (e.g., pressure and coolant temperature) may

'not be sufficient to cause trips, it is probable that the reactor could be operating with-process variables less conservative than those assumed .in --

generating LC0 and LSSS setpoints. Therefore, the ACTION statement associated with the large misalignment of a CEA requires a prompt and significt.nt recuc-tion in THERMAL P0'JER prior to attempting realignment of the misaligned CEA.

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! The ACTION statements applicable to misaligned or inoperable CEAs include l requirements to align the OPERABLE CEAs in a given group with ti.e ino::erable Conformance with these alignment requirements bring the core, within a i CEA.

e' short period of time, to a configuration consistent with that assumed in ll generating LCO and LSSS setpoints. However, extended operation with CEAs

- is significantly inserted in the core may lead to perturbations in 1) Iccal burnup, 2) peaking factors, and 3) available shutdown margin whicn are more ll adverse i than the conditions assumed to exist in the safety analyses and LCO

. and.LSSS setpoints determination Therefore, time limits have been im;:osed

! on operation with inoperable CEAs to preclude such adverse conditions from developing. g Operability of the CEA position indicators is required to determine CEA positions and thereby ensure compliance with the CEA alignment and insertion limits and ensures proper operation of the rod block circuit. The CEA " Full In" and " Full Out" limits provide an additional independent means for dete mining the CEA positions when the CEAs are.at either their fully inserted or ,

i fully withdrawn positions. Therefore, thefACTICU stataments applicable ;o l l inoperable CEA position indicators permit continued operations when the positions of CEAs with inoperable position indicators can be verified by the

" Full In" or " Full Cut" limits.

CEA positions and OPERABILITY of the CEA position indicators are reqaired to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable.

These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicabic LCOs are satisfied.

The surveillance requirements affecting CEAs with inoperable position ,

indicat.fon channels allow 10 minutes for test'ing each affected CEA.

limit was selected so that 1) the time would be long enough for the requiredTh testing, and 2) if all position indication were lost during testing, the ti e >

uould be short enough to allow a power reduction to 70", of maximum allo.;able thermal power within one hour from when the testing was initiated. The time <

limit ensures CEA misalignments cccurring during CEA testing are corrected  ;,

within-the time requirements required by existing specifications. - '

<n CALVERT CL:FFS - UNIT 1 C 3/4 1-4 Amendment ';c . //,

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REACTIVITI COffrROL SYSTEMS . .

POSITION INDICATOR CHANTELS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPEFATION 3.1 3 3 At least two of the following three CEA position indicator channels shall te OPERABLE for each shutdown and regulating CEA:

a. CEA voltage divider reed switch position indicator channel, capable of detemining the absolute CEA position within 1.751nches;  !

b. CEA " Full Out" or " Full In" reed switch position indicator channel, i only if the CEA is fully withdrawn or fully ir.serted, as verified by actQation'of the applicable position indicator; and

c. CEA pulse counting position indicator channel.

APPLICABILITY: 10 DES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With a maximum of one CEA per group having its voltage divider reed switch position indicator charnel or its pulse counting position indicator channel inoperable and the CEA(s) with the inoperable position indicator channel partially inserted, either:

1. Within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> a) Restore the inoperable position indicator channel to OPERABLE status, or b) Be in at least HOT STANDBY, or c) Reduce THERMAL POWER to < 70", of the maximum allowable THERMAL POWER level for the existing Reactor Coolant Pump combination; if negative reactivity insertion is required to reduce THERMAL POWER, boration shall be used. Opera-tion at or below this reduced THERMAL POWER level may

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continue provided that within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> either:

l The CEA group (s) with the inoperable position indi-

1) ,

cator is fully withdrawn while maintaining the with-l' drawal sequence required by Specification 3.1.3.6 j and when this CEA group reaches its fully withdrawn position, the " Full Out" limit of the CEA with the inoperable position indicator is actuated and verifies this CEA to be fully withdrawn. Subsequent to fully withdrawing this CEA group (s), the THERMAL POWER level may be returned to a level consistent with all other applicable specificationspee nad.opnah M ccaH* pr l 5puSedtis 3.I,33 aben4 or i 2) The CEA group (s) with the inoperable' position indi-

cator is fully inserted, and subsequently maintained i fully inserted, while maintaining the withdrawal' sequence and THERMAL POWER level required by Specifica-tion 3.1.3.6 and when this CEA group reaches its fully CALVERT_ CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-21 Amendment No. 22, 72, D. j

R. r: bi!

., . REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION inserted position, the " Full In" limit of the CEA with the inoperable indicator is actuated and verifies this CEA to be fully inserted. Subsequent operation shall be within the limits of Specificat'on 3.1.3.6,oad q c at.a t er SpahJica 3.1.3).a b t.

2. or, if the failure existed before entry into MODE 2 or occurs prior to an "all CEAs out" configuration, the CEA group (s) with inoperable position indicator channel must be moved to the

" Full Out" position and verified to be fully withdrawn via a

" Full Out" indicator. These actions must be completed within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> of entry into !!03E 2 and prior to exceeding 70% of the maximum allowable THERMAL POWER level for the existing Reactor Coclant Pumo combination. The provisions of Specification 3.0."

aperreSnot,hede'on pe 3.t 1$ a 6a .a pplicable. Onet 41vu ce/icas are C et,,4td' cyardko

b. With more than one CEA pero,,roep hoq its CEA pulse counting position I indicator channel rwt eakerhhc 11t Of ce

• Fun In" pa.t.64 ,oa m.te c

! or dtke voltge. divider pos;Hm indicator eLaul 'incperah fe, cperut cn m fYloDES }ana ,1, ,nay etniinv4. for vp to 24 hcors, provided -tMt fcc Hw oflected CEAs.eHher:

1. the CEA veltqe d; sider rce.1 twitch, pcsition indimice cbnnels ort OP Ei?40tE, ce

2. 4ht cE A " F.all Owt

• ce' Fall In" ral svetch positico indicator cFaarel 5 ore OPERAetE, win the CEA fulig wMhdro ;n ce fulig insected, as vcedied bg ocluAik.t cf IFr.opplicable posifica indicafor.

.iURVElditNCE RE40iREMENTs . - - . . --

4.1.3.3.1 Each rcquired CE4 palW^ i4Lcalic^ channel shall be dettem;.w( h bc OPEgAstF by cleterm;n.'3 CEA pesit,cos o> follows of 145t 4 once per l A hw..

a. Verifyng ihe CCA pulse counting pas.+,m iM:cafee c6nmis cad the CEA vot%c 4;4dar rud s.,Hefe pcsihcn in h tar d b atts agert. Mio 4.5 lachts, ce b Vershiq ik CCA P

• CSSali% FC5;"ca iadicaldr chanch on* de 0CA %II O"* '

er" fun In" reed sst+<Js po;Ihse indiccJoe chanceb ogree sinia 4.6 iachs, ce C. Veriff*3 the CEA vetroy divide.e reed swilcA pesHion indicAfer eknnch cut Me CE4

}- 'Att Ou t" oc'Fwit In' recJ 5-acA. psNm indicJoe <banels agret wahin 4,6 ;ncha.

4.1.33 2. Duri$ hm $nterv6 when the Denaten circail- is looperoide, tk.abm uihv. .a

; of repred MA Po!** Mcat'e cAancels skll be mit af fent eact Fr 4 ho6. ,.  !

g .

C,ALVERT Cl.IFFS '. . .- UNIT 1 3/4 1-22 _ AmendmentNo.66,73,M,.

f ATTACilME?rr 2 7cg ,

CONTAINMENT SYSTEM _S,

__ CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 Two Independent groups of containment air recirculation and coci-ing units shall be OPERABLE with two units to each group.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3. I

, ACTION:

with one containment air rec.f ecula tion-and-coolin J.-ur>R- inope eMe ,

_.. , restore the- inoperat>1e-air- recirculation-and-cooling-unit-to-00ERABLE-

-stetus-within-72-hours-orbe-in-HOT--SHUTOOWN-withirt-the-next 12- hours.

i AHocha:l )

O SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 Each containment air recirculation and cooling unit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BAS!S by:

1. Starting each unit from the control room.

2. Verifying that each unit operates for at least 15 r.inu*.c:.

3. Verifying a cooling water flow rate of > 2000 gpa to each cooling unit when the full flow service water outlet vaivas are fully open.

b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each unit stu t3 automatically on a Containment Spray Actuation test signai .

O CAtvEn Currs - untT 14-1  :/ ri-1: AwedralAlt I l

f.

(CR ? L'O _ ,

f(J10M:

a.W ;+h cne e <0cc & c'A*& v&0i~d * """d""

• d ""1 voits }noparable c nel both con +ain ment spra+ sys% OPGMBur, rese Oc inoptrad-Q MUp C Qir reciteddon and ceolirs vni ts do OPER.&1.c<

Status within 7 days or be in d least f{oT SMurbovu wnhin 12 hem,

,b.\//O(we greaps:of rquired -dentatomg41 cdr:rceiredAbon Ortcl deo vnlls knopemLk and both containmed spyOPGMBLf syfws s restoreal StASY Cnl gf0Vf of Qir recitcdtthk ond Cec fing units to O PE siniva wethin 72 hws or- be in cat lec.t Hor stivtocwa w; % 12. h u s.

Res%d- hof k ct hove.

nsviced groeps of con 4ainment air recircu.9cdron cml cochg wik to OPcMetc stafvs ath 74 9 or k in cd Icost Hor St4vrDowM wi+Ain 12 keu n,.

c. With cne t3teet of (!WNd tut'ai^& M' N'i vaiFC I*^ R"O **0U"0 ineperabl.a. ancl one. ttutiaind spq sysfeet inoperaM, resic

%. inoqura%. containment sprm4 syck to QPEMMCs!Mvs wdhi 12 hears or be ir Ok lla1+ ({or SoutOcuG w;H,in

%> ort It hcurs,

- k. InoPUa% yrevp d emininnted alc egc;ecufgm( ,,y teoling chih io h ined leas + GPGRA8ui sicda wiWn 7%s of initial Itas ce Nor SHvtDowd wMAih 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

e_.o

}

O O O -e*

TABLE 3.7-4 .

SAFETY RELATED llVDRAULIC SNUBBERS

• h SNUB 6ER SYSTEM SNUB 8ER INSTALLE0 ACCESSIDLE OR lilGli RADIAT10ti ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT y, 't0. - ON, LOCATI0ff AND ELEVATION INACCESSIBtE ZONE ** 10 REMOVE

$ , (A or I) (Yes or fio) (Yes or tio) - .

n- _

.C _2-IS-S' COMP.'C00LitlG Pu!4P #22 DISCll.

4 -18'-6" A fia Yes vi 2-15-6 C0tiP. COOLING PUMPS 015C11. IIEADER E 14 ' - S" A No , Yes U

y 2-15-7 COMP. C00LitlG PUMPS DISCH. IIEADER 14'-S" A flo Yes 2-15-8.

-COMP. C00LitlG TO LIQUID WASTE

• EVAP. 64' A tio tio- 4-M w 2-15-9 . COMP. COOL! fig TO LIQli!0 WASTE @

l EVAP. 64' To U Q uaD Wart A No tio IS 4

7.- I f-l o g. cg4 4 g g 4, 2-36-1 "

STEAM SUPPLY TO E22 AUX. SGFP 12' A fio tio 2-36-IA STEAM SUPPLY TO #22 AUX. SGFP 12' A No No 2-36-2 STEAM SUPPLY TO #21 AUX. SGFP 12' A No fio

'd 3 2-36-2A STEAM SUPPLY TO #21 AUX. SGFP 12' A No tio

'l 3 2-36-3 UtilT 2 AfW PUMP ROOM 18' tio A No if 2-36-4 AfW li4LET T0 #21 STEAM GENERATOR ,

65' I Yes i;o

-p -

U O 2-36-4A AfW INLET TO #21 STEAM GENERATOR ^

D CS' I Yes tio U'

M 2-36-5 Aru IrtLET TO #22 STEAM GEtiERATOR (-

65' I Yes fM i

g TABLE 3.7-4 E SAFETY RELATEt)llVDRAULIC SNUBBERS

• b t* *.lituf R SYSTEM SNUBDER INSTALLED ACCESSIBLE OR lilGli RADIATIO!! ESPECitLLY DIFFICULT r:0. ON, LOCAT10tl AND LLEVATION INACCESSIBLE ZONE ** TO REMOVE LA or 1) (Yes or No) (Yes or tio) ,

4 E i.Il 1. I SEl(VICE WATElt FROM C0!!TAINMENT 2 COOLERS 5' A No Yes 1 11-11A SERVICE WATER PUMP SUCTID'l g fluit 5' A No Vs ,

a 1 12 SLRVICE ilATER FROM C0filAINMENT N COOLERS S' A No Yes g secarrva ecv6- g 1 11-13

$ SERVICE WA1ER FROM EONTAINMENT-C0 tit.ERS 5' A fio yo Me l

Y y 1-11-14 SERVICE WATER FROM CONTAINMENT t.00LERS S' A No No 1-11-16 SE!!VICL WAIER PUMP DISCllARGE I!EADER 5' A Ho No .

I-11-17 SERVICE WA1ER PU!!P DISCllARGE IIEADEtt 5' A No No ,

1 11-13 SERVICE UATER PUMP DISCllARGE p

n, llEADElt 5' A No tio .-

2 .

I-il-18A SEl(VICE ifA1Elt PUMP DISCllARGE -

lit ADI.R 5' A No No

' I - I I - l ') SEltVICE WATEtt PuttP DISCllARGE A No No

[/N-

b IIEADElt 5' C 7

g '

4 3 9 9 i

• T C* / O AA A , a, a *.

h,g >== \j \1 V V/~ -

i h D J l.r(-w t>. . n .2 e v I I w

ww -

1 . - > 0

• OC Z Z

>- w t- *

• e a e w e e a e c d= 0 G G G o y y y o y go y

-J >" >" >* Z >= 3 >= > >= >= > >- >=

y e4 C e

- > = U U >=

w w L

e w

=

3 ~

- o

>- Z

• C

• S . . .o

-* L- 0 0 3 O. O C O O Cw O O 3 O Z Z 4  % Z Z Z Z .7 Z Z *:' Z aC Z

=C e N Q

":" D-C w e

A c:" l

= C wi

. I e

= wJ -* ={ -

.O D,, .O v l *-a

- el e < < < < < < - - - - - -- -

.u .

.. mw

, m b.: *C

• , Ui L.J V w e, ==l V<

.7

( w Z.g

• C . t N <1 wt

=i C

t d

<., c E,l =

O

=

O o

=

C

O

- . C.

. .O w . . . . . = > >- p.- e P.- .

• == N N

N N

N N

N N

N N < aC < < < < <

st 2 N N = = = c = = =

s Co n.- - e.- == >- *- p.-

.a ws - - - N N .- N w w 6J w w w

J >- - - - - - - Z = = z Z r

-.4 =C *= = = = == == w .a w w w w w

>- e: > L A A G A G G

>- e.- w . . . . . .

w m -- C - = = = = = -

6 Zw C. C. . C. C. C. N N  % N N N N aC - A e m m m o N N N N N N N m ,

C

= Z Z Z Z ."" P W 6J bJ 64 LJ w LJ kJ .Z:

=

c o o m

d o T-5 --c = = = = = =

ce ce = cx: - - - - -

C3 Z u. l=.h 6 6 6 6. -J J J J J J .

3O A" - E T E 2* Z Z Z Z Z 3" Z Z m >- <

w w

w w

w

< eC w

=C M"" =c =C < <

et 6J kJ u.J LJ w w w Zu >- >= >- >- >. e-- >= >- p- >- >- c.-

wc m m m m m m +J mJ mJ mJ eJ eJ ma

>= J w J LJ w uJ w -

Z ZZ ZZ ZZ C ZZ e.

> . .Z - .Z

-- .Z- .Z == z -z .Z =Z == z .Z. n -n Z

-. =a m '" # < $ "C $ *** **

• C D <D <2 O M  %  %  % $ *k. >3 -

% >= Z >=  % >- $.

- >C- $.s. *O $_ =

a w - c M , . .

N 8 -f0 sf h a c0 CD

• e 4 i e e e e e e a- e CO O M M M 89 il M M M fM M M DE E

G3 CO a

CD e

G3 e

CD e

CO e

4D e

II3 a

W to e

c3 e

c) 3 a w - - - - - - -

3

~

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/ 7-58 Amendment No. 33e 46e If i'

t. .

c.

. ,M-

. . fh ]^]Y d

e

• D V

N

• La.

O  % ha A I -> C C Z

> L.J 1. vi e a

=d M C G b e p

• U G U O O

< ** D= >= > O O O O O c

.C

.A Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z e

U >-

w w C-e

.J l 2' .

^

O.

o

>= e': .-

<a

-* 8. O O c D e c c c c c c e

=Q

~

0 na Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z =

o g =

o

=

e N U T >=

c . -

Z e

At .Y

= 0W wI a +=.

* 6J = s =

C h

=

m - el c

,m M V,

- - - - -- < < < < < < < < e vi

• 7 ==* 4 u

b; C ,

vi -

e. -Jt U Zt

%; D8 < ==* l m*

-. >- >. Z Z

< < < < ec:" w 4

42")

m to N N N  %

-J C Q.

C:

• =

CC CC C: 2 C fQ N N N e- *-- >==

s=J wa == LaJ w Ls2 ua

>= e:  :>. >= >= b >= >. >= >=

Z Z %J kso .J mJ .J w Z Z J -J

>=

..e**.; < 6J L.J 6.J Z

L.J Z

kJ Z O., 4 A A C C. A J

C.

J

• =

at". > A Ca. C A C >=

C. CL CL C. A C. A CL

>- LJ D D D D D D D D LJ n .J . .= .J M La e A m W w N N

. . . A La e

.Z L.J N N N at N N A U V U i

C N N N D .O. == .U .U U Ai.

M

- == == .U CE' Z L.A kJ LaJ J -J w '

J J J J bJ < Z Z Z L.J LaJ D D D D D D D Z Z Z < < < D C::

=Z

--. - -= == ==. == ct E a:C cc m

< < *tC <

.J .J -J .,J J Z C: C: C::.

DQ L.s O C C Q C C C Z ** ** >== > >= >= >- >= >=

C mw Z Z 2 T @ Z Z Z

>= >-

aC R.J < < af" < Z Z Z *"*

Z ZU

t. L.J h.J w L.J w N N N N 6-. >= >.- p.= p-= A N N kJ G MJ MJ M.3 MJ W.J b=

== - - - - .N - .N-

e. .J %J %J u,n  % 'E4 dutt h e Z L.J W aC 8 811s een ZZ C"' 2" ZZ ZZ >

. = . = ===2 m.

== Z a.= Z *,= Z

> >  :.=. > > > >

mZ aC D e aig D at 3 Q w$' >D =

Z ** E *D - to e e La M M M e E P-= Z P- "We 2*. Z Z A .n. T Z. Z c O g d (O m

.=.J C2

- N r4 q N o

m m

~ m m

m e

m e

m N

me m

t . t e e

m. m m m m m e e e 8

o e DZ a m m m m m m e

m e

Z m. m. e a m m - - . -

e. a. m. a. e a. e. a.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-59

. Amendment No. //

e

/

m

. TABLE 3.7-4 E SAFETY RELATED llYDRAULIC SNUBBERS *

-t h '::UBUEft

., SYSTD1 SNUBBER INSTALLED ACCESSIBLE OR hlIGli RADIATION ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT g NO. ON, LOCATI0ft Afl0 ELEVATION INACCESSI@lE 20tlE** TO REMOVE y (A or I)- (Yes or flo) (Yes or flo)

E -

I-60-1 SERVICE WATER TO C0ftTAINMENT

, 2 COOLER #12 42' I Yes No 1-60-2 SERVICE HATER TO CONTAINMENT C00LLit #12 43' I Yes No I-60-3 SERVICE WATER TO CONTAINMEllT >

C00 Lift #12, 6S' I Yes No 4 1-60-4 SERVICE UATER TO CONTAINMENT b C00LEll #14 66' I Yes No @

[

a l-60-4A SERVICE WATER FROM C0flTAINMENT COOLER #14 66' I Yes No e

h 1-60-S SERVICE UATER FROM CONTAINMENT C00LLit #14, 68' I Yes No .

1-60-SA SERVICE WATER FROM CONTAINMENT -

C00LE.1 #14 68' I Yes No 4 7

1-60-6 SERVICE WATEft FROM CONTAINMENT l',

C00LEft #12, S3' I Yes No "

7 Lf

> l E 0 SER'!!CE UATER FROM CONTAIN"ENT Tr R COOLER 413 64' ,  ! Ycs No Q3 t p m T e , .,

h B2

- ~

d

(

O -

O~

TABLE 4.3-2 e..' -

L I

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTAION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS f}% -

i g CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH

?jg CHANNEL- CHANNEL' FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE n n CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED Cg IONCTIONAL UNIT CHECK b 1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) d a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A.

E c,: b. Containment Pressure - High 5 R M . 1, 2, 3 55 c. Pressurizer Pressure - Low S R N.A.

M . 1, 2, 3

d. Automatic Actuation Logic fl . A. M(1)(3) 1, 2, 3 i]

Y

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) *

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A.

b. Containment Pressure -- -

High S R M 1, 2, 3

c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(1)(lo) I , 2, 3 Ei s.

3 CONTAINMEtiT ISOLATION (CIS) #

9

3. is w a. Manual CIS (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A.

A Containment Pressure - liigh S R M 1, 2, 3 4

" b. e

c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(1)(4) 1, 2, 3

4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (SGIS)

a. Manual SGIS (MSIV Hand f L' Switches and Feed llead Isolation Hand Switches) N.A. N.A. R N.A.

i 2 R M 1, 2, 3 It& b. Steam Generator Pressure - Low S 1, 2. 3

c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(1)(S) l@

??E

) Containment isolation of non-essential penetrations is also initiated by SIAS -(functional units p Uw

• 1.a and 1.c).

Qy

~

r S

c

. - e eM c*,

Fc a. 93 05 ' '

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ABl.E NOTATION (1) The logic circuits shall be tested manually at least once per 31 days.

(3) SIAS logic circuits A-5, B-5, A-10 and B-10 may be exempted from testing during operation; however, these logic circuits shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown.

(4) CIS logic circuits A-5 and B-5 rnay be exempted from testing during operation; however, these logic circuits shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown.

~

(5) SGIS logic circuits A-1 and B-1 may be exempted from testing during operation; however, these logic circuits shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown.

((,) (545 fey <_ circuib A-3 anct 6-3 9 k ("#f'M b" O'hy 4re'op 1 opfat,y , heaver, hse. foyit circah sad be in M at (easi 0ntL pr- i$ n n %s civring OdNq &

c S

CALVERT CLIFFS - Uti!T 1 "

- "r--  %-IFF; - UH F 2 - 3/4 3-?a Amandmant Mn

)