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{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORNPORMAT IONDISTRIBUTION STEM(RIBS)ACCESSION NBR:8102250210.
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORNPORMAT ION DISTRIBUTION STEM (RIBS)ACCESSION NBR:8102250210.
DOC~DATE:81/01/26NOTARIZED:
DOC~DATE: 81/01/26 NOTARIZED:
NOFACIL:50389St9LuciePlantEUnit2EFloridaPower8LightCo~AUTH~NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION UHRIGPR~E~FloridaPowerLLightCo,RECIP.NAB, RECIPIENT AFFILIATION 0REILLYiJ~P~Region2PAtlanta,OfficeoftheDirector
NO FACIL:50 389 St 9 Lucie PlantE Uni t 2E Florida Power 8 Light Co~AUTH~NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION UHRIGPR~E~Florida Power L Light Co, RECIP.NAB, RECIPIENT AFFILIATION 0 REILLYi J~P~Region 2P Atlanta, Of f ice of the Director


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
Finaldeficiency reptrepotentially reportable designdeficiency invalvesmfgbyTargetRockCorpiinitially reported801120~TargetRockhasmodifiedvalvedesigntoeliminate flowinducedvibration
Final deficiency rept re potentially reportable design deficiency in valves mfg by Target Rock Corpiinitially reported 801120~Target Rock has modified valve design to eliminate flow induced vibration~DISTRIBUTION CODE: B019S COPIES RECEIYED:LTR
~DISTRIBUTION CODE:B019SCOPIESRECEIYED:LTR
~ENCL SIZE: TITLE: Construction Deficiency Report (iOCFR50.55E)
~ENCLSIZE:TITLE:Construction Deficiency Report(iOCFR50.55E)
NOTES: DOCKET 05000389 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME ACTION: A/D LICENSNG 00 RUSHBROOKPM
NOTES:DOCKET05000389RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME ACTION:A/DLICENSNG00RUSHBROOKPM
~06 INTERNAL: AD/RCI/I E 17 D/DIR HUM FAC15 EDO L STAFF 19 HYD/GEO BR 22 LIC QUAL BR 12 NRC PDR 02 PROC T T REV 13 e.~FIL 01 21 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME YOUNGBLOODgB 05 NERSESEV~07 ASLBP/J~HARD DIRE DIV OF LIC EQUIP QUAL BR11 I8E 09 MPA 20 OELD 21 QA BR 10 RUTHERFORD,lf, IE COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL: ACRS NSIC 16 08 16 16 1 1 LPDR 03 1 1 pF8 36)99fl TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 39 ENCL 39 0 H
~06INTERNAL:
.O.BOX 529100, MIAMI, FL 33152 FLORIDA POWER I(LIGHT COMPANY January 26, 1981 L-81-25 Mr.James P.O'Reilly, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
AD/RCI/IE17D/DIRHUMFAC15EDOLSTAFF19HYD/GEOBR22LICQUALBR12NRCPDR02PROCTTREV13e.~FIL0121COPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME YOUNGBLOODgB 05NERSESEV~07ASLBP/J~HARDDIREDIVOFLICEQUIPQUALBR11I8E09MPA20OELD21QABR10RUTHERFORD,lf, IECOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111'1111111111EXTERNAL:
ACRSNSIC1608161611LPDR0311pF836)99flTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR39ENCL39 0H
.O.BOX529100,MIAMI,FL33152FLORIDAPOWERI(LIGHTCOMPANYJanuary26,1981L-81-25Mr.JamesP.O'Reilly,
: Director, RegionIIOfficeofInspection andEnforcement U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission 101MariettaStreet,Suite3100Atlanta,Georgia30303


==DearMr.O'Reilly:==
==Dear Mr.O'Reilly:==
 
Re: St.Lucie Unit 2 Docket No.50-389 Low Pressure Safety Injection System Valves Target Rock Valves-Design Deficiency 50.55 e On November-24, 1980-, Florida Power 8t Light Company (FPL)notified the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II of a potentially reportable design deficiency in several valves manufactured by the Target Rock Corporation.
Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389LowPressureSafetyInjection SystemValvesTargetRockValves-DesignDeficiency 50.55eOnNovember-24,1980-,FloridaPower8tLightCompany(FPL)notifiedtheOfficeofInspection andEnforcement, RegionIIofapotentially reportable designdeficiency inseveralvalvesmanufactured bytheTargetRockCorporation.
On December 23, 1980 (L-80-414),.
OnDecember23,1980(L-80-414),.
FPL submitted an interim response which stated that the subject deficiency was being evaluated and that a final report would be submitted by January 24, 1981.FPL has completed its evaluation, and a final report is attached for your review.Very truly yours, Robert E.Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems 8 Technology REU/TCG/ah Attachment, cc: Harold F.Reis,, Esquire,(w/o attachment)
FPLsubmitted aninterimresponsewhichstatedthatthesubjectdeficiency wasbeingevaluated andthatafinalreportwouldbesubmitted byJanuary24,1981.FPLhascompleted itsevaluation, andafinalreportisattachedforyourreview.Verytrulyyours,RobertE.UhrigVicePresident AdvancedSystems8Technology REU/TCG/ah Attachment, cc:HaroldF.Reis,,Esquire,(w/o attachment)
Director.of Inspection and Enforcement.
Director.
U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 (w/attachment) pot'f gi(~>So B,l>PEOPLE...SERVING PEOPLE h~"4~s IC', y~
ofInspection andEnforcement.
Final Design Deficiency Report Target Rock Valves~Summa r A design deficiency was identified in valves manufactured by Target Rock Corporation and furnished by Combustion Engineering.
U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555(w/attachment) pot'fgi(~>SoB,l>PEOPLE...
Due to the design deficiency the valves, when operated under design conditions, would be prone to failure.The failure.would consist of the disc separating from the stem, cracks in the valve seat and backseat, and scoring of the disc below the seating surface.In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e), the above deficiency is considered reportable.
SERVINGPEOPLE h~"4~sIC',y~
By telephone FPL notified the NRC on November 24, 1980, and an interim report was submitted on December 23, 1980 (FPL Letter L-80-414).
FinalDesignDeficiency ReportTargetRockValves~SummarAdesigndeficiency wasidentified invalvesmanufactured byTargetRockCorporation andfurnished byCombustion Engineering.
This final report is submitted to advise the NRC of the descrip-tion of the deficiency and the corrective actions that will be taken.Descri tion Our NSSS vendor (Combustion Engineering) and Mr.C.R.McFarland (NRC)informed FPL that a.design deficiency had been identified in Target Rock valves (8" motor-operated globe valve)at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS)and had been reported by Southern California Edison to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.55(e).An investigation concluded that St.Lucie Unit 2, globe valves HCV 3615, HCV 3625, HCV 3635, HCV 3645, V 3536, V 3539, V 3550, and V 3551 perform the same flow throttling service as the valves in the SONGS unit and are similar in design to the SONGS valves that failed, except that the,St..Lucie valves are 6" (HCV 3615, HCV 3625, HCV 3635, HCV 3645), 4" (V 3536, V 3539)and'"'V 3550, V 3551)in size.The valve failure.at, SONGS has been attributed to excess flow induced vibration while the valve disc was in a partially open position.Cracks in the valve seat and backseat weld.a'nd scoring of the valve disc below.the seating surface would result from impact of the vibrating disc on the seat.Corrective Action Target Rock Corporation has modified their valve design to eliminate flow induced vibration by providing a disc which is guided by the seat in the partially opened position., All affected 6", 4", and 3" valves cited above will be returned to the valve manufacturer for inspection, rework, modifica-tion and testing;Safet Im lication This deficiency could have adversely affected the safety of operations at the.plant during its 40 year life if it were to have remained uncorrected.
Duetothedesigndeficiency thevalves,whenoperatedunderdesignconditions, wouldbepronetofailure.Thefailure.wouldconsistofthediscseparating fromthestem,cracksinthevalveseatandbackseat, andscoringofthediscbelowtheseatingsurface.Inaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.55(e),
It represented a significant deviation from performance specifications which required repairs to establish the adequacy of the component to perform its intended safety function.The affected val,ves are part of the Safety Injection System whose safety related function is to-insure that adequate flow is delivered to the Reactor Coolant System, thus insuring adequate core cooling.Without the assurance of valve component integrity when subjected to the design basis service conditions, safety of plant operations could be jeopardized.
theabovedeficiency isconsidered reportable.
V.Conclusion Corrective action as indicated in Section III of this report will be under-, taken by the, vendor to assure.that the valves are able to perform their intended safety function.
Bytelephone FPLnotifiedtheNRConNovember24,1980,andaninterimreportwassubmitted onDecember23,1980(FPLLetterL-80-414).
Thisfinalreportissubmitted toadvisetheNRCofthedescrip-tionofthedeficiency andthecorrective actionsthatwillbetaken.DescritionOurNSSSvendor(Combustion Engineering) andMr.C.R.McFarland (NRC)informedFPLthata.designdeficiency hadbeenidentified inTargetRockvalves(8"motor-operatedglobevalve)attheSanOnofreNuclearGenerating Station(SONGS)andhadbeenreportedbySouthernCalifornia EdisontotheNRCunder10CFR50.55(e).
Aninvestigation concluded thatSt.LucieUnit2,globevalvesHCV3615,HCV3625,HCV3635,HCV3645,V3536,V3539,V3550,andV3551performthesameflowthrottling serviceasthevalvesintheSONGSunitandaresimilarindesigntotheSONGSvalvesthatfailed,exceptthatthe,St..Lucievalvesare6"(HCV3615,HCV3625,HCV3635,HCV3645),4"(V3536,V3539)and'"'V3550,V3551)insize.Thevalvefailure.at,SONGShasbeenattributed toexcessflowinducedvibration whilethevalvediscwasinapartially openposition.
Cracksinthevalveseatandbackseatweld.a'ndscoringofthevalvediscbelow.theseatingsurfacewouldresultfromimpactofthevibrating discontheseat.Corrective ActionTargetRockCorporation hasmodifiedtheirvalvedesigntoeliminate flowinducedvibration byproviding adiscwhichisguidedbytheseatinthepartially openedposition.,
Allaffected6",4",and3"valvescitedabovewillbereturnedtothevalvemanufacturer forinspection, rework,modifica-tionandtesting;SafetImlicationThisdeficiency couldhaveadversely affectedthesafetyofoperations atthe.plantduringits40yearlifeifitweretohaveremaineduncorrected.
Itrepresented asignificant deviation fromperformance specifications whichrequiredrepairstoestablish theadequacyofthecomponent toperformits intendedsafetyfunction.
Theaffectedval,vesarepartoftheSafetyInjection Systemwhosesafetyrelatedfunctionisto-insurethatadequateflowisdelivered totheReactorCoolantSystem,thusinsuringadequatecorecooling.Withouttheassurance ofvalvecomponent integrity whensubjected tothedesignbasisserviceconditions, safetyofplantoperations couldbejeopardized.
V.Conclusion Corrective actionasindicated inSectionIIIofthisreportwillbeunder-,takenbythe,vendortoassure.thatthevalvesareabletoperformtheirintendedsafetyfunction.
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Revision as of 18:15, 7 July 2018

Final Deficiency Rept Re Potentially Reportable Design Deficiency in Valves Mfg by Target Rock Corp,Initially Reported 801124.Target Rock Has Modified Valve Design to Eliminate Flow Induced Vibration
ML17209A657
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie 
Issue date: 01/26/1981
From: UHRIG R E
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: OREILLY J P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, L-81-25, NUDOCS 8102250210
Download: ML17209A657 (7)


Text

REGULATORNPORMAT ION DISTRIBUTION STEM (RIBS)ACCESSION NBR:8102250210.

DOC~DATE: 81/01/26 NOTARIZED:

NO FACIL:50 389 St 9 Lucie PlantE Uni t 2E Florida Power 8 Light Co~AUTH~NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION UHRIGPR~E~Florida Power L Light Co, RECIP.NAB, RECIPIENT AFFILIATION 0 REILLYi J~P~Region 2P Atlanta, Of f ice of the Director

SUBJECT:

Final deficiency rept re potentially reportable design deficiency in valves mfg by Target Rock Corpiinitially reported 801120~Target Rock has modified valve design to eliminate flow induced vibration~DISTRIBUTION CODE: B019S COPIES RECEIYED:LTR

~ENCL SIZE: TITLE: Construction Deficiency Report (iOCFR50.55E)

NOTES: DOCKET 05000389 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME ACTION: A/D LICENSNG 00 RUSHBROOKPM

~06 INTERNAL: AD/RCI/I E 17 D/DIR HUM FAC15 EDO L STAFF 19 HYD/GEO BR 22 LIC QUAL BR 12 NRC PDR 02 PROC T T REV 13 e.~FIL 01 21 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME YOUNGBLOODgB 05 NERSESEV~07 ASLBP/J~HARD DIRE DIV OF LIC EQUIP QUAL BR11 I8E 09 MPA 20 OELD 21 QA BR 10 RUTHERFORD,lf, IE COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL: ACRS NSIC 16 08 16 16 1 1 LPDR 03 1 1 pF8 36)99fl TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 39 ENCL 39 0 H

.O.BOX 529100, MIAMI, FL 33152 FLORIDA POWER I(LIGHT COMPANY January 26, 1981 L-81-25 Mr.James P.O'Reilly, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr.O'Reilly:

Re: St.Lucie Unit 2 Docket No.50-389 Low Pressure Safety Injection System Valves Target Rock Valves-Design Deficiency 50.55 e On November-24, 1980-, Florida Power 8t Light Company (FPL)notified the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II of a potentially reportable design deficiency in several valves manufactured by the Target Rock Corporation.

On December 23, 1980 (L-80-414),.

FPL submitted an interim response which stated that the subject deficiency was being evaluated and that a final report would be submitted by January 24, 1981.FPL has completed its evaluation, and a final report is attached for your review.Very truly yours, Robert E.Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems 8 Technology REU/TCG/ah Attachment, cc: Harold F.Reis,, Esquire,(w/o attachment)

Director.of Inspection and Enforcement.

U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 (w/attachment) pot'f gi(~>So B,l>PEOPLE...SERVING PEOPLE h~"4~s IC', y~

Final Design Deficiency Report Target Rock Valves~Summa r A design deficiency was identified in valves manufactured by Target Rock Corporation and furnished by Combustion Engineering.

Due to the design deficiency the valves, when operated under design conditions, would be prone to failure.The failure.would consist of the disc separating from the stem, cracks in the valve seat and backseat, and scoring of the disc below the seating surface.In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e), the above deficiency is considered reportable.

By telephone FPL notified the NRC on November 24, 1980, and an interim report was submitted on December 23, 1980 (FPL Letter L-80-414).

This final report is submitted to advise the NRC of the descrip-tion of the deficiency and the corrective actions that will be taken.Descri tion Our NSSS vendor (Combustion Engineering) and Mr.C.R.McFarland (NRC)informed FPL that a.design deficiency had been identified in Target Rock valves (8" motor-operated globe valve)at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS)and had been reported by Southern California Edison to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.55(e).An investigation concluded that St.Lucie Unit 2, globe valves HCV 3615, HCV 3625, HCV 3635, HCV 3645, V 3536, V 3539, V 3550, and V 3551 perform the same flow throttling service as the valves in the SONGS unit and are similar in design to the SONGS valves that failed, except that the,St..Lucie valves are 6" (HCV 3615, HCV 3625, HCV 3635, HCV 3645), 4" (V 3536, V 3539)and'"'V 3550, V 3551)in size.The valve failure.at, SONGS has been attributed to excess flow induced vibration while the valve disc was in a partially open position.Cracks in the valve seat and backseat weld.a'nd scoring of the valve disc below.the seating surface would result from impact of the vibrating disc on the seat.Corrective Action Target Rock Corporation has modified their valve design to eliminate flow induced vibration by providing a disc which is guided by the seat in the partially opened position., All affected 6", 4", and 3" valves cited above will be returned to the valve manufacturer for inspection, rework, modifica-tion and testing;Safet Im lication This deficiency could have adversely affected the safety of operations at the.plant during its 40 year life if it were to have remained uncorrected.

It represented a significant deviation from performance specifications which required repairs to establish the adequacy of the component to perform its intended safety function.The affected val,ves are part of the Safety Injection System whose safety related function is to-insure that adequate flow is delivered to the Reactor Coolant System, thus insuring adequate core cooling.Without the assurance of valve component integrity when subjected to the design basis service conditions, safety of plant operations could be jeopardized.

V.Conclusion Corrective action as indicated in Section III of this report will be under-, taken by the, vendor to assure.that the valves are able to perform their intended safety function.

t~r